Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Update: February 2004)

1. Purpose Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (Update: February 2004) One of the Secretariat s key objectives according to the 2001-2005 Medium Term Strategy (GOV/1999/69) is to contribute towards the putting into place of an integrated safeguards system by working actively towards the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols. The Secretariat aims to achieve the conclusion of many of the outstanding safeguards agreements and additional protocols for a majority of States and almost all States with nuclear facilities. The aim of this Plan of Action is to focus the Secretariat s efforts towards the attainment of those objectives and to provide a strategy for the Secretariat s outreach activities. It is an internal Secretariat document that serves as a blueprint for cooperation within the Secretariat to favour wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system. It is not a document of Member States, though it bears out some of the objectives expressed by the General Conference, the Board of Governors, the NPT State Parties and the General Assembly (see below). 2. Background When the Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements Between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)) in May 1997, it tasked the Director General with negotiating such protocols with all States. Further impetus to this mandate was given by the States Party to the NPT in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which recommended: that the Director General of the IAEA and the IAEA Member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements. In the same year, the General Conference adopted Resolution GC(44)/RES/19 on Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Additional Protocol, which recommended: 1

that the Director General, the Board of Governors and Member States consider implementing the following elements of a plan of action, as appropriate and subject to available resources, so that safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols can be brought in to force, and review progress in this regard: (i) Intensified efforts by the Director General to conclude safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, especially with those States having substantial nuclear activities under their jurisdiction, (ii) Increased bilateral and regional consultations among Member States at both technical and political levels, with a view to promoting the domestic process to conclude safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, (iii) Assistance by the IAEA and Member States to other States by providing their knowledge and technical expertise necessary to conclude and implement safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, (iv) Reinforced co-ordination between Member States and the IAEA Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, (v) Consideration by Member States, subject to progress made under (i) to (iv) above, of further steps to promote the safeguards agreements and Protocols, including, inter alia, an appropriate international meeting. The United Nations General Assembly, in Resolution A/55/33R: welcomes the adoption by the IAEA General Conference of resolution GC(44)/RES/19, which contains elements of a plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution. In 2003, in GC(47)/RES/11, the General Conference: Notes the commendable efforts of some Member States, notably Japan, and the IAEA Secretariat in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and in the Agency s updated plan of action (April 2003), and encourages them to continue these efforts, as appropriate and subject to the availability of resources, and review the progress in this regard, and recommends that the other Member States consider implementing elements of that plan of action, as appropriate, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols 2

Secretariat s Plan of Action, 1998-2003 Already in 1998, following the approval of the Model Additional Protocol, the Secretariat developed a strategy according to which its outreach efforts focused on four categories of States: States which have already concluded a safeguards agreement; States which, in the Secretariat s assessment, are the most likely to conclude an AP; States with significant nuclear programmes and activities; and States in areas of tension. In 2001, taking into account the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and GC(44)/RES/19, the Secretariat developed a more formalized Plan of Action and possible schedule of associated activities. It aimed at substantiating some of the elements proposed in GC(44)/RES/19 (see Annex II). The plan specified enabling activities that could be carried out through Secretariat initiatives, State initiatives, and co-operative initiatives between the Secretariat and States. It differentiated between two types of target countries, i.e., States with safeguarded nuclear material or facilities (Type 1); and States with little or no nuclear activities (Type 2). The latter category roughly corresponds to States qualifying for a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP). 3. Current Activities Since the development of the 2001 Plan of Action, the Agency has redoubled its outreach efforts. This was greatly helped through extrabudgetary contributions by Japan and the United States. Moreover, there have been several requests for Technical Co-operation Projects on legislative assistance for peaceful use of nuclear energy, which includes safeguards-related legislation, as well as safety and security, and several related projects are included in the Technical Co-operation Programme. In addition to its traditional efforts centred on correspondence and consultations, the Secretariat by use of the above-mentioned funding sources - has organized a series of regional, sub-regional and national seminars to help States better understand and prepare for the implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. While the purpose of those Seminars is to promote wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system, the focus depends on the group of States attending. Thus, in Johannesburg, South Africa, where the Seminar was attended by a large number of States without any safeguards agreement, the basic features of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocol were explained, whereas the Seminar in Poiana Braşov, Romania, where almost all participating countries had comprehensive safeguards agreements and half also had additional protocols in force, focused more on States experience implementing strengthened 3

safeguards. The Seminars were carried out with the active support of the host countries and oftentimes in collaboration with the United Nations and other partners. Table 1: Regional Outreach Seminars Seminar Partners Participants/Observers Minsk, November 2000 Approx. 15 participants from 5 of the Newly Independent States Tokyo, June 2001 IAEA (Japanese Seminar co-sponsored Approximately 20 participants from 16 Asian States Lima, December 2001 Tallinn, January 2002 Almaty, January 2002 Johannesburg, June 2002 Poiana Braşov, February 2003 Kuala Lumpur, March/April 2003 Tashkent, June 2003 Vienna, November 2003 by the Agency) OPANAL, UN Regl. Centre for Peace and Disarmament Sweden (cosponsored) UN Regl. Centre for Peace and Disarmament, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) ASEAN Secretariat, UN Reg. Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia Pacific 49 participants from 22 out of the 33 States of Latin America and the Caribbean, observers from Japan and the US 21 participants from 3 countries of the Baltic Region and observers from Kazakhstan (focus on legislation) 23 participants from 4 Central Asian and 3 South Caucasus Republics, observers from China, Japan and the US 75 participants from 35 of the 53 African countries, including 10 non-member States; observers from the European Union and Japan 42 participants from 13 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, observers from Cyprus, Finland, Malta and the US 41 participants from 9 ASEAN States and observers from Australia, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and the US 21 participants from 7 States of Central Asia and South Caucasus, Observers from China, Japan and US 32 participants from 16 States in five regions, mostly with no safeguards agreements in force 4

Other efforts of the Secretariat include the following features: National Seminars on the additional protocol; such seminars were held so far in Astana, Bangkok, Bogotá, Hanoi, Kiev, Kuala Lumpur, Mexico City and Port-au- Prince. Consultations with State delegations in Vienna to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In 2003, such formal consultations were held with 4 States. In 2003, seven national, regional and international training events for State Systems of Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) were conducted to assist Member State personnel in fulfilling their obligations under safeguards agreements and additional protocols. This included interregional and regional SSAC training courses in the USA, Japan and South Africa; a workshop on familiarization with Agency safeguards held in the Russian Federation; a workshop on Agency safeguards activities at bulk facilities in Kazakhstan; a national training course on the Additional Protocol in Chile; and a workshop on nuclear material accounting held in Vienna for Iranian participants. High-level dialogue: Adherence to Strengthened Safeguards is a priority for the Director General in his dialogue with representatives of Member States; several safeguards agreements and additional protocols have been signed in connection with official visits by the Director General. Outreach publications; in 2002, the Agency published a booklet specifically targeting policy-makers, providing the rationale for concluding safeguards agreements and additional protocols and outlining the steps involved in bringing those instruments into force. The booklet is widely used in outreach efforts and was made available on the Agency s web pages. Outreach to civil society: in February 2003 and again in February 2004, the Secretariat organised an awareness seminar on verification and nuclear security for NGOs, academic institutions and media. Outreach to the General Public: a fact sheet on the safeguards system was issued on the web for public information purposes. The verification facts on the Agency s web site have been re-designed to provide accessible information in 2002. 5

In-house co-ordination The Office of External Relations and Policy Co-ordination (EXPO) co-ordinates the Secretariat s outreach efforts. Each IAEA Department, as well as the Office of the Director General and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) has appointed a focal point to help implement the Secretariat s objectives in this regard. In particular EXPO, OLA and the Department of Safeguards (SG) work closely together, and the Department of Technical Co-operation (TC) likewise plays a crucial role. EXPO chairs an interdepartmental group of focal points on the promotion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which meets regularly to discuss the implementation and further development of the Plan of Action. Each outreach seminar is a co-operative undertaking by EXPO, OLA and SG, with administrative backstopping by the Training Section of SG s Division of Technical Support and/or by the Division of Conference and Document Services. TC supported Agency-wide outreach efforts in particular in connection with the Johannesburg and Lima seminars. Country officers of TC Department receive training, as appropriate, by SG and EXPO, to understand better the strengthened safeguards system and to support, as appropriate, regional outreach efforts. The Agency s offices in New York and Geneva participate in the Secretariat s efforts; in particular with regard to States without Missions in Vienna. In 2001, the New York Office wrote to all African States without any safeguards agreements with the Agency. In 2003, the NY Office approached Members of the UN Security Council that did not have any safeguards agreements in force. TC regularly arranges for Member State representatives undergoing fellowship training or scientific visits in Vienna to meet with EXPO, OLA and SG to discuss, inter alia, adherence to and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Co-ordination with States In accordance with the fourth element of the Action Plan proposed in GC/(44)/RES/19, which calls for Reinforced co-ordination between Member States and the IAEA Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, the Secretariat takes steps, as appropriate, to ensure that its efforts and those of proponent States are aligned. A number of States are actively involved in efforts to promote wider adherence to the additional protocol. The most vocal proponent is Japan, which was also the first country with a major nuclear cycle to bring into force an additional protocol. Other active advocates 6

include Australia, Burkina Faso, the European Union, France, Indonesia, Peru, Romania, South Africa, Sweden and the United States. The Agency co-sponsored an international conference, held in Tokyo in December 2002 by the Government of Japan, attended by 82 participants representing 36 States. The Conference, which aimed at facilitating and coordinating international efforts towards wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system, underlined the Agency s role in facilitating the co-ordination of multilateral and bilateral assistance and co-operation and sharing of related information. A number of States offered to lend their assistance in accordance with element (iii) of the proposed Action Plan contained in GC/(44)/RES/19. (see annex III.) The Secretariat supports the co-ordination of efforts among Member States, and has on several occasions provided venues for meeting in the margin of IAEA meetings in Vienna. Subsequently to the December 2002 meeting, a group of likeminded States was set up, which meets regularly on the level of IAEA Missions in Vienna, chaired by the Permanent Representative of Japan to the Agency. At the request of the Chairman, Agency staff have attended those meetings. Several States have shared the results of bilateral demarches to encourage wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system, and timed such demarches to support regional efforts of the Secretariat. The Secretariat has acted as a mailbox and co-ordinator of such efforts. The Secretariat responded to requests by Romania and South Africa to host regional seminars on the additional protocol in their countries, and co-sponsored the June 2001 regional Seminar held in Tokyo by Japan. At the request of the Committee Chairs, the Secretariat made presentations at the 2002 and 2003 sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and briefings were made in connection with a regional conference in Wellington organised by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. In the Latin America Section, consultations on safeguards agreements, additional protocols and other legal instruments in the nuclear field have been discussed in the margins of ARCAL and other regional meetings. At the Johannesburg regional outreach seminar, AFRA s field committee organized a co-ordination meeting in the margins, and the AFRA President lectured at the Seminar about the role foreseen for AFRA in the Pelindaba Treaty. Several TC country and regional projects help States prepare for the implementation of strengthened safeguards. 7

4. Results to date The Secretariat s efforts have helped bring about a steady increase in the number of States that have concluded the necessary instruments for implementation of strengthened safeguards. By the end of 2003, there has been some success towards the fulfilment of the Secretariat s objectives in this regard. However, with only 38 States having brought additional protocols into force, and with 20 States with safeguards significant nuclear activities that have not signed additional protocols and 45 States still having outstanding NPT safeguards agreements, a great deal remains to be done. The figures below illustrate the progress in recent years with regard to the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Specifically, by the end of 2003: 12 NPT Parties have brought into force outstanding safeguards agreements since the end of 1998. (20% of those outstanding at the end of 1998) (MTR Objective: Many) 79 out of 192 States (41%) have signed additional protocols (MTR Objective: Half). (N.B. Only 38 States have AP in force, though EU 15 are expected soon) 50 out of 70 States with safeguards significant nuclear activities (71%) have signed additional protocols. (MTR Objective: Almost all) 8

Outstanding safeguards agreements Conclusion of Outstanding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, 1998-2003 (yearly) 6 5 Number of States 4 3 2 1 Entered into force Signed BoG Approved 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Conclusion of Outstanding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, 1998-2003 (cumulative) (States yet to conclude Agreements Pursuant to the NPT) 60 50 40 30 20 10 1 11 44 2 3 2 11 13 14 41 38 36 2 13 33 2 14 29 Approved only Signed Neither approved nor signed 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 9

Additional Protocols Conclusion of Additional Protocols, 1998-2003 (yearly) Number of States 40 30 20 10 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Entered into force Signed BoG Approved Conclusion of Additional Protocols, 1998-2003 (cumulative) 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 4 7 0 41 4 1 39 37 2 35 37 30 38 24 28 18 5 8 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Approved only Signed In force 10

5. Categories of States In the 2001 Plan of Action, the Secretariat made the rough distinction between States with safeguarded nuclear material and facilities and SQP States, and concluded that SQP States needed different approaches, including more inter-departmental cooperation. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, additional protocols have been concluded with two thirds of the States with safeguarded nuclear material or facilities (though 29 of those States, including the 15 EU States, still need to bring their signed APs into force). This means that more attention must now also be paid to the universal application of the additional protocol among SQP States, many of which are not Member States of the Agency. The dimension of Member States versus non-member States needs to be brought into the Action Plan since the Secretariat s ability to approach non-members is limited, and will in many instances require co-ordination with facilitator States. What we are left with are the following categories: Table 2: Categories of States Member State Safeguardssignificant nuclear activities Other States / SQP States Group I: 70 States 23 with AP in force 28 signed/to sign AP 1 with NPT CSA outstanding Group II 67 States 15 with AP in force 10 signed/to sign AP 20 with NPT CSA outstanding Non-Member States DPRK Group III 54 States 0 with AP in force 3 signed/to sign AP 23 with NPT CSA outstanding 6. Lessons learned Based on its outreach experience, not least the regional seminars, the Secretariat has gained a better understanding for the obstacles facing States wishing to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols. These can roughly be divided into four categories: 1. Policy Factors include a low priority given to nuclear non-proliferation compared to other national priorities, insufficient awareness of the role of strengthened safeguards for nuclear non-proliferation and international security, expectations of reciprocal economic and/or security-related benefits and unwillingness to submit to an intrusive verification regime or to accept certain provisions of the AP. 11

2. Legislative factors include insufficient understanding of legal requirements and the need for legislative assistance, existing national legislation that contradicts provisions of the additional protocol (e.g. confidentiality provisions) or a lack of legal authority to collect and share information for declarations, for instance, export/import monitoring. 3. Administrative factors include a lack of working relationship between nuclear authorities and Government Ministries involved in the conclusion of international agreements (Foreign/Legal Affairs), a lack of communication channels between nuclear authorities and mining companies and research facilities for declaration purposes and a reluctance among policy-makers and law-makers to attend to matters perceived as overly complex and technical. 4. Technical factors involve insufficient understanding of requirements to make declarations and the need for technical assistance, the lack of technical infrastructures to implement the AP and absence of a functioning SSAC. In terms of the categories of states identified above, the typical obstacles facing the different categories of States would be as follows: Table 3: obstacles to concluding legal instruments Member State Safeguards- Group I significant Lacking legislative and technical nuclear infrastructure for making activities declarations (notably for export monitoring) Inconsistencies with existing legal provisions;expectations of something in return for concluding legal Other States / SQP States instruments (tit-for-tat) Group II Technical counterparts lack of access to Ministries Lack of understanding for the role of strengthened safeguards Low priority given to nuclear nonproliferation Insufficient understanding of legal requirements Non-Member States DPRK Group III Lack of awareness of the policy function of the Agency in general and strengthened safeguards in particular 12

7. Future Efforts As mentioned above, more than 70% of all States with safeguards significant nuclear activities have concluded additional protocols. While concluding APs with such States - especially those with proliferation sensitive nuclear facilities - remains a matter of highest priority, outreach efforts also need to focus on SQP States. Table 2 introduced three groups of countries for outreach purposes. Table 4 below summarizes the focus that such efforts should now take, for each of those groups. In general terms, the following applies: Group I: All the remaining States with significant nuclear activities have given consideration to concluding an Additional Protocol, though some of the States are not yet ready to conclude one, due to the policy, legal, adnimistrative and technical factors identified above. The Secretariat needs to address the concerns of those States individually, and to make every effort to encourage all these States to soon bring into force additional protocols. Group II: Focusing more on SQP Member States will require a concerted effort within the Secretariat. Such States generally have well-developed relations with TC and/or the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security (NS) but little or no experience of safeguards implementation. Group III: Most non-member States have safeguards agreements in force, but none (with the exception of the DPRK) has safeguarded nuclear material or facilities. Some States in this group will occasionally come into contact with representatives NS, the Department of Nuclear Applications (NA) and even TC in connection with regional training. However, outreach will also require coordination with Facilitator States. States like Australia and France have played such a role in the past. It is important to continue to include non-member States in regional Seminars, country visits etc. Table 4: focus of future outreach efforts Member State Safeguards- Group I significant nuclear activities Individualized consultations National seminars Detachment of safeguards inspectors on mission to help prepare for AP implementation SSAC training Focus on facilitating entry into force of signed agreements. Non-Member States DPRK 13

Other States/SQP States Group II Outreach visits to provide advice on policy, legislative and technical aspects of strengthened safeguards; this includes making use of scheduled visits by the DG, and by TC, NS and others in the house. Use of good offices to help technical counterparts gain access to relevant Government Ministries Consultations with officials in Vienna Regional seminars; briefings at international meetings; legislative and technical assistance; this could include piggybacking on TC and other meetings and, on demand, presentations to parliamentarians to facilitate ratification Group III Concerted efforts with Member States with close links to the State concerned Non-Member States to be invited to Agency Seminars subject to extrabudgetary resources Briefings involving non- Member States to be held in the margins of other regional / international meetings to minimize resource demands. Specific proposed actions by the Secretariat and other partners are summarized in annex I. This includes: An event on the additional protocol in connection with the third session of the Preparatory Committee, for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which will be held in New York during April-May 2004; Sub-regional seminars for Southern Africa, Western Africa, the Accession Countries to the EU and the Caribbean; An SSAC course on strengthened safeguards implementation for the Newly Independent States; A concerted effort with TC, NS and other parts of the house to identify scheduled country visits that could be used for outreach purposes; Updating of a booklet on safeguards agreements and additional protocols; A co-operative event with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and Contributions at events held by OPANAL and by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (headed by Dr. Hans Blix). 8. Resource Implications The Secretariat has so far been pursuing its expanded outreach efforts mainly through extrabudgetary contributions from Japan and the United States. Recently, Germany, France and Sweden have also offered to contribute to the Agency s efforts. Moreover, Australia, France and the United States have aligned their bilateral efforts with the Secretariat s outreach activities. Japan has taken upon itself to co-ordinate States efforts through meetings of like-minded States in Vienna etc. Staff costs (mainly EXPO, OLA, Safeguards and Conference Services) have been borne by the Agency 14

through the regular budget. The implementation of this Action Plan imposes a significant burden on the staff of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Section (VSPS), in the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, and on OLA, in terms of staff time and other Agency resources from the Division of Conference and Document Services. Given the expanding work load of VSPS regarding safeguards implementation and enhanced nuclear security issues, VSPS will look into further efficiencies as well as a greater focus on organizing more outreach and training events at the Agency s headquarters. The 2002-2003 IAEA Budget included a Core Activities Unfunded in the Regular Budget (CAURB) item (M.1.05) entitled Increased level of activities to promote and facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, under which many of the Secretariat s outreach activities were carried out. Under the 2004-2005 Programme and Budget, the activities are continuing under an item (N.2.12) entitled Negotiation and Promotion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Subsidiary Arrangements. 9. Lessons from elsewhere Lessons may be drawn from comparing the rate of entry into force of additional protocols to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Both entered into force soon before the additional protocol was approved (CWC in 1993 and CTBT in 1996). However, despite the fact that these are new treaties (as opposed to the AP which is an extension of States existing undertakings), the CWC has now more than 150 and the CTBT had 108 contracting parties at the end of 2003 (though the 44 ratifications required for entry into force are still distant), while there are less than 40 contracting parties to additional protocols. The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organisation has 4 dedicated staff members tasked actively to promote signature and ratification of the CTBT in regional and international meetings; to join forces, as appropriate, with other parts of the UN system; and to engage with States in capitals. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) offers States regular courses in The Hague and elsewhere on CWC implementation. Several States have campaigned actively for early CTBT and CWC signature and ratification. We assess that strategies such as these, clearly instrumental in the success of efforts to promote wider adherence to CTBT and the CWC, need to be borne in mind in the context of enhanced action on safeguards agreements and additional protocols, particularly in the context of resources. 15

10. Conclusions In general terms, it can be concluded that the Agency s outreach efforts, in particular regional seminars and bilateral consultations, have helped States initiate national inter-agency processes leading to the conclusion of NPT safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Clearly, this has been true for a number of Latin American and African States. The Secretariat has been most successful when a country-specific approach could be applied addressing the particular situation of a country. In this sense, the Secretariat s outreach efforts in recent years complemented by efforts by other States - have had some success in facilitating and speeding up the putting into place of an integrated safeguards system. The continued success of the Secretariat s Plan of Action will require that sufficient resources continue to be made available, that appropriate co-ordination within the Secretariat and between States and the Secretariat is maintained, and that strengthened safeguards continue to be a top priority for peaceful nuclear co-operation and in the wider context of international security, disarmament and non-proliferation. 16

A. Type of activities B. Proposed Action Annex I. Enhanced Plan of Action for Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols 1. Agency Activities 2. Proponent States Activities 3. Agency/State Activities Regular correspondence Preparation of draft agreements/protocols Presentations/speeches at international mtgs. Informal contact in margins of Agency mtgs Piggy-back on other Agency pgm activities Consultations during visits of officials to Agency, and within the framework of the DG s dialogue meetings Regional and national seminars SSAC training Country visits by EXPO and other staff Formal consultations upon request Development of guidelines and tools Encouragement to other States and regional organizations (eg NWFZ) to use good offices Pro-active support for early ratification Further sub-regional seminars, incl. Southern and Western Africa (SADC, ECOWAS) and the Caribbean States Interregional seminar(s) for States that have not attended any IAEA outreach seminars Briefings in the margins of international meetings, incl. the NPT review process and events of regional groupings such as the Central Asian 5 and the South Pacific Forum One-house co-operation within the Secretariat, in particular to reach SQP States Outreach to the technical and NGO communities and to Media and academia Continued technical and legislative assistance for AP implementation Press briefings and public information campaigns Printed how-to manuals, for easy understanding of AP requirements Inclusion of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols as priorities in bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferation Other individual State-to-State bilateral approaches High-level bilateral visits Coordinated group demarches (eg Friends of the AP, P-5, G-10, EU) to individual States Sharing of experience of AP preparation and implementation Push for general adherence to strengthened safeguards in groups, e.g. EU, NWFZ etc. State-to-State training programmes; e.g. Annex 2 item monitoring and legislative drafting Pro-active support for early ratification Bilateral and multi-country demarches to encourage States to adhere to the strengthened safeguards Sharing of experience with respect to the implementation of the additional protocols State-to-state assistance in legislative drafting State-to-state assistance related to the monitoring of Annex 2 items. Support for the secure financing of the strengthened safeguards system Extrabudgetary support for the Agency s outreach efforts Hosting of IAEA Regional Seminars IAEA co-sponsoring of States international meetings on the strengthened safeguards system Agency participation in international meetings on the strengthened safeguards system Co-operative training programmes Alignment of regional blitzes and rounds of demarches with Agency seminars Cooperation with or use of regional organizations Secure financing of the strengthened safeguards system Hosting of regional seminars Continued extrabudgetary support for the Agency s outreach efforts Requests for IAEA assistance to facilitate adherence to and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system Invitation to the Agency to make presentation to regional meetings. Co-ordination of outreach activities with other States and with the Agency; the Friends of the Additional Protocol group of Viennabased Missions can play an important role. 17

Annex II: Activities of the Secretariat in terms of elements contained in GC/(44)/RES/19 Elements of Action Plan Proposed in GC(44)/RES/19 (i) Intensified efforts by the Director General to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols, especially with those States having substantial nuclear activities under their jurisdiction (iii) Assistance by the IAEA and Member States to other States by providing their knowledge and technical expertise necessary to conclude and implement safeguards agreements and additional protocols (iv) Reinforced co-ordination between Member States and the IAEA Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols Secretariat Activities January 1998-February 2004 Regional, sub-regional and national seminars to promote understanding and conclusion of strengthened safeguards Publication of information on the value of the safeguards system and steps toward AP conclusion Presentations during the 2002 and 2003 Preparatory Committee sessions for the 2005 NPT Review Conference Regional, sub-regional and national seminars to promote understanding and conclusion of strengthened safeguards Technical Co-operation projects supporting SSAC infrastructures and legislative assistance for peaceful use of nuclear energy (several such projects are included in the 2003-04 TC Programme) Regional, sub-regional and national seminars to promote understanding and conclusion of strengthened safeguards Agency co-ordination and participation in June 2001 and December 2002 meetings on AP promotional efforts, both sponsored by Japan EXPO participation in meetings of likeminded States in Vienna on ways to promote the AP Efforts by the Secretariat and interested States to co-ordinate timing of bilateral demarches and Secretariat regional activities 18

Annex III: International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards Chairman s Summary (10 December, 2002) 1. A total of 82 participants representing 36 States met in Tokyo on 9 th -10 th December 2002 to consider ways and means to bring about wider adherence to strengthened IAEA Safeguards. 2. The participants stressed the necessity of strengthening the IAEA Safeguards system, which plays a vital role in underpinning the NPT (Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). This task is particularly urgent, in view of recent challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime e.g. verified compliance of Iraqi disarmament in terms of all weapons of mass destruction and reports of a concealed enrichment program in the DPRK. The participants reaffirmed the importance of universalising the NPT regime. 3. In this regard, the participants agreed that impartial and critical inspections are a cornerstone of the NPT regime and that the Agency should be given the authority to provide credible assurance to the international community not only about the diversion of the declared nuclear material but also the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. 4. They discussed ways and means of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system notably through universal adherence to additional protocols to safeguards agreements in the light of the IAEA Action Plan and the outcomes of a series of regional seminars held in the past two years. The outcome of IAEA regional seminars for Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia and South Caucasus, the Baltic Region and Africa provided valuable inputs to the discussions at the Conference. Appreciations were expressed to the Governments of Estonia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Peru, and South Africa which hosted the seminars, as well as support provided by Australia, France, Sweden, and the United States. 5. It was noted that certain progress has been made since the Tokyo seminar held in June 2001, with 12 additional States having signed protocols and 9 States having brought protocols into force. However, at the time of the Conference, there are still only 67 States that have signed an additional protocol, and merely 28 States in which the protocol has entered into force. Moreover, NPT safeguards agreements with 48 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT are still outstanding. The goal of universalization of 19

comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols is far from achieved. Intensified and concerted efforts are urgently required to make progress toward wider adherence to strengthened IAEA safeguards. 6. The participants shared the view that States should undertake in cooperation with the IAEA, collectively or individually, appropriate measures, specifically the following: a. In order to maintain the political momentum for strengthening the safeguards system, States concerned and the IAEA should co-operate closely in their outreach efforts, share information and continue to bring the issue to the forefront of international discourse. Specifically, the importance of strengthened safeguards should be raised in connection with the NPT review process, with a view to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties, as well as UN General Assembly and other international meetings dealing with disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation issues. A possibility of issuing a joint ministerial statement was suggested to raise political interest. b. The adherence by States to safeguards agreements that are further strengthened by additional protocols promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology and international collaboration in the field of nuclear activities. By fully implementing such agreements and protocols, States are able to further demonstrate transparency concerning their nuclear activities, which could lead to regional peace and stabilization, to the strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as to facilitating cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear application. States should consider deepening their contacts with other States and the IAEA to identify the area of cooperation and assistance toward this goal. The role of parliamentarians, the media and the civil society in general was emphasized in order to underline and disseminate the significance and benefits of strengthening IAEA safeguards system. c. States should also recognize the role of the IAEA safeguards system in protecting against nuclear terrorism. The establishment of effective State Systems for Accounting and Control (SSAC), and co-operation between such systems and other relevant players are key measures in this regard. d. In connection with efforts to strengthen SSACs, the IAEA should continue to play a significant role in facilitating the coordination of multilateral and bilateral assistance and cooperation, and sharing of related information among bilateral donors and the IAEA. 20

e. Bilateral and required collaboration should be promoted to the maximum extent possible, through the provision of necessary information and assistance by States that have already concluded an additional protocol to States that have not yet done so, in order to facilitate the universal conclusion of additional protocols. This applies in particular to these States that are not Members of the IAEA. In this connection, several representatives, notably Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, expressed their readiness to offer expertise to help overcome technical and other obstacles that States might encounter in preparing for the conclusion and implementation of an additional protocol. f. Regional and national seminars, workshops, briefings, and training courses to provide advice on policy, legal and technical aspects of strengthened IAEA safeguards continue to be useful mechanisms in order to promote wider adherence to strengthened safeguards. Due account should be taken of the different needs in this regard of States with nuclear material and facilities and those without, taking into account means available to meet these needs. g. A suggestion was made to form an informal Friends of the Additional Protocol with participation of interested countries, particularly those having hosted regional seminars to coordinate their national and regional efforts and maintain the momentum. 7. The December 2002 conference in Japan was seen as an excellent opportunity to review progress on the basis of the outcomes of a series of regional seminars and related efforts by States and the IAEA Secretariat. The participants were able to share information with each other on their experience with such activities and on their perception on relevant issues to be solved, and agreed on the importance of continuous co-operation in this regard. In that context, they stressed the significance of the Conference and hoped for the continuation of such efforts in order to achieve wider adherence to strengthened IAEA safeguards. 8. The participants expressed their hope that all States that had signed but not yet ratified additional protocols- notably, the remaining nuclear weapons States and EU member states redouble their efforts to finalize their national ratification procedures promptly in order to maintain political momentum. 9. The participants expressed their appreciation of the efforts by some States, notably Japan, in hosting and supporting a series of regional seminars to States that supported these activities as well as the Secretariat of the IAEA. 21