The United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council Letter from the Executive Board Welcome delegates, to the THSMUN 15! In this document you will find basic information about both the agendas,please read the document and do further research on the same.the Background Guide helps you to get a grasp over the agendas and gives you the basic outline of what your research material should be. We hope that this document helps you understand the issue and that understanding leads to better debate in the committee. Best of Luck! Keshav Gupta Chairperson Shreesh Chadha Vice-Chairperson

About the UN Security Council Under the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council also recommends to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and the admission of new Members to the United Nations. And, together with the General Assembly, it elects the judges of the International Court of Justice. You are also advised to look into the Practice of the UN Security Council 1 and how the Charter affects the same. This will be highly informative as to the inner workings of the SC and hence, debate on it. 1 http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml

An advised pattern of research is the following: 1. Understanding of the UN and the Committee Mandate, etc. 2. Research on the allotted country, especially with respect to the agenda, past policies or actions taken 3. Understanding the Foreign Policy of the allotted country by studying past actions, their causes and consequences 4. Reading the Study Guide 5. Researching further upon the Agenda using the footnotes and links given in the guide 6. Prepare topics for moderated caucuses and their content 7. Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/allegation you are going to use in committee 8. Keep your research updated using news websites given in the Proof Proof/Evidence in the Council Evidence or proof is acceptable from sources: 1. News Sources: a. REUTERS 2 Any Reuters article which clearly makes mention of the fact or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council. b. State operated News Agencies These reports can be used in the support of or against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any Country as such but in that situation, they can be denied by any other country in the council. Some examples are, RIA Novosti (Russia) 3, IRNA (Iran) 4, BBC (United Kingdom) 5 and Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (P.R. China) 6 2 http://www.reuters.com/ 3 http://en.rian.ru/ 4 http://www.irna.ir/enindex.htm 5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 6 http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/

2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a nuance is that a report that is being denied by a certain country can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible information. Examples are, a. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America 7 or the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 8 b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India 9, People s Republic of China 10, France 11, Russian Federation 12 c. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations 13 Reports and other documents d. Multilateral Organizations like the NATO 14, ASEAN 15, OPEC 16, etc. 3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information or evidence for the Executive Board of the Security Council. a. UN Bodies: Like the UNSC 17, GA 18, HRC 19 etc. 7 http://www.state.gov/index.htm 8 http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm 9 http://www.mea.gov.in/ 10 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ 11 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ 12 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/main_eng 13 http://www.un.org/en/members/(click on any country to get the website of the Office of its Permanent Representative.) 14 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm 15 http://www.aseansec.org/ 16 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ 17 http://www.un.org/docs/sc/ 18 http://www.un.org/en/ga/ 19 http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/pages/hrcindex.aspx

b. UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency 20, World Bank 21, International Monetary Fund 22, International Committee of the Red Cross 23, etc. c. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System 24, the International Criminal Court 25 Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia 26, Amnesty International 27, Human Rights Watch 28 or newspapers like the Guardian 29, Times of India 30, etc. be accepted as PROOF; but may be used for better understanding of any issue and even be brought up in debate, if the information given in such sources is in line with the beliefs of a Government. 20 http://www.iaea.org/ 21 http://www.worldbank.org/ 22 http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm 23 http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp 24 http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm 25 http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc 26 http://www.wikipedia.org/ 27 http://www.amnesty.org/ 28 http://www.hrw.org/ 29 http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 30 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/

AGENDA 1 - State of Central Africa- With Special Emphasis on Burundi Elections Introduction Central Africa is a core region of the African continent which includes Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, thedemocratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda. Middle Africa (as used by the United Nations when categorising geographic subregions) is an analogous term that includes Angola, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, therepublic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe. [1] All of the states in the UN subregion of Middle Africa, plus those otherwise commonly reckoned in Central Africa (11 states in total), constitute the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). [2] Since its independence in 2011, South Sudan has also been commonly included in the region à Map of Africa To understand the dynamics of Central Africa it is important to understand the conflict in The Central African Republic, since no other country in this region is as disturbed as CAR. The said conflict is a civil war in the Central African Republic between the Seleka

rebel coalition and government forces, which began on 10 December 2012. 31 The conflict arose after rebels accused the government of President François Bozizé of failing to abide by peace agreements signed in 2007 and 2011. 32 Many of the rebel groups were previously involved in the Central African Republic Bush War. 33 Map of battles in the Central African Republic Rebel forces known as Seleka captured many major towns in the central and eastern regions of the country in the end of 2012. Seleka comprises two major groups based in north-eastern CAR: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), but also includes the lesser known Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK). 34 Two other groups based in northern CAR, the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) and the Chadian group Popular Front for Recovery (FPR), also announced their allegiance to the Seleka coalition. 31 http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=31&regionselect=2- Southern_Africa# 32 Ibid 33 Ibid 34 http://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/three-rebel-groups-threaten-topplecafrican-regime

Chad, [35 Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Republic of Congo sent troops as part of the Economic Community of Central African States FOMAC force to help the Bozize 36 government hold back a potential rebel advance on the capital, Bangui. However, the capital was seized by the rebels on 24 March 2013 ] at which time François Bozize fled the country, and the rebel leader Michel Djotodia declared himself president. On 18 April 2013 Michel Djotodia was recognized as the transitional head of government at a regional summit in N'Djamena. 37 On 14 May CAR's PM Nicolas Tiangaye requested a UN peacekeeping force from the UN Security Council and on 31 May former President Bozizé was indicted for crimes against humanity and incitement of genocide. The security situation remained poor during June August 2013 with reports of over 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as human rights abuses including the use of child soldiers, rape, torture, extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances as well as renewed fighting between Seleka and Bozize supporters in August with French President François Hollande calling on the UN Security Council and the African Union to increase their efforts to stabilize the country. By August the Seleka-run government under Djotodia was said to be increasingly divided 38 The conflict worsened towards the end of the year with international warnings of a "genocide." The fighting was between the government of the Central African Republic's former Seleka coalition of rebel groups, who are mainly from the Muslim minority (as is President Michel Djotodia), and the mainly Christian antibalaka coalition. In January 2014, President Djotodia resigned and was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza but the conflict continued. In 2014, Amnesty International reported several massacres committed by the anti-balakas against Muslim civilians, forcing thousands of Muslims to flee the country. 35 http://www.trust.org/item/?map=chad-sends-troops-to-back-car-army-against-rebels 36 http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2013/04/19/zuma-joins-regional-leaders-overcrisis-in-central-african-republic 37 http://www.ndjamenapost.com/world/item/718-central-african-republic-swears-inpresident-michel-djotodia 38 http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/14/central-african-republichumanitarian-crisis-un

In ordinary parlance the conflict in the Central African Republic can be explained as follows- Two armed rebel groups are struggling for dominance over the country and are using attacks on civilians as their primary tactic. The largely-muslim Seleka rebels attack civilians from CAR's Christian majority. The largely-christian anti-balaka militias attack civilians from the Muslim minority. On both sides, atrocities are frequent: large-scale killing, often grisly, and accompanied by rape, lynching, and destruction of homes and neighbourhoods. And the state's own forces are unable and ineffective in stopping them. The resulting violence has killed thousands of people and forced approximately a million more from their homes, about 25 percent of the country's population into sprawling tent cities or out of the country entirely. More than 85 percent of the country's once-substantial Muslim population has fled.

Although the fighting has calmed somewhat since earlier this year, when the country seemed to be on the brink of genocide, the war shows no sign of stopping despite a peace treaty, a new president, and a deployment of UN peacekeepers. In the last two and a half weeks alone, fighting in Bangui, CAR's capital city, has forced 6,500 people from their homes. Origins The conflict began as a political one. The Seleka rebel group, whose name means alliance, was formed in 2012 by disaffected Muslim military and political leaders who felt they'd been sidelined for their religion. They easily conquered the capital, installing Seleka leader Michel Djotodia in power. But the campaign quickly bled into sectarian killings, with rebels slaughtering civilians from communities that did not bend to them, often by rule-by-terror methods such as burning them alive. In response, members of the old regime s security forces formed the anti-balaka militias (balaka is a portmanteau of machete and AK-47) to fight back. The anti-balaka mission almost immediately expanded to include launching reprisal killings against Muslim civilians, and eventually expelling Muslims entirely. Now, the conflict has taken on a momentum and logic all its own. According to Human Rights Watch 39, the Seleka have burned more than 1000 homes across more than 34 villages, as part of their campaign of rape and murder. Human Rights Watch has also documented 40 numerous cases of anti-balaka fighters targeting entire Muslim communities, including by killing women and children, and telling civilians that they wanted to "kill all Muslims." This violence has, sadly, been extremely effective. Seleka leaders have repeatedly demanded that the country be partitioned into a Muslim region in the North and a Christian region in the south. The sad fact is that the partition is already essentially in place, as nearly all Muslim civilians have fled the southern part of the country. 39 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/09/18/i-can-still-smell-dead 40 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/12/18/they-came-kill

Reasons for the continuance of the conflict In a country where government is weak or entirely powerless, military power has become a way for fighters to gain everything from material goods to political power. And because the state and peacekeepers lack the strength to protect civilians, violence against Muslim and Christian communities begets reprisals, which beget more violence. In other words, until peace has more to offer, the fighting won't stop and peace is very hard to implement even if everyone agrees to it. Both the Seleka and anti-balaka are loose coalitions that lack centralized top-down command structures. No one person has the authority to agree to a peace treaty or the power to enforce one. In September 2013, when Djotodia took power and tried to disband the Seleka, they ignored him and carried on with their attacks. In July of this year, representatives of the Seleka and anti-balaka signed a cease-fire agreement, only to have other leaders of other factions within those groups repudiate the agreement almost immediately. However, there is at least some good news: although the violence isn't over, it has not spiraled out of control to the degree that many expected it to earlier this year, when the fighting was at its worst. Can the conflict end? The international community has tried to mediate, but although foreign peacekeepers may have prevented the conflict from getting worse, there aren't enough peacekeepers to police the whole country, and some African Union peacekeepers have become involved in the conflict themselves. The AU peacekeeping mission failed to bring peace. Its troops included Chadian officers who had actually fought alongside the Seleka, which have been supported by Chad since the war began in 2012. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 41, the Chadian peacekeepers opened fire on a market filled with civilians in March 2014, killing at least 30 41 http://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/displaynews.aspx?newsid=14471&langid=e

people. That same month, some Congolese peacekeepers arrested 11 civilians in response to an anti-balaka attack that had killed a peacekeeper; none of the 11 were heard from again. The UN officially took over peacekeeping duties in September of 2014. United Nations Peacekeeping and Central African Republic: The Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) by its resolution 2149 (2104) of 10 April 2014 and requested the Secretary-General to subsume BINUCA 42 in the new mission as of the date of the adoption of that resolution. It further requested the Secretary-General to ensure a seamless transition from BINUCA to MINUSCA. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council authorized MINUSCA to take all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment. It further decided that the transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA will take place on 15 September 2014. In the period preceding this transfer of authority, MINUSCA implemented the mandated tasks through its civilian component, while MISCA continued to implement its tasks as mandated by Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) 43 MINUSCA commenced the implementation of the mandated tasks through its military and police components on 15 September 2014. 42 http://binuca.unmissions.org/default.aspx?alias=binuca.unmissions.org/binucaeng&language=en-us 43 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/2127(2013)

Mandate The Council decided that the mandate of MINUSCA shall initially focus on the following priority tasks: a. Protection of civilians i. To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Central African Republic authorities, the civilian population from threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, including through active patrolling; ii. To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors; iii. To identify and record threats and attacks against the civilian population, including through regular interaction with the civilian population and working closely with humanitarian and human rights organizations; iv. To design, implement and deliver, in close consultation with humanitarian and human rights organizations and other relevant partners, a mission-wide protection strategy; b. Support for the implementation of the transition process, including efforts in favor of the extension of State authority and preservation of territorial integrity i. To take a leading role in international efforts to assist the Transitional Authorities working with ECCAS, the African Union, relevant stakeholders and the international community to devise, facilitate, coordinate and provide technical assistance to the political transition and electoral processes; ii. To provide good offices and political support for the efforts to address root causes of the conflict and establish lasting peace and security in the CAR; iii. To provide appropriate support, in coordination with the Transitional Authorities, and based on the risks on the ground, for the provision of security for key national stakeholders, including members of the Transitional Government;

iv. To assist the Transitional Authorities in mediation and reconciliation processes at both the national and local levels, working with relevant regional and local bodies and religious leaders, including through inclusive national dialogue, transitional justice and conflictresolution mechanisms, while ensuring the full and effective participation of women; v. To devise, facilitate and provide technical assistance to the electoral process and make all necessary preparations, in support of the Transitional Authorities and working on an urgent basis with the National Electoral Authority, for the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections, including the full and effective participation of women at all levels and at an early stage, and the participation of CAR IDPs and refugees no later than February 2015; vi. To promote and support the rapid extension of state authority; c. Facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance To contribute, including through effective civil-military coordination and in close coordination with humanitarian actors, to the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with UN guiding humanitarian principles and relevant provisions of international law, and for the voluntary safe, dignified and sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors; d. Protection of the United Nations To protect the United Nations personnel, installations, equipment and goods and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; e. Promotion and protection of human rights i. To monitor, help investigate and report publicly and to the Security Council on violations of international humanitarian law and on abuses and violations of human rights committed throughout the CAR, in particular by different armed groups, including the former Seleka and the anti-balaka, and to contribute to efforts to identify and prosecute perpetrators, and to prevent such violations and abuses, including through the deployment of human rights observers;

ii. To monitor, help investigate and report specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women, including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict, and to contribute to efforts to identify and prosecute perpetrators, and to prevent such violations and abuses; iii. To support the International Commission of Inquiry and the implementation of its recommendations; iv. To assist the CAR authorities in the effort to protect and promote human rights; f. Support for national and international justice and the rule of law i. To support and work with the Transitional Authorities to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, including through cooperation with States of the region the ICC; ii. To help build the capacities, including through technical assistance, of the national judicial system, and of the national human rights institutions and assist with national reconciliation efforts, coordinating with the Independent Expert as appropriate; iii. To provide support and to coordinate international assistance to the police, justice and correctional institutions to reinstate the criminal justice system, within the framework of the UN global focal point on rule of law, including through assistance in the maintenance of public safety and basic law and order, in a manner that emphasizes civilian oversight, impartiality and the protection of human rights and to support the restoration and maintenance of public safety and the rule of law including through the presence and assistance of UN police; g. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR) i. To support the Transitional Authorities in developing and implementing a revised strategy for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR) of former combatants and armed elements to reflect new realities on the ground, while paying specific attention to the needs of children associated with armed forces and groups, and support for the repatriation of foreign elements; ii. To support the Transitional Authorities in developing and implementing community violence reduction programmes;

iii. To regroup and canton combatants and confiscate and destroy, as appropriate, the weapons and ammunition of elements of personnel who refuse or fail to lay down their arms; Additional tasks The Security Council further decided that the mandate of MINUSCA shall include the following additional tasks as conditions permit and requested the Secretariat to begin planning for these tasks: a. support to security sector reform and vetting processes, including through the provision of strategic policy advice and coordination of technical assistance and training; b. coordinate international assistance as appropriate; (c) assist the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 57 of resolution 2127 (2013) 44 and the Panel of Experts established by the same resolution, within its capabilities, including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the mandate of the Committee and Panel of Experts; (d) monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013), in cooperation with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), including by inspecting, as it deems necessary and when appropriate without notice, all arms and related materiel regardless of location and advise the Transitional Authorities on efforts to keep armed groups from exploiting natural resources, (e) seize and collect arms and any related materiel the transfer of which into the CAR violates the measures imposed by paragraph 54 of resolution 2127 (2013) and to record and dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate. SITUATION IN BURUDI. Background. 44 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/res/2127(2013)

Presidential elections were held in Burundi on 21 July 2015 wherein President Pierre Nkurunziza ran for a third term despite controversy over whether he was eligible to run again. The opposition boycotted the vote, and Nkurunziza won re-election. elections were held elected using the two-round system. If no candidate had won a majority of the vote in the first round, a second round would have been held. The two-round system (also known as the second ballot, runoff voting or ballotage) is a voting system used to elect a single winner where the voter casts a single vote for their chosen candidate. However, if no candidate receives the required number of votes (usually an absolute majority or 40-45% with a winning margin of 5-15%), then those candidates having less than a certain proportion of the votes, or all but the two candidates receiving the most votes, are eliminated, and a second round of voting occurs The controversy The ruling CNDD FDD or National Council for the Defense of Democracy Forces for the Defense of Democracy. and the opposition disagreed over whether President Pierre Nkurunziza was eligible to run for a third term in office. Allies of Nkurunziza claimed that he was eligible for a third term, as his first term began after being elected by Parliament rather than a popular vote, and so was not included in the term limit. [3] During a two-day visit to Burundi in March 2015, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete warned of a risk of violence if the constitution and the 2005 Arusha Peace Agreement 45 is not adhered to. The Arusha Peace Agreement was Signed on 28 August 2000 by 13 of the 19 warring parties of Burundi. Among the signatories were the Burundi Government, the Burundi National Assembly, seven Hutu parties and four major Tutsi parties. Six Tutsi parties refused to sign the agreement. 46 In April 2015, the CNDD FDD nominated Nkurunziza as its candidate. The decision prompted days of protests and clashes with police in Bujumbura. The government denounced the unrest and accused the opposition of trying to reignite the violence and ethnic tensions of the civil war.the Burundian Civil War was an armed conflict lasting from 1993 to 2005. 45 https://www.issafrica.org/cdburundipeaceagreements/no%201%20arusha.pdf 46 http://unterm.un.org/dgaacs/unterm.nsf/8fa942046ff7601c85256983007ca4d8/d1e795e7 6bc4480c85256b0b0064661f

The civil war was the result of long standing ethnic divisions between the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes in Burundi. The conflict began following the first multi-party elections in the country since independence from Belgium in 1962, and is seen as formally ending with the swearing in of Pierre Nkurunziza in August 2005. The estimated death toll stands at 300,000 killed. On 5 May 2015 the Constitutional Court ruled that Nkurunziza was eligible to stand for a third term, although its ruling followed the court's Vice President Sylvere Nimpagaritse fleeing the country, saying that most of the court judges believed that Nkurunziza standing for a third term was unconstitutional, but that they had come under pressure to change their minds. On 13 May a coup attempt was launched by elements in the military opposed to Nkurunziza's third term bid, but loyalist soldiers reasserted control by the next day. The African Union and the United States both called for Nkurunziza not to stand for a third term. On 19 May, following a meeting of regional leaders, South African President Jacob Zuma called for the election to be indefinitely delayed. On 27 May, the government urged citizens to donate money to help finance the election, reacting to the possibility of foreign aid being cut by saying that the vote would be held regardless. On 31 May, regional leaders of the East African Community called for the election to be delayed by six weeks. [10] While the Burundian government responded positively, protesters were angry that the EAC said nothing about Nkurunziza's candidacy. On 8 June 2015, the electoral commission proposed that the date of the presidential election be moved from 26 June to 15 July, delaying the vote by nearly three weeks. Nkurunziza began his re-election campaign at a rally on 25 June. On 11 July 2015, in response to requests from regional leaders, the government announced another delay, pushing the vote back by six days to 21 July. Although the regional leaders had requested a delay to 30 July to allow time for a potential mediation effort coordinated by the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, the government pointed to the constitutional requirement that the vote be held no later than 26 July, one month prior to the expiration of Nkurunziza's term. With the election only days away, the mediation effort was largely unsuccessful. Museveni acted as mediator for one day and then placed the Ugandan Minister of Defense, Crispus Kiyonga, in charge of the effort. Government representatives did not attend the talks on 19 July, and they were consequently suspended. Opposition In December 2014 it was announced that eight opposition parties would field a joint candidate for the presidential elections, as well as running together in the parliamentary elections.

On 10 June 2015, various opposition leaders called for a boycott of the election, rejecting the notion of holding the vote amidst ongoing protests and controversy regarding Nkurunziza's re-election bid and complaining that the election should have been delayed further, especially in light of the EAC's call for a six week delay. 17 opposition parties announced on 26 June that they would boycott the election. With the entire opposition, including key opposition candidate Agathon Rwasa, calling for a boycott, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for another postponement on the same day, "in order to create a conducive environment for inclusive, peaceful and transparent elections", and he urged dialogue between the government and the opposition. Albert Shingiro, Burundi's Permanent Representative to the UN, rejected the notion of postponing the vote again. He argued that it was constitutionally necessary to hold the vote as planned and that to do otherwise would mean an "institutional vacuum", and he said that it would be unacceptable for the overwhelming majority of voters to be held "hostage" by a small "radical minority" who opposed holding the election on schedule. Although the opposition candidates pulled out of the race and called for a boycott, their names remained on ballot papers Results The electoral commission announced on 24 July 2015 that Nkurunziza had won the election with 69.41% of the vote. Agathon Rwasa was placed second and credited with 18.99% despite calling for a boycott. The CNDD-FDD described Nkurunziza's re-election as a "stunning victory" and a "divine miracle". Candidate Party Votes % Pierre Nkurunziza CNDD FDD 1,961,510 69.41 Agathon Rwasa National Forces of Liberation 536,625 18.99 Gerard Nduwayo UPRONA 60,380 2.14 Jean Minani FRODEBU-Nyakuri 38,554 1.36 Jacques Bigirimana FNL 28,609 1.01

Domitien Ndayizeye RANAC 19,996 0.71 Jean De Dieu Mutabazi COPA 4,436 0.16 Sylvestre Ntibantungaya Gira Ijambo 3,952 0.14 Invalid 103,420 3.66 Abstain 68,590 2.43 Total 2,826,072 100 Registered voters/turnout 73.44 Source: Reuters Aftermath Nkurunziza was sworn in for his third term a few days early, on 20 August 2015. The ceremony was not announced until the same day it was held. Speaking on the occasion, he described his re-election as "a victory of all Burundians". He vowed that if his enemies continued to pursue violence, they would be beaten with the aid of God and "scattered like flour thrown into the air".he appointed a new government on 25 August. Nkurunziza loyalists considered to be hardliners were appointed to key posts, but supporters of Rwasa, who had adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the government, were appointed to head five less important ministries http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704736?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents