START DEPP Linking Preparedness Response & Resilience (LPRR) Christian Aid s 2012 Response to Conflict in South Kivu, the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Contents Page Executive Summary.1 Introduction..3 The Context..3 The Disaster..5 The Intervention...7 Project Strategy...7 Research Methodology....8 Findings 9 Conclusions.16 Executive Summary This paper is one of a collection of Linking Preparedness Response and Resilience in Emergency Contexts (LPRR) case studies and analysis papers. LPRR is a START Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP), Department for International Development (DfID) funded 3-year consortium led project which is aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming for more resilient communities. Specifically, this case study has been developed as part of the humanitarian strand of the LPRR project which focuses on developing a practical method for improved, resilience informed humanitarian response. To do this, eight case studies of past humanitarian response interventions will be explored. This paper focuses on Christian Aid and partners 2012 response to conflict in South Kivu, DRC. The aim of this paper is to act as a communication tool, to feed back to the Bangladesh team, verify understanding and outline initial reflections prior to academic analysis. It is important to note that this project and paper recognises the term community as a collective group of at risk, exposed residents. The main aim of this research is to capture community members perception of resilience and both community members and field staff s recommendations for future, resilience focused humanitarian response programming. For the community members interviewed and involved in the focus group discussions, resilience means; 1. Peace 2. Development: roads, health centre 3. Secure livelihoods 4. Access to a market 5. Community togetherness and places to come together 6. Independence 1
Field staff feel that this conflict response project has been conducted in a very challenging context and ultimately was unable to strengthen community preparedness or resilience to the risks faced. Both field staff and crises survivors feel that peace needs to be established before resilience can be built. Despite this, one area of community transformation has been reflected on; field staff and crises survivors feel that the project has enabled women to challenged and changed their place in society and now have the ability, respect, capacity and confidence to participate in community decision making and leadership. Furthermore, eight recommendation have been made by both the field staff and crises survivors around how humanitarian programmes can build and not undermine community resilience, even in a conflict context such as South Kivu. These recommendations include: 1. Humanitarian Communication. Clear communication is needed between NGO and communities throughout all stages of the project. One field officer explains how the mouth to ear communication wasn t successful and that many crises survivors got confused, information was misinterpreted, other information was brought in. 2. Work with the government. Increase collaboration with government and build local government s capacity to protect the communities. Work with the government, go with the government (Field staff). 3. Risk awareness and practical preparedness plans. Do conflict sensitive PVCA s with the communities to raise awareness of risk but also go beyond this to map out preparedness action plans for reducing risks. 4. Psycho-social care and medical care. Include psycho-social community based work from the beginning but go beyond this, also ensure access to medical care for physical damage. Community based psycho-social care can also strengthen community cohesion. 5. Human Rights & Protection. Include protection work and accompany vulnerable communities. Have field staff in the community, accompanying the people always. 6. Advocacy for underlying issues. Include advocacy work on underlying issues. For the DRC context filed staff feel that peace is needed alongside good governance of the mining sector. If there was good governance of the mining sector, the population would not suffer (Field staff) 7. Stronger participation. Closer participation, participation was strong but go beyond this whereby the community and NGO work side by side. 8. Resilience Training. Need to train the people in charge of the response on resilience; from the project officer, the person developing the proposal and the community members; everyone involved needs to be aware of the bigger picture and the long-term goal. 2
1. Introduction This case study aims to outline the strengths, challenges and recommendations shared by the humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders involved in the response such as local government and independent consultants. This paper does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the case study s level of resilience building but aims to outline participants reflections and recommendations. A second paper will be developed critically analysing the impact this example can have on resilience building. This paper is one of a collection of Linking Preparedness Resilience and Response in Emergency Contexts (LPRR) case studies and analysis papers. LPRR is a START Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Programme (DEPP) Department for International Development (DfID) funded 3 year, consortium led project which is aimed at strengthening humanitarian programming for more resilient communities. It is important to note that this project recognises the term community as a collective group of at risk, exposed residents. The LPRR consortium is led by Christian Aid and includes Action Aid, Concern Worldwide, Help Age, Kings College London, Muslim Aid, Oxfam, Saferworld and World Vision. The countries of focus include Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic Congo, Colombia, Indonesia and the Philippines and cover a multi-risk profile. The project has three strands focusing on; resilient informed humanitarian response, resilience informed conflict prevention and learning and capacity building. Specifically this case study has been developed as part of the humanitarian strand of the LPRR project which focuses on developing a practical method for improved, resilience informed humanitarian response. In order to do this, eight case studies of past humanitarian response interventions will be explored. This particular paper focuses on Christian Aid s 2012 Response to conflict in Mwenga and Shabunda in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2. The Context First, in order to provide a clear picture of the context and environment that the project was working in, this section will map out The DRC and specifically South Kivu s economic, environmental, political and social background, the disaster and the subsequent intervention. 2.2 DRC Overview The DRC has a population of approximately 74.99 million people. The poverty level is high at 63.9% and despite impressive economic growth rate between 2005 and 2015 the country was still ranked 187 out of 187 on the Human Development Index in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). 3
The country is still in a state of humanitarian emergency in the more unstable areas of the DRC and the United Nations estimates that there are some 2.3 million displaced persons and refugees in the country and 323,000 DRC nationals living in refugee camps outside the country. Here, Sexual, Gender Based Violence (SGBV) remains one of the highest in the world. Economic Growth In 2014 the economy grew by nearly 9%. This was driven by the extractive and manufacturing industries, agriculture, commerce and construction, and benefited from fairly good external demand and quite high raw material prices. In 2014 the GDP is $32.96 billion. The DR Congo is wealthy in minerals like diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt and zinc which contributed to around 4.6% of its GDP in 2013 Growth expected to remain high in 2016 if the domestic political and security situation stays calm and if external conditions remain good (UNDP 2014). Political Stability The DRC remains fragile and politically unstable. The institutions are thought to be weak and characterised by a culture of corruption. Female participation in politics is thought to be weak and since the 2006 elections, civil society has also been undermined through the politicisation of many groups; in-fighting; lack of resources and capacity; and continued repression and abuse by the government of human rights defenders. The ongoing conflict is thought to have not only limited development but also distorted how people vote (UN, 2014). There is very low transparency and accountability of the public servants and corruption is very high. According to corruption perception index 2014 results by Transparency International in public sector, DRC is perceived to be 22% clean and 78% corrupt and ranked 154/175 (World Bank, 2014). Further to this DRC suffers from a number for human rights violations including (but not limited to); killings by Government forces and non-stated armed groups in the context of the Kimia II military operation in the Kivus, and by the Lord s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Congolese army in Province Orientale. As well as political killings by Congolese security forces in the west of the country, killings by private actors which the government fails to adequately prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish; including vigilante killings, and killings of human rights defenders, journalists and alleged witches and deaths in custody and prison conditions. 2.3 Kivu Kivu s economy is made up of subsistence farming, livestock keeping, mining, commerce, fishing, and mineral transportation. Subsistence agriculture is predominantly pursued by 84% of the households as a livelihood strategy. However, there is low food production and subsequent extreme poverty which is thought to increase the vulnerability of the community to food insecurity. Furthermore, livestock production is a major challenge as large animals are a special target of looting farmers, therefore, the community focus more on small livestock including pigs and rabbits etc. 4
Kivu has a male dominated society where women have low status in societal decision making. There are high rates of early marriage (from the age of 15) and little attendance and access to education particularly for girls. Furthermore girls are particularly vulnerable to targets of SGBV and rape during times of conflict. Communities vulnerabilities There is ongoing large scale displacement due to ongoing violence- IDPs and Refugees. There are a incredibly high number of acts of sexual and gender based violence perpetrated by the different armed groups. Community members suffer from food shortages due to a poor agricultural harvest caused by a lack of agricultural inputs and repeated acts of violence and extortion. There are regular clashes between Raia Mutomboki and FARDC which have aggravated the difficulties of access due to insecurity. Further to this the area is prone to outbreaks diarrhoea, cholera and malaria; 350 cases of diarrhoea and 32 deaths were reported in the Health Zone of Mulungu in the Shabunda territory during the project implementation. Agricultural challenges such as livestock and plant disease, and natural disasters such as flash floods, irregular rains and landslides, which have a negative impact on yields, livestock and infrastructure. Additional challenges include the fact that it is very difficult to the landlocked villages, particularly in Shabunda. 3. The Disaster(s) Christian Aid and partners humanitarian response is focused on the vulnerabilities (re)created and exacerbated by the protracted, ongoing conflict. Risks faced by community members have included violence, SGBV, food insecurity and displacement. The past and ongoing crises in the area include: Past Crises Date Crises 2006 Forces of renegade General Laurent Nkunda and the UN-backed army clash in North Kivu province, prompting December some 50,000 people to flee. The UN Security Council expresses concern about the fighting. 2007 Aid agencies report a big increase in refugees fleeing instability in North Kivu and south Kivu. 2007 September - Major outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus 2008 April April - Army troops clash with Rwandan Hutu militias with whom they were formerly allied in eastern Congo, leaving thousands of people displaced. 2008 August Army troops clash with Rwandan Hutu militias with whom they were formerly allied in eastern Congo, leaving thousands of people displaced. 2010 July- Mass rapes reported in North Kivu province. August 2014 June - Congolese and Rwandan troops clash on the border of their two countries. 2015 January Dozens killed in protests against proposed electoral law changes which the opposition said were designed to allow President Kabila to remain in power. 5
Goal: Strategy: Outcome To reduce the vulnerability of populations affected by armed conflict in Mwenga and Shabunda territories in South Kivu, DRC Targeted assistance (NFI and farm inputs) to the most vulnerable following Provide psychosocial and economic support to victims of GBV. Raise awareness of GBV to all sections of the community 3,000 households received essential items which improved their living conditions and 1,758 households received livelihood support that strengthened and diversified production capacities 850 victims of GBV received psychosocial support, 100 of these were also referred for medical treatment and 400 were supported to reintegrate in to their communities through psychosocial and socio-economic assistance Objectives Activities/Strategy Outcome Indicators: To improve the living conditions of 3,000 displaced households by providing household kits (kitchen sets, bed materials and clothes) Strengthen the basic production means of 1,750 returnee and vulnerable host families by distributing agricultural supports Provide psychosocial support for 400 survivors of sexual and other gender based violence and promote prevention mechanisms against violence in all its forms in the areas currently most affected Train the communities representatives, local authorities, the displaced committees and the returnees on good practices in humanitarian response: Organize the distribution of 3000 NFI kits through the local fair approach Organize training on agricultural techniques (small livestock / fish farming) for 1,750 households tural inputs to 1,750 households Provide psychosocial help to women and girl survivors after rape and refer survivors to appropriate medical structures Train survivors and vulnerable women and girls in microcredit management, grouping targeted women and girls in inter-dependent groups, and provide micro-credit to the survivors and Humanitarian committees were formed in Mwenga and Shabunda and trained in humanitarian standards, allowing them to take part in the planning and implementation of activities 3,000 vulnerable families (4,500 men, 6,300 women and 7,200 children) in the intervention zone have improved living conditions (warmer, increased dignity and more comfortable sleeping conditions The living conditions of 3,000 IDP households were improved and their dignity increased through providing clothes, kitchen sets and blankets. 1,758 households have strengthened and diversified their basic production skills and income. Partner monitoring indicated that 70% of households have harvested 10 times more than usual; 20% failed and 10% didn t sow but kept seeds for next agricultural season, however this is difficult to verify (see narrative point six) 850 rather than the planned 400 GBV affected women/ girls were identified and received psychosocial support (see narrative point five). The psychosocial condition of 95% of survivors was improved and there is evidence of their acceptance back in to their community: successful mediation of 68 couples separated after rape through family counselling 400 survivors chose individual income generating activities and created dynamic women's solidarity groups that supported their economic activities and self- care Military officers have started to sensitize their units about forms of violence and relevant laws and trained military staff have started to refer perpetrators of rape to the military court (2 cases were referred to the military court from Kitutu and Kigulube) Local leaders, traditional chiefs, FARDC officers, PNC officers and civil society leaders are familiar with the relevant national and international laws governing sexual and other gender-based violence Ongoing Crises The ongoing crises include regular clashes between Raia Mutomboki and FARDC, ongoing large scale displacement due to ongoing violence- IDPs and Refugees, increased number of returnees from Rwanda and high numbers of SGBV perpetrated by the different armed groups. In addition to these on-going crises are exacerbated by of food shortages, ongoing violence and extortion perpetrated against civilians, ongoing outbreaks of cholera, diarrhea, malaria and HIV, and environmental hazards such as fires. 6
4. The Intervention The humanitarian intervention aimed at reducing the vulnerability of communities affected by armed conflict in Mwenga and Shabunda territories in South Kivu, DRC. The implementing Christian Aid partner organizations were SARCAF and ECC-MERU. The target of these projects were returnees, IDPs, refugees and other civilians and consisted of victims of insecurity and regular clashes in the East of the DRC, particularly the territories of Shabunda and Mwenga in the province of South Kivu. The project was 9 months and the main activities of the Project included distribution of NFI (non- food Items, agriculture inputs, psycho-social and socio-economic reintegration of survivors of GBV in targeted zones and training and workshop sessions on civilian protection to facilitate social dialogue. 5. The Project strategy A summary of the project phases explored in this case study is outlined in the diagram below. The core focus of the project included cash for work, cash transfers, water filters, and community involvement, local market strengthening, Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience Building. 6. Research Methodology 6.1 Research Aims 1. To explore Christian Aid s 2012 Response to conflict in Mwenga and Shabunda in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 2. To explore both the response & rehabilitation, to capture lessons learnt; recommendations and challenges of smoothly aligning resilience informed response and rehabilitation phases to strengthen community resilience 3. With the over-all project aim of developing recommendations for global resilience informed humanitarian response 6.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling The LPRR research team spent two weeks in the DRC researching Christian Aid s 2012 Response to conflict in Mwenga and Shabunda in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This research is underpinned by Bene et al s (2012) conceptual framework which outlines a resilient system as one which is stable, flexible and able to cope with change. A comprehensive and detailed outline of the methodology can be found in the LPRR learning google drive and project box account. Links to both can be found in the bibliography. Ultimately five core resilience principles have underpinned the research methodologies. These include: 7
1. There is community involvement, incorporating social values and appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects 2. There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and recognising that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective 3. The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards 4. There are spaces and places for continuous learning 5. A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a system are acknowledged to support bouncing forward and better. Any approach to building resilience should not work with an idea of restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a stable state to which they should return after a disturbance. 6.2 Methods, Study Site & Sampling Taking a triangulated approach this research adopts a mixture of methods including; semi structured interviews with key informants and household interviews and focus group discussions with community members which included risk and resilience mapping as the primary data collection methods. The case study sites have been selected by Christian Aid as good examples of lessons learnt. Purposive sampling was adopted for participants in order to gain a diverse range of participants. A total of 10 semi structured interviews were conducted, 5 household interviews and 2 FGDs) 6.3 Data Analysis Data was analysed through thematic analysis, drawing out core aligning and opposing themes and perceptions around the identified resilience variables and additional core factors. A further, more in-depth phase of analysis will be conducted after all case studies have been captured. 6.4 Limitations Several challenges were experienced throughout the DRC case study data collection which are felt to have significantly limit the quality of data. Visa issues meant that the LPRR lead researcher was unable to travel to the South Kivu, therefore a substitute researcher was contracted to collect the data. However, the short timeframe for training this researcher and lack of experience working in this context is felt to have impacted upon the quality of the data collected. The rigorous data collection methods were not followed as systematically as the other case studies; with questions, sample size and methods being shortened, adapted and changed. The biggest challenge is felt to be the lack of recording and transcript documentation of one of the FGD s. Further to this, in the second FGD the essence of the study has been lost, when the researcher failed to ask the crises survivors what resilience means to them. In addition to this, the challenging environment, security issues due to the the conflict context, access issues due to poor roads, the remote location and environmental conditions served to limit the amount of time that the data 8
collection team had in the communities. Furthermore, the timing of the research trip aligned with a challenging period in the Christian Aid Goma office. The lead team member organizing the research left the organization the week before the research trip. This resulted in confusion over logistics and is felt to have impacted the recruitment of the in-country research assistant who submitted transcripts six weeks after the deadline and were not at the same level of quality of the other 7 case studies. If the LPRR project had the time and financial resources a second field visit would be conducted to bridge the gaps required for academic rigor. 7. Findings Resilience Principles Next the five core principles underpinned by Bene et al s (2012) theoretical conceptualization of resilience have been explored. Community members, field staff, local government officials and other key stakeholders were asked to reflect on the five core principles; map out the challenges that existed and recommend opportunities where resilience could be introduced into preparedness, response and recovery and rehabilitation. Principle 1: There is community involvement, incorporating social values and appropriation of local knowledge in resilience building projects In general, field staff and community members feel that community participation throughout the project was strong. However, field staff feel that community participation was weaker at the start of the project however strengthened over time. Despite this, both field staff and community members clearly outline that crises survivors did participate from the very start of the project. Field staff visited households to collect needs assessments and understand the context and needs from the community members perspective before the project proposal was developed. Door to door visits to the community meant the people passed on their knowledge to us Field staff Furthermore, participants explained that the project worked through existing community committees and also established new committees to strengthen participation. Specifically, the project focused on specifically increasing female participation. Field staff feel that interaction with women in the community and the confidence of the women to participate in decision making has significantly increased. This is felt by the field staff and community members to be a direct strength and focus of the local partner, Sarcaf. Interestingly, the project also went beyond just engaging with members of the community and included engaging with the soldiers in the area. Local field staff explained that they feel it is important to include and engage with conflict actors for long term peace to be an option. For the good of the community members we were speaking to soldiers as our friends (Field staff). Local knowledge is felt by community members and field staff to have been shared through the household visits and committees; particularly in regards to the risk context, most vulnerable and the design of the project. local knowledge was utilized in the project, we talked to the community about the types of crops they would like and one 9
example was that they explained to us not to provide soya as it could not grow in their land (Field staff). However, the community also explained that they feel they were not always listened to. For example, the community explained that when they were asked what they would prioritised in terms of development needs in the community, they decided, collectively that the development of a proper road was most important, for access to neighbouring markets but also for quick escape routes in the case of future conflict. However, the project decided on behalf of the community that a health centre was more important. The community were not happy and did not understand why they had not been listened to. Further to this, local culture appears to be negatively perceived by field staff as a challenge. Addressing cultural beliefs and behaviour that contradicts with the law, appears to be an issue that the project has tried to address. People finally understood that custom is not more important than law this was a strong focus we had on our sensitization work (field staff). Further to this, field staff explain that cultural practices such as asking the chief before communication with community members and seeking permission from husbands for the women to be involved served as time consuming blockages to clear communication and strong participation with the community. Principle 2: There is effective governance, supporting community cohesion and recognising that resilient systems take a cross-scalar perspective Secondly, the level of local governance and community cohesion and the impact the project is perceived to have had on both has been explored. Social Cohesion Field staff explained that low social cohesion was highlighted as an issue in the initial needs assessment. Therefore, strengthening social cohesion was described as a core focus of the project and local partner Sarcaf. Both the crises and project are felt by crises survivors and field staff to have shaped social cohesion and community togetherness. Some participants explained that the crises increased social cohesion as it brought the community members together; specifically, the displaced people who stayed with other families. With 15 25 people staying in one house, the community feel that togetherness was strengthen as they looked after one another. However, others explain that the act of displacement served to break down the feeling of togetherness and social cohesion. The response project is felt by crises survivors to have at first undermined social cohesion because survivors did not understand why some people were receiving aid and others were not. However, both crises survivors and first responders feel that the psycho-social work conducted by the local partner and the way in which the community committees have been run has served to significantly increased social cohesion and community togetherness. The psycho-social work has supported the community cohesion and brought the community back together and closer. Especially the community based psycho-social work (Field officer). Community Leadership Local leadership is felt by field officers to be weak, yet crucial for effective project implementation. Community leaders are felt to have been crucial for mobilising and engaging with the community, however lacked confidence 10
and decision making capacity. It was also explained that community mobilisers already existed before the project was implemented, however the project engaged with different community leaders and mobilisers which caused great confusion at the start of the project and was felt by crises survivors to have undermined existing community capacity and organisation. Field officers recommend that local leadership capacity should be built to ensure both social cohesion and effective humanitarian response programming. The Government Field officers explain that the project did engage with the local and national government from the start. However, interaction was mainly around security and protection when visiting the communities. The local government did not engage with the project activities and whilst field officers attempted to engage with local government officials, they struggled to get a response. It is challenging to communicate with the government, they do not reply or answer (Field staff). Further to this, field staff feel that the local government lack the capacity to engage with humanitarian programming and that the Christian Aid project lacked the capacity and resources to build government capacity. Several field officers explained that they would have liked to have taken government officials to visit the community and project. We would like to have taken relevant government officials to the field to see and understand the situation, Christian Aid s work and how they could interact with it (Field staff). However, field staff feel that the government do not always understand the humanitarian mission. The government do not want to work here with us (Field staff). Several field staff felt that both the NGOs and government are responsible for this blockage and that the humanitarian sector should dedicate more effort to strengthen dialogue with the local government. For long term improvement to the communities quality of life, exposure to risk and levels of preparedness, field staff and crises survivors recommend that programmes should include the resources to work with the government and build local government capacity. However, one local government office did directly engage with the project. The local government volunteers of the women, family and health unit directly engaged with the project, offering local knowledge and support. However, these participants were government volunteers not government officials. Therefore, whilst represented the government, had no formal decisions making powers or regular dialogue with the government decision makers. Furthermore, field staff and crises survivors explained that the government appear embarrassed to talk about sexual violence, this limits their ability to raise awareness and tackle the issue. Principle 3: The inevitable existence of uncertainty and change is accepted with preparedness activities enabling flexibility to a range of future unexpected hazards Most of the participants feel that the community was not prepared for the conflict and are not still no prepared today. We were not ready for this because we were living happily in our families and suddenly these wars successions started. It was very hard for us. For me, if it happened today, we would just run away again. What else can we do? (Community member). Whilst community members and field staff feel that risk awareness has increased and specifically, survivors now know how to denounce sexual violence and massacre as a crime, know how to ask for 11
psycho-social support and health care such as PEP kits after incidents of sexual violence, they lack the capacity to prevent future crises. However, several community members feel that they have learnt a small number of preparedness actions such as listening for warnings about when to run and hide from rebel groups and to tape the chickens beaks shut so they don t draw attention to them when they are running away. However, participants also explain that they do not have preparedness plans that go beyond listening for warnings and running away. Further to this, the community feel that they do not have the capacity to think about future risks and how it may change as they are still trying to figure out how to prepare for the current risks that they live with. In addition to the conflict, the community also outline food insecurity and flooding as additional risks that they face. However, field staff do explain that a lot of awareness raising work has been done around the rights of the women, prevention of rape, the family code and early warning systems for conflict however feel that ultimately protection and peace can only be established by the army and government. Principle 4: There are spaces and places for continuous learning Both community members and field staff feel that there have been spaces and places for learning throughout the project. Participants explain that they feel the community and field staff have learnt together about what to do if they are a survivor of violence. This is felt to have increased a level of risk awareness. Within the community, the committees and specifically the woman s groups are felt to have shared a large amount of information and experience with each other and the field staff. Field staff also explained that the project focused strongly on capacity building and awareness raising around sensitisation which trained the community on the family code, women s rights and how to prevent day to day risk from sexual violence (such as females travelling in groups instead of alone). However, whilst awareness is felt to have increased, crises survivors and fields staff feel that more needs to be done to translate learning into preparedness actions. Learning is not always put into action or taken forward, often we don t know how to do this (Community member). Further to this, the field staff explained that the project had a strong focus on learning and the team met every three months to reflect on the project, how it was going and how it could be changed or adapted for improvement. For example, several field staff explain that their ways of working changed as they learnt from the community and the project. For example, at first, the project focused on just food aid but as the project went on realised they needed to do something more long term thinking and started doing livelihoods. Field staff also explained how they worked with other organisations to learn from them. For example, partners had support from Caritas international around issues of protection and cash transfers which they tried to integrate into the project. Equally, field staff explain that the Christian Aid HPP programme offered multiple opportunities for training and capacity building. Principle 5: A high degree of social and economic equity exists in systems. The non-equilibrium dynamics of a system are acknowledged to support bouncing forward and better. Any approach to building resilience should not work with an idea of restoring equilibrium because systems do not have a stable state to which they should return after a disturbance. 12
There has been a lack of rigorous data collection exploring what the community feel resilience means to them and whether they have bounced back better. However, from the limited response collected from field staff and community members, participants explain that the community felt like it was back to normal in 2015. Here, housing, livelihoods and quality of life felt as good as before 1998 (when the conflict first began). However, participants feel that the community has not managed to bounce back better because they are still living in conflict and feel that resilience can only be successfully achieved with peace. When exploring whether the crises survivors and field staff feel the community have undergone a process of transformation, the level of female participation in projects and the capacity and confidence of women to contribute to community decision making was highlighted. The community feel that women are now accepted equally as community leaders. However, when reflecting on whether they feel the community has bounced back batter, both crises survivors and field staff again reflect on the fact that they feel that this is not possible until peace is achieved and the government s capacity to protect the people is strengthened. On the other hand, the government officials interviewed feel that the Christian Aid project has significantly improved the community members quality of life. Furthermore, crises survivors feel the government have improved since the Christian Aid project begun, taking more interest in and responsibility for the security of the community. However, participants feel that to truly build back better, crises survivors need to find their independence and overcome their feeling of dependence on the NGO s. Field staff and community leaders explained that the way in which aid has been conducted has created a culture of dependence and normalised providing cash whenever organisations engage with the community. This has created a culture whereby community members expect to receive cash and are reluctant to participate or actively engage without financial insensitive. This in turn is felt by participants to have (re)enforced a feeling of hopelessness. Therefore, field staff explain that for resilience to be built, community independence, confidence and capacity must be built. Ultimately, crises survivors feel that to be able to build back better and feel more resilient they need peace, development such as good quality roads for transport and quick evacuation, a football pitch to bring the community together, secure livelihoods and a market to strengthen the local economy. Challenges and Recommendations Several challenges have been highlighted and recommendations for future, improved, resilience building humanitarian response programming have been made by crises survivors, first responders and field staff. Challenges 1. Projects lack of capacity to work with government 2. Corruption within the government Recommendations 1. Humanitarian Communication. Clear communication is needed between NGO and communities throughout all stages of the project. One field officer 13
3. Level of distrust between the NGOs and government 4. The government are embarrassed to talk about and tackle sexual violence 5. Male rape victims do not come forward for help due to the stigma associated with male sexual violence and feelings of shame and embarrassment. 6. The conflict context; security issues and lack of understanding of how to do long term programming in a conflict context 7. Challenging, remote villages to access with poor transport links and very poor roads 8. Field staff feel they lacked the capacity to know how to lead and support the community to be independent and felt that crises survivors had become dependent on aid and lost their drive and independence 9. Poor organisation of humanitarian aid in general after the spikes in conflict. Crises survivors explained that they were unaware of why some households received aid and others did not and would have preferred a blanket approach 10. The communities did not feel listened to. When asked to prioritise their biggest need, the community agreed that the development of a good quality road was needed. However, the organisations decided that a medical centre was decided to be more important. Community members felt undermined and confused. explains how the mouth to ear communication wasn t successful and that many crises survivors got confused, information was misinterpreted, other information was brought in. 2. Work with the government. Increase collaboration with government and build local government s capacity to protect the communities. Work with the government, go with the government (Field staff). 3. Risk awareness and practical preparedness plans. Do conflict sensitive PVCA s with the communities to raise awareness of risk but also go beyond this to map out preparedness action plans for reducing risks. 4. Psycho-social care and medical care. Include psychosocial community based work from the beginning but also ensure access to medical care for physical damage. Community based psycho-social care can also strengthen community cohesion. 5. Human Rights & Protection. Include protection work and accompany vulnerable communities. Have field staff in the community, accompanying the people always. 6. Advocacy for underlying issues. Include advocacy work on underlying issues. Need peace and good governance of the mining sector. If there was good governance of the mining sector, the population would not suffer (Field staff) 7. Stronger participation. Closer participation whereby the community and NGO work side by side. 8. Resilience Training. Need to train the people in charge of the response on resilience; from the project officer, the person developing the proposal and the community members; they need to be aware of the long-term goal 7. Bene et al (2012) Absorb (cope), Adapt, Transform Analysis In reflection of Bene s (2012) Resilience Absorb, Adapt, Transform (AAT) observations, it was felt important to gauge the community s perception of what resilience means to them and explore how the field officers and other 14
stakeholders felt that the intervention impacted on the community s resilience. The table below illustrates the field staff reflections on the intervention s phases in relation to the resilience principles. Participants were asked to score each principle 0-5 throughout the different phases of the project. 0 being non-existent and 5 being as strong as possible. However, it is important to note that due to limitations and challenges with the data collection team; only two participants answered these scoring questions, making it a very poor representation of perception of those involved in the program. It is felt that the qualitative data shared in the previous section gives a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of each principle. Principle Beginning of the project End of the project Principle 1: 3.5 3.5 Level of community participation Principle 2: 2.5 3 Level to which project worked to strengthen community links to government Level to which project sought to strengthen community leadership 3 3 Level of social cohesion 2 3 Principle 3: 1 3.5 Level to which project supported understanding of risk Level of community preparedness 1 1 Principle 4: 1 2 15
The extent to which there were spaces and places for the community to learn throughout the project The level of focus the project had on learning and capacity building 2 3.5 Principle 5: 2 3.5 The extent to which the project focused on building back better Despite the poor participation in this scoring exercise, the two-individual field staff who did participate feel that: 1. The level of community participation remained in the medium throughout the project, 2. The focus of the project strengthening community linkages to the government slightly increased throughout the project 3. The level to which community leadership was focused upon by the project remained a medium focus of the project 4. The level of social cohesion increased; from a medium level to high level throughout the project 5. The projects focus on providing the community with access to risk information dramatically increased from very low to very high throughout the project 6. The level of community preparedness remains very low and the project has not been successful in strengthening this 7. The opportunities that the community had for learning throughout the project remained low 8. The projects overall focus on learning and capacity building slightly increased throughout the project 9. The projects focus on building back better also slightly increased from low to a medium focus. AAT Reflection Ultimately it is felt that the community are still in a state of absorbing (coping) with the shock that they were (and still are) exposed to; through knowing when to evacuate, how to gain medical and psychological aid after being attacked and how to denounce human rights violations. However, the case study also shows signs of potential transformation through the way in which women are perceived and engage in community decision making and activities. Here, participants feel that the confidence, capacity and acceptance of women leaders has significantly increased, serving to transform women s life. It is important to note that whilst this is an overview, an in-depth analysis of the data collected in this case study will be presented in a second paper. 16
7. Conclusions In conclusion, this case study has outlined the strengths, challenges and recommendations of Christian Aid and partners response to the conflict in South Kivu, in the DRC. All reflections documented in this case study have been shared by the humanitarian staff, local partners, beneficiaries, community members and other key stakeholders involved in the response. Ultimately, participants feel that long term resilience cannot be built without peace. In addition to peace, crises survivors feel that resilience means strong community togetherness or cohesion and development; including the construction of good roads, good access to healthcare, livelihoods and a market. Further to this, field staff feel that for the community to be resilient in the future, the crises survivors need to re-establish their independence drive and hope for the future and overcome a perceived dependency on aid. In reflection of this, the community members and field staff have outlined eight core recommendations for how humanitarian programming can be improved to build and not undermine community resilience in the future. 1. Humanitarian Communication. Clear communication is needed between NGO and communities throughout all stages of the project. One field officer explains how the mouth to ear communication wasn t successful and that many crises survivors got confused, information was misinterpreted, other information was brought in. 2. Work with the government. Increase collaboration with government and build local government s capacity to protect the communities. Work with the government, go with the government (Field staff). 3. Risk awareness and practical preparedness plans. Do conflict sensitive PVCA s with the communities to raise awareness of risk but also go beyond this to map out preparedness action plans for reducing risks. 4. Psycho-social care and medical care. Include psycho-social community based work from the beginning but go beyond this, also ensure access to medical care for physical damage. Community based psycho-social care can also strengthen community cohesion. 5. Human Rights & Protection. Include protection work and accompany vulnerable communities. Have field staff in the community, accompanying the people always. 6. Advocacy for underlying issues. Include advocacy work on underlying issues. For the DRC context filed staff feel that peace is needed alongside good governance of the mining sector. If there was good governance of the mining sector, the population would not suffer (Field staff) 7. Stronger participation. Closer participation, participation was strong but go beyond this whereby the community and NGO work side by side. 8. Resilience Training. Need to train the people in charge of the response on resilience; from the project officer, the person developing the proposal and the community members; everyone involved needs to be aware of the bigger picture and the long-term goal. 17
Next steps Next, all 8 case studies will be critically analysed and a global approach for resilient informed humanitarian response will be developed, piloted and rolled out. For more information or any questions please contact Becky Murphy the LPRR Resilience Learning and Capacity Building officer at rmurphy@christian-aid.org. 18