Manley Panel on Afghanistan: The Senlis Council s Analysis Ottawa, January 2008
Contents Introduction 3 Summary: The Manley Panel Report 4 1. New strategic direction for Canada in Afghanistan 6 2. Yes to P4M: Canada engages in counter-narcotics policy 7 3. Security in Afghanistan requires more troops 8 4. Aid and development: prioritising Afghan needs 9 Conclusion 11 www.senliscouncil.net 2
Introduction The Manley Panel s report includes an extensive list of essential policy changes which address the full spectrum of issues facing Canada s mission in Afghanistan: Canada should stay in Afghanistan until the job is done; more troops are needed from our NATO allies; Poppy for Medicine projects should be implemented as part of a coherent counter-narcotics policy; CIDA should be revamped; and the Kandahar hospital should be refurbished and renovated as a signature Canadian project. Although the Panel is not as clear on action items to deal with the Taliban and Al Qaeda bases in Pakistan as they could have been, their report does recognise the insurgent safe havens in Pakistan as a critical problem. The Senlis Council congratulates the Manley Panel on the extensive consultation process which led to this important report. To generate more public involvement and knowledge of the issues encapsulated in the Panel s report, the Harper government should organise a cross-canada tour of town hall meetings for the Manley panel, bringing Canadians into the ongoing conversation about Canada s mission in Afghanistan. In many cases what the Manley Panel report says applies to other NATO governments operating in Afghanistan, particularly the US and the UK. The leaders of these countries would do well to heed the words and recommendations of the Manley panel. What remains to be seen now is whether Prime Minister Harper and his government have the political will and competency to put the Manley panel s recommendations into action. Our presence in that distant land does matter. Honourable John Manley, PC Ottawa, January 2008 www.senliscouncil.net 3
Summary: The Manley Panel Report Canada gains a strategy: With its main conclusions echoing The Senlis Council s call for Canada to adopt a new overall strategic approach in Afghanistan, the implementation of the Manley Panel s recommendations can provide a much needed road map for Canada s future role in Afghanistan. As the Panel observed in its report, Canada s presence in Afghanistan does matter, and Canada must not abandon the country prematurely. Canada is in Afghanistan to counter the threat of terrorism, to ensure that Afghanistan does not again revert to the status of sanctuary and head office for global terrorism. It is now incumbent on the Harper Government to provide the political leadership necessary to make the recommendations reality. Fulfilling Canada s commitment in Afghanistan requires the political energy only a Prime Minister can impart. 1 No fixed withdrawal date. Achievement of measures of success defines withdrawal date: Canada should establish clear objectives and corresponding critical success factors for its humanitarian, stabilisation and reconstruction work in Afghanistan. The Manley Panel also stated that any withdrawal date should be dependent on the achievement of defined measures of success. Canada should stay until the job is done. To leave before would be a fickle abandonment of the country s most significant foreign policy endeavour, and a sad commentary on the value of the Canadian lives already sacrificed. 2 An abrupt departure of Canadian troops, without new ISAF forces to take their place, would trigger a security collapse in [Kandahar] province. 3 Recognition of current security realties: In its report, the Manley Panel recognised what the Canadian Government has consistently denied: the security situation in Afghanistan has seriously deteriorated in the South and East, including Kandahar province where Canadian Forces are based. The troubling lack of reliable benchmarks for measuring progress in improving security for the people must be 1 To ensure systematic and sustained political oversight and more effective implementation, a better integrated and more consistent Canadian policy approach should be led by the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and a single full-time task force involving all key departments and agencies. Independent Panel on Canada s Future Role in Afghanistan, Part IV: Canada s Future in Afghanistan: Considerations and Recommendations, p.34 2 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Peace in Afghanistan: Made in Canada, September 2007, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/peace_in_afghanistan 3 Independent Panel on Canada s Future Role in Afghanistan, Part IV: Canada s Future in Afghanistan: Considerations and Recommendations, p.30 www.senliscouncil.net 4
urgently addressed through a unified and coherent security strategy, which imposes verifiable criteria for gauging and analysing the course of that strategy. 4 Security generally has deteriorated in the South and East of Afghanistan, including Kandahar province where Canadian Forces are based. 5 Properly equip and support the military: The Manley panel emphasised the serious failure of strategic direction in security policy. Its report highlighted the too-frequent rotation of ISAF commanders and a lack of proper equipment as important issues that not only require immediate resolution, but which also indicate the serious need for a stronger, more cohesive strategic direction in Afghanistan, at the highest levels. 6 One source of ISAF inefficiencies, cited by senior NATO officers, is the too-frequent rotation of ISAF commanders. 7 Engage frankly with Canadians: The Canadian Government has consistently failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour about the reasons for Canadian involvement in Afghanistan, or about the risks, difficulties and expected results of that involvement. The Panel strongly recommends that this information deficit be redressed immediately in a strategy of open, continuous, and constructive engagement with Canadians. 8 While public support for Canadian troops is strong, Canadians have been uncertain about Canada s evolving mission in Afghanistan. 9 4 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Canada in Afghanistan: Charting a new course to complete the mission, May 2007. 5 Afghanistan, p.12 6 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the brink, November 2007, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/afghanistan_on_the_brink 7 Afghanistan, p.13 8 The Canadian Government s ongoing failures to provide clear and frank information regarding the transfer of Afghan detainees, even to the Manley Panel (Michael Valpy, Manley Panel not told of change to detainee policy, Globe and Mail, 25 January 2008) illustrates the urgency of this issue. For prior Senlis commentary on this, see Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Canada s Leadership to Break the Cycle of Violence in Southern Afghanistan, October 2006, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/hearts_and_minds 9 Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements, p.20 www.senliscouncil.net 5
1. New strategic direction for Canada in Afghanistan Canadian leadership within NATO: The Manley panel calls for Canada to engage heavily with other NATO leaders on Afghanistan - a plea for Canadian leadership within NATO - to create a new balance between military and humanitarian interventions within the stabilisation strategy for Afghanistan. The panel recommends Canada should prioritise the achievement of this new balance at the April NATO meeting in Bucharest. 10 The NATO summit meeting this April in Bucharest, where the elaboration of a comprehensive alliance strategy for Afghanistan is to be discussed, presents an opportunity for Canada to address these issues at the highest level. 11 Prime Minister Harper should use Kandahar sacrifices as leverage with NATO: The Canadian Prime Minister should prioritise focused diplomatic efforts with other NATO country leaders to increase overall NATO troop numbers and remove national caveats on other troops that prevent them from fighting in the south alongside Canadian troops. Canada should use its hard-earned influence to ensure the job gets done and gets done properly. 12 The objective of Canadian diplomatic effort should be to raise Canada s voice, commensurate with the Canadian contribution in Afghanistan, to establish a comprehensive political-military ISAF strategy; to press for improvements in NATO/ISAF force structure, command organization and operational effectiveness; and to advocate the deployment of more forces to Afghanistan by other NATO partners. 13 No action points on Pakistan: Despite its recognition that the insurgency has continued to benefit from easy resort to safe havens inside Pakistan, the Manley Panel s report failed to provide any strategic recommendations on addressing the pivotal Pakistan factor. NATO forces must be permitted to enter Pakistan alongside the Pakistan military to root out Taliban bases. The dramatic escalation in Taliban and Al-Qaeda activity would never have been possible without the establishment of 10 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Canada s Leadership to Break the Cycle of Violence in Southern Afghanistan, October 2006. 11 Independent Panel on Canada s Future Role in Afghanistan, Part IV: Canada s Future in Afghanistan: Considerations and Recommendations, p.34 12 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Peace in Afghanistan: Made in Canada, September 2007, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/peace_in_afghanistan 13 Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements, p.27 www.senliscouncil.net 6
extra-territorial sanctuaries. Without going across the border to deal with these safe havens, it will be impossible to stop the growth of the insurgency in Afghanistan. Pakistan s own political disarray magnifies the destabilizing threat of the insurgency both to Pakistan and Afghanistan. 14 Not enough support for President Karzai: Although the Manley panel reiterated President Karzai s calls for Canada to help facilitate the necessary reconciliation process with more moderate elements of the Taliban, it failed to provide an effective solution to increase diplomatic and popular support for the President. 15 Institutional capacity in the Afghan government is still very weak. 16 2. Yes to P4M: Canada should engage in a renovated counter-narcotics policy Endorsement of the Poppy for Medicine initiative: Confirming overwhelming Canadian popular support for Afghan Poppy for Medicine projects, 17 the Manley panel proposes The Senlis Council s Poppy for Medicine initiative as part of a coherent policy response to Afghanistan s illegal opium crisis. The Canadian government should green-light pilot Poppy for Medicine projects in Kandahar in the next planting season to promote vitally important economic relationships between the Karzai government and Kandahar s rural communities. 18 14 Afghanistan, p.12 15 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep, June 2006, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/kandahar_report; and Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Canada s Leadership to Break the Cycle of Violence in Southern Afghanistan, October 2006. 16 Afghanistan, p.16 17 In an Ipsos Reid poll conducted in late August 2007, 8 out of 10 Canadians supported Poppy for Medicine Projects in Afghanistan. See The Senlis Council, Eight in ten Canadians support Poppy for Medicine initiative in Afghanistan, 28 August 2007. 18 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep, June 2006; see also Losing Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Canada s Leadership to Break the Cycle of Violence in Southern Afghanistan, October 2006, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/hearts_and_minds; and Poppy for Medicine: a Technical Blueprint, June 2007, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/poppy_for_medicine www.senliscouncil.net 7
Counter-narcotics approaches must offer effective economic provisions... a poppy-for-medicine project might be worth pursuing. 19 Missed opportunity to oppose eradication: Given the dangers associated with the US-proposed chemical spraying campaign in Afghanistan, it is unfortunate that the Manley panel did not seize the opportunity to clearly condemn the failed US-led policy of forced poppy crop eradication. Forced poppy crop eradication has been pivotal in hindering stability, security and development in Afghanistan s most impoverished areas, pushing farmers instead into the arms of the Taliban and putting troops in grave danger. 20 Coherent counter-narcotics strategies need to be adopted by all relevant authorities. 21 3. Security in Afghanistan requires more troops No peace to keep: Acknowledging the conclusions of our reports since early 2006, 22 the Panel noted that there is no peace to keep in Kandahar, and that the job of the Canadian troops is getting harder than when they were first deployed. The Panel noted that Afghans are losing confidence in NATO/ISAF capacities to provide security, and that the insurgency is regaining ground due to ISAF s incapacity to prevent incursions from Pakistan. The Panel s explicit call for more troops from other NATO countries and better equipment in Kandahar is timely, as is the recognition of the need to prevent civilian deaths, not least because insurgents are using civilian casualties for propaganda purposes. Improving Afghan security requires more ISAF soldiers. 23 Building Afghan National Army Capacity: The Panel correctly noted that the Canadian combat mission should only conclude when the Afghan National Army is ready to provide security in Kandahar province. With the training and equipping of the ANA an extremely urgent priority for Canada, diplomatic efforts should be 19 Afghanistan, p.15 20 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep, June 2006. 21 Afghanistan, p.15 22 The Senlis Council, Canada in Kandahar: No Peace to Keep, June 2006, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/kandahar_report 23 Afghanistan, p.14 www.senliscouncil.net 8
concentrated on assuring funds for the shipment of donated military equipment to Afghanistan. 24 Accelerating the training of Afghanistan s security forces is an urgent Canadian and ISAF goal. 25 Lack of a real hearts and minds action strategy: The Panel s report fails to put sufficient weight on the importance of effective hearts and minds strategies in fighting insurgencies. 26 No insurgency and certainly not the Afghan insurgency can be defeated by military force alone. 27 4. Aid and development: prioritising Afghan needs Signature Canadian Projects in Kandahar: Recognising the need for practical, visible projects that immediately impact positively on the day to day lives of Afghans in Kandahar, the Manley panel recommends targeting Canada s aid to Afghanistan on initiatives that directly address the urgent needs of locals. The Senlis Council congratulates the Panel on its insights and its call for Canada to adopt Kandahar s hospital as a signature project. Because the virtual absence of health care in Kandahar is one of the locals chief grievances, the refurbishment of Kandahar City s Mirwais Hospital would go a long way towards rebuilding local support for the Canadian mission in Kandahar. 28 It is urgent to complete practical, significant development projects of immediate value to Afghans, while at the same time contributing to the capacity and legitimacy of Afghan government institutions. 29 24 See Security and Defence Agenda, A Press Dinner with SACEUR General John Craddock - Applying Lessons from Afghanistan: Actions and Outcomes, Brussels, 2007, p.4. For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the brink, November 2007. 25 Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements, p.24 26 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Hearts and Minds in Southern Afghanistan: Zroona Aw Zehnoona, December 2006, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/hearts_and_minds_campaign 27 Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements, p.28 28 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Hearts and Minds in Southern Afghanistan: Zroona Aw Zehnoona, December 2006, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/hearts_and_minds_campaign 29 Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements, p.27 www.senliscouncil.net 9
Canada s civilian reconstruction and development engagement in Afghanistan should include at least one signature project (a hospital, for example, or a major irrigation project) identified with Canada and led by Canadians. 30 Full-scale review of CIDA: Acknowledging that aid is not getting to where it can impact on the lives of ordinary Afghans in Kandahar, the Manley panel recommends that the Government conduct a full-scale review of the performance of the Canadian civilian aid program, 31 and CIDA s internal procedures be revamped and integrated into military and diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan. 32 The Panel also emphasised the need for systematic measures of success in development and capacity building, but cautioned that assisting Afghans to improve governance will not mean instituting Western concepts of law and justice, but rather, on working with the existing capacities of traditional institutions of social governance. 33 Canada s civilian programs have not achieved the scale or depth of engagement necessary to make a significant impact. It is essential to adjust funding and staffing imbalances between the heavy Canadian military commitment in Afghanistan and the comparatively lighter civilian commitment to reconstruction, development and governance. Similarly, the Canadian government needs to elevate coordination in Ottawa among Canadian departments and agencies engaged in Afghanistan for better efficiency and effectiveness, and to enhance the civilian content of Kandahar PRT activity. 34 Where s the food? Although the Manley panel Report quotes UNDP figures showing that more than one fifth of the Afghan population is chronically malnourished, the Panel fails to recommend that emergency poverty relief be prioritised. Given the dire humanitarian situation and negative security environment in Kandahar, the Canadian Government should immediately empower the Canadian military to secure the delivery of Canada-funded food aid and other supplies to Kandahar s people. Where there are no local or international aid organisations 30 Ibid. p.36 31 Ibid. 32 The Canadian aid program in Afghanistan has been impeded not only by the dangerous security environment in Kandahar but by CIDA s own administrative constraints... Funding allocations aside, CIDA staffers in Kandahar do not often venture beyond their base, in part, we were told, because of restrictive security regulations maintained by CIDA s headquarters in Canada. While it is undeniably difficult to place civilians in a conflict zone, CIDA should delegate decisions about security of movement to civilian and military officials on the ground who are best placed to make such assessments... Kandahar PRT units do not move outside the wire without a military convoy including at least three armoured vehicles and 20 Canadian soldiers. Independent Panel on Canada s Future Role in Afghanistan, Part III: Assessing Canadian Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements, p.26 33 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Peace in Afghanistan: Made in Canada, September 2007. 34 Engagement: Origins, Experience and Achievements, p.28 www.senliscouncil.net 10
present, the Canadian soldiers should be involved in the actual delivery of humanitarian aid. 35 6.6 million Afghans do not meet minimum food requirements. 36 Under-funding of development and aid: Despite the Manley panel s correct assessment that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means alone, it failed to recognise the significance of matching development and aid spending with military spending. Promoting a stable and prosperous Afghan state is undoubtedly an expensive task. But most importantly, development assistance expenditure must be increased to a level where it can adequately address the humanitarian crisis in the country and create the necessary infrastructure for sustainable growth. 37 Canada s commitment in Afghanistan matters because it concerns the well-being of some of the world s most impoverished and vulnerable people. 38 Justice and human rights: Achieving a genuine and stable peace in Afghanistan will necessitate a more comprehensive political and social reconciliation among Afghans. The Panel recommends that Canada contribute to Afghanistan s better governance by facilitating, where possible, the reconciliation process. 39 Members of the old Taliban regime guilty of the grossest violations of human rights and responsible for the deaths of uncounted thousands of innocent Afghans should be brought to justice. 40 Conclusion The Manley panel and their staff should be congratulated for their fine work on an issue of historic significance to Canada. It is now up to Prime Minister Harper and his government to deliver both the actions and the competence necessary to take these recommendations forward. 35 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban, September 2006, [online] Available at: http://senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/afghanistan_five_years_later 36 Afghanistan, p.18 37 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban, September 2006. 38 Independent Panel on Canada s Future Role in Afghanistan, Chair s Forward, p.3 39 For prior Senlis commentary on this issue, see Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the brink, November 2007. 40 Afghanistan, p.17 www.senliscouncil.net 11