ISSUE 89 MARCH 2017 In this issue On the Agenda The clock is ticking for the AU to establish a Continental Free Trade Area, but many obstacles still remain. The PSC discussed the use of child soldiers a burning issue in war zones like South Sudan. Situation Analysis With a crowded starting line in Liberia s electoral race, coalition politics will be key. Addis Insight The new financing model of the AU is an opportunity for member states to pay their dues regularly and on time. PSC Interview Peace & Security Council Repor t Prof Eddy Maloka, CEO of the African Peer Review Mechanism, tells the PSC Report his organisation can help The Gambia get back on track after two decades of dictatorship. Ellen Johnson Revenue Sirleaf failed to deliver on her promises institutions would have to be corruption-free The Gambia has now entered a new era Page 7 Page 11 Page 14
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT On the Agenda The long road to opening Africa s borders Is the state of peace and security in Africa conducive to the free movement of people? This was the question facing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) during its recent debate on the implications of the African Union s (AU) aims to establish a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). The PSC tried to come up with a balanced response, despite the complexity of the issue, encouraging member states to facilitate free movement while addressing security concerns. The launch of an African passport in Kigali last year illustrated the growing demand among many African states for the AU to facilitate the free movement of people throughout the continent. Over the last year a number of AU member states have removed visa requirement for African nationals. But, with the clock ticking for the AU to establish the CFTA this year, there are still many obstacles before it can be fully implemented. The clock is ticking for the AU to establish the Continental Free Trade Area this year A closer look at the issue of visa regulations for Africans shows that the concept of open borders has been unequally implemented. This is largely because of security concerns and because African states are jealous of their sovereignty. PSC Chairperson H.E Hope Ndumiso Tumukunde NtshingaGasatura Ambassador of Rwanda South Africa to to Ethiopia and and Permanent Representative to the AU Current members of the PSC: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Egypt, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, Zambia The ideal of the free movement of people across Africa is the object of a plethora of statements and agreements by African heads of state. The Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, adopted by the Organization for African Unity in 1991, made the free movement of people, along with rights of residence and establishment, the fifth stage of the realisation of this ideal. One of the objectives set by the AU Constitutive Act is to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent, although there is no explicit mention in the act of the free movement of people. West Africa ahead in establishing the free movement of people The state of the free movement of people in Africa differs from one region to another. Of these, West Africa is the most advanced. Inhabitants of the 15 member countries of the Economic Community of West African States can travel, get residence permits and work in member countries. The East African Community (EAC) is the second most advanced of the regional economic communities (RECs). Its member states adopted a 2
protocol establishing a common market in 2009. This agreement includes the free cross-border movement of people, an integrated border management system, the right of establishment and residence and the removal of restrictions on the movement of labour and services. In order to speed up the implementation of this protocol, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya have removed visa requirements for EAC citizens, allowing them to travel only with identity documents. While the Southern African Development Community adopted the Protocol on Facilitation of the Movement of People in 2005, it has been ratified only by Botswana, Swaziland, South Africa and Mozambique. In Central Africa, free circulation has been effective among only three members of the Economic Community of Central African States, namely Cameroon, Chad and the Republic of Congo. Gabon and Equatorial Guinea which have the highest gross domestic product in the region while being the least populated have long resisted the implementation of this policy. In North Africa, one of the goals of the treaty creating the Arab Maghreb Union is the facilitation of the free movement of people. However, both the simmering Algeria/Morocco tensions and the war in Libya hamper its implementation. Most AU member states have concerns about free movement Clearly, despite the pledges made to the AU, the issue of the free movement of people and goods still raises concerns in many AU member states. Because border control remains uneven on the continent, the removal of visa or other requirements is often seen as weakening state control over migration policies. These concerns are fuelled by the lack of any fact-based assessment on the benefits of free movement. Such free circulation is instead perceived to give rise to cross-border crime, the illegal movement of people and other ills plaguing states with porous borders. From this perspective, it should also be recalled that less than 30% of African borders have been demarcated. In many regions, borders and the areas surrounding them have become ungoverned spaces where state authority is weak. Many border areas problematic The major zones of instability in Africa remain the crossborder areas, whether in northern Mali; the area bordered by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger where the terror group Boko Haram operates; the cross-border areas between Uganda, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); or the eastern borders of the DRC. It should be noted that these borders are mostly cross-regional rather than intra-regional. In many regions, borders and the areas surrounding them have become ungoverned spaces These zones are often affected by human trafficking, the flow of small and light weapons, drug smuggling and uncontrolled migration. This de facto free movement of people and goods is happening far from state control, and often to undermine the state. Rivalries and tensions among member states also often constitute aggravating factors. For example, the crisis in Darfur and its regionalisation took place in a context where both Chad and Sudan supported and hosted proxy movements along their respective borders. One of the conclusions of the PSC meeting about free movement and peace and security was that the benefits outweigh both economic and security challenges. It also asked the AU Commission to speed up the finalisation of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in Africa. In addition, the PSC called for enhanced collaboration between and among member states in the area of migration, dispelling any fears that may be generated by the promotion of free movement of people, goods and services. Free movement an opportunity for cooperation In Europe, countries wishing to accede to the Schengen Treaty, which provides for free circulation between member countries, had to go through a rigorous process 3
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT obliging them to adhere to strict requirements. Contrary to the situation in Africa, border controls in Europe were functioning well before the treaty was adopted. Clearly, the mitigation of the risks posed by free movement to peace and security require a careful, staged process, as the PSC proposes. On the positive side, it is an opportunity for AU member states to adopt a common approach in managing their security. However, such a development may be challenging in many regions where inter-state tensions hamper any cooperation. Overcoming these challenges requires a number of crucial steps, including implementing various existing instruments. Firstly, those instruments pertaining to a common border management need to be implemented. The Niamey Convention on Cross Border Cooperation, adopted in 2014, provides a framework for such activities. But this convention has been signed by only nine member states (Benin, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania Niger, São Tomé et Príncipe, Sierra Leone and Togo) and ratified only by Niger. The recent xenophobic events in South Africa and Algeria showed that migration remains a sensitive issue Secondly, the African Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), which was launched during the last AU summit in Addis Ababa, should be extended to African judicial systems as a whole. The creation of an African Common Warrant should be sped up in this regard. Thirdly, the implementation of an area of free movement requires a common database. The main challenge would be to ensure that the management of such a database respects the various instruments regarding human rights and that the database is not used to serve political purposes. Finally, the main issue remains the timetable for creating this area of free movement of people and goods. In the current context, it is unlikely that all African regions can bear the risks associated with free movement. 9 STATES HAVE SIGNED THE NIAMEY CONVENTION ON CROSS BORDER COOPERATION The recent xenophobic events in South Africa and Algeria showed that migration remains a sensitive issue in many member states. Moreover, the security situation in various regions and the tensions among many states require the careful implementation of the planned CFTA. Instead of a uniform and continent-wide process, it should be selective and sequenced. Member states should be required to adhere to strict conditions in terms of digitising their civil registry, police and judicial systems and adhering to various AU legal instruments. A mechanism for verification should be created to ensure that member states fulfil these requirements. Only a process that takes into account the multiplicity of the security contexts can ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the free movement of people throughout the continent. 4
On the Agenda Protecting children from fighting adult wars in South Sudan from fighting adult wars. This was an opportunity for the PSC to look at its own tools to intervene in conflicts such as in South Sudan, where child soldiers are prevalent. Thanks to the efforts released in South Sudan in the past few years, but a lot more can still be done. Recent reports underline the worsening situation of child soldiers employed by warring factions to commit indiscriminate violence in South Sudan. According to the UN Children s Fund (UNICEF), more than 17 000 children have been recruited by government and opposition forces in South Sudan since the war began in 2013. About 1 300 children were recruited in 2016 alone. The report also highlighted the abhorrent number of children killed, maimed, abducted or sexually assaulted. The use of children to fight adult wars does not only violate the rights of children but also undermines initiatives to hold perpetrators accountable, as many of the accused could turn out to be underage. The ongoing trial of a former Ugandan Lord s Resistance Army (LRA) child soldier, Dominic Ongwen, at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, for example, highlights the way children have been radicalised through war. At the age of 13, Ongwen was allegedly abducted by LRA forces and used as a child soldier. Within two decades he rose through LRA ranks to become a fierce commander alongside the notorious Joseph Kony. Today, Ongwen faces charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. At the age of 13, Ongwen was abducted by LRA forces and used as a child soldier Some say he is a victim because his agency in committing those crimes is questionable, having been recruited and radicalised as a child. Children s vulnerability and blind obedience to instructions are regarded as assets by the warring factions that conscript them. According to UNICEF, campaigns against the use of children have contributed to the release of more than 115 000 child soldiers in various conflict regions since 2000. 17 000 CHILD SOLDIERS IN SOUTH SUDAN 5
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT In the case of South Sudan, the government and opposition factions signed agreements to prevent the use of children. These include the action plans with the UN that form part of the peace agreement of August 2015. Altogether, 1 932 children were released in 2015 and 2016 thanks to this agreement. However, those releases are token gestures by the warring factions in South Sudan to appease international criticisms. Thousands of children remain fighters for the warring parties in the country. An opportunity for the African Union? The PSC held a briefing on protecting children from fighting adult wars on 23 February. In view of its limited capacity, the AU would stretch itself too thinly by pursuing elaborate child protection campaigns. The continental body could, however, use its existing peace and security initiatives to encourage the protection of children. In South Sudan, the hybrid court provided for by the 2015 peace deal enables the AU and the international community to show their commitment by holding the warring factions accountable for violating the rights of children at all levels. (The peace deal has committed the warring factions to end the use of children as soldiers.) The AU Commission s campaign for accountability in South Sudan, which began last year, can also serve to push for the end of violations against children. The AU would stretch itself too thinly by pursuing elaborate child protection campaigns Need to prevent further insecurity Measures to ensure accountability will, however, prove futile if there are no robust civilian protection efforts. Insecurity and poor civilian protection have played a significant role in driving children into the camps of warring factions. Some children, speaking to Human Rights Watch researchers, narrated chilling stories on why they opted to join warring groups in South Sudan: to, to be safe? You either die, or kill your enemy. Everyone is treated the same way, whether young or old. The latest six-monthly PSC report indicates an upsurge in the recruitment of civilians, including children, since July 2016, when the peace process in the country stalled. The UN has also warned that there is a real danger of mass atrocities owing to the rise of militias and heavyhanded military offensives in the region. Children form a significant part of the government and militia forces. Children form a significant part of the government and militia forces The AU and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) were the motivating partners for the UN-mandated Regional Protection Force (RPF) that is yet to be deployed to South Sudan. Given that the troops will come from within Africa, the AU and IGAD should work speedily with the UN to expedite the deployment of the RPF to prevent further violence and enhance the protection of civilians. Hopefully, the force will reduce the rate at which civilians, including children, turn to militia groups for protection. The continental body should also support its African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) to work at a practical level with partners to deter the recruitment and use of children. This will advance the ACERWC s mandate of protecting the rights of children beyond its current visibility at the level of campaigns and advocacies on child protection. It remains to be seen how the AU s 2017 theme on investing in youth will spur the continental body to action in protecting the rights of children. The briefings on protecting children should not only be about recognising the plight of children in conflict zones. It should rather drive the AU and its partners to concrete action aimed at resolving insecurity and safeguarding the dreams of the next generation of leaders. We can die too, like everyone else; it s safer as a soldier. It is like a competition, where do you run 6
Situation Analysis Of businessmen, technocrats and politicos: the race for Liberia s presidency will participate in the peaceful transfer of power between a living president and an elected successor. A compelling cast of businessmen, technocrats and career politicians are jockeying to replace incumbent Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Over the 11 years of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf s presidency, she might have stabilised Liberia s transition from war to peace, but she failed to deliver on the promises of economic prosperity and social justice that would have provided a foundation for that peace to be sustainable. Socio-economic inequalities in Liberia have worsened, marked by a timid post-ebola economic recovery, enduring youth unemployment and persistent gender inequalities. In addition, the elections will take place in a context of heightened security concerns resulting from the progressive drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to 1 240 military and 606 police officers by 1 July this year from an initial number of over 15 000 UN military personnel in 2003. Of the candidates with a fighting chance to reach the second round of voting, there are two businessmen, two technocrats and three career politicians. The leader of the All Liberian Party (ALP), Benoni Urey, has built a business empire around agriculture, media and telecommunications in Liberia. Urey s bid for presidency illustrates the complexity of unresolved post-war transitional justice issues Urey served as Commissioner of Maritime Affairs from 1996 to 2003 under Charles Taylor, earning him a spot on both the UN Sanctions List and the United States Specially Designated Nationals list. He was subsequently taken off the lists in 2013 and 2015 respectively. Urey s bid for presidency illustrates the complexity of unresolved post-war transitional justice issues. Meanwhile Alexander Cummings, a Liberian-born American, is a former Coca- Cola executive who has worked across Africa. He is running for president in a country whose Alien and Nationality Law prohibits dual citizenship: an issue which remains a centrepiece of Liberia s constitutional review process. Both Urey and Cummings are serious contenders for the presidency, depending on their picks for running mate. 1 July 2017 MOST UNMIL SOLDIERS TO LEAVE LIBERIA 7
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Technocrats also in the race The two technocrats in the race for the presidency current Vice-President Joseph N Boakai and J Mills Jones, the former governor of the Central Bank of Liberia have both served in the Johnson Sirleaf administration. It is widely believed that Jones used this position to launch the Loan Extension and Availability Facility (LEAF) and Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) schemes, which facilitate access to credit for rural communities, to boost his 2017 presidential bid. Meanwhile, Boakai s technocratic acumen earned him a spot on Johnson Sirleaf s Unity Party (UP) ticket in 2005. However, the vice presidency comes with the gift and the curse of party incumbency. According to Rodney Sieh, the publisher of Liberia s leading newspaper FrontPageAfrica, Boakai, although probably favoured by the international community, faces challenges at home. These include the lukewarm support he has recently been getting from President Johnson Sirleaf and the poor record of the Johnson Sirleaf administration, particularly regarding corruption. Two legislative leaders of the ruling UP House Speaker Alex Tyler (the Bomi County Representative) and party Chairperson Senator Varney Sherman (Grand Cape Mount County) are under indictment on corruption charges. The governing coalition that the UP built while in power has slowly disintegrated, with party stalwarts jumping ship to hedge their bets on the fractured opposition. At age 72, Boakai, whose political base is north-western Lofa County, is also the oldest candidate in the field. The governing coalition that the UP built while in power has slowly disintegrated, with party stalwarts jumping ship George Weah tries to make a comeback 7 FRONTRUNNERS FOR PRESIDENT IN LIBERIA The career politicos in the race have all run before. Senator George Weah was the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) candidate for the presidency in 2005 and its Vice-Presidential candidate in 2011. The 1995 FIFA World Player of the year, who remains very popular among Liberia s urban youth, Weah won the first round of voting during the 2005 presidential election only to be defeated by Johnson Sirleaf in the runoff. For 2017, Weah s CDC has forged an alliance with Senator Jewel Taylor s National Patriotic Party (NPP), and indicted speaker Alex Tyler s Liberia People Democratic Party (LPDP) to form the CDC. By making the politically expedient choice of Taylor as his running mate, Weah is angling for voter-rich Bong County. Charles Brumskine of the Liberty Party (LP) also ran for the 2005 and 2011 presidential elections. A shrewd political actor, Brumskine, whose political 8
base is Grand Bassa County, understands that his shot at the presidency hinges on building a geographically optimal coalition; as well as what Liberians make of the material support he is allegedly getting from Johnson Sirleaf. Former Charles Taylor ally and then archenemy during the civil war, Senator Prince Y Johnson (Movement for Democracy and Reonstruction- Nimba County) ran for president in 2011. He placed third and later endorsed Johnson Sirleaf s UP based on their pledge not to enforce the recommendations of Liberia s Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. This report, which banned him from holding public office for 30 years, has never been implemented. Johnson, who has become a fixture in Nimba politics, remains a long-shot presidential candidate whose endorsement is a boon for anyone hoping to carry Nimba; Liberia s second most populous county. The race has largely devolved into one between personalities manoeuvring to form strategic coalitions No clear favourites In a race between a disintegrating ruling coalition and a fractured opposition there are no clear favourites. On the crowded starting line, the race has largely devolved into one between personalities manoeuvring to form strategic coalitions that will deliver the ultimate prize the presidency. In September 2016, 13 of the 21 registered opposition parties committed to the Ganta Declaration, resolving not to engage in campaign smearing, and to work collectively to defeat the ruling UP. It understandably fell short of endorsing a single opposition candidate to represent the opposition. However, despite the UP s weaknesses, for many observers, it would take a disciplined and strategic coalition of the opposition to keep the ruling UP from making it to the second round. In her 2006 inaugural address on the capital grounds in Monrovia, Johnson Sirleaf renewed her campaign pledge to wage war against corruption, regardless of where it exists, or by whom it is practiced. In her final State of the Republic address, she acknowledged the intractability of challenges posed by corruption and uncertain reconciliation. These issues should not only play a central role in voters choices, but they ought also to shape the formation of political coalitions by the presidential candidates, in a race that will shape Liberia s post-war reconstruction trajectory. 9
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Addis Insight The new funding model tests the commitment of AU member states This year, the AU is supposed to begin the implementation of its new provides the AU with a fresh opportunity to reach its goal of financial scrutiny shows that the existing regional funding models, on which part of the AU plan is based, have faced huge setbacks. According to the AU s factsheet for the implementation of its financing plan, drawn up by former African Development Bank chief Donald Kaberuka, a number of countries have already started implementing the new plan. This includes Kenya, Rwanda, Chad, Ethiopia and the Republic of Congo. Yet this is far from adequate on a continent with 54 countries. The effectiveness of the new funding mechanism clearly depends on the timely implementation by all AU member states. Lessons from Africa s subregions Kaberuka stated at the 27 th AU summit in Kigali, when his plan was adopted by heads of state, that the AU import levy is possible because it is modelled on similar successful import levies adopted by African states to finance regional economic communities (RECs). Kaberuka used this to fend off criticism about the ambitious nature of the funding proposal on a continent known for its lavish plans that lack implementation. 2006 ECOWAS FIRST ADOPTED A COMMON EXTERNAL TARRIF The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for instance, adopted a Common External Tariff (CET) in 2006. The tariff plan only came into force in January 2015, almost a decade after its adoption, due to numerous delays. Only nine member states at this stage apply the CET. This year, ECOWAS decided to push for the effective application of the CET by all 15 member states starting January 2017. The Community Levy of 0.5% of imports to fund ECOWAS programmes has also faced challenges and delays. Thus, while some states may seem keen to implement the new 0.2% levy, others may stall the process, as the ECOWAS example shows. A regional arrangement for the Peace Fund While arrangements for financing the AU s operations and programmes are up to individual countries, according to assessed contributions, each of 10
Africa s five regions are required to contribute to peacekeeping operations on a regional basis. Each region is required to contribute $64 million in the first year of the plan, totalling $320 million to finance roughly 25% of the total budget for peacekeeping in Africa. The United Nations (UN) and other outside partners pay the rest. Each of Africa s five regions are required to contribute to peacekeeping operations The contributions to the Peace Fund are over and above those paid to the AU through assessed contributions, but also taken out of the 0.2% levy on imports. Institutional barriers The new funding mechanism requires each country to select the appropriate financial institution(s) or customs authority responsible for assessment and collection of the AU import levy. The weak revenue-generating agencies and unsophisticated financial institutions of some member states could, however, make it difficult for them to implement the levy within the given timeframe. The responsible revenue institutions would also have to be corruption-free to ensure that the import levy is paid to the AU account rather than ending up in the hands of corrupt officials. Will it be about choosing between the AU and RECs? Considering that AU member states also belong to other subregional groupings with their own levy arrangements, the question can be asked whether the new AU levy would not be an extra burden on some states. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) also has a 0.4% levy arrangement on all imports from outside the region. The levy arrangement was to start in January 2017, as was the AU arrangement. Rwanda, which re-joined ECCAS in 2015, is already negotiating to be left out of the ECCAS import levy model due to other commitments. It had committed to a similar arrangement of 1.4% under the East African Community (EAC), as well as the recent AU 0.2% import levy. Since 2017 is when most of the levy arrangements on the continent are either kicking off or maturing, some states may have to decide what to prioritise in the short term: the AU or their own RECs? As such, the import levy tests the level of commitment of member states to the AU and to their own regions. New costs and opportunities Some commentators have also expressed concern over the possible impact of this import levy on importers and African consumers. 0.4% IMPORT LEVY IMPOSED BY ECCAS 11
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT However, Stephen Karingi, Director of the Capacity Development Division of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, told the PSC Report, It is possible to implement the 0.2 levy in a way that it has a neutral impact on the costs to importers and the consumers. He says Kenya is a good example of how this neutrality of impact on the costs of production and to consumers has been achieved. It has done this through the innovative use of existing fiscal measures. The Kenyan minister of finance has proposed to reduce the existing import declaration fee of 2.5% in order to cater for the 0.2% AU levy, without raising the cost of importation or causing a price increase for consumers. Karingi argues that whichever approach the African governments decide to take to implement the levy, any short-term costs or pain are far outweighed by the medium- to long-term benefits of an African Union which is self financing. Contingency plans to cover deficits? The AU states that if any country collects more money through the import levy than what is required from it by the AU, it can keep the rest of the funds for its own needs. Countries pay according to assessed contributions based on the size of their economies. This provision could, theoretically, encourage countries to impose the levy, since part of it could go to state coffers. The flipside of the coin is that member states also have to make contingency plans to foot the bill if the import revenues do not match their assessed contribution. How the 0,2% import levy works Take Country X s assessed contribution to the AU per year as $1. From the 0.2% levy, Country X collects $5 per year. It s from the $5 that the country deducts the $1 and remits it to the AU Also, from the $5, the country is obligated to deduct the amount levied on it by the region to contribute to the $65 million per region (annually) to the Peace Fund. Any surplus collected by member states after the fulfillment of obligations under the assessed contribution are to be retained by the state for their own development needs. Any deficits between the assessed contribution and revenues collected under the AU import levy by a member state shall be covered by the member state. Source: FAQ s about Financing the Union AU 12
As such, member states need to strengthen their tax and revenue system to ensure the generation of ample funds for running their country and paying their dues. The 2015 Thabo Mbeki report on illicit funding estimated that Africa looses $50 billion annually partly because of tax avoidance by multinational companies. This persists owing to the weak tax system that renders African states unable to generate funds for pertinent development needs. Once you re the one paying, you become more concerned about getting good value for money Making the most of the funds One of the underlying implications of the new funding model is that it may push the AU to become more effective. The AU would have to implement reforms to make the most of the money member states would now generate locally. During the 28 th AU Summit Rwandan President Paul Kagamé acknowledged that the reform of the AU is closely tied to the new funding decision. Once you re the one paying, you automatically become more concerned about getting good value for money, he said. Reports on the reform of the AU since 2007 have consistently highlighted the need for the organisation to focus on priority areas rather than spreading itself too thinly. The resource-constrained AU embarks on many superfluous, if noble, projects and programmes. These projects are often poorly executed and at times abandoned halfway. The AU has to explore ways to delegate to, or rather cooperate with, existing institutions, including civil society organisations, to attain its mandate. Effective cooperation with state and non-state actors will reduce the duplication of efforts and the number of ineffective silo projects in the continent. If successful, the new funding mechanism will elevate the status of the AU as an equal partner to the UN and powerful regional bodies such as the European Union. It will also go a long way to address concerns over the capture of the AU by powerful countries such as France, Britain, the United States or China. 13
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT PSC Interview Helping The Gambia to pick up the pieces Following a dramatic exit from power by The Gambia s former leader Yahya Jammeh in January 2017, the country s democratically elected President Adama Barrow is slowly picking up the pieces. After 22 years of authoritarian rule by Jammeh, a lot needs to be done. At the end of February, Barrow met with Prof Eddy Maloka, chief executive officer of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) about acceding to the mechanism. If this happens, The Gambia will be the 36 th member state of the APRM. The PSC Report asked Maloka about the implications of this decision. The Gambia s President Adama Barrow has indicated that his country wants to join the APRM. What will it mean for The Gambia? It will be a very important symbol that The Gambia has now entered a new era. As the APRM we are the best placed to address the institutional deficits facing the country. For example The Gambia doesn t have a human rights council and many other institutions that can ensure good governance, sustainable development and so forth. We can assist them with building institutions of accountability and governance. The Gambia is also facing huge issues of transitional justice. We can help them in this healing process. The APRM was designed to improve good governance in Africa through internal processes. Therefore it requires certain institutions for self-assessment. Won t it be too difficult for The Gambia under the current circumstances where many institutions are in disarray or simply don t exist? No, this is what the APRM is all about. We hope that The Gambia will accede to the APRM at the next APRM summit [on the margins of the AU summit] in June or July. After that happens the country has to set up its own structures like a national governing council [the national APRM institution that is independent of government, including all stakeholders] and then draw up a plan of action. Being part of the APRM will put energy into the process of establishing institutions to ensure greater transparency, accountability and human rights. 14
Will the APRM send in consultants or outsiders to help The Gambia to set up these institutions? How will this happen? It depends on what comes out of the process. We now have a technical team that is helping them with acceding to the APRM, which should happen at the next summit. An APRM panel member will then coordinate the process and determine which missions should be undertaken and what actions have to be taken. Then we can see if any external assistance is needed. Remember this is a self-led process. The APRM will pick up the strengths and weaknesses and take it from there. What about the other country reviews? In January this year, Senegal, Chad, Djibouti and Kenya presented their reports [to their peers] at the AU summit. These reports will now be launched, but this will be preceded by a stakeholder meeting. We are now insisting that before the public launch, there must be a roadmap in place. For example, if the country report states there should be more women represented in parliament, or that a human rights council must be set up, these challenges should be part of the roadmap, with timelines of how it will be implemented. This is new. You have to unveil the roadmap and say what you are going to do, together with publishing the report. So immediately after the [AU] summit, we were already busy looking at the plan of action, the next set of actions to be taken, the challenges the country is facing and how to move forward. Will there be any APRM country reports presented in at the 29 th AU summit in July? The Sudan report is ready and Liberia is also ready. We thought we might add Uganda and Nigeria [undergoing their second review], but they need more time to finish. That s not a bad thing, because launching two reports at a time is enough. In fact, we want to negotiate with the new AU Commission for more time allocated to the APRM summit. We can t rush through these reports. At the previous summit we were given just four hours, which are not enough. What about the rest of the year? So far 17 out of the 35 member states of the APRM have been peer reviewed. We are moving fast, but some countries, like Nigeria have asked us for more time. Our aim is to do five to seven reports this year. 15
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT About the ISS The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) partners to build knowledge and skills that secure Africa s future. Our goal is to enhance human security as a means to achieve sustainable peace and prosperity. ISS work covers transnational crimes, migration, peacekeeping, crime prevention and criminal justice, peacebuilding, and the analysis of conflict and governance. Using its networks and influence, the ISS provides timely and credible analysis, practical training and technical assistance to governments and civil society. This promotes better policy and practice, because senior officials can make informed decisions about how to deal with Africa s human security challenges. Contributors to this issue Yann Bedzigui, ISS Addis Ababa researcher Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Consultant to the PSC Report Ndubuisi Christian Ani, ISS Addis Ababa researcher Richard Fonteh Akum, ISS Pretoria senior researcher Contact Liesl Louw-Vaudran Consultant to the PSC Report ISS Pretoria Email: llouw@issafrica.org Acknowledgements The publication of the PSC Report is made possible through support from the Hanns Seidel Stiftung and the Government of The Netherlands. The ISS is also grateful for the support of the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA. ISS Pretoria Block C, Brooklyn Court 361 Veale Street New Muckleneuk Pretoria, South Africa Tel: +27 12 346 9500 Fax: +27 12 460 0998 ISS Addis Ababa 5th Floor, Get House Building, Africa Avenue Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Tel: +251 11 515 6320 Fax: +251 11 515 6449 ISS Dakar 4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum Route de Ouakam Dakar, Senegal Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42 Fax: +221 33 860 3343 ISS Nairobi Elysee Plaza, 3rd floor Kilimani Road off Elgeyo Marakwet Road Nairobi Tel: +254 72 860 7642 Tel: +254 73 565 0300 2017, Institute for Security Studies Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the contributors and the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the contributors and the ISS. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the ISS, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity. www.issafrica.org