ECN RECOMMENDATION ON THE POWER TO ADOPT INTERIM MEASURES

Similar documents
ECN RECOMMENDATION ON COMMITMENT PROCEDURES

ECN RECOMMENDATION ON THE POWER TO IMPOSE STRUCTURAL REMEDIES

ECN RECOMMENDATION ON THE POWER TO SET PRIORITIES

THE REVIEW OF THE DE MINIMIS NOTICE

Case T-67/01. JCB Service v Commission of the European Communities

Léon Gloden and Katrien Veranneman Elvinger Hoss Prussen, Luxembourg

ECB-PUBLIC. Recommendation for a

Summary table of draft transposition of directive 2007/66/EC into Member States law

Swedish Competition Act

Enforcement against Member States

Official Journal of the European Union. (Legislative acts) DIRECTIVES

Official Journal of the European Union. (Legislative acts) DIRECTIVES

public consultation on a draft Regulation of the European Central Bank February 2014

ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TEMPLATE. CARTELS WORKING GROUP Subgroup 2: Enforcement Techniques

SJ DIR 4 EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 18 November 2015 (OR. en) 2011/0901 B (COD) PE-CONS 62/15 JUR 692 COUR 47 INST 378 CODEC 1434

Notice of 16 May 2011 on the Method Relating to the Setting of Financial Penalties

DIRECTIVE 2014/57/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive)

Competition: revised Leniency Notice frequently asked questions (see also IP/06/1705)

EFTA Surveillance Authority Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases

COU CIL OF THE EUROPEA U IO. Brussels, 11 December /12 Interinstitutional File: 2012/0036 (COD) DROIPE 185 COPE 272 CODEC 2918

This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents

PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT RESULTING FROM INTERINSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

Council Regulation (EC) No 2532/98 (23 November 1998)

STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (CONSOLIDATED VERSION)

(Non-legislative acts) REGULATIONS

ECN MODEL LENIENCY PROGRAMME

EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 4 April 2014 (OR. en) 2011/0297 (COD) PE-CONS 8/14 DROIPEN 1 EF 6 ECOFIN 21 CODEC 47

Official Journal of the European Union. (Legislative acts) DIRECTIVES

THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS; AN INDISPENSABLE INSTRUMENT IN THE FIELD OF ASYLUM

How widespread is its use in competition cases and in what type of disputes is it used? Euro-defence and/or claim for damages?

Regulation 1/2003: a modernised application of EC competition rules

712 Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Legal sciences CRISTIAN JURA

Official Journal of the European Union

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

Worksheets on European Competition Law

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION. of XXX

STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

COU CIL OF THE EUROPEA U IO. Brussels, 3 December /12 Interinstitutional File: 2012/0036 (COD) DROIPE 178 COPE 264 CODEC 2887 OTE

COMPETITION LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES. Aidan O Neill QC

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

L 346/42 Official Journal of the European Union

Self-Assessment of Agreements Under Article 81 EC: Is There a Need for More Commission Guidance?

Council of the European Union Brussels, 1 February 2017 (OR. en)

Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL PERSONS FROM ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE. Preamble

Official Journal of the European Union. (Legislative acts) DIRECTIVES

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

L 33/10 Official Journal of the European Union DIRECTIVES

Council of the European Union Brussels, 26 February 2015 (OR. en)

ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TEMPLATE. CARTELS WORKING GROUP Subgroup 2: Enforcement Techniques

Introduction. amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (OJ L 341 of 24 December 2015, p.

DECISION-MAKING POWERS REPORT

Official Journal of the European Union. (Legislative acts) DIRECTIVES

COU CIL OF THE EUROPEA U IO. Brussels, 11 October /13. Interinstitutional File: 2013/0023 (COD)

4 Are there any rules applying to the unilateral conduct of non-dominant. 5 Is dominance controlled according to sector?

PROTOCOL (No 3) ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Council of the European Union Brussels, 22 January 2016 (OR. en)

10 th Congress of the IASAJ Sydney March 2010.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Session document

The Role of the Hearing Officer in Competition Proceedings before the European Commission

Case C-387/97. Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic

ARBITRATION AND COMPETITION LAW NEW PROSPECTS OF RECOVERY FOR VICTIMS OF ANTITRUST INFRINGEMENTS

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 16 thereof,

Reports of Cases. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber) 15 October 2015 *

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber) 17 March 2016 (*)

Oral Hearings Neither a Trial Nor a State of Play Meeting

THE EU SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON: A FIRST EVALUATION *

10291/18 VK/PL/mz 1 DG B 1C

Council of the European Union Brussels, 22 September 2014 (OR. en)

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 11 June /08 Interinstitutional File: 2004/0209 (COD) SOC 357 SAN 122 TRANS 199 MAR 82 CODEC 758

EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 5 March 2014 (OR. en) 2012/0036 (COD) PE-CONS 121/13 DROIPEN 156 COPEN 229 CODEC 2833

Comments on DG Competition s Guidance on procedures of the Hearing Officers in proceedings relating to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU *

Consolidation Act on the Prohibition of Differences of Treatment in the Labour Market etc. 1)

This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents

PE-CONS 80/14 DGG 3B EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 24 October 2014 (OR. en) 2013/0185 (COD) PE-CONS 80/14 RC 8 JUSTCIV 80 CODEC 961

Table of Contents. Chapter one. General Issues

***I DRAFT REPORT. EN United in diversity EN 2012/0010(COD)

(Legislative acts) DIRECTIVES

(Non-legislative acts) REGULATIONS

THE COURT (Grand Chamber),

Interim Measures in EEC Competition Cases

Case T-395/94. Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v Commission of the European Communities

Draft agreement on a Unified Patent Court and draft Statute - Revised Presidency text

Case T-325/01. DaimlerChrysler AG v Commission of the European Communities

COMPETITION LAW REGULATION OF HUNGAROPHARMA GYÓGYSZERKERESKEDELMI ZÁRTKÖRŰEN MŰKÖDŐ RÉSZVÉNYTÁRSASÁG

TEXTS ADOPTED Provisional edition

Number 12 of Energy Act 2016

ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Fifth Chamber) 10 March 2005"

LIMITE EN COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 12 February /13 Interinstitutional File: 2010/0210 (COD) LIMITE MIGR 15 SOC 96 CODEC 308

Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION

Reports of Cases. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 22 March

EU MEMBER STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL AND EU RULES: THE CASE OF POLAND

PRACTICAL LAW COMPETITION AND CARTEL LENIENCY MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL GUIDE The law and leading lawyers worldwide

EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 3 February 2006 (OR. en) 2005/0182 (COD) PE-CONS 3677/05 COPEN 200 TELECOM 151 CODEC 1206 OC 981

CONTROL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

Community Directives relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public contracts:

Act XCV of on the prohibition of unfair distributor conduct vis-à-vis suppliers regarding agricultural and food industry products

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 16 thereof,

RECOGNITION, EXECUTION AND TRANSMITTING OF CONFISCATION OR SEIZURE DECISIONS AND DECISIONS IMPOSING FINANCIAL PENALTIES

Transcription:

ECN RECOMMENDATION ON THE POWER TO ADOPT INTERIM MEASURES By the present Recommendation the ECN Competition Authorities (the Authorities) express their common views on the power to adopt interim measures. It contains the general principles which the Authorities consider relevant to ensure the effective enforcement of the EU competition rules within the ECN. This Recommendation may serve as guidance to all those involved in shaping the legal framework for enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It is without prejudice to the legal frameworks of those ECN jurisdictions which already provide for these general principles or which go beyond the scope of the present Recommendation. I. INTRODUCTION 1. Decisions ordering interim measures can be an important tool for competition authorities by ensuring that while an investigation is on-going no irreparable damage is caused to competition, which cannot be remedied by any decision which may be taken at the conclusion of the proceedings. The adoption of interim measures may also avoid that the power to take decisions at the conclusion of competition enforcement proceedings becomes ineffectual. 2. Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 1

expressly enables national competition authorities to adopt interim measures when applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 1 3. Many Authorities have made use of this tool to date in a variety of sectors, including energy, telecommunications, distribution of motor vehicles, food, postal services, newspapers, advertising and pharmaceuticals. In terms of the type of infringements for which interim measures have been adopted, it seems that interim measures have most often been imposed in the abuse of dominance cases, especially in refusal to supply cases. Interim measures have also been adopted with respect to other types of infringements, most notably, with respect to vertical restraints. Some Authorities have considered interim measures to be useful in cases of decisions of associations of undertakings recommending that their members change prices or limit supplies. 4. In general most jurisdictions provide for an explicit legal basis which permits Authorities to adopt interim measures. In order to ensure that this is the case through-out the ECN, it is desirable all jurisdictions expressly provide for the adoption of interim measures by law. In proceedings which may lead to the adoption of interim measures, the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned should be ensured and addressees of decisions ordering interim measures should have the right to effective judicial review, in accordance with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union where applicable. Such judicial review should take account of the urgency inherent in situations where interim measures are granted. 5. Most jurisdictions share similar substantive requirements for the adoption of interim measures. To ensure the effectiveness of the interim measure tool, it is desirable that all Authorities should be able, as a minimum, to adopt interim measures where the following cumulative requirements are met: (i) urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable harm to competition; and (ii) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that 1 OJ L1/1, 4.1.2003. 2

an infringement has occurred. This Recommendation is not intended to exclude the use of wider criteria for the grant of the interim measures. The recommended standard which is recommended is based on the following considerations: (i) Urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable harm to competition. The element of urgency is found in the majority of jurisdictions, either by way of an explicit reference in the applicable law or by way of interpretation in the relevant jurisprudence. This is widely interpreted as the need to act immediately in order to hinder any possible harm to the public interest/ competition, otherwise the adverse effects of an alleged infringement could not be effectively addressed in a decision of the respective Authority at the conclusion of proceedings. Some Authorities have set a limited timeframe between the occurrence of the alleged infringement and the request for granting an interim measure (a time period of three to six months). The requirement of serious and irreparable harm to competition is found in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Certain jurisdictions extend this notion to cover harm to general economic interests, the public interest, the economy in general or the economy of the sector concerned or the interests of consumers. Some jurisdictions also provide for harm to the interests of natural or legal persons such as undertakings in general, or a category of natural and legal persons or an individual natural or legal person as an additional ground for the adoption of interim measures by Authorities, whereas other jurisdictions view this as a task for national courts. (ii) The substantive standard to be met with regard to the alleged infringement ranges in the ECN from a possibility to a probability or presumption of infringement. These notions have been developed in case-law, e.g., a possibility of infringement was distinguished from a reasonably strong presumption of infringement 2 ; conversely, a probability of infringement was said not to amount to a clear and obvious 2 Cour de Cassation (French Supreme Court), 8 November 2005, Neuf Télécom e.a, 04-16.857. 3

infringement 3. The substantive standard to be met with regard to the alleged infringement should be commensurate with the urgency which is inherent in an assessment of whether to adopt interim measures and should allow the Authority to act in an effective and expedient manner. 6. Interim measures, by their nature, are temporary and protective. In line with the principle of proportionality, they must be restricted to what is necessary in the circumstances of the case. 7. Within the ECN, there is a range of approaches with regard to the duration of interim measures. Some jurisdictions have set limits, for example, three months, six months or one year. In other jurisdictions, there is not a time limit, but usually a specified time period is set in the decision ordering interim measures. Finally, in some systems the decision ordering interim measures is valid until the conclusion of the proceedings or the adoption of the decision on the merits of the case by the Authority. In several jurisdictions, it is possible to renew or prolong the implementation of interim measures. The Authorities should be able to adopt decisions ordering interim measures of a duration which is effective so as to avoid serious and irreparable harm to competition. A decision ordering interim measures should only be valid until the conclusion of the proceedings or the adoption of the decision on the merits of the case by an Authority or until a higher instance annuls the decision on interim measures. To enhance the effectiveness of interim measures, decisions granting interim measures should be renewable insofar as is necessary and appropriate in each case. 8. In accordance with the urgency inherent in deciding whether to grant interim measures, it is important to ensure that the procedures relating to interim measures are effective and efficient. 3 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) of 24 January 1992. - La Cinq SA v Commission of the European Communities, paragraph 62 4

9. In some jurisdictions, interim measures are granted ex officio, whereas in others, applications for the adoption of interim measures can be made by individual natural or legal persons to protect their interests. It is desirable that the respective enforcement systems governing interim measures are sufficiently flexible to allow the Authorities to deal effectively with cases which are brought to the attention of more than one Authority. 10. Monitoring compliance with decisions ordering interim measures is key to guaranteeing the effectiveness of this enforcement tool. The Authorities should have at their disposal effective powers in order to monitor the implementation of their interim measures decisions. Effective monitoring mechanisms may include: (i) ex-officio monitoring by the Authority; (ii) monitoring based on complaints or information from market participants; (iii) regular reporting by the parties which are the addressees of the interim measures decision; (iv) monitoring based on cooperation with sector regulators; (v) use of trustees. The choice of mechanism to be used depends on the case at hand and may include a combination of different tools. 11. In cases of non-compliance with decisions ordering interim measures, the majority of Authorities has at its disposal means of sanctioning, for example the possibility to impose administrative fines. Some Authorities may in addition have means to compel compliance with decisions ordering interim measures, for example, through the imposition of periodic penalty payments. To underpin the effectiveness of interim measures, it is essential that effective sanctions may be imposed for non-compliance with decisions ordering interim measures and that effective means are at the disposal of Authorities in order to compel compliance. 5

II. ECN RECOMMENDATION It is recommended that: 1. All ECN jurisdictions should provide explicitly in their legal framework for effective means to order interim measures to protect competition. 2. The Authorities should be able, as a minimum to adopt interim measures where the following cumulative requirements are met: i) urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable harm to competition; and ii) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an infringement has occurred. 3. Interim measures should be of a temporary and protective nature and should be restricted to what is necessary in the circumstances of the case. 4. The Authorities should be able to adopt decisions ordering interim measures of a duration which is effective so as to avoid serious and irreparable harm to competition. A decision ordering interim measures should only be valid until the conclusion of the proceedings or the adoption of the decision on the merits of the case by an Authority or until a higher instance annuls the decision on interim measures. A decision granting interim measures should be renewable insofar as is necessary and appropriate in each case. 5. The procedures related to interim measures should be efficient and effective. 6. The enforcement systems governing interim measures should be sufficiently flexible to allow the Authorities to deal effectively with cases which are pending before more than one Authority. 7. The Authorities should have at their disposal effective powers to monitor the implementation of decisions ordering interim measures. 8. In cases of non-compliance with decisions ordering interim measures, the Authorities should have at their disposal effective sanctions, notably fines, in addition to efficient 6

means to compel compliance with decisions ordering interim measures, for example through the imposition of effective periodic penalty payments set at an appropriate level. DISCLAIMER: This document does not create any legal rights or obligations and does not give rise to legitimate expectations on the part of any undertaking or third party. The content of this document is not binding and does not reflect any official or binding interpretation of procedural rules or the practice of any Authority. Neither any Authority nor any person acting on its behalf is responsible for the use which might be made of this document. 7