The European Union as a regional power and international actor: a coherent approach to the Eastern neighbourhood?

The European Union as a regional power and international actor: a coherent approach to the Eastern neighbourhood? Niels Bogegaard Abstract This study analyzes the EU s European Neighbourhood Policy towards its nearest Eastern neighbours on the basis of coherence. It does so, because coherence is a prerequisite for international actorness and therefore also for the EU s visibility, effectiveness and credibility as a foreign policy actor. When analysing the ENP, the study is inspired by Cremona s multi-layered conceptualization of coherence with some alterations in how it is conceptualized and applied. The study finds that the ENP is rather incoherent, but also that the coherence of the policy has improved since a review in 2011. The core issue in the ENP is a lack of overall guiding principles and substance. On the basis of this analysis, the paper discusses how the EU acts in its neighbourhood based on the parameters of visibility, effectiveness and credibility leading to a conclusion which questions the EU s ambition of becoming a recognized and influential international actor.

Acknowledgements I would first of all like to thank my supervisor Dr Neil Winn at the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds for giving me guidance and support. I would also like to express my gratitude to Grethe and Odd. Thank you for opening up your house for me and giving me support. Also, thank you Mike for the invaluable comments and constructive feedback during this process. Your positive attitude and encouragements are greatly appreciated. Furthermore, a big thank you to my parents for always believing in me and helping me when I need it. Last, but not least Thea, without you this project would never have happened. You are my inspiration and guiding light. Introduction What kind of actor the EU is internationally has preoccupied academia for a long time, especially since the establishment of the European Political Cooperation in 1970 when the foundation for the current Union s foreign policy system was laid. This has resulted in a long, diverse academic tradition discussing the scope and width of the EU s international clout (see for instance Manners (2002), Zielonka (2006) or Bretherton and Vogler (2006)). These different assessments reveal how difficult it is to evaluate the impact and weight of the Union s policies abroad. Often research in this area focuses on enlargement as a special kind of foreign policy. Whether arguing that the EU is a normative power house such as Manners (2002); some kind of neo-medieval postmodernist Empire such as Zielonka (2006); or just an international actor with its own values, such as Hyde-Price (2006) or Youngs (2004), it is fruitful to examine the EU s policy in its near abroad. The CEEC enlargement process showed that the EU s impact vis-à-vis its neighbors is greater than towards other actors. Therefore proximity policies offer the best way of examining the EU s regional (and global) clout. Thus, this paper will focus on the ENP. There is a genuine need to examine the EU s foreign policy, and especially the neighborhood policy, in relation to coherence. Although research has been done in this particular field, little agreement exists on how to measure and define the subject. Building upon that, this paper will reflect on the implications of the level of coherence in the ENP on the EU s ambition to be a more influential international actor. From the Laeken declaration it can be read that the EU aims to be a power that can stabilize international affairs and offer guidance to other countries and peoples (Council, 2000: 2). To do this, the EU needs

visible, effective and credible policies, and coherence plays a significant role as a prerequisite for achieving this. Thus, the ENP will be analysed on the basis of its level of coherence. It will be argued that the EU s neighbourhood policy is rather incoherent and significant reasons exist for the EU to try to increase the policy s overall coherence. This process is already in motion to some extent, since a review from 2011 has improved the coherence of the policy. Still, the core issue in the ENP is a lack of overarching, guiding principles and substance. Following this analysis of the ENP, the second part of the paper will consider the implications of the lack of coherence on the EU s level of actorness, based on the parameters; visibility, effectiveness and credibility. When applying the framework, the paper will focus on the nearest Eastern neighbours; Ukraine and Moldova. Belarus will not be considered, other than observing here that developments in the political and economic ties between Belarus and the EU have been miniscule. No real progress has been apparent, since the isolation of Belarus by the EU in 1997 (Smith, 2011: 319). This research strategy also means that the Mediterranean and Caucasian part of the neighbourhood policy will not be investigated, primarily because the former perspective has been included in the policy due to political considerations and (postcolonialist) agendas of specific Member States, such as France (Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2008), and the latter only after the Rose revolution in Georgia in 2003, forcing the EU to reward the region (Primatarova, 2005: 24). Furthermore, the countries in those two regions do not have a membership prospect as the EU has rejected such a claim on principle. Therefore, only the nearest western CIS countries are potential members bringing into play the partnership/membership dynamic, which has led Ukraine to view the ENP in a preaccession light (Sasse, 2010: 188). Therefore, the primary focus of this study will be on Ukraine as it is the largest and most important neighbor in the Eastern dimension of the ENP. As part of the preparation of accession of the CEEC, Malta and Cyprus in 2004 and 2007, the ENP was formulated as the EU s response to the new dividing lines in Europe. Since its first introduction in 2003 the policy has been continuously developed most recently with a review in 2010/11. This development has been in the background of what some authors have coined a growing enlargement fatigue *Erweiterungsmüdigkeit+ (Faber, 2008: 61). For the EU, the prospect of an ever larger Union is undesirable. According to former Commission President Romano Prodi, accession is not the only game in town

and therefore, relations with the neighbors should be based on the notion that the EU has to offer more than partnership but less than membership (Prodi, 2002: 4). Approaching the neighborhood in this manner raises interesting questions on whether the ENP offers a framework for the EU to address the political, economic and social challenges on its border to serve the foreign and security interests of the Union. As the ENP has been designed as a particular expression of a multi-pillar, multi-institutional and multi-level policy, it offers an interesting academic possibility for discussing coherence in relation to foreign policy. According to Cremona and Hilion, the ENP is a policy designed to meet the challenge of ensuring coherence between the three EU pillars (Cremona and Hilion, 2006: 1). Yet, what is coherence? Conceptual and theoretical framework: Coherence As a concept, coherence has been part of the agenda of the European Union for a long time. Already in 1969, during the heads of state meeting in the Hague, the notion of coherence was referred to in this quote: the EU needs to stick together to bring weight on international events and to exercise international responsibilities (quoted in Nuttall (2001: 2). Coherence can therefore be seen as a prerequisite for asserting influence abroad and to protect itself from unwanted influence at home (Ekengren and Sundelius, 2004: 110). The emphasis on coherence increased gradually as the complexity of the Union rose. For instance, when the European Political Cooperation was formalized as an intergovernmental component supplementing the internal community with a foreign policy dimension in the Single European Act of 1987, the importance of how this new foreign policy dimension could be reconciled with the supranational institutions rose significantly (Tietje, 1997: 214). Coherence is therefore closely linked to EU integration. With the formal establishment of the CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the intergovernmental pillar, the need for ensuring unity became even more important as the institutional setup was complicated further (Gebhard, 2011: 104). The civil war in the Balkans, and the ensuing humanitarian crisis, showed that the EU faced significant challenges in becoming a visible, effective and credible international actor, since it had huge difficulties in matching strategies with expectations and providing resources for implementation something Chris Hill coined as the expectations-capabilities gap (Hill, 1993). After internal policy development, High Representative Solana presented the ESS in 2003 as a response to the

critique on the EU s handling of the crisis on the Balkans, the 9/11 terror attack, and the European split over the American invasion of Iraq (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006: 211). It is therefore not a surprise that the ESS highlights coherence as a prerequisite for improved international performance of the EU (Solana, 2003). Yet, achieving coherence while expanding with ten additional members proved challenging. The Lisbon treaty therefore introduced changes to how the EU operates, for instance by a drive for de-pillarization and the creation of new institutions, such as the EEAS. Still, it can be discussed how much has really changed. The CFSP remains subject to special provisions and procedures outside OLP and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (with exceptions). Furthermore, there is an attempt to avoid cross-contamination between the CFSP and other (community) policy areas, meaning that they work within their own sphere (Cremona, 2008b: 32). As can be seen, coherence has received more and more attention in Brussels yet, it highlights some conceptual issues, especially as it has been seen as both a political requirement in the EU and a source of (normative) concern to policy-makers and scholars. It is clear that the concept s interdisciplinary character combined with the complexity of the EU makes it difficult to conceptualize and it has also preoccupied both legal and political scholars in the academic literature. For legal analyses see for instance: Bertea (2005), Cremona (2008b), Dworkin (1986), Gauttier (2004), Hilion (2008) and Tietje (1997); for political analyses: Christiansen (2011), De Jong and Schunz (2012), Duke (2012), Koehler (2010), Missiroli (2001), Missiroli (2005), Nuttall (2001), Nuttall (2005), Portela and Raube (2009), Reynart (2012), Smith (2001), Thomas (2012), and Trauner (2011). The concept has been the subject of heated discussions and is essentially contested. Thus, there is a lack of agreement on how to define and measure it (Bertea, 2005: 159; Thomas, 2012: 458). While some authors focus on the institutional perspective (such as Bertea (2005), Christiansen (2011), Cremona (2008b), Duke (2012), Missiroli (2001b), Missiroli (2010), Reynaert (2012), M.E. Smith (2001), Tietje (1997) and Tulmets (2008)), others focus on the policy-output (such as Aubert (2012), De Jong and Schunz (2012), Dwan (2001), Economides (2001), Thomas (2012) and Trauner (2011)). Some of these differences are purely analytical, but some also concern conceptual understandings. As an illustrative example of this disagreement on what to call the concept, article 7 of the TFEU states: The

Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers. (emphasis added) As can be seen, the term consistency is used in the English version. In the continental translations however, the term coherence is used (i.e. cohérence in French, coherencia in Spanish and Kohärenz in German (Gebhard, 2011: 105)). Although used interchangeably in the treaties, there are important differences between these concepts, which the treaties do not take into account (Tietje, 1997: 213). This also relates to the academic use of the term. Tietje (1997) argues that consistency is the lack of contradictions, while coherence is a quest for synergy and added value (see also Missiroli (2001b), Reynaert (2010)). Therefore, as Missiroli (2001b: 4) writes it is quite conceivable that something is more or less coherent. Coherence is a matter of degree, while consistency is a static notion of either or not. Tietje argues that consistency is a necessary condition of coherence, but not a sufficient one (Tietje, 1997: 213). Following this line of thought, Bertea (2005: 159) argues that coherence is made up of more primitive elements and should at least include consistency, comprehensiveness, completeness and continuity. His conceptualization is, however, rather inaccurate. Although Bertea acknowledges the need to weight and balance these different notions, his operationalization of the key concepts is too vague. Cremona (2008b), on the other hand, offers a much more fruitful conceptualization. She suggests a multilayered definition comprising three concepts operating on both the horizontal and vertical level: horizontal coherence refers to the application of EU foreign policy mechanisms between different EU institutions, while vertical coherence denoting the degree to which Member State policies support common EU positions (Nuttall, 2001). The first concept is clear rules of hierarchy to ensure conflict avoidance and the resolving of conflicts. For instance, Community rules have primacy over national rules. Secondly, tasks must be allocated effectively to avoid duplication and gaps through rules of delimitation. For instance, each institution should work inside their own domain. Thirdly, the concept also involves synergy between norms, actors and institutions through principles of cooperation and complementarity (Cremona, 2008b: 14-16). Rules of delimitation can therefore function on both a horizontal and a vertical level. This might be counterintuitive, since rules of delimitation can be seen as inherently horizontal, because they are used to settle and prevent turf wars. However, they are also relevant on the vertical level in the respect that turf wars also need to be settled between

the EU institutions and the Member States. One key criticism of Cremona that can be raised is an apparent inconsistency, rather paradoxically, in distinguishing between the horizontal and institutional perspectives of coherence. She includes the institutional level within the horizontal level, since she defines it as the inter-policy and inter-pillar coherence (Cremona, 2008b: 19), but also includes an individual analysis of institutional coherence. While it lowers her analytical credibility somewhat, it does not alter the way this paper employs the framework by adhering to the horizontal and vertical perspective as Nuttall (2001) conceptualizes them. For a discussion of the different definitions of coherence see for instance Gebhard, 2011 and Nuttall, 2001 who disagree on the definition of horizontal and institutional coherence. This author agrees more with Nuttall s conceptualization in that his definition is more analytical stringent. Operationalization and methodology Unlike Cremona (2008b), who uses three levels, this analysis will rely on two levels: rules of hierarchy and rules of delimitation. The former will be used to investigate the objectives and political goals of the EU s neighborhood policy. Is it possible to identify a hierarchy of the policies, programs and initiatives within the remit of the neighborhood policy? If it is not clear that a hierarchy exists on a political level it points towards incoherence. The latter, rules of delimitation, will be operationalized as what instruments and methodologies are used to implement the policy. Are these in concordance with the political aims and goals, and is the policy clearly operationalized? Because Cremona s conceptualization is based on a legal tradition, the way she has conceptualized the framework there is a solid focus on the rules of the political game, both substantially and normatively. Within the framework, therefore, the hierarchical and delimitating levels are employed to investigate levels of consistency, with the third level, cooperation and complementarity, investigating whether or not the actors within the EU system, including the Member States, are faithful to the principles of the policy on the implementation level and to what extent they work together to further those principles. Yet, I would argue that the latter becomes redundant by the way this paper conceptualizes the framework, as focus is more on policy and implementation. Thus, Cremona s third level, cooperation and complementarity, is an inherent part of my conceptualization, as these notions are essentially involving how the ENP is instrumentalsed and implemented.

Furthermore, Cremona s conceptualization is a general framework offering scholars an opportunity to investigate the coherence of the general political system of the European Union, meaning that it is not specifically aimed at investigating the ENP or any other policy specifically. By adjusting the framework it can more readily and more precisely be used to perform an analysis of the ENP, as the ENP is a Union policy with Member States primarily only playing important roles in furthering the policy as rotating presidents of the Council (and by being sovereign nation states with independent foreign policies). Of course, interesting perspectives concerning (in)coherence can be identified in this respect, but these can without any issue be covered with the proposed research model. When applying the framework, the paper will primarily rely on content analysis of political and legal documents produced within the EU system supplemented by studies carried out by other scholars. Content analysis is understood in its broadest conceptualization offered by Ole Holsti as any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1969: 14). In this regard, the theory can be said to be used to split the empirical world into manageable parts, in this particular instance meaning the ENP and the two levels it is analyzed on, which allows for consideration of specific contexts within the foreign policy of the EU (Beach, 2012: 9). However, this is not an explanatory analysis pointing to why or why not the ENP is incoherent, but rather focusing on the nuances of how it is or is not coherent. Approaching the study thusly allows for taking into account the highly complex matter of the subject of analysis, and being very context (and case)-specific. This means that the approach will rely on the classical International Relations methodology of scholarly interpretation of events and observations (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007: 41). King, Keohane and Verba argue that the goal of any social science research should be to generate scientific inference and thus to provide knowledge beyond the immediate observations (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 8). This study will besides empirical inference also provide what Yin has termed theoretical inference in that the boundaries of the chosen theory can be assessed as well as its strengths and weaknesses (Yin, 1994: 37). In what follows, I will assess the level of coherence in the EU s policy under the ENP towards the nearest neighbours, using the above theoretical framework and operationalization, which will be followed by a reflection on the implication of this on the EU s ambition and attempt at becoming a more visible, effective and credible international

actor. Lastly, an evaluation of the theoretical framework and a conclusion will be offered. First, a brief introduction to the ENP. The genesis of the European Neighborhood policy actorness and security Stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law along our borders are all fundamental for our own security (Javier Solana and Chris Patten, 2002). With the decision in 2002 to enlarge the EU with ten new countries, demands were made that the EU needed a framework to deal with the redrawn map of Europe, as the Union s neighbourhood was expanded far into Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus. Right on the border of the EU would be political instability, poverty, corruption and high rates of crime. These new neighbours posed a significant, potential threat to the security of the Union, and this prompted a reaction. Former High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten therefore wrote a paper called Wider Europe that initiated a debate on how the Union should approach its expanded neighbourhood. Yet, only seeing this as a response to enlargement is too narrow; equally important was the question of how the EU could increase its foreign policy strength to become a more credible and recognized international actor following the calamitous mishandling of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the expansion of the Petersburg tasks in the treaty of Amsterdam (see also article 42 in the TEU). After the Council of the European Union had agreed on the big bang enlargement in late 2002, Solana expanded on the Wider Europe letter by formulating the ESS that also serves as the basis for the ENP. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe (Solana, 2003: 8). It has therefore been argued that the ENP can be seen as the operationalization of the ESS (Biscop, 2010: 73, Cremona, 2008a: 244) and a way to further its objectives (Whitman and Wolff, 2010: 7). This argument is based on the three overarching objective sstability, prosperity and security, being evident in the ENP (see also the above quote). Interestingly enough and as an indicator of the importance given to the policy as part of EU foreign policy, the legal basis for the ENP is found in article 8 (1) in the TEU, which states the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to

establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. It is quite significant that the basis of the ENP is outside the TFEU dedicated to the EU foreign policy and rather included the TEU. It might be explained by the enlargements in 2004 and 2007, where the new eastern members, especially Poland, pushed for putting a neighbourhood policy on the agenda of the TEU (Tulmets, 2008: 113). They were concerned about the lack of EU engagement and policy in Eastern Europe, and thus became vocal in furthering the ENP. In 2003, Poland issued a non-paper calling for an Eastern dimension to EU foreign policy in which relations should be differentiated, based on bilateral relations with each capital. The Polish proposal relied to a large extent on the Polish experience with enlargement and their proposal excluded Russia, because Russia did not aspire to become an EU Member (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2007: 4). But also other new members, such as the Baltic States, have taken part in shaping the EU s relations with the neighborhood; for instance by pushing for the EU to support democratization efforts in Belarus and Ukraine (Kratochvil and Tulmets, 2007: 4). These efforts show the importance given to the policy from both a Member State and institutional perspective. On the EU level, it is primarily the Council and the Commission who are involved in the policy the Parliament plays only a minor role in the ENP as it partakes in deciding the size of funding to the ENPI and by ratifying AAs and PCAs. The Commission is responsible for drafting the specific APs with the partner countries and annually publishing progress reports on the implementation of these. The Council decides on the overall policy objectives, on issues related to CFSP and ESDP and policy management (Tulmets, 2008: 116). As with other policy areas, the Council is therefore more involved in policy dialogue with the Commission responsible for managing the policy. This division of labour is also seen in how the policy has been conceptualized. It functions on both a general and bilateral level. On the general level, the ENP s setup is characterized by strategy papers and other soft policy documents, while on the bilateral level it is characterized by APs. The idea inherent is that the specific APs can be designed to meet the needs and challenges within each neighbouring country. The APs are structured by the notion of conditionality a principle the ENP has borrowed from the enlargement process. When the Commission was tasked with developing the policy in 2003, many of the resources came from DG enlargement which partly explain why the notions underpinning

enlargement were used (Kelley, 2006: 30; Tulmets, 2008: 115). It can also be identified by how, then President for the Commission, Romano Prodi proposed and articulated the new proximity policy, as he said in a seminal speech he gave in 2002: I admit many of the elements which come to my mind are taken from the enlargement process (Prodi, 2002: 4). Yet, when drafting the ENP, a decision was basically made to exclude the countries with some sort of an accession perspective (at the time: the Balkan states, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) (Commission, 2003: 5). In other words, by excluding those countries, the draft also excluded the Western-most NIS countries from membership prospects in the near future (Whitman and Wolff, 2010: 5). There is therefore an inherent tension within the policy between the objectives of the policy on the one hand and how these are thought to be achieved on the other. This conflict will be expanded upon in section two. This brief introductory section has shown that security has played an enormous role for the EU when developing the ENP, with ideas of how the EU can increase its actorness and impact the neighborhood also influencing its inception and development. These needs are, however, conditioned on the level of coherence in the policy, and while it has been argued internally, in the EU, that the ENP has been constructed to meet the need for coherence across the EU (Cremona and Hilion, 2006: 1), the extent to which this actually is the case is unknown. Application of the concept of coherence: Policy and implementation: Rules of hierarchy: Multi-pillar security policy the ENP Remembering the operationalization, this section will analyze the extent to which the policy level is coherent in relation to the horizontal and vertical levels that is on the EU level, and between the EU and the Member States. Looking at recent European history and the history of EU integration, it can be maintained that the EU has had a certain way of engaging with its neighbours and nearby regions (Soderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005; Smith, 2005: 361). Following the process of EU integration, only after the establishment of an independent Union foreign policy, has the EU engaged actively in impacting its near abroad from a normative perspective (Gebhard, 2010: 93). Now norms, values and EU rules are an inherent part of any relationship the Union tries to establish with other actors. The accession process the CEEC went through illustrates clearly the EU s capabilities in

influencing and transforming third parties to the EU s liking. Most importantly in this respect, is the use of conditionalities linked to political, economic and societal developments. Conditionality as an instrument will be addressed in more detail in the next section. Therefore, the accession process has also influenced the ENP. As Gebhard argues, it is a process of external governance projection through conditional integration (Gebhard, 2010: 93). While looking at the treaty text introducing the ENP, the ambiguity of the wording is striking (see previous section). The text does not give any hints as to how specifically the ENP should be formulated, other than on the basis of EU norms. Interestingly enough, emphasis is on the values of the European Union and not shared values with the ENP countries or indeed any other values. It is seemingly assumed that they share the values of the EU. Going back to the objectives of the ENP (security, stability and prosperity), they might well be shared, but when trying to operationalize these overall objectives, priorities may vary greatly: the EU above all seems to emphasize security (Council, 2007), while the neighbouring countries to a much larger extent would emphasize prosperity (Meloni, 2007: 101). This gap adds to the incoherence of the policy and it is difficult to breach. By the EU, prosperity and stability are viewed as preconditions for security and they are used to underpin the security dimension Cremona and Hilion contend that the security dimension is not incidental, but fundamental to the entire framework (Cremona and Hilion, 2006: 4). This emphasis, argue Cremona and Hilion, stems from the eastward enlargement removing the internal barriers on movement of people and thus increasing the importance of wellgoverned external borders. However, it poses a challenge to the extent, rather paradoxically, that important notions to achieve security are found in stability and prosperity and there is a genuine risk that these are downplayed in the EU s effort to secure itself. This is because, in the long-term, the EU will need to develop a sustainable vision for how the eastern neighbors can be integrated that takes into account the prosperity and stability perspectives for instance, through better developed institutional setups in relation to these parameters which would improve the coherence of the policy. To some extent this has already been done. For example, cooperation between the EU and the partner countries in key policy areas are thought to strengthen security (Council, 2004). Yet, there is an issue with prioritization within this. Looking at the action points elaborated in December 2004, they amounted to a long shopping list of very diverse items

without any visible hierarchy (Missiroli, 2010: 261). The range of topics covers almost every conceivable field of politics including political dialogue and cooperation, trade, aspects of internal market policies, energy, transport, information society, environment, research, and innovation, social policy and people to people contact (Commission, 2004: 3). This lack of prioritization is problematic for the level of coherence of the policy. The list of priorities is long and diverse, benchmarks are many, and incentives for change are few (K. Smith, 2011: 318). However, this is an area where the policy has improved over the years. A review was initiated in 2010 aimed at improving the policy, since the impact of the policy was lower than expected (Commission, 2011: 1). The priorities have been better linked with the goals of the policy, increasing the focus on democratization and economic development. Nonetheless, the policy can still be criticized for being too ambitious; as the EU wants to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links (Commission, 2011: 1). Even within the EU, some Member States face problems in living up to these ambitions, so it is valid to ask if such bold goals perhaps are problematic and adding to the incoherence of the policy. Interestingly enough however, the ENP seems to reaffirm the EU s belief that democracy and economic development are necessary if deeper roots of insecurity are to be resolved effectively (Dannreuter 2006: 201). Yet, this brings back the discussion of coherence and whether or not it is problematic to believe that security is preconditioned on prosperity and democracy? Developing long-term sustainable democracy requires much effort which often does not result in more stability developments in Egypt in July 2013 are unfortunately a good illustration of how implementing democracy does not necessarily equate stability or indeed prosperity. This discussion is therefore a reflection of long-term vs. short-term goals, with the former relating to stability and prosperity and the latter to security. Larive (2012: 197) argues, in relation to how security is conceptualized inside the EU, that the Council, by its intergovernmental nature and responsibility for the CFSP and ESDP, focuses to a much larger extent on security issues and crisis-management. The Commission on the other hand, by its supranational nature and responsibility for development, instead focuses on good governance and conflict-prevention. Although it could be argued that this would ensure that both perspectives are included, it is rather problematic from a coherence perspective that lack of agreement is apparent between the two main bodies dealing with the ENP inside the EU, because there is a risk for competition on which notion should be promoted more.

Moreover, the EU might risk being criticized for acting in self-interest. The first sentence in the paper proposing the EaP mentions how the EU suffers when Russia cuts off gas supplies to Ukraine (Ferrero-Waldner, 2009: 1). Incidents such as this has led Sven Biscop to argue that the EU has favoured stability, economical and energy interests over reform, which limits the EU s soft and normative power (Biscop, 2010: 76). The implication of this is that, in the region, the EU is seen more as a status quo actor that tries to take care of its own interests than a proactive actor that could drive bilateral relations forward and find common ground with the ENP countries leading to incoherence and a lack of credibility. Biscop s argument is persuasive, but it seems the EU is becoming more aware of how its policy can be perceived. For instance, in the review from 2011, an attempt was made at better delivering what the partner countries seek from cooperation with the EU, particularly concessions in trade related issues. As preparation for the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013 the EU has prepared for signing an extended AA that would include a DCFTA that could deepen the economic integration and political cooperation between Ukraine and the EU (Commission, 2013c: 1; Commission, 2013d). However, this is conditioned on Ukraine fulfilling specific requirements before then. At the time of writing, it is unknown whether or not the Summit will lead to a substantial policy development between the EU and Ukraine in this area. Also in relation to visa-free travel much remains unknown, although there have been efforts in this area. For the EU, focus is on Ukraine to implement a specific visa liberalization AP before liberalization can happen (EEAS and Commission, 2012: 6). Based on the arguments presented here, it can be maintained that there is a lack of coherence on the horizontal level although not as bad as some authors claim. The vertical perspective It is emphasized in EU policy documents that the ENP is a policy of the Union, and the Member States should therefore align their own bilateral policies to support its overall political objectives (Commission, 2011: 1). However, the treaty also states that competences not conferred to the Union remain with the Member States (TEU, 2010: article 4 (1)) and that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State (TEU, 2010: article 4 (2)). On one side therefore, the importance of trying to ensure coherence on the vertical level between the Union and the Member States is acknowledged, but, at the same

time, clear boundaries to the Union s influence are evident in Member State foreign policy. Balancing these two concerns is the responsibility of each Member State and is a difficult balancing act when the Member States partake in the Union political apparatus as presidents of the Council. This is mainly how the Member States (besides taking part in the Council) has contributed and impacted the policy. Still, the inception of the ENP was primarily on the premise of Member States initiatives. Germany, the Baltic States and especially Poland insisted on developing the Eastern dimension of the neighborhood policy (Kratochvil, 2007: 191). As noted in section one, France, proposed as president of the Council to include the Barcelona Process into the ENP, so it could maintain relations with its former colonies (Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2008). The pushing of own agendas has meant that the ENP has been subject to rather incoherent conditions. With rotating presidencies of the Council every six months and the presentation of new agendas for each new presidency, developing coherent policies has proved difficult. For instance, the German presidency in 2007 proposed strengthening the Eastern dimension with a new Ostpolitik, in line with Germany s traditional orientation towards the East (Rynning and Pihlkjær Jensen, 2010: 144). But with the new Portuguese presidency after Germany, focus was oriented towards the South, after which Slovenia - being both a Southern and Eastern Member State tried to bridge the two dimensions (Missiroli, 2010: 265). Missiroli (2010: 265) even argues that this lack of coherence in policy priorities can be identified within the traditional geographical blocs in the EU for instance between Germany and Poland, and Denmark and Finland. Yet, Missiroli offers no real explanation for this. I believe a reason for this internal divide can be the fact that the wide scope and focus of the ENP adds a perverse effect that impedes discipline and favours nationally motivated agendas adding to the incoherence of the policy. Poland, sharing a border with Belarus, of course wishes to focus on that aspect of the neighborhood policy, with Germany focusing to a larger degree on the greater geopolitical relations to ensure the supply of gas for instance, by pushing for building the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, circumventing Ukraine (De Jong and Schunz, 2012: 173). It therefore seems it could be speculated that: the ENP does not discipline the Council presidency and instead invites conflicts over foreign policy resource allocation (2010: 153). Of course, one reason for creating the EEAS was that the HR/VP could theoretically help to clarify this and better the coordination of national priorities

within the policy. After the Lisbon treaty, the HR/VP does chair the Foreign Affairs Council and thus could help to heighten the coherence of EU foreign policy. The extent to which this actually will be the case, only time will tell. Section three will elaborate more on this. Yet, what can be deduced is that by reducing the role of the rotating presidency, a source of incoherence has been attempted lessened. Still, it is not eliminated Lithuania having the presidency in the second half of 2013 has identified the Eastern partnership as a key priority, while Cyprus focused on the Southern dimension while having the presidency in second half of 2012 (Lithuanian presidency 2013: 16; Cyprus presidency, 2012: 3). The Member States try to coordinate the rotating presidencies and one of the main responsibilities of the presidency of the Council has been to try to ensure coherence (Trauner, 2011: 19). One instrument for doing this is the so-called trio that consists of the three following presidencies, where the Member States can come together and discuss policy objectives. This allows for some coordination but is mostly relevant for long-term internal projects such as the MFF. For the 2014-2020 MFF - finalized in spring 2013 - several years of negotiations were necessary before agreement was reached. This shows the difficulty faced by the EU in ensuring coherent policies. When such an important area, which affects the daily politics within each Member State, is so difficult to reach agreement on, what does that not say about other areas of politics, such as the ENP? After focusing on the policy level, the next section will concentrate on rules of delimitation that is the methodology and instruments underpinning the ENP. Rules of delimitation: Neighborhood policy based on enlargement template: differentiation and conditionality On the methodological level, the ENP is to a very large extent based on the enlargement and pre-accession template used towards the CEEC in the 1990s and onwards. With the review in 2011, even more focus was put on differentiation (Commission, 2011: 2). Differentiation potentially allows for many different tempi for the countries involved. Despite bringing a disparate group of countries together under one heading, differentiation is achieved by developing individual APs and priorities for each country. Arguably, this could give more teeth to the EU foreign policy (Missiroli, 2010: 261). Differentiation allows for flexibility and taking into account country specific conditions, which therefore - if done correctly could give more sway to the EU foreign policies, compared to more traditional policies based on

financial assistance. Yet, this argument does not consider that one of the main political objectives of the policy, security, is not easily achieved on a bilateral basis and therefore by implementing the policy through differentiation, a broader, regional approach to achieving security is hindered. Additionally, an important part allowing for this differentiated approach is conditionality. Using the principle of conditionality in a policy towards geographical neighbours reduces the potential effect the policy could have. Conditionality is an effective policy, when substantial benefits are achievable. But the ENP offers very little in substantial incentives and therefore the attractiveness of adopting the acquis which is basically what the ENP countries are being asked to lessens (Whitman and Wolff, 2010: 13). Additionally, enlargement is based on finalité but since EU membership is out of the picture the Union loses its most powerful instrument in transforming the countries to its liking (Missiroli, 2010: 261). The ENP has been described as an enlargement fatigue policy, as it relies much more heavily on socialization processes that together with reputational pressure is thought to provide incentives for change (Faber, 2008: 65; Gebhard, 2010: 94). Yet, this is a rather weak instrument that relies on well-defined, coherent objectives based on credible political aims. As the first part of the analysis showed, the ENP is lacking in this respect. K. Smith goes even further in arguing that the instruments are inadequate and used with little sense of urgency (K. Smith, 2011: 320). It does seem a bit too critical to argue that they are used with only little urgency, because the ENP receives large amounts of attention in Brussels. Yet, the attention primarily amounts to soft policy documents, strategy papers, political meetings and the like, while harder instruments such as the amount of money per capita allocated is rather low. 12 billion is set aside for the ENP, but considering that the policy includes well over 120 million people and the money covers a seven-year period, it is not a significant amount for such ambitious objectives. Of course, it is not only the amount of money that is important, but also how it is spent. In 2007, the EU replaced the TACIS and MEDA financial instruments with the new ENPI, which has been thought to better coordinate the financial part of the ENP, making it more efficient. The ENPI is the main tool for implementing ENP-related initiatives. The ENPI has been designed to provide better coordinated support for subregional cooperation across the external borders of the EU, which according to Dannreuther (2006: 193) was very

difficult to do with the earlier financial instruments. Additionally, this would allow for more coherence between the objectives of APs and the support provided by the ENPI. Yet, this is only achievable if priorities stated in the APs are clear and consistent. Looking at the AP for Ukraine it amounts to a long list of quite diverse items, which are not clearly prioritized. It therefore more reflects EU priorities rather than the sectoral policy approach as seen in enlargement (Cremona, 2008a: 276) in which the EU and the accession countries can exchange ideas and formulate common visions. The APs are rather vague and illusive, with little or no clarity on which policies and programs participation by ENP countries are possible (Whitman and Wolf, 2010: 13). This is a significant issue within the ENP, especially as they include explicit references to the Copenhagen criteria (Gebhard, 2010: 94) adding to the incoherence of the ENP, since there is missing a link between the stated objectives and the implementation of these. It is not only on the horizontal level, this can be identified. The next section will therefore focus on the vertical level. The vertical perspective The notion of vertical delimitation is clearly seen in the treaties. Not only are there proclamations that the EU functions in subsidiarity to the Member States and that powers not conferred to the Union remain with the Member States, the treaty also states that the Union s common foreign and security policy is to be implemented in joint effect by the Union and the Member States and additionally that the Union s implementation of the CFSP is not to affect the Member States possibility of exercising foreign policy (TEU, 2010: article 4, article 5, article 13, article 24). The implication of this is that not only are Member States important for the total implementation of the CFSP, but also that they are instrumental in the development of the policies (Cremona, 2008b: 29). The legal logic inherent in the treaties therefore seems to emphasize that there are clear, delimitating boundaries between the Union and the Member States, and that the Member States still retain significant power in foreign policy and are instrumental in furthering Union policy. This becomes problematic, however, if Member States interests are at odds with the values of the ENP. There is a balance to consider between upholding the common values and concerns for realpolitik. This is most clearly seen between, on the one side, the values of democracy, good governance, rule of law and on the other, the supply of gas and keeping good relations with Russia. Balancing the need to maintain strong connections with Russia

and the values and norms underpinning the EU seem to be problematic in some instances. As an example, Dannreuter (2006) argues that former German Kansler Schroder was reticent in criticizing Russia, which he argues was due to energy security (Dannreuter, 2006: 197). In 2010, Russia provided 34.5% of EU s demand for crude oil and 31.8% of natural gas making it by far, the Union s largest and most important supplier (Eurostat, 2012). Ukraine plays a significant role in this since approximately 60% of EU s gas supply is delivered through Ukraine (EUractiv, 2013). Therefore, as Hettne and Söderbaum (2005: 550) argue, the EU comes into conflict with Russia s sphere of influence, when Moscow tries to maintain a balance of power in its near abroad. This often leads to support for pro-russian forces within the EaP countries, resulting in an aversion from the EU s normative agenda (Helén, 2010: 19; Haukkala, 2009: 1757). For instance, Kurowska and Tallis argue that the EU BAM in Transnistria, Moldova is advisory and technical, because the EU tries to please Russia by making it more palatable (Kurowska and Tallis, 2009: 57). The EU BAM will be further investigated in section three. Because of the multidimensional nature of the ENP, one part of it falls within the CFSP of the Union, while another falls within the traditional sensitive policy areas of the Member States related to national sovereignty (Everts, 2002: 32; Faber, 2008: 64). Each Member State still retains veto power in the Council on CFSP issues, and secondly they have long-established foreign policy interests and traditions in bilateral relations with the ENP countries. The ENP therefore faces a number of challenges, since Member State ties with ENP countries can be much stronger than the ties the EU has been able to produce. Although this is mostly relevant in relation to the MENA region, it is also relevant for the Eastern dimension. In the former, France and Britain have colonial histories and therefore (post-colonial) special interests and interactions with the countries. In the Eastern dimension, even though the post-colonial perspective is not relevant, the Member States still have established traditions and therefore might impede, or indeed prevent, the Union from developing coherent objectives (or coherent implementation of the objectives). For instance, as Everts (2002: 32) argues, the mere fact that the EU is made of several nation states restricts the EU from conducting genuine foreign policies: the British claim to have a special Anglo-Saxon relationship with the US, the French claim to have an exceptional stance in foreign policy (in general and specifically with the francophone countries), the Finnish have a friendly, yet problematic relationship with Russia, Germany emphasizes

multilateralism for various historic reasons and so forth for all 28 members. As Winn (2003) writes, often differences between the Member States are wider than between Europe and the USA (Winn, 2003: 54). Considering these impediments, it seems obvious that coherence is difficult to achieve. Incoherence between hierarchy and delimitation: linking the two levels together This analysis has shown that the EU uses an enlargement template on a political framework which Brussels clearly does not see as an enlargement policy or even pre-accession, although Ukraine has tried to frame the ENP in this light. By grouping together European countries that fulfil the article 49 requirement in the TEU with non-european countries, it causes incoherence in the ENP. Furthermore, since security concerns have overshadowed and structured the policy, it becomes difficult to further shared objectives with the ENP countries. Additionally, it could be argued that when security is the primary concern for the EU, a much broader (regional) approach would be needed. The insistence on APs results in a rather narrow focus that is not conducive to improving security provisions in the neighbourhood. Being the sole alternative for the neighbouring countries after the big bang enlargement, the idea of differentiation between the countries does not prevent new dividing lines in Europe, but could instead rather risk magnifying these. There is therefore incoherence between this objective and how it is implemented between hierarchy and delimitation. More generally, the objectives of the policy are too broad (and ambitious). Using the current methodologies of the ENP to transform the neighbourhood into westernstyle democracies is both unrealistic and perhaps even counterproductive. The ENP countries are essentially being asked to implement the acquis, but the EU offers no real incentives or even reasons for why they should do so. Perhaps it would be better to lower expectations by clearly identifying shared values and thus better connect the objectives and methodologies used to implement the policy. After the Lisbon treaty, the lack of an institutional dimension to the policy has improved. The EEAS and the HR/VP are envisioned to deliver this, but as will become evident in section three, they have had a difficult time in doing so thus far. The result is limited success in implementing the ENP, particularly as interested partners are denied the prospect of accession and a lack of vision of what the ENP is thought to achieve when there is a lack of political and economic incentives for the