Update Early warning unit Madagascar Quarterly Risk ssessment May to ugust 2003 swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation
Update Madagascar May ugust 2003 Page 2 Contents Country tability and Relative orceful ctions 3 Relative Civil and Government Direct ctions 4 verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation 5 verage International Conflict and Cooperation 6 ppendix: Description of indicators used 7 he Early Warning ystem 8 Contact : Phone: +41 31 330 12 07 ax: +41 31 330 12 13 @swisspeace.ch www.swisspeace.org/fast ubscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation
Update Madagascar May ugust 2003 Page 3 Country tability and Relative orceful ctions 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0-0.1 Country tability Relative orceful ctions 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 verage number of reported events per month: 119 Indicator description see: appendix Risk ssessment: Country tability decreased slightly in comparison to the stable trend reported in the previous Update. his decrease can be attributed to a peak in reported forceful actions in June and ugust. In June, reported forceful actions were mainly politically motivated, whereas in ugust most forceful actions appear to be related to crime and rural banditry, and corresponding police measures taken in response. ypical of these are the endemic cow thefts which are currently being fought by both police and military. he scope of recent activities (armed robberies using K47s, thefts of hundreds of cows) bear the hallmarks of organized crime. President Ravalomanana is still in the early stages of implementing his nation-building policies, a daunting task against the backdrop of the administrative decentralization policy enacted in favour of the autonomous provinces (created under the previous government). In fact, the increase of Relative orceful ctions in June could be blamed on opposition attempts (particularly by former president Ratsiraka s rema party) to foment dissent, especially in the provincial capitals of oamasina and oliara. campaign to orchestrate demonstrations, clamoring for increased institutional and financial independence from the seat of power in ntananarivo, is the most recent sign that this will be a key terrain in determining who controls the country in the future. utonomous provinces present a very high political risk, being well positioned to exploit and entrench local configurations of inequality. he discourse of decentralization is likely to have a strong appeal to leaders in most parts of rural Madagascar, where village life is governed by tompon-tany ( masters-of-the-land ). he tompon-tany social and political organization of villages, largely unmonitored by the national legal system in the past, will also continue to hamper the national government attempts to deal with issues ranging from national resource management to dispute settlement, as it is at the core of people s day-to-day lives. Madagascar still lacks a centralized, enforceable land title system. No comprehensive natural resource management legislation has been enacted. Prime Minister Jacques ylla declared that local views on natural resource management will be taken into account by the government. Public hearings are organized and farmers are invited to express their concerns. ompon-tany attend these regional hearings, but the largely migrant population who lease land from the tompon-tany feel they have no voice in these proceedings. Migrants currently have a vested interest in keeping good relations with the tompon-tany who are still the gatekeepers to their own quest to acquire land. his entrenched local structure is a fundamental threat to the democratization of the country, one of Ravalomanana s publicly avowed objectives. If Ravalomanana really wants to democratize Madagascar, he must find a way to trump the agenda of the current power holders at the regional level and come up with an imaginative land access policy which provides land title with the clout of the central government behind it, thus opening land acquisition up to the hitherto disenfranchised Malagasy. andra Evers swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation
Update Madagascar May ugust 2003 Page 4 Relative Civil and Government Direct ctions 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 Relative Civil Direct ctions Relative Government Direct ctions 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 verage number of reported events per month: 119 Indicator description see: appendix Risk ssessment: fter a considerable decrease in the early part of the monitoring period, Relative Government Direct ctions rose again during ugust. Relative Civil Direct ctions also decreased considerably in May, only to increase again in ugust. his slight increase of both Government and Civil Direct actions in ugust can be attributed to increasing rural banditry and the government s decision to respond with military resources. However, the general trend remains below peaks reached during the previous monitoring period. he general trend since pril shows an overall decline in Relative Direct ctions. Government policy during this consolidation phase of the new government has been non-confrontational towards civil society. his is reflected in the decrease in Relative Civil Direct ctions. However, the recent trend of more sophisticated and violent criminal activity would indicate that this policy may prove shortlived. t the same time, a source of political uncertainty has been removed with the sentence in absentia of former president Ratsiraka, who lives in exile in rance, to 10 years of hard labor for misappropriation of public funds. he prosecution successfully proved that former President had wrongfully withdrawn 49,25 billion francs malgaches (more than 7 million Euros) from the Malagasy central bank in oamasina after his mandate as President had expired. he verdict of the Central Criminal Court is significant both as a symbol that the Ratsiraka era has ended, and strategically, as Ratsiraka can be arrested the moment he sets foot on Malagasy soil. Generally, Ravalomanana s image as a shrewd politician has passed the early tests of using carrot and stick to structure a policy aiming to rejoin the international community both politically and economically, while excluding any possible return of the former government. His principal challenge will undoubtedly emerge from the competing parallel jurisdictions of power within the country, particularly the autonomous provinces who are asserting their power, and village leaders, who will use local social and justice systems to preserve their power (cf. Country tability and orceful ctions). andra Evers swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation
Update Madagascar May ugust 2003 Page 5 verage Domestic Cooperation and Conflict 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 verage Domestic Cooperation verage Domestic Conflict 2 1 0 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 verage number of reported events per month: 119 Indicator description see: appendix Risk ssessment: he verage Domestic Conflict curve stabilized over the monitoring period. he verage Domestic Cooperation curve shows a similar trend. gainst the backdrop of potential conflict outside the capital region (cf. first graph), the government has launched a major initiative to reconstruct the national road infrastructure. his project, if successful, will go a long way in convincing a highly sceptical electorate that things are finally changing, while presenting numerous other advantages in terms of security, transport of goods and people, and the reduction of poverty. he Ravalomanana government continues to follow IM inspired free market strategies, further distancing itself from the former socialist regime. further economic stimulus was announced by Ravalomanana s promised elimination of the import tax on industrial and agricultural equipment, and transport materials such as trucks. Cement and textile production input have already been granted this tax exemption. On 31 July, the country returned to the riary, the name of the pre-colonial currency. his decision was partially influenced by the advent of the Euro and the corresponding abolition of the rench ranc, which in turn has made the franc malgache somewhat of an anomaly. lthough economic prospects are portrayed by the government to be improving, the reality for most Malagasy remains bleak. Prices of their daily food requirement are expected to rise over the coming three months according to estimates of the IN (Institut National de la tatistique). he World ood Programme (WP) has maintained its warning concerning food shortages in Madagascar. he WP indicated towards the end of July that it expects 270,000 people, spread out over 18 districts in the outh of the country, will need food aid from eptember to December 2003. hese regions in the semidesert of Madagascar suffer from chronic drought and soil erosion, which makes agriculture very problematic. Based on the stabilization trend of the verage Domestic Conflict and Cooperation curves, and the government s public commitment to improving administrative and economic structures at the regional level, relations between government and civil society are expected to remain stable in the near future. Maintaining these trends depends, however, upon resolving the pressing issue of rising food prices. andra Evers swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation
Update Madagascar May ugust 2003 Page 6 verage International Conflict and Cooperation 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0-1 verage International Cooperation verage International Conflict 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 verage number of reported events per month: 119 Indicator description see: appendix Risk ssessment: he verage International Conflict curve remained constant through May, June and July, and increased in ugust. he cooperation curve shows limited fluctuations between May and July, with a slight increase in ugust, a reflection of the willingness of both Madagascar and its neighbors to consolidate relations, particularly on the multilateral level. Madagascar was recently re-admitted into the frican Union (U) in July after its one and a half suspension brought on by allegations that Ravalomanana had seized power after the presidential elections of December 2001 in an undemocratic and unconstitutional manner. he Ravalomanana government s reduction of duties on capital and goods is also a part of Madagascar s renewed commitment to the COME (Common Market for Eastern and outhern frica), and the government s stated aim to increase exports within the region, particularly of frozen fish, timber, tea and textiles. new UID sponsored project has been launched to maximize access of Malagasy businesses to available opportunities under the frican Growth and Opportunity ct (GO). he GO jumpstart project is designed to increase export volume in three targeted areas: textiles, natural resources and handicraft. It has led to the creation of the U.. Madagascar Business Council. Despite the laudable economic initiatives and reinsertion of Madagascar within the international community, for the coming period, the Ravalomanana government urgently needs to find international donors to assist them in their fight against poverty. andra Evers swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation
Update ppendix: Description of indicators used Page 7 Variable Name Description / Definition Proportion of orceful ction events compared to ll Direct ctions. Relative he indicator orceful ctions depicts all reported uses of physical force by any actor. his includes orceful ctions non-injury destructive acts, non-military injury-destruction, and military engagement. Civil ector Relative Civil Direct ctions Government ector Relative Government Direct ctions Conflict Carrying Capacity Country tability verage Domestic Conflict verage Domestic Cooperation verage International Conflict verage International Cooperation Proportion of Civil Direct ctions compared to ll Civil ctions. Civil Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to non-governmental, or civil sector actors. Proportion of Government Direct ctions compared to ll Government ctions. Government Direct ctions are conflictive events that can be assigned to the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationships, expel, seize and force. hese categories encompass direct action limited to the political sector, or government actors. he Conflict Carrying Capacity (or CCC) is a composed index that depicts the overall stability of the country or region of interest. he CCC is operationalized in terms of the multiplicative interaction among three Proportional measures: (1) civil contentiousness or the Proportion of civil actions that are reported as contentious or "direct" and thus challenge (at least implicitly) the state's monopoly on conflict regulation; (2) state repression or the Proportion of state actions that are reported as extra-institutional or "direct" both in response to direct challenges from the civil sector and those initiated by the state to repress and control opposition; and (3) violent contention or the Proportion of actions entailing physical damage to persons or property. the index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. he country stability index is another version of the CCC measure with minor changes in order to improve the responsiveness of the index to events that influence the stability of a country. indicators are used to display Proportions of conflict and cooperation events in time. Each event category is assigned a rating (value), ranging from -10 (extreme conflict) to 10 (extreme cooperation). Zero value events are excluded from these calculations. he verage Domestic Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative () values of all conflictive intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative values divided by the total number of conflictive domestic events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he verage Domestic Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive () values of all cooperative intrastate or domestic events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive values divided by the total number of cooperative domestic events). he verage International Conflict indicator displays the cumulative average of the negative () values of all conflictive interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the negative values divided by the total number of conflictive international events). or interpretation purposes we take the absolute values (means positive values). he verage International Cooperation indicator displays the cumulative average of the positive () values of all cooperative interstate or international events in a specific time period (means the sum of the positive values divided by the total number of cooperative international events). swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation
Update he Early Warning ystem Page 8 Who are we? (German acronym for Early nalysis of ensions and act-finding ) is the early warning project of swisspeace, based in Berne, witzerland. In 1998 the wiss gency for Development and Cooperation (DC) assigned swisspeace to set up a political early warning system for early identification of impending armed conflict and political crisis situations. What do we want? aims to enhance political decision makers ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent political strategies can be formulated either to prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or to identify opportunities for peacebuilding. How do we work? uses both quantitative and qualitative methods for its analysis. he centerpiece in the quantitative analysis is based on event data analysis and the respective tools developed in the framework of the Program on Nonviolent anctions and Cultural urvival (PONC) at Harvard University. he logic of event data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale. hese values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. he quality and quantity of data input is crucial for the success of such a method. In order to gather the quality and quantity of data required to suit early warning purposes, sets up its own local information networks (LINs) and thus overcomes shortcomings of existing information sources (e.g., international news wires). unique set of data is collected for each country completely independently from Western news-media coverage. or qualitative data analysis, contracts internationally renowned country experts. What are our products? products are risk assessments tailored to individual customers' needs. he standard product ( Update ) consists of three to five charts depicting the latest conflict related trends and a concise expert interpretation. s the time-series of collected data grow, analysts will apply statistical methods to go beyond retrospective description and forecast future developments. Updates are available in either hard copy or electronic form, covering time intervals as chosen by the customer. Which countries do we monitor? frica: sia: Europe: ngola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, omalia fghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Caucasus region, Pakistan, ajikistan, Uzbekistan lbania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, erbia and Montenegro Middle East: Palestine swisspeace wiss gency for Development and Cooperation