VII. Aristotle, Virtue, and Desert Justice as purpose and reward Justice: The Story So Far The framing idea for this course: Getting what we are due. To this point that s involved looking at two broad sorts of things to which persons may be due: Rights and resources (distributive justice); punishments and sanctions (retributive justice). But, of course, there are other sorts of things which can be due to persons 1
for instance: awards, prizes and honours. Recall: Rawls s view of justice suggests that highearners/high-achievers like Wilt Chamberlain are entitled to their wealth only (or mainly) in the way that a lottery winner is entitled to her winnings (i.e., on the basis of rules already set out). For Rawls, no one actually deserves the benefits that result from their talents and opportunities, since these are ultimately the result of the (morally arbitrary) natural lottery. Desert vs. Entitlement but sometimes justice (or simply fairness) seems to require recognizing desert as something distinct from entitlement. Consider: Team A (highly skilled players; effective, skillful play in the game; great season so far) and Team B (less skilled players; more luck than skill in game play; in the playoffs on a fluke). Yet Team B scores more points in the game than Team A. Team B is entitled to win, but it is still cogent to say (as some fans well might) that Team A deserved to win 2
when people say that Team A deserved to win (even though they weren t entitled to win according to the rules of the game), what they probably have in mind is something like: Team A exemplifies the excellences that we value in this sport, exemplifies what we value about the game. They are the better team (even if they didn t happen to win today) Aristotle: Virtue In his Nicomachean Ethics (325 BCE), Aristotle describes the fundamental task of ethics as articulating the good for man (i.e., what s good for us as members of our species). What that turns out to be: activity of the soul in conformity with virtue Virtue > Greek areté excellence, power, goodness. N.B: The same etymological root as aristos, as in aristocracy 3
Virtue: The Aristotelian View A good ditch-digger (presumably) will have the virtue of physical strength; a good teacher (hopefully) will possess the virtues of knowledge, articulateness, patience, etc.. These virtues enable the practitioners of these arts to realize the purpose of their art (teleology). Similarly, sharpness is a virtue of a knife: A good knife is a sharp knife. But what, in general, makes someone a good person? Aristotle mentions, inter alia: Moral Virtues: Courage, Temperance (moderation), Generosity (moderation in giving and taking wealth), Magnificence (correctly dealing with great wealth or power), Pride (claiming honor due to you), Gentleness (moderation with respect to anger), etc. Intellectual Virtues: Wisdom (sophia), Knowledge (epistēmē), Intuition (nous), Practical Wisdom (phronēsis), Art/Skill (technē) 4
The Point: Happiness Eudaimonia On the Aristotelian view, having a virtue isn t simply a matter of making a judgment or calculating from a principle it s not primarily a cognitive activity at all. Instead, virtues are instilled through training and experience they are habits of character (e.g., the person with phronēsis has developed the habit of making good judgments) How so good? According to Aristotle, developing the virtues is necessary in order to become a good person where good means simply flourishing (happy). Eudaimonia = living a successful human life Justice: The Aristotelian View Recall: We know what a good sports team is, what a good teacher is, what good ditch-digger is etc., by reference to the purposes (the telos) of their activities. Likewise, says Aristotle, when it comes to justice: Justice is teleological: Determining who gets what requires us to first figure out the telos of the social practice in question. Justice is honorific: To determine the telos of a practice is specify what virtues it should honour and reward. 5
Aristotle: Justice and Politics Aristotle: Justice in the political community (polis) is less about distribution of wealth than it is about distribution of offices and honours (i.e., desert, as opposed to rights or welfare). The telos of the polis is not simply to protect rights, or to maximize the well-being of citizens, but to make citizens virtuous to make it possible for citizens to lead the good life. So, if the political community has a purpose (promoting citizen virtue) and justice requires rewarding and honoring virtue, who should rule? For Aristotle, the answer is clear: As a matter of justice, the excellent man should rule the man who best instantiates the virtues (in particular, the virtue of phronesis) This may sound rather appealing (especially in a post- Trump, post-g.w. Bush world): As a matter of justice, the brave should be rewarded for their bravery, the wise for their wisdom and the best decision-makers should be rewarded with political power 6
But not everyone is equally favoured by, equally capable of virtue on Aristotle s view, however. Women, e.g., are naturally less capable of certain virtues as compared to men. The courage of man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying (Politics, 1259b). So it is fitting (i.e., just) that women should be subordinate to men both in the home and in the political sphere. Similarly, according to Aristotle, some people are naturally fit to be slaves. Natural masters possess the rational, commanding virtues that fit them to lead; the natural slave lacks these virtues and so is fit only for menial tasks. And besides, having slaves will free up time for virtuous men to participate in political life. 7
Criticisms of Justice as Desert I For modern, broadly liberal theorists (Locke, Kant, Nozick, Rawls), the Aristotelian view seems fundamentally mistaken. Questions about rights and fairness are (and ought to be) separate from questions about honour, virtue, and desert. Respecting people s freedom (i.e., respecting their rights) means respecting people s ability to choose for themselves what they value and what goals they choose to pursue so, on the broadly liberal view, justice requires us (in particular, the state) to remain neutral about the goals people may choose to pursue and about different conceptions of the good life. (Recall Rawls here, especially.) Similarly, a virtue account of justice is a threat to equality. If certain ways of living your life, certain ends or goals are deemed ex ante to be excellent (virtuous), then other ways of living are, logically less-thanexcellent. 8
Criticisms of Justice as Desert I Perhaps the most serious criticism of the Aristotlean view (at least in my opinion) is what might be termed the problem of possible arbitrariness. It s not necessarily the case that a justice-as-virtue purists cannot in principle provide good reasons for the character traits that she happens to favour (Indeed, Aristotle provides a pretty elaborate reasoned justification for his list.) But notice just how culture-bound Aristotle s list seems from a contemporary perspective: manliness, being a big guy, being magnificent. Once a list of virtues becomes detached from its reasons, I d suggest, it can easily become hypostatized. Consider, e.g.: The time-honoured virtue of chastity 9
So, by way of summing up Three Main Conceptions of Justice In this course we ve looked (from several different angles) at the three classical conceptions of justice: Justice = maximizing welfare (utilitarianism) Justice = protecting rights and freedoms (Kant, Nozick, Rawls) Justice = rewarding virtue (Aristotle) 10
And That s It? Some theorists (e.g., Sandel) suggest that these three conceptions pretty much exhaust the field. (Or, in any case, no one has yet proposed a conception of justice that doesn t boil down to one or another of those listed.) I suppose there is no good reason to be Whiggish about this, however: A fundamentally new, fundamentally different conception of justice could be proposed any day now. But, if we settle (for now) on the three we have, how do they relate to each other? Mix and Match? For instance, since there seems to be at least something to be said for each of the three conceptions, maybe the correct or the best account of justice combines all three conceptions. That sounds vaguely wise (or balanced ) and, indeed, it is not impossible to combine elements from different conceptions: E.g., it is entirely cogent to speak of the virtue of being a good utilitarian ; Mill himself attempted to combine U with (something like) respect for individual rights 11
But, I think, we should be at least a bit cautious about a mix and match approach: As we ve seen, there are some deep-down incompatibilities among the three conceptions. Maximizing utility (without further qualification) is in tension with respecting rights. Protecting individual property rights is in tension with respecting equality (and possibly also with overall utility) Promoting virtue seems to come at the cost of respecting autonomy and equality etc. So: What Have We Learned? I hope that you ve learned (and, possibly, enjoyed learning) about some of the main theories of justice on offer in the Western tradition. I am NOT going to declare a winner (though I may have tipped my hand from time to time). You are, of course, free to make up your own mind. After all, that s only just. 12