Issue 3 April 1995 CONFRONTING FAMINE IN AFRICA Summary: Famine poses a continuing threat to many of the poorest countries in Africa. There is much that can be done, however, to reduce the risk of famine, and limit the damage done. Speeding up the response to famine early warning signals is vital. Even when famine has gained hold, measures can be taken to help people survive the crisis, and rebuild their lives afterwards. Relief operations need to be much better integrated with long-term development. But with war now a major factor behind famine in Africa, more concerted peace making efforts are also essential if the spectre of famine is to be confronted. Understanding the problem Understanding the causes and nature of famine is crucial, since the popular view of famine is badly flawed. The causes - though drought remains an ever-present risk in much of Africa, drought by itself is not the cause of famine. Rather, it is the combination of poverty, drought and - increasingly - war that provides the lethal ingredients. Famines are worst when all three factors coincide. Why people die - famine is characterized by widespread and acute hunger. But it is disease - not starvation - that is generally the main cause of death. It is triggered when people, already weakened by lack of food, are forced to abandon their homes. If they end up in relief camps, overcrowding and poor sanitation provide a breeding ground for disease. This is what leads to the sudden surge in death rates. Who is most vulnerable - famine does not affect people equally. Some food is always available within a country or region, or can be bought on the international market. Access to food is what counts. It is the poor - those without savings, jobs, influence or bargaining power - who are most at risk. Some sections of the community, such as merchants and wealthy farmers, may actually benefit from famines, at the expense of others. Why poor countries suffer - per capita food production has fallen in many African countries. But this is not the only reason they have remained so prone to famine. Badly planned development and excessive spending on arms, together with external factors such as worsening terms of trade, debt, and crudely conceived structural adjustment policies, have all combined to keep poor countries poor - and make them more susceptible, both to famine, and to conflict. With conflict now a major contributory factor behind famine in Africa, efforts to avert and resolve conflict must be placed at centre stage of any strategy to tackle the problem of famine. Reducing people's vulnerability is the second key approach. In the long-term this means better rural development policies that enable people to produce and earn more, and become more resilient to drought and other shocks. In the short-term it means providing better safety nets, so that when crops or livestock fail people can stay where they are and not be forced to move. Job schemes to provide an alternative source of income, emergency food supplies, interventions to stabilize food prices, and special credit arrangements, can all play a valuable role. These kinds of policies were used in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana during the severe 1992/93 drought and successfully averted famine.
Heeding early warnings Since the mid 1980s, famine early warning techniques have steadily improved, and many African countries now have their own early warning systems in operation. As a result, there is now advance notice of most famines in Africa caused by drought or crop failure. Despite this, the record of famine prevention is still poor, and action - by governments and aid agencies - is usually taken too late. Why warnings are Ignored bureaucratic procedures at government and donor headquarters are not geared to the needs of recipients. Decision making is too slow, and delays in delivery mean that food relief arrives too late; decision makers only take action when there is clear quantitative evidence that a crisis is already underway - they rarely respond to the less concrete, qualitative indicators that problems are on the way; early warning information is sometimes distorted to suit the needs of different interest groups, who may have reasons to exaggerate or downplay the problem. This makes relief agencies sceptical of the validity of early warning signals; if political relations between donors and recipient governments are strained, early warnings may be ignored and the response delayed. Early warning systems have a vital continuing role to play, but action is needed to address these problems since early response is the key to effective famine prevention. There are a variety of ways by which reaction times could be speeded up: instead of waiting until crops are harvested before international relief is pledged, production estimates made earlier in the season should be used to trigger the release of food aid; decentralizing control of relief operations so that decisions can be taken quickly at a local level; pre-positioning emergency food stocks, under joint donor and government control, to reduce delivery times; in situations of regular food crisis, negotiating multi-year aid pledges from donors would avoid having to start the process from scratch each year. A more flexible response is also needed, geared to protecting livelihoods, rather than just providing food aid to save lives. This requires an understanding of how people cope in famine situations, so that wherever possible assistance can be used to support and augment existing survival strategies. Surviving and rebuilding Faced with food shortages, rural people use a range of survival strategies that are logical, well-adapted, and carefully planned: existing supplies are more rigorously rationed; more use is made of traditional exchange arrangements between families and within them - in the form of food gifts, work paid for with food, and informal loans; non-essential assets are sold or money is borrowed in order to buy food; wild food is collected more intensively; some members of the household may leave to try to find work elsewhere. Decisions are based on careful calculations balancing short-term needs with long-term consequences. People may choose to risk malnutrition, rather than sell key assets such as ploughs, oxen, or carts. This is because they know they will need these in future, once the immediate danger has passed.
Helping people retain their assets, and rebuild them once the crisis is over, is one of the most effective ways of encouraging long-term food security. Approaches that have been used successfully include: market interventions to stabilize prices, or buy assets and sell them back later at a fair price; loans or grants to help rebuild herds, reconstitute seed stocks, or buy ploughs and other tools. Schemes of these kinds need to be carefully designed, and implemented at the right time, if they are to work. But they offer a potential way out of the dangerous downhill spiral, where every successive food emergency forces people to sell more assets, and in the process reduces their ability to respond to the next crisis when it comes along. A good example of how this approach can work comes from Northern Kenya, where during successive seasons of drought pastoralists were faced with having to sell most of their livestock. Prices were low and buyers few. If they sold it would be impossible for many to rebuild their herds later, because once the drought was over prices would rise rapidly. Instead, several aid agencies introduced an alternative. They offered to buy the animals at a reasonable rate in order to protect herders' incomes. Once the drought was over, they helped with re-stocking programmes. This meant that pastoralists could survive the drought and rebuild their herds later. Action at village level Governments and aid agencies are not the only bodies that can help in dealing with famine. Given the authority and resources, local leaders and infrmal groups can play a lead role: helping communities stay together; monitoring the food situation; distributing food to the poorest and most vulnerable; participating in efforts to resolve conflicts. Credible local institutions do not exist everywhere, but where they do, they are more likely to be effective than those newly established from the outside. In Somaliland, for example, it was traditional elders who played a central role in restoring peace and stability, after years of war. Linking relief and development In the past, emergency relief and long-term development have usually been seen as separate problems, involving different concerns, and requiring different types of action. This view is changing, especially in parts of Africa where conflict and famine have become so frequent that a situation of almost 'permanent emergency' has emerged. Relief efforts can hinder development in several ways: if existing institutions such as government departments or village committees are by-passed by relief agencies, their authority and effectiveness can be seriously undermined; the arrival of emergency relief teams in an area can sweep away overnight the efforts of existing development projects, and the working relations built up between project staff and local people; flooding markets with food aid after the main crisis is over can remove the incentive for farmers to grow food themselves. Linking relief and development is not easy. The sheer urgency of many emergencies means that rapid action has to be taken, despite the risks.
Planning ahead, and acting early enough, are the key elements. Disaster preparedness plans have been developed in some countries to provide local governments with the resources, equipment and training to deal with problems before they become emergencies. Existing development projects can also contribute to relief efforts, provided they are flexible enough to adapt to emergency situations. The local expertise and contacts of project staff can be invaluable in making relief efforts more sensitive to local community needs. In Somalia, for instance, the aid agency ACORD was able to channel emergency inputs through an already-established network of village committees. And in Turkana, Kenya, Oxfam (UK) chose to distribute food aid only to women, recognizing their traditional role as household food managers. Once relief operations are underway, the emphasis should - wherever possible - be on the long-term recovery of the people and the region. Helping people to restore their own assets and livelihoods is one important approach. Another is to use food-for-work and other job-creation schemes to build infrastructures that will be of long-term value to the area - repairing roads, for example, planting trees, developing irrigation schemes, or carrying out soil conservation works. Even in conflict areas, efforts to link relief and development can be worthwhile. During the recently-ended war in Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, food was channelled through local non-governmental groups. This helped strengthen community structures, which was important in coordinating rehabilitation work once the war was over. Saving lives in the camps Relief camps provide a refuge in times of crisis but often bring dangers of their own. Overcrowding and poor sanitation provide ideal conditions for the spread of diseases such as cholera, measles, and gastroenteritis. The resulting epidemics can wipe out large numbers of people in a short space of time, even when ample food supplies are available. Providing food and shelter are usually seen as the first priorities in relief camps. But many more lives could be saved if greater attention was paid to: providing clean water supplies; setting up effective sanitation facilities; timely immunization programmes. Confronting war Famine and war are often intimately linked. There are many ways that conflict can create famine and by which famine is used as a deliberate weapon of war: Direct intervention - armies can have an immediate impact on food supplies by: demanding food from villagers and depleting their food stocks; diverting food aid intended for the civilian population; deliberately destroying communities, by stealing livestock, burning fields and villages, cutting down trees, poisoning wells, or laying mines; using siege tactics to create famine among the civilian population and destroying transport and other infrastructures that support food mobility. Counterinsurgency - to frustrate the actions of opposition forces, measures may be taken to control the movement of people. This can mean moving people away from their land into 'protected' villages or camps. As a result, they cannot produce or gather food, or graze their animals. If trade is also restricted, people cannot rely on exchanges with neighbours and nearby districts as a means of survival.
Asset stripping - the chaos of war is frequently used as a cover for soldiers, officials and businessmen to enrich themselves by stealing land, cattle and other possessions. The vulnerability of ordinary people, especially refugees, makes them an easy target for extortion and theft. For agencies involved in famine prevention and relief, the spread of armed conflict poses real dilemmas. They cannot ignore the damage it is causing. Yet few have the mandate or experience to intervene effectively in preventing it. Some aid agencies are beginning to get involved at a local level in conflict resolution. They recognize that in doing so they run the risk of compromising their neutrality and thus jeopardizing their traditional humanitarian role. But some argue that this is better than standing back and doing nothing, and point out that simply by providing food aid in war situations they can be manipulated by the warring factions, and may end up prolonging the conflict. It would be foolish to pretend there are any easy answers. Recent international peace-keeping efforts have been fraught with difficulties. Foreign governments have become increasingly wary of being sucked into conflicts. Yet they end up paying the costs of massive relief operations once war takes hold. If the problem is to be confronted, efforts to resolve conflict and build peace must be given much greater priority. Existing institutions need to be brought into the process - ranging from international bodies to village councils, and local religious and tribal groups. Northern governments also need to put much more weight behind peace-making and conflict resolution. Diplomatic and economic pressures can be effective, if used in a coordinated way. 'Preventive diplomacy' of this kind is no simple option. But it is far better to act early than run the risk of full-scale conflict breaking out. Further reading Buchanan-Smith, M. and Davies, S., 1995 (forthcoming), Famine Early Warning and Response: the Missing Link?, London: Intermediate Technology IDS, 1993, 'New Approaches to Famine', IDS Bulletin Vol 24 No 4, Brighton: IDS IDS, 1994,'Linking Relief and Development', IDS Bulletin Vol 25 No 4, Brighton: IDS Webb, P. and von Braun, J., 1994, Famine and Food Security in Ethiopia: Lessons for Africa, Chichester: Wiley This Policy Briefing draws on the research of IDS Fellows Jeremy Swift, Margaret Buchanan-Smith, Susanna Davies, and Simon Maxwell, as well as other collaborators. It was written by Sarah Hobson and Geoff Barnard. The opinions expressed are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of IDS or its funders. For further information on the series contact Geoff Barnard, Head of Communications, IDS. Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from IDS Policy Briefings in their own publications. In return, IDS requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. Institute of Development Studies, 1995 ISSN 1353-8772 IDS Policy Briefings are published by the Institute of Development Studies and aim to provide concise, up-to-date reviews of important development issues. Institute of Development Studies, at the University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK Tel: (+44) 1273 606261 Fax: (+44) 1273 691647 or 621202 E-mail: ids@ids.ac.uk