Understanding the Economic and Social Issues of the Arab Uprisings *(Partial Sample) A Research Paper by Submitted to: In complete fulfilment of the requirements of University of 01-01-2011
Introduction The revolts that the Arab world witnessed since the end of 2010 have greatly surprised the observers of regional and international life. The suddenness, the sequence of challenges, and their snowball effect across the region, have overtaken the world. The surprise was even greater than the break which occurred within a world previously considered to be resistant to change and democratic transition. From Morocco to Syria, via the Arabian Peninsula, the wave of protest spread very quickly throughout the region of the Arab world, suggesting that the regimes would fall one after the other like a house of cards. The similarities that bind Arab countries suggest that an event as significant as a revolution would undoubtedly have regional impacts. The analysis of the rapid succession of events during 2011 shows the relationships between the fall of these different dictatorships. The Arab Spring is largely the result of the deteriorating life and, in particular, the economic crisis of 2008. 1 By basing ourselves on approaches of political economy, we do not seek to solely explain political developments in economic variables. Rather, we intend to examine the role and importance of these variables in the context of multifactorial explanations which puts a focus on the interaction between politics and economics privileging dependency links between factors rather than links of causality in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, we will not reduce the economic and social variables only to poverty, shifting social classes and unemployment. Finally, as mentioned earlier, we are not interested in only the economic variables that contributed to political developments that were designated by the seasonal metaphor of the Arab Spring but also to the economic and social consequences of this event. The revolution in Tunisia In 2008, events had already taken place in the south-west of Tunisia, which was due to the endemic unemployment in the mining area of Gafsa. Nevertheless, while the population demanded socioeconomic measures, the regime's response was protectionist. Tunisian police 1 Ansani, Andrea, and Vittorio Daniele. "About A Revolution: The Economic Motivations Of The Arab Spring." International Journal of Development and Conflict 02 (2012). http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010269012500135 (accessed March 29, 2014).
fired live bullets at hundreds of young people leaving one dead and several wounded. This event, which had lasted a few months in a city that was crisscrossed by the military and the police, did not produce a domino effect at the national scale. However, when in December 17, 2010, a person immolated himself in the Sidi Bouzid region in central Tunisia, it caused local frustrations to quickly spread at the regional and national level. 2 The popular uprising in Tunisia is beforehand part of a profound social revolt. Since January 14, 2011, it was discovered that poverty figures had been manipulated by the exregime. 3 In 2005, the former had set the poverty line at $1.25 per person and per day to quantify the rate of poverty. With this amount, we obtain a percentage of 1.1% of Tunisians living below the poverty line. 4 Whereas placing the poverty line of $2 per day equated to 4.3% Tunisians living below the poverty line in 2010. 5 In fact, the old regime skilfully played with the calculation methods of the World Bank, taking the threshold of extreme poverty (less than $ 1.25 / day) to describe the higher levels of poverty (less than $ 2 / day). To everyone's amazement, the Minister of Social Affairs announced in May 2011 that one out of every four Tunisian, or 24.7% of the population lives under the poverty line according to the standards of the World Bank (less than $2 / day). 6 Former interim Prime Minister Beji Caid Sebsi reported a month before the ouster of President Ben Ali, that the official unemployment figure is at 800,000 people of which 250,000 are graduates of higher education. 7 Then, on the economic side, Tunisia has long disqualified skilled and educated labour. Graduates occupied jobs that required low qualifications and in general, the undiversified economy, inscribed itself to the logic of the international division of labour and of outsourcing 2 Schiller, Thomas. "Tunisia - A Revolution and its Consequences." Kas International Reports 1 (2011). http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22802-544-2-30.pdf?110516130505 (accessed April 1, 2014). 3 Medien, Ahmed. "November 7th, 2011 Ben Ali s Political Propaganda Conspicuously Absent." Tunisia Live. http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/07/november-7th-2011-ends-up-with-ben-alis-political-propaganda/ (accessed April 4, 2014). 4 "Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)." The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/si.pov.dday (accessed April 4, 2014). 5 "Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)." The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/si.pov.2day (accessed April 4, 2014). 6 Medien, Ahmed. "November 7th, 2011 Ben Ali s Political Propaganda Conspicuously Absent." Tunisia Live. http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/07/november-7th-2011-ends-up-with-ben-alis-political-propaganda/ (accessed April 4, 2014). 7 Amara, Tarek. "Economy could sink Tunisia revolution: outgoing PM." Reuters. http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/economicnews/idindee7bb0ez20111212 (accessed April 8, 2014).
by creating jobs that catered to individuals with low qualifications. Tunisia, generally described as a good student by major international bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank had therefore focused on economic growth, regardless of social justice. 8 In the political field, and like most other Arab countries, elections were routinely rigged, often claiming over 90% of voter support between 1989 and 2009. The constitutional amendment of May 2002 opened the way to a life presidency, by removing the limitation to three consecutive terms. 9 Finally, to better control civil society, Ben Ali based himself on an omnipotent and omnipresent police force. Since his arrival to the Presidency, the number of police were multiplied by five and counted as much as 130,000 men out of a population of a little over 10 million. Ironically, France, whose population is six times bigger than Tunisia, has roughly the same number of police officers. 10 Facing the wave of protests, the former President tried to repress the demonstrators but the security forces were quickly overwhelmed. When the army decided not to intervene, Ben Ali was forced into exile to Saudi Arabia. 11 The contagion in the Arab world The fall of the Tunisian dictator created a collective sense of euphoria in most Arab countries. Thus, very rapidly, spontaneous movements of manifestations took unprecedented forms. Egypt was the first country to be affected. In reality, the Tunisian revolution was not the only trigger. The first sources of the dispute go back to 2004 with the organization of the Kifaya movement, through which young people expressed their weariness towards the corruption and the lack of prospects for the future. Faced with this movement, Egypt had decided 8 Hermassi, Hela. "Tunisian Revolution and Regional Imbalance." Global Advanced Research Journal of Management and Business Studies 1 (2013). http://garj.org/garjmbs/pdf/2013/february/hermassi.pdf (accessed April 11, 2014). 9 Arieff, Alexis. "Political Transition in Tunisia." Congressional Research Service 1 (2011). http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/156511.pdf (accessed April 14, 2014). & Schiller (2011). 10 Schraeder, Peter J., and Hamadi Redissi. "Ben Ali's Fall." Journal of Democracy 22 (2011). http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2011.0047 (accessed April 16, 2014). 11 Schiller (2011).
to hold elections in 2005. Though largely biased, the move brought about the emergence of a parliamentary opposition led by the Muslim Brotherhood, winning 88 out of the 450 seats. 12 When in January 2011, a spontaneous popular uprising in Tunisia had provoked for the first time, the downfall of a dictator and the fall of his regime, led to the galvanization of Egyptians hungry for change. The mostly violent demonstrations at Tahrir Square led to the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, barely a month after the fall of Ben Ali, leaving power in the hands of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 13 In Yemen, the overthrow of the dictator took longer because it depended on a skillfully negotiated agreement with Saudi Arabia. Even though, protests to demand the departure of their president Ali Abdullah Saleh in power for 33 years began just two days after the flight of Ben Ali, The Yemenis had to wait over a year to see their expectations materialize. Indeed, it is only on November 23, 2011 that the President agreed to sign the agreement in Riyadh, granting impunity for himself and his clan, assuring him the full enjoyment of his fortune and authorizing him to remain as an honorary president until the end of his mandate. On February 21, the presidential election transferred power to the only declared candidate, Vice-President Abd- Rabbo Mansour Hadi. 14 Since March 2011, the Syrian Sunni majority has also joined the trend, determined to uproot the dictatorship and to fight for their freedom. The first peaceful rallies were organized on March 18 demanding for; the release of political prisoners, political reforms and the abolition of the state of emergency and the tribunal of state security. Nevertheless, things quickly degenerated; live rounds were fired on crowds, water and electricity was cut and the injured were unable to receive proper medical treatment etc. From the onset of manifestations, the fierce 12 Tammam, Hossam. "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Regime: The Test of Parliamentary Elections as a Condition for Political Transition." Arab Reform Initiative 1 (2010). http://www.arabreform.net/sites/default/files/arb_38_egypt_h-tammam-_eng.pdf (accessed April 21, 2014). 13 McGreal, Chris, and Jack Shenker. "Hosni Mubarak resigns and Egypt celebrates a new dawn." The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo (accessed April 20, 2014). 14 Thiel, Tobias. "Yemen s Arab Spring: From Youth Revolution to Fragile Political Transition." The London school of Economic and Political Science 1 (0). http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/sr011/final_lse_ideas YemensArabSpring_Thiel.pdf (accessed April 22, 2014).
repression of the regime was felt across the country. 15 A crisis of the authoritarian social state One approach frequently utilized by economists and in international organizations to highlight the role of economic and social variables in the Arab uprisings is; setting the socioeconomic context. These works highlights the fact that, in the Arab countries, most basic macroeconomic variables were altered during the second half of the 2000s, including rising prices of food commodities that preceded and, somehow, inaugurated the 2008 financial crisis. A slowing growth, lower revenues, foreign direct investment, remittances from expatriate workers, rising food prices, rising unemployment and inequality are most often cited as evidence of a state of economic depression that sparked the mobilizations. Certain studies have examined the long- 15 Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. "Tracking the Arab Spring." Journal of Democracy 1 (2013). http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/heydemann-24-4.pdf (accessed May 5, 2014).
Works Cited *(Partial) Arieff, Alexis. "Political Transition in Tunisia." Congressional Research Service 1 (2011). http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/156511.pdf (accessed April 14, 2014). Amara, Tarek. "Economy could sink Tunisia revolution: outgoing PM." Reuters. http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/economicnews/idindee7bb0ez20111212 (accessed April 8, 2014). Ansani, Andrea, and Vittorio Daniele. "About A Revolution: The Economic Motivations Of The Arab Spring." International Journal of Development and Conflict 02 (2012). http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010269012500135 (accessed March 29, 2014). Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. "Tracking the Arab Spring." Journal of Democracy 1 (2013). http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/heydemann-24-4.pdf (accessed May 5, 2014). El-Meehy, Asya. "Relative Deprivation and Politics in the Arab Uprisings." Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs American University of Beirut ` (2014). https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/programs/social_justice/documents/papers/20140507ifi_socialjustic e_asyaelmeehy.pdf (accessed May 22, 2014). Frantz, Erica. "A dictator s toolkit: Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies." Journal of Peace Research 1 (2014). http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/03/17/0022343313519808.full.pdf (accessed May 25, 2014). Hermassi, Hela. "Tunisian Revolution and Regional Imbalance." Global Advanced Research Journal of Management and Business Studies 1 (2013). http://garj.org/garjmbs/pdf/2013/february/hermassi.pdf (accessed April 11, 2014). Horres, Caroline. "How Durable is Durable Authoritarianism? A Comparative Study of the Kingdoms of Bahrain and Jordan during the Arab Spring." Annual Review of Undergraduate Research, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, School of Languages, Cultures, and World Affairs 1 (2012). http://chrestomathy.cofc.edu/documents/vol11/horres.pdf (accessed May 18, 2014).