CASE NO: JS1034/2001. ENSEMBLE TRADING 341 (PTY) LIMITED Second Respondent JUDGMENT

Similar documents
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA HELD AT PORT ELIZABERTH

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA. FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED Plaintiff. ANDRé ALROY FILLIS First Defendant. MARILYN ELSA FILLIS Second Defendant JUDGMENT

MAFIRAMBUDZI FAMILY TRUST versus LIBERTY MADZINGIRA and PANNAH NHIWATIWA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS N.O and THE SHERIFF

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

GUMA AND THREE OTHERS JUDGEMENT. [1] This is an application for rescission of a judgement given by. August In terms of the judgement the

THE KWAZULU-NATAL HIGH COURT PIETERMARITZBURG CASE NO. 1225/12 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. This matter came before me as an application in terms of section 165 of the Labour

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN) MICHAEL ANDREW VAN AS JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON 26 AUGUST 2016

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, HELD AT JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

[1]This is an interlocutory application in terms of which the applicants seek leave to

IN THE GAUTENG DIVISION HIGH COURT, PRETORIA (REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA)

IN THE KWAZULU-NATAL HIGH COURT, PIETERMARITZBURG REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA JUDGMENT BELLS BANK NUMBER ONE (PTY) LTD

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (HELD AT BRAAMFONTEIN) GOLD FIELDS MINING SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD (KLOOF GOLD MINE) Applicant

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT. [1] In the main application in this matter the applicant seeks to review and set aside

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, FREE ST ATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN HEARD ON: 2 FEBRUARY 2017

7 01 THE WORKFORCE GROUP (PTY) (LTD) A...

JUDGMENT. [2] On 11 August 2005, a rule nisi was granted in the following terms on an unopposed basis:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG ZURICH INSURANCE COMPANY SA LTD

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA JUDGMENT STAMFORD SALES & DISTRIBUTION (PTY) LIMITED METRACLARK (PTY) LIMITED

IN THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA BOLLORE AFRICA LOGISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD BOLLORE TRADING AND INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, DURBAN JUDGMENT ETHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT EDWIN NCHABELENG & 2 OTHERS LAPACE CONSTRUCTION (PTY) LTD JUDGMENT

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

B. B. Applicant. J. S. B. Respondent JUDGMENT. [1] This is the return day of a rule nisi obtained by the applicant on an urgent

In the Labour Court of South Africa Held in Johannesburg. Northern Training Trust. Third Respondent. Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA) Case number: 28366/2015 Date: 31 July 2015

[1] This is an appeal, brought with leave granted by the court a quo

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG. NATIONAL UNION OF METALWORKERS OF SOUTH AFRICA obo ANDREW MATABANE

JUDGMENT THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO: 30400/2015. In the matter between: And

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, PORT ELIZABETH JUDGMENT

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA HELD AT JOHANNESBURG

BIKEBUDDI INTERNATIONAL LTD. BIKEBUDI HOLDINGS (PTY) LIMITED Respondent J U D G M E N T

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA JOHANNESBURG

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

POTPALE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD NKANYISO PHUMLANI MKHIZE JUDGMENT

STALLION SECURITY (PTY) LTD JUDGMENT. [1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the order which this Court

Case No: C1118/2001. Second Respondent MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT. T/A KFC v ALEN FRASER

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG NUPSAW OBO NOLUTHANDO LENGS

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

COMPANIES TRIBUNAL REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. In the matter between; PHINDA PRIVATE GAME RESERVE (Pty) Limited

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SWAZILAND JUDGMENT LUZALUZILE FARMERS ASSOCIATION LTD THE REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SAVING BANK

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG ELIZABETH MATLAKALA BODIBE

JUDGMENT THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO: 07897/2016. In the matter between: SAPOR RENTALS (PTY) LIMITED

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA HELD AT JOHANNESBURG CASE NUMBER: J 3275/98. In the matter between:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, PORT ELIZABETH. CASE NO: 4305 / 2017 Date heard: 26 June 2018 Date delivered: 31 July 2018

REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA, MAIN DIVISION, WINDHOEK RULING ON SPECIAL PLEA ARANDIS LUBRICATION SERVICES CC

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA AT JOHANNESBURG Case Number: J1134/98. First Respondent M Miles Commissioner: CCMA Motion Engineering (Pty) Ltd

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN PIETER WILLEM DU PLOOY OOS VRYSTAAT KAAP BEDRYF BEPERK

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, DURBAN JUDGMENT. First Applicant

Republic of South Africa IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA KWAZULU-NATAL LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN SIVAPRAGASEN KRISHANAMURTHI NAIDU

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT ABRAHAM HERCULES ENGELBRECHT EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY JUDGMENT

NOMZINGSI PRINCESS MNYIPIZA JUDGMENT

Rules for CNNIC Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (2012)

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA HELD IN JOHANNESBURG

ANDILE AUSTIN ANDRIES. MANGO MOON TRADING 1122 CC t/a V & R AUTO COLLISION REPAIR SPECIALISTS REASONS

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

LABOUR COURT RULES, 2017 ARRANGEMENT OF RULES PART I PRELIMINARY

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT NORTH WEST PARKS AND TOURISM BOARD

NATIONAL UNION OF METALWORKERS OF SOUTH AFRICA JUDGEMENT

RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE LABOUR COURT. as promulgated by. Government Notice 1665 of 14 October 1996.

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT DENNIS PEARSON AND 14 OTHERS

ANGLOGOLD HEALTH SERVICE (PTY) LTD

CONCILIATION RULES. - to conciliation in accordance with The Institute of Arbitrators & Mediators Australia Mediation and Concilliation Rules; or

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

INTHE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (EASTERN CAPE, MTHATHA) CASE NO.: 943/2007. In the matter between: And

HELD AT JOHANNESBURG CASE NO: C77/2006. SPANJAARD LIMITED Applicant JUDGMENT. 2. The applicant has raised the following grounds for leave to appeal:

THE HIGH COURT OF SWAZILAND

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA. Case CCT 3/03 VOLKSWAGEN OF SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD JUDGMENT

IN THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ("THE TRIBUNAL") CASE NUMBER: CT009DEC2017 In the matter of: BATTISTA LEONARDO ERRERA

Decision ADJUDICATOR DECISION. Contents

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT

KUNGWINI RESIDENTIAL ESTATE AND ADVENTURE SPORT CENTRE LIMITED JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS TECHNICAL (SOC) LTD

THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT Third Respondent

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG JUDGMENT BENJAMIN LEHLOHONOLO MOSIKILI

IN THE GAUTENG DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, PRETORIA

a) to take account of the policy rules that apply to.au domain names, that do not apply to gtld domain names; and

Business Day: means a working day as defined by the Provider in its Supplemental Rules.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA. Food and Allied Workers Union obo J Gaoshubelwe v Pieman s Pantry (Pty) Limited MEDIA SUMMARY

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA /ES (GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA JUDGMENT

CONSOLIDATED MANDATE AGREEMENT BETWEEN:

MOLAHLEHI AJ IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (HELD IN JOHANNESBURG) CASE NO: JR 1552/06. In the matter between:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)

In the matter between:

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

Transcription:

IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA In the matter between: and CASE NO: JS1034/2001 Applicant First Respondent ENSEMBLE TRADING 341 (PTY) LIMITED Second Respondent JUDGMENT FRANCIS J Introduction 1. The respondents are applying for condonation of the late filing of its response to the applicant s statement of claim. The applicant is opposing the application and raised an objection that Schalk Eybers ( Eybers ) who deposed to an affidavit for the respondents did not have the necessary locus standi to bring the application. Background facts 2. The applicant was employed by the first respondent with effect from 14 October 1997 until his services were terminated by the first respondent for operational reasons on 7 June 2001. During or about June 2001 the second respondent took over the first respondent s business as a going concern.

1. 3. On 21 June 2001, the applicant referred a dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration ( the CCMA ) for conciliation. After conciliation failed, the applicant referred his dispute to this Court for adjudication on 6 September 2001. A copy of the statement of claim was served on the respondents per telefax. The respondents were required to file its response on or before 19 September 2001. 4. On 14 September 2001 Eybers, on behalf of the respondents, transmitted a facsimile to the applicant s attorneys of record stating that it would be opposing the matter and would be filing its papers early in the following week as its counsel was not available at the time. A copy of the letter was also transmitted to the Registrar of this Court. 5. On 10 October 2001 the applicant s attorney applied to this Court for the matter to be set down for default judgment. On or about 12 October 2001 the applicant s attorneys were contacted by the respondents attorneys requesting a round table meeting. The round table meeting took place on 17 October 2001. The parties were unable to resolve the dispute. There were no discussions about whether the pleadings were going to be suspended. 6. On 7 October 2001 the Registrar of this Court notified both parties that the matter had been set down for default judgment on 31 October 2001 which prompted the

respondents to launch this condonation application. The respondents filed its application for condonation on 26 October 1997 at 15h07 which was served 26 court days out of time. 1. 7. The respondents contended that they were under the bona fide impression that the period for filing its response would be suspended pending the round table meeting, and was surprised to learn that the applicant had filed a notice of set down for hearing for default judgment the same day of the round table meeting. 8. The applicant raised an objection that the respondents application for condonation was deposed to by Eybers who does not allege that he is duly authorised to bring the application on behalf of the respondents, nor does he set out facts in his affidavit to support any inference that he is entitled and/or authorised to do so. He did not show that he has locus standi to bring this application and the application should be dismissed. Does the Respondents have locus standi? 9. It is common cause that the respondents are artificial or juristic persons. It is trite that a party may object if there is nothing before a Court to show that a juristic person duly authorised the institution of notice of motion proceedings. A juristic person can only function through its agents and can only take decisions by the passing of resolutions in the manner provided by its constitution. It is trite that where a close corporation or a company commences proceedings by way of notice

of motion, it must appear that the person who makes the application on behalf of the juristic person is duly authorised to do so by the said juristic person. In such a case some evidence should be placed before a Court to show that the juristic person has duly resolved to institute the proceedings and that the proceedings are instituted at its instance. 1. 10. It was held in Mall (Cape)(Pty) Ltd v Merino Ko operasie Bpk 1957(2) SA347 CPD at 352 paragraph A: The best evidence that the proceedings have been properly authorised would be provided by an affidavit made by an official of the company annexing a copy of the resolution but I do not consider that that form of proof is necessary in every case. Each case must be determined on its own merits and the Court must decide whether enough has been placed before it to warrant the conclusion that it is the applicant which is litigating and not some unauthorised person on its behalf. Where, as is in the present case, the respondent has offered no evidence at all to suggest that the applicant is not properly before the Court, then I consider that a minimum of evidence will be required from the applicant. 11. Eybers deposed to an affidavit and stated the following at paragraphs 1 to 4 of his supporting affidavit: 1. I am an adult male businessman employed by Ensemble Trading 341 (Pty) Limited of Shop 14, Linksfield Road, Linksfield. 2. The facts herein contained are, unless otherwise stated, within my personal

knowledge and are both true and correct. 3. Since the facts contained herein are within my knowledge as opposed to being within the knowledge of anyone in the employ of the Second Respondent, it is I who deposes to this Affidavit on behalf of the First and Second Respondents. 1. 4. I was the sole member of the First Respondent, Aerial Excellence CC, a Close Corporation which has since been sold to the Second Respondent Ensemble Trading 341 (Pty) Limited t/a Aerial Excellence. I am currently an employee of the Second Respondent. 12. In response to the applicant s objection, Eybers filed a supplementary affidavit and deposed to the following at paragraph 3 and 4: 3. It is averred by the applicant that I do not display the requisite authority required to depose to the Supporting Affidavit attached to the Application for Condonation. This is an erroneous assumption as the facts contained herein are within my exclusive knowledge, as opposed to being within the knowledge of anyone else in the employ of the second respondent. I am consequently competent and authorised to depose to this Affidavit on behalf of the First and Second Respondents. 4. I was the sole member of the First Respondent... I am currently an employee of the Second Respondent. 13. It is trite that a party cannot establish its authority in a replying affidavit.

Appropriate allegations to establish the locus standi of an applicant should be made in the founding affidavits and not in the replying affidavits. Thus, if it is indeed so that the challenged passages in the replying affidavits are not legitimate responses to the objection and have been included solely to remedy an omission in the founding affidavits, they are liable to be struck out. 1. 14. It will be noted from the respondents supplementary affidavit that Eybers avers that he is an employee of the second respondent and thus competent and authorised to depose to the affidavit in support of the first application for condonation. The deponent in Mall (Cape)(Pty) Ltd v Merino Ko operasie Bpk supra was the secretary of the applicant Society who had stated that I am duly authorised to make this affidavit. That Court found that even though it was not stated that it was the applicant Society which had conferred the authority upon the deponent. The word duly showed that the authority conferred on the deponent had been properly conferred, i.e., that all the necessary formalities prescribed by the applicant s Society constitution had been complied with. That Court found that what the deponent was saying is that he is duly authorised to speak on behalf of the applicant Society. In other words, it is really the applicant s affidavit and not the deponent s. That Court found that there was no reason to think that the applicant did not pass a proper resolution authorising the institution of proceedings against the respondent and that the proceedings are those of the applicant. The Court found that the respondent had put no evidence whatsoever to suggest that was not the case, and in the circumstances was held that the

applicant had put sufficient evidence before that Court. 15. The same cannot be said about the respondents in this case. The second respondent took over the first respondent s business as a going concern. Eybers stated that he is an employee of the second respondent which is now a company. He did not state in his founding affidavit that he was duly authorised by the respondents to bring the application. In his supplementary affidavit he did not state that he was duly authorised by the respondents to do so. Eybers has placed no evidence in his affidavit to show that he has the necessary authority to bring these proceedings. He did not display the requisite authority to depose to his affidavit on behalf of either of the respondents. As an employee of the second respondent he cannot be authorised to depose to the affidavit on behalf of the second respondent without being authorised specifically in terms of a resolution of the board of the Second Respondent. Mr Roodt, who appeared for the respondents, conceded that there was nothing that indicated that Eybers had the authority to bring the application. He submitted that Eybers was an employee of the respondents who was tasked with dealing with those types of procedures. Eybers was the only person who was authorised by the respondents to bring the application. He admitted however that there was no formal declaration or that there was nothing in the papers before me that shows that Eybers had been given the necessary authority to bring the application for condonation. 16. Eybers has not shown that he has the necessary locus standi to bring this application

on behalf of either the first or second respondent. The application for condonation stands to be dismissed on this ground alone. 17. I see no reason why in law and equity costs should not follow the result. 18. In the circumstances I make the following order: (a) The application for condonation is dismissed with costs. FRANCIS J JUDGE OF THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA E APPLICANT: E RESPONDENT: M WESLEY INSTRUCTED BY BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC ROODT INSTRUCTED BY FRIEDLAND HART INC F JUDGMENT: 8 MARCH 2002