In The Supreme Court of the United States

No. 11-840 ================================================================ In The Supreme Court of the United States --------------------------------- --------------------------------- JOHN DOE AP, versus Petitioner, ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF ST. LOUIS, et al., Respondents. --------------------------------- --------------------------------- On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The Supreme Court Of Missouri --------------------------------- --------------------------------- REPLY TO THE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI MARCI A. HAMILTON, ESQ. Counsel of Record 36 Timber Knoll Drive Washington Crossing, PA 18977 (215) 353-8984 hamilton.marci@gmail.com --------------------------------- --------------------------------- REBECCA RANDLES, ESQ. RANDLES MATA & BROWN, LLC 406 W. 34th Street, Suite 623 Kansas City, MO 64111 (816) 931-9901 Rebecca@rmblawyers.com KENNETH M. CHACKES, ESQ. M. SUSAN CARLSON, ESQ. CHACKES, CARLSON & HALQUIST, LLP 230 S. Bemiston Avenue Suite 800 St. Louis, MO 63105 scarlson@ccsg-law.com JEFFREY R. ANDERSON, ESQ. PATRICK NOAKER, ESQ. JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, PA 366 Jackson Street, Suite 100 St. Paul, MN 55101 Patrick@andersonadvocates. com Counsel for Petitioner John Doe AP ================================================================ COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS... i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... ii INTRODUCTION... 1 I. There Is No Adequate And Independent State Ground That Would Render A First Amendment Holding Superfluous To Final Resolution Of This Case... 1 II. There Is A Split In Authority On The Question Of Whether The First Amendment Is A Defense To Liability For A Religious Employer s Acts Of Negligence... 4 III. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church And School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Is Not Controlling, And Does Not Sweep As Broadly As Respondent Describes It... 11 CONCLUSION... 12

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)... 5 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)... 6 Bequette v. Buff, 862 S.W.2d 921 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)... 1 Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996)... 5 Berry v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124 (N.H. 2005)... 5 Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. 2002)... 9 Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)... 2 Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991)... 5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)... 9 Cook v. Smith, 33 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)... 1 C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1999)... 5 Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Conn. 2003)... 5 Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis, 347 S.W.3d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)... 10 Employment Div., Dep t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)... 7, 9

iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued Page Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)... 5 Faheen, by and Through Hebron v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)... 2 F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997)... 5 Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Me. 2005)... 5 General Council on Fin. and Admin., United Methodist Church v. Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, 439 U.S. 1355 (1998)... 8 Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997)... 7, 10 Goebel v. Johnston, No. 4:09-CV-106 CEJ, 2009 WL 2600750 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2009)... 10 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 556 U.S., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)... 8, 11, 12 Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999)... 3 John Doe CS v. Capuchin Franciscan Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (E.D. Mo. 2007)... 10 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)... 7 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)... 7, 9 Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)... 5

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued Page Kraus v. Board of Educ., 492 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1973)... 6 Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995)... 3 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002)... 5, 6, 7 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)... 6 Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999)... 5 Martinez v. Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-01458, 1998 WL 242412 (Tex. Ct. App. May 15, 1998)... 5 Mary Doe SD v. The Salvation Army, No. 4:07- CV-362 MLM, 2007 WL 2757119 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2007)... 10 Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991)... 3 Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)... 5 Oliver v. State Tax Comm n, 37 S.W.3d 243 (Mo. 2001)... 9 Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)... 5 Perry v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 2d 996 (E.D. Mo. 2009)... 10 Perry v. Johnston, 641 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2011)... 10 Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995)... 6

v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued Page Rashedi v. General Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)... 5 Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993)... 9 Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 2005)... 5 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)... 7 Smith v. O Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997)... 5 Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)... 5 State v. Bullock, 153 S.W.3d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)... 4 State v. Young, 139 S.W.3d 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)... 4 Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997)... 6 Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal, 54 S.W.3d 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)... 3 Young v. Gelineau, No. 03-1302, 2007 WL 3236736 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2007)... 5 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. Const. amend. I... passim

vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued Page RULES Supreme Court Rule 15... 1 OTHER AUTHORITIES 28 U.S.C. 1331 (2006)... 8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 315 (1965)... 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 317 (1965)... 1, 2, 3

1 INTRODUCTION Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 15.6, Petitioner John Doe AP ( Petitioner ) respectfully submits this Reply to Respondent Archdiocese of Saint Louis ( Respondent or Archdiocese ) Brief in Opposition to John Doe AP s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. I. There Is No Adequate And Independent State Ground That Would Render A First Amendment Holding Superfluous To Final Resolution Of This Case Respondent has mischaracterized Missouri law. A premises requirement is not a necessary element of negligence law in Missouri. Respondent incorrectly states that torts of negligent supervision and intentional failure to supervise have the same premises element adopted from section 317 of the restatement of torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 317 (1965) (hereinafter 317 ) (Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 13, John Doe AP v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, No. 11-840 (U.S. Feb. 6, 2012) (hereinafter Resp. Opp. ). However, 317 and Missouri s negligence theory in general do not require sex acts with a child to be on the employer s premises to attach liability. Missouri law is clear that supervision goes to the person not the activity. Cook v. Smith, 33 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Bequette v. Buff, 862 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). Ownership of premises or instrumentality is only a factor in duty

2 if the ownership of the premises or instrumentality provides the means of control. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 317 (1965). That is not the case in child sex abuse cases. Respondent misleadingly treats sex abuse as nothing more than a sex act. This is a gross oversimplification. Child sex abuse is not merely a single act it is a continuum of grooming and building trust that leads to and then involves inappropriate touching and sex acts like the oral rape and attempted anal rape in this case. Respondent placed Fr. Cooper in a position with access to children and took no action to ensure the protection of the children who would inevitably fall into his sphere of influence. Petitioner, a child in a devout Catholic family, who knew Cooper only through the parish, became ensnared in Cooper s web, because Cooper was an employee of the Respondent acting in his assigned role while befriending, grooming, and seducing Petitioner. If a party has a special relationship that gives rise to a duty to either protect the victim or control the bad actor, then liability for negligent supervision can attach without regard to who owns the premises upon which the bad act occurs. RESTATEMENT (SEC- OND) OF TORTS 315 (1965); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). Special relationships or special facts and circumstances can give rise to a duty to protect third parties from criminal attacks. See Faheen, by and Through Hebron v.

3 City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Respondent ignores the fact that Fr. Cooper s employment role as a priest created the means for the abuse to occur. Thus, the Archdiocese, which bestowed and created this special relationship, has a duty to protect the child even if some of the actions occurred off-premises. Furthermore, Missouri cases regarding abuse occurring off-premises attach liability. For example, in Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal, 54 S.W.3d 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a minister who sexually abused another member of the church on property not owned by the church met the requirements of 317. Here, Petitioner s parents only allowed him to go to Fr. Cooper s clubhouse because of his employment as an Archdiocesan priest. Their relationship revolved around Church functions; Petitioner trusted him only because of his role as a priest; and excursions to the clubhouse began and ended at the Church. Fr. Cooper s employment status and role in the parish and the Archdiocese afforded him the access to Petitioner at the clubhouse. See also Hutchison v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052, 1062 (Pa. 1999); Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 907 P.2d 358, 386 (Cal. 1995); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1354-55 (Cal. 1991). Even if there were a requirement that the abuse take place on premises, Petitioner has established

4 that fact as well. Acts of grooming that took place on church premises cannot be separated from the sex acts. They are part of the series of events that normalized and made possible the sex abuse, and have been recognized as such under Missouri law. See generally State v. Bullock, 153 S.W.3d 882, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Young, 139 S.W.3d 194, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). II. There Is A Split In Authority On The Question Of Whether The First Amendment Is A Defense To Liability For A Religious Employer s Acts Of Negligence Respondent argues that there is no split in authority regarding whether the First Amendment is a bar to organizational liability on the theory that Missouri applies a profession-specific inquiry to negligence claims. This purportedly sets it apart from every other state. Resp. Opp. at 15. Respondent is incorrect for two reasons. First, Missouri recognizes many other categories of negligence, which are distinct from theories related to specific professions. Second, Missouri s inquiry into this question only differs semantically from other states. In fact, Missouri follows the same basic inquiry as other states. But in contradiction to most states, Missouri incorrectly has read the First Amendment as a bar to the application of negligence tort principles to religious organizations.

5 A majority of states recognizes that the application of neutral principles of tort law to religious institutions in clergy abuse cases does not violate the First Amendment. 1 But there is still need for this Court s guidance. Both state and federal courts are in disarray and require this Court s guidance in these important and numerous cases. Lower courts have noted that this area of First Amendment law is in flux and the United States Supreme Court cases offer very limited 1 Young v. Gelineau, No. 03-1302, 2007 WL 3236736, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2007); Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1240 (Miss. 2005); Berry v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1136 (N.H. 2005); Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208, 1232 (Me. 2005); Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139, 147 (D. Conn. 2003); Rashedi v. General Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364 (Fla. 2002); C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 985 P.2d 262, 277 (Wash. 1999); Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 431 (2d Cir. 1999); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Martinez v. Primera Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-01458, 1998 WL 242412, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. May 15, 1998); Smith v. O Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702-03 (N.J. 1997); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323 (Colo. 1996); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 1991); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).

6 guidance. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 357 n.7 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)). See also Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441, 446-47 (Me. 1997) (Lipez, J., dissenting). Respondent manufactures a requirement of a profession-specific inquiry to evade negligence liability for its tortious actions. It then argues that Missouri law substantially differs from other states, which according to Respondent, do not require an inquiry into church doctrine, polity, and administration. Resp. Opp. at 17. This argument is a diversion; there is nothing in tort law that mandates that the beliefs of an organization must be taken into account in order to determine whether it has acted negligently in placing employee pedophiles near children. The facts needed to prove the tort involve conduct, not belief. While state courts have the power to decide federal constitutional issues, they are nevertheless constrained to follow this Court s doctrine. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1995). The Supreme Court of Missouri previously recognized this principle in Kraus v. Board of Education, by confirming that state court judges in Missouri are bound by the supreme law of the land, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States. 492 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Mo. 1973). They

7 may not use state law interpretation as a cover for misinterpreting the First Amendment. Respondent contends that Missouri s determination in Gibson v. Brewer 2 does not conflict with the former decisions of this Court. Resp. Opp. at 23. However, Respondent studiously ignores the principles set forth in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979), which state that neutral principles of law can and should be applied to religious bodies. See also Employment Div., Dep t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (hereinafter Smith ). What Respondent casts as state choice in tort law is in fact constitutional misinterpretation. Respondent also asserts that this Court s decisions in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), and Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), have uniformly held that civil inquiry into the church/clergy employment relationship is prohibited under the First Amendment. Resp. Opp. at 23. Respondent s contention is an overstatement, as this Court has not extended the principles espoused in those cases beyond ecclesiastical intrachurch disputes. See Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 363 (distinguishing clergy abuse cases from strictly ecclesiastical intrachurch disputes ). 2 Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997).

8 Respondent also asserts that General Council on Fin. and Admin., United Methodist Church v. Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, 439 U.S. 1355 (1998), only applies to purely secular disputes, as though religious organizations are immune from tort liability merely because they are religious. Resp. Opp. at 26. That is an indefensible position. In any event, the issue in this case involves the secular issue whether an organization has created the conditions leading to the sexual abuse of a child to whom it owes a duty. Thus, General Council is on point. Petitioner is bringing a third-party claim and invoking neutral, generally applicable tort laws to be applied to Respondent. Petitioner is not disputing the Church s internal beliefs, and he is not a member of the Church s clergy who willingly accepted employment on an implicit understanding that employment disputes were to be left solely to the church. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 556 U.S., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). The standards for negligence and negligent supervision and retention claims are civil law standards of conduct that do not require courts to interpret or apply religious law or dogma. 3 The Respondent s 3 Respondent contends that this Court cannot be the arbiter of the interpretation of state tort law. Resp. Opp. at 17. However Missouri s Court of Appeal s application of the First Amendment to this neutral negligence inquiry turns on a federal constitutional issue, over which this Court plainly has power. See 28 U.S.C. 1331 (2006).

9 absolute right to believe whatever it chooses is not affected by the law governing conduct at stake in this case. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). This case asks this Court only to analyze conduct, which is properly subject to neutral laws of general applicability, even if it is religiously motivated or performed by religious actors. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79; Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 547 (Mo. 2002); Oliver v. State Tax Comm n, 37 S.W.3d 243, 248 (Mo. 2001). As this Court has declared: Legislative power to punish subversive action cannot be doubted. If such action should be actually attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 109. The same principle applies to religious institutions and organizations. The question of whether or not the Respondent was negligent, engaged in negligent supervision, or negligent retention, is assessed by analyzing the reasonableness of any employer in permitting a suspected child abuser to have access, through their employment, to more children. This Court is not being asked to determine what a reasonable diocese would do, but only what an ordinary, prudent employer whose employees are regularly in contact with children would do. 4 Thus, whether Respondent acted in conformity 4 As with any corporation, compliance with industry standards does not create immunity in tort. One of the best-known principles of tort law... is that compliance with [industry] custom is no defense to a tort claim. Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 888 (7th Cir. 1993).

10 with the standard set by other dioceses or the Church as a whole is not determinative, and this court need not establish a reasonably prudent diocese standard to determine whether Respondent violated an employer s duty of care to children. Respondent s opposition is further undermined by four recent cases asserting claims of negligence under Missouri law against religious institutions for child sexual abuse by clergy, where the courts have concluded that Gibson does not comport with decisions of this Court, that Gibson should not control, and the negligence claims should not be dismissed. These cases were decided by a Missouri Circuit Court and federal judges in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Perry v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 2d 996 (E.D. Mo. 2009); Goebel v. Johnston, No. 4:09-CV-106 CEJ, 2009 WL 2600750, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 21, 2009); Mary Doe SD v. The Salvation Army, No.4:07-CV-362 MLM, 2007 WL 2757119, at *6, (E.D. Mo. Sept. 20, 2007); John Doe CS v. Capuchin Franciscan Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (E.D. Mo. 2007); but see Perry v. Johnston, 641 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2011). The court below held that it was required to apply Gibson, 5 but, as the four cases above have found, a Missouri Supreme Court case that is at odds with this Court s interpretation of the First Amendment is not 5 See Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis, 347 S.W.3d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).

11 controlling precedent and the motion to dismiss the negligence, negligent supervision and retention claims should not have been granted. This Court s guidance on the First Amendment is sorely needed in Missouri as well as Utah and Wisconsin and those states not yet to address the issue. III. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church And School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Is Not Controlling, And Does Not Sweep As Broadly As Respondent Describes It This Court s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 556 U.S., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), does not govern this case. The church s own brief to the Court urged that the application of a ministerial exception to a suit by or on behalf of a minister would not in any way bar criminal prosecutions for interfering with law enforcement investigations or other proceedings. Hosanna-Tabor, 556 U.S., 132 S. Ct. at 710. According to the Church, the [ministerial] exception applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves. Id. The decision is limited due to discrimination claims. This Court further narrowed the holding, to make clear that the ministerial exception likely would not apply in other types of disputes between ministers and their employers: The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a

12 minister, challenging her church s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise. Id. Respondent is relying on Hosanna-Tabor for a broad exception that this Court explicitly refused to grant. See Hosanna-Tabor, 556 U.S., 132 S. Ct. at 710; Resp. Opp. at 24. If the ministerial exception is not controlling in cases involving torts between the ministerial employee and employer, it is certainly irrelevant in cases between third-party tort victims like Petitioner and religious organizations like Respondent. --------------------------------- --------------------------------- CONCLUSION Respondent has offered no persuasive reasons for this Court to deny certiorari. For the foregoing reasons and those in the Petition, Petitioner requests

13 this Court grant certiorari or, in the alternative, summarily reverse the decision below. Respectfully submitted, MARCI A. HAMILTON, ESQ. Counsel of Record 36 Timber Knoll Drive Washington Crossing, PA 18977 (215) 353-8984 hamilton.marci@gmail.com REBECCA RANDLES, ESQ. RANDLES MATA & BROWN, LLC 406 W. 34th Street, Suite 623 Kansas City, MO 64111 (816) 931-9901 Rebecca@rmblawyers.com KENNETH M. CHACKES, ESQ. M. SUSAN CARLSON, ESQ. CHACKES, CARLSON & HALQUIST, LLP 230 S. Bemiston Avenue, Suite 800 St. Louis, MO 63105 scarlson@ccsg-law.com JEFFREY R. ANDERSON, ESQ. PATRICK NOAKER, ESQ. JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, PA 366 Jackson Street, Suite 100 St. Paul, MN 55101 Patrick@andersonadvocates.com