Corruption: Costs and Mitigation Strategies

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Corruption: Costs and Mitigation Strategies Presented by Bernardin AKITOBY Assistant Director INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SEPTEMBER 2017

Motivation Corruption has been identified as one of the most important problems facing the world today To a varying degree, it afflicts economies at all stages of development This SDN looks at Fund country experience; it does not, however, draw implications for Fund policy 2

Outline Definitions and Manifestations The economic and social costs of corruption based on a comprehensive review of existing and new literature Strategies for addressing corruption based on IMF experience Conclusions 3

Definitions and Manifestations Abuse of public office for private gain Limited to public sector corruption (not private sector corruption) Corruption can: Involve non-financial gain (e.g., conflicts of interest arising from family interests) Pervert the law making process (state capture/privatization of public policy) If corruption becomes systemic (i.e. the norm), in the extreme it can affect all state functions and lead to a breakdown 4

The Economic and Social Costs of Corruption

Corruption State Functions Fiscal Market Regulation Monetary Policy Financial Sector Oversight Public Order & Enforcement Macro-Financial Stability Banking crises External sector imbalances Inflation Fiscal unsustainability Financial inclusion Public & Private Physical Capital Inefficient public investment Costly investment and production Distorted composition of projects Uncertainty Distorted asset prices Human Capital Insufficient spending on education/health Poverty and inequality Disincentives for skill acquisition TFP Insufficient investment (R&D) Inefficiency Distorted capital allocation Skills mismatch Political Instability and Conflict Potential Inclusive Growth 6

Corruption Perception Index (avg. 2005-14) 2/ Corruption weakens the state s capacity to raise revenue Corruption and VAT C-Efficiency 1/ Harms the culture of compliance, increasing tax evasion (see figure) Creates disincentives to pay taxes when tax exemptions are viewed as arbitrary As a result, lower revenue limits the ability of the state to provide public services with consequences for growth -50-40 -30-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 Correlation = -0.249** 50-0.4-0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 C-efficiency Ratio (avg. 2005-13) 1/ Variables presented are deviations from values predicted by income level. 2/ Larger numbers indicate lower perceived levels of public sector corruption. Asterisks from the correlation equation imply significance at 5%. 7

Public Investment Efficiency Index (larger numbers mean higher efficiency, 0-1) It undermines quantity and quality of public spending through Public Investment Efficiency and Corruption Perception Index 1.0 Inflated public procurement costs Siphoning of funds through off-budget transactions Weak payroll controls and Weaknesses in computerized PFM systems Distorts budget allocations Lower public investment and other priority spending Lower efficiency of public investment (see figure) 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 High Corruption Medium Corruption Low Corruption Corruption Perception Index (avg. 2004-15) Note: The samples are grouped into high, medium and low corruption in equal numbers based on the Corruption Perception Index. The lines show the range of efficiency for each group. The green and red boxes are the second and third quartile (from the bottom) of the samples, thus the boxes cover 50 percent of the countries. 8

Corruption Perception Index 2/ and can hinder sound monetary policy -40-30 -20-10 0 10 20 30 CPI Inflation and Corruption Perception Index 1/ (Average for 1995-2014) Correlation= 0.426*** 40-2 -1 0 1 2 3 CPI Inflation 1/ Variables presented are deviations from values predicted by income level. 2/ Larger numbers indicate lower perceived levels of public sector corruption. Asterisks from the correlation equation imply significance at 1%. Because of lower public revenues, countries tend to rely more on seigniorage finance Fiscal dominance Inflation bias as shown in the figure Corruption further weakens financial oversight and stability Poor lending and regulatory practices Weak banking supervision 9

Corruption Perception Index 2/ Corruption hampers market access Emerging Market Sovereign Spreads and Corruption Perception Index 1/ (Average for 1995-2014) -40-30 -20-10 0 10 20 30 Correlation = 0.488** Even market participants appear to factor in corruption into their lending decisions 40-1.5-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 EM Yield Spread (Basis Points) 1/ Variables presented are deviations from values predicted by income level. 2/ Larger numbers indicate lower perceived levels of public sector corruption. Asterisks from the correlation equation imply significance at 5%. 10

Corruption Perception Index (avg. 2003-2015) 2/ and negatively impacts the private sector by: Corruption and the Ease of Starting a Business 1/ -40 Raising uncertainty Acting as a barrier to entry (see figure) Distorting resource allocation from productive to rent-seeking activities -30-20 -10 0 10 20 30 Correlation= 0.466*** 40-10 -5 0 5 10 15 Number of procedures to register a business (avg. 2003-2015) 1/ Variables presented are deviations from values predicted by income level. 2/ Larger numbers indicate lower perceived levels of public sector corruption. Asterisks from the correlation equation imply significance at 1%. 11

Corruption is linked to poor social and environmental outcomes Limits build-up of human capital Through reduced allocations for social programs Compounded by leakages With potential consequences for equality and poverty Studies show that child mortality rates are about one-third higher in countries with high corruption. Infant mortality rates and percent of low-birthweight babies are almost twice as high. More pollution due to Weaker, poorly enforced environmental regulations Over extraction of natural resources 12

Political instability and conflict In the extreme, systemic corruption can lead to political instability and conflict It has been argued that natural resource abundance can accentuate the situation 13

Strategies for Addressing Corruption Transparency, Rule of Law, Economic Reform and Regulation, Building Institutions

Costs and Strategies Fund experience An effective strategy requires a holistic approach But measures must be sequenced, notably ensuring the institutional framework is adequate. It is a long term process (need to manage expectations) There is a role for short-term measures with more immediate impact. Preventive measures are no less important than enforcement Transparency is a typical example. 15

Challenges in Measuring Corruption The clandestine and hidden nature of corruption. There is a heavy reliance on perceptions. There is a margin of error inherent in subjective perceptions, which is amplified when used for complex statistical constructions. Differences in the types of transactions captured under the definition of corruption are a complicating factor. 16

Fund Experience: four main areas 1. Transparency: providing public with access to information 2. Rule of Law: having a credible threat of prosecution 3. Economic Reform: eliminating excessive regulation 4. Building institutions: all depends on effective institutions 17

Transparency General Transparency is a pre-requisite for the proper functioning of the market It can also be targeted on corruption Development of international standards on fiscal and financial transparency Transparency in extractive industries these are important because of their relative share in many economies Supporting international standards on transparent corporate ownership 18

Enhancing the Rule of Law There must be a credible threat of prosecution Sometimes new specialized institutions must be set up where existing ones are themselves corrupt An effective anti-money laundering framework must be in place to minimize the laundering of proceeds of corruption Enforcement must also target the private sector 19

Economic Reform Eliminating Excessive Regulation Excessive regulation is an important source of corruption (Anne Krueger: rent seeking ) Elimination of excessive regulation and simplification are a cornerstone of anti-corruption strategy (i.e., Ukraine Caribbean, MENA countries). However, it is important to have an adequate institutional framework in place first when transitioning from state controlled monopolistic markets. (i.e., emerging economies in Eastern Europe) 20

Building Institutions The key issue is implementation, for which institutions are critical. Four building blocks for effective institutions. A clear legal framework is required For example: an independent central bank (mandate, oversight, operational and financial autonomy, appointment criteria, dismissal rules, legal protection of staff) With adequate technical expertise Institutions cannot be effective without requisite technical competence And the right incentive package for non-corrupt behavior For example: securing wage adequacy in combination with effective dismissal procedures With a critical role of leadership For example: both setting a personal example and ensuring decisive action 21

Conclusion Public sector corruption substantially impairs key channels influencing inclusive growth. Fighting corruption calls for a long term and holistic strategy, albeit appropriately sequenced based on country-specific circumstances. A crisis can be a catalyst for change; but a crisis setting generally does not permit for full resolution. Determined leadership over time is a key underlying factor. 22