Grade 6 Math Circles Winter February 27/28 The Mathematics of Voting - Solutions

Similar documents
Grade 7/8 Math Circles Winter March 6/7/8 The Mathematics of Voting

Arrow s Impossibility Theorem

1.6 Arrow s Impossibility Theorem

Voting Criteria: Majority Criterion Condorcet Criterion Monotonicity Criterion Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion

Chapter 1 Practice Test Questions

The Mathematics of Voting. The Mathematics of Voting

Fairness Criteria. Review: Election Methods

The Impossibilities of Voting

12.2 Defects in Voting Methods

Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

Elections with Only 2 Alternatives

Fairness Criteria. Majority Criterion: If a candidate receives a majority of the first place votes, that candidate should win the election.

Today s plan: Section : Plurality with Elimination Method and a second Fairness Criterion: The Monotocity Criterion.

Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

Math116Chap1VotingPart2.notebook January 12, Part II. Other Methods of Voting and Other "Fairness Criteria"

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued

Measuring Fairness. Paul Koester () MA 111, Voting Theory September 7, / 25

Math for Liberal Arts MAT 110: Chapter 12 Notes

Social Choice: The Impossible Dream. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.

Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream Lesson Plan

Write all responses on separate paper. Use complete sentences, charts and diagrams, as appropriate.

Intro to Contemporary Math

Head-to-Head Winner. To decide if a Head-to-Head winner exists: Every candidate is matched on a one-on-one basis with every other candidate.

Section 3: The Borda Count Method. Example 4: Using the preference schedule from Example 3, identify the Borda candidate.

Voting Methods

The Mathematics of Voting

The Mathematics of Voting

Make the Math Club Great Again! The Mathematics of Democratic Voting

Mathematical Thinking. Chapter 9 Voting Systems

Syllabus update: Now keeping best 3 of 4 tests

Math Circle Voting Methods Practice. March 31, 2013

Math for Liberal Studies

Introduction: The Mathematics of Voting

answers to some of the sample exercises : Public Choice

In this lecture we will cover the following voting methods and fairness criterion.

9.3 Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates

The search for a perfect voting system. MATH 105: Contemporary Mathematics. University of Louisville. October 31, 2017

The actual midterm will probably not be multiple choice. You should also study your notes, the textbook, and the homework.

Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

CS 886: Multiagent Systems. Fall 2016 Kate Larson

Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Kenneth Arrow. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Strategically vulnerable

Many Social Choice Rules

SOCIAL CHOICES (Voting Methods) THE PROBLEM. Social Choice and Voting. Terminologies

Sect 13.2 Flaws of Voting Methods

Voting rules: (Dixit and Skeath, ch 14) Recall parkland provision decision:

that changes needed to be made when electing their Presidential nominee. Iowa, at the time had a

Chapter 10. The Manipulability of Voting Systems. For All Practical Purposes: Effective Teaching. Chapter Briefing

n(n 1) 2 C = total population total number of seats amount of increase original amount

Desirable properties of social choice procedures. We now outline a number of properties that are desirable for these social choice procedures:

Presidential Election Democrat Grover Cleveland versus Benjamin Harrison. ************************************ Difference of 100,456

Voting Systems. High School Circle I. June 4, 2017

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued. Voting II 1/27

Exercises For DATA AND DECISIONS. Part I Voting

Voting Definitions and Theorems Spring Dr. Martin Montgomery Office: POT 761

Simple methods for single winner elections

Explaining the Impossible: Kenneth Arrow s Nobel Prize Winning Theorem on Elections

In deciding upon a winner, there is always one main goal: to reflect the preferences of the people in the most fair way possible.

Josh Engwer (TTU) Voting Methods 15 July / 49

Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream

The mathematics of voting, power, and sharing Part 1

The Manipulability of Voting Systems. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.

Introduction to the Theory of Voting

Voting Criteria April

Main idea: Voting systems matter.

Economics 470 Some Notes on Simple Alternatives to Majority Rule

MATH4999 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics Topic 3 Voting methods and social choice theory

Mathematics of Voting Systems. Tanya Leise Mathematics & Statistics Amherst College

Computational Social Choice: Spring 2007

MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.

Mathematics and Social Choice Theory. Topic 4 Voting methods with more than 2 alternatives. 4.1 Social choice procedures

(c) 2013 Janice L. Epstein Voting Methods 1

Public Choice. Slide 1

Lecture 16: Voting systems

MATH 1340 Mathematics & Politics

Election Theory. How voters and parties behave strategically in democratic systems. Mark Crowley

Homework 7 Answers PS 30 November 2013

Math for Liberal Studies

In deciding upon a winner, there is always one main goal: to reflect the preferences of the people in the most fair way possible.

Majority- more than half of the votes Plurality- the most first place votes. The Majority Criterion

Rock the Vote or Vote The Rock

Voting Protocols. Introduction. Social choice: preference aggregation Our settings. Voting protocols are examples of social choice mechanisms

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems. Voting I 1/36

Notes for Session 7 Basic Voting Theory and Arrow s Theorem

1.1 The Basic Elements of an Election 1.2 The Plurality Method

Social welfare functions

Constructing voting paradoxes with logic and symmetry

Introduction to Theory of Voting. Chapter 2 of Computational Social Choice by William Zwicker

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems

Reality Math Sam Kaplan, The University of North Carolina at Asheville Dot Sulock, The University of North Carolina at Asheville

Voting Methods for Municipal Elections: Propaganda, Field Experiments and what USA voters want from an Election Algorithm

2-Candidate Voting Method: Majority Rule

Social Choice & Mechanism Design

Introduction to Social Choice

Name Date I. Consider the preference schedule in an election with 5 candidates.

(67686) Mathematical Foundations of AI June 18, Lecture 6

The Math of Rational Choice - Math 100 Spring 2015

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems. Voting I 1/31

VOTING SYSTEMS AND ARROW S THEOREM

Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream Lesson Plan

The Mathematics of Elections

Transcription:

Faculty of Mathematics Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 Centre for Education in Mathematics and Computing Grade 6 Math Circles Winter 2018 - February 27/28 The Mathematics of Voting - Solutions Warm-up: Time to vote! We need to decide what the class preference is: candy, chocolate or chips. Think about your answer and we will take a vote! Record the number of votes received for each food. The food with the most votes wins! Candy Chocolate Chips Now we are going to do the same vote but in a different way. You are going to be split up based on your birth month as follows: Group A: January, February, March Group B: April, May, June Group C: July, August, September Group D: October, November, December The food preferred by the most groups wins in this case.

Definitions A candidate is a person or thing that we can vote for in an election A voter is someone who votes in an election An election is a process where a population votes to make a decision A ballot is a device used to express the voters opinions of the candidates An outcome is a result of an election Here are some types of ballots: A single-choice ballot asks voters to choose the one candidate that they prefer. An example is our federal election. A preference ballot asks voters to rank all candidates in their order of preference. An example is if I asked you to rank all 3 of candy, chocolate and chips. A truncated preference ballot asks voters to rank their first few preferred candidates. An example is when you vote for players in the NHL All-Star game. Here are some types of outcomes from elections: A winner-only outcome indicates the winner of the election. An example is the Grammy awards. A partial ranking ranks the first few candidates by number of votes. An example is a math club where first place is the president and second place is the vice-president. A full ranking ranks all candidates by number of votes. An example is a reality show like American Idol. Finally, we look at a preference schedule, which tells us how many voters voted for a certain order of candidates. An example is shown below: Consider our warm-up example with candy, chocolate and chips. How many different ballots are possible? 3! = 6. This is a permutation (seen in probability). 3! = 3 2 1 = 6. Page 2

Number of voters 15 20 13 10 19 8 1 Chocolate Chocolate Candy Candy Chips Chips 2 Candy Chips Chips Chocolate Chocolate Candy 3 Chips Candy Chocolate Chips Candy Chocolate This means that 15 people voted for the order chocolate, candy, chips, 20 people voted for the order chocolate, chips, candy and so on. In total, how many people voted for each food as their favourite? Chocolate: 35; Candy: 23; Chips: 27 Methods of Voting 1. Plurality The plurality method counts only the number of first-placed votes. The candidate with the highest number of first-placed votes wins the election. Example Evan (E), Hannah (H), Simon (S) and Annie (A) are running for school president. Their school has a ranked election. Here are the results: Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1 1st A S E H S 2nd H H S E E 3rd S E H S H 4th E A A A A Who wins the election based on the plurality method? Annie has 14 votes and wins the election If the school gives 2nd place the position of vice-president, 3rd place the position of treasurer and 4th place the position of secretary, who fills each position? Annie wins with 14 votes, Simon comes second with 11 votes, Evan comes third with 8 votes, Hannah comes 4th with 4 votes. Therefore, Annie is president, Simon is vice-president, Evan is treasurer and Hannah is secretary. 2. Borda Count The Borda count method gives points in increasing order based on number of votes. Often, last place will get 1 point, second last place will get 2 points, all the way up until first place, who gets the maximum number of points for a vote. The candidate with the most points is the winner. Page 3

Example Returning to the school presidential election, we will allocate 4 points to a first place vote, 3 points for a second place vote, 2 points for a third place vote and 1 point for a fourth place vote. Here is the preference schedule: Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1 1st (4 pts) A (56) S (40) E (32) H (16) S (4) 2nd (3 pts) H (42) H (30) S (24) E (12) E (3) 3rd (2 pts) S (28) E (20) H (16) S (8) H (2) 4th (1 pt) E (14) A (10) A (8) A (4) A (1) Using the Borda count method, who wins the election? Annie has 56 + 10 + 8 + 4 + 1 = 79 points Hannah has 42 + 30 + 16 + 16 + 2 = 106 points Simon has 28 + 40 + 24 + 8 + 4 = 104 points Evan has 14 + 20 + 32 + 12 + 3 = 81 points Therefore, Hannah wins the election. What is the maximum possible points a candidate can get? If a candidate gets all 37 first place votes, they will have 37 4 = 148 points. 3. Plurality with elimination The plurality with elimination method is a multi-step process. After a ranked election, the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is eliminated. Their votes are transferred to the voter s second ranked candidate (or next-highest ranked candidate who has not been eliminated). This process is repeated until one candidate has a majority, at which point they are declared the winner. Page 4

Example Recall the school presidential election with Evan, Hannah, Simon and Annie. Here is the preference schedule: Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1 1st A S E H S 2nd H H S E E 3rd S E H S H 4th E A A A A Round 1 Here is a summary of the number of votes for each candidate: Candidate A H S E Votes 14 4 11 8 Hannah is eliminated (she has the fewest votes). Her votes are transferred to Evan, since everyone who made Hannah their first-place vote also made Evan their second-place vote. Round 2 Candidate A S E Votes 14 11 12 Simon is eliminated with the lowest number of votes (11). From the preference schedule, we see that 10 of his votes would go to Hannah, but she has been eliminated! So, 10 of Simon s votes go to Evan. And the other vote goes Evan as well. Round 3 Candidate A E Votes 14 23 Evan has 23 votes. the election! Since there were a total of 37 votes, Evan has a majority and wins Page 5

Practice We are down to the top 5 of American Idol! Below is a preference schedule for the remaining contestants. Who wins the show, using the plurality with elimination method? Number of voters 93 44 10 30 42 81 1st Adam Blake Carrie Carrie David Elise 2nd Blake David Adam Elise Carrie David 3rd Carrie Elise Elise Blake Elise Carrie 4th David Carrie Blake Adam Adam Blake 5th Elise Adam David David Blake Adam Round 1 Candidate Adam Blake Carrie David Elise Votes 93 44 40 42 81 Carrie has the least number of first-place votes and is eliminated first. go to Adam, 30 go to Elise. Round 2 10 of her votes Candidate Adam Blake David Elise Votes 103 44 42 111 David has the fewest first-place votes, so he is eliminated next. All 42 of his votes would go to Carrie, but she has already been eliminated, so they will go to Elise. Round 3 Candidate Adam Blake Elise Votes 103 44 153 Elise now has 153 of 300 possible votes. She has the majority, so we do not need to vote again. Elise is your American Idol! 4. Pairwise Comparison The pairwise comparison method puts candidates in a head-to-head setting. Based on the preference schedule, 1 point is given to a candidate that is ranked higher by the most voters, 0 points are given to the candidate ranked lower, and 1 a point is given to both candidates 2 if it is a tie. Page 6

Example We use the same example, with the preference schedule given below: Number of voters 14 10 8 4 1 1st A S E H S 2nd H H S E E 3rd S E H S H 4th E A A A A We need to check 6 different pairs: A vs. H, A vs. S, A vs. E, H vs. S, H vs. E, and S vs. E. Let s see Annie vs. Hannah: Annie has 14 votes where ranks above Hannah, while Hannah has the other 23. Therefore, Hannah beats Annie in this pairwise comparison and gains 1 point. The table below can help to show pairwise comparisons. Fill in the rest: Pairwise comparison Votes Winner A vs. H A (14); H (23) H A vs. S A (14); H (23) S A vs. E A (14); E (23) E H vs. S H (18); S (19) S H vs. E H (28); E (9) H S vs. E S (25); E (12) S Who has the most total points (and is therefore the winner)? Hannah has 2 points, Simon has 3 points, Evan has 1 point, Annie has 0 points. Therefore Simon is the winner. For an election of N candidates, how many pairwise comparisons will need to be done? N(N 1) We have 6 comparisons for 4 candidates. For N candidates, we have 2 Page 7

Which method is the best? Here is a summary of the school presidential election results using the 4 voting methods: Method 1st 2nd 3rd 4th Plurality A S E H Borda count H S E A Plurality with elimination E A S H Pairwise comparison S H E A What do you notice about these results? Someone different wins for each voting method! Arrow s Impossibility Theorem Given three or more candidates, it is mathematically impossible to have a fair voting method. What does fair mean? Here are the 4 fairness criteria: 1. Majority: The candidate with the majority of first-place votes should win 2. Condorcet: The candidate who is preferred to the other candidates in pairwise comparison should win 3. Monotonicity: A candidate should not be negatively affected by a voter moving them up higher on their ballot 4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The winner should not be changed if other candidates are removed Arrow s Impossibility Theorem tells us that each of our 4 voting methods violates at least one of these criteria. Page 8

The Electoral System in Canada In Canadian federal elections, we use the plurality method combined with the first past the post method. Voters vote for a candidate in their riding (based on their city or geographical location), who represents a certain party. The party with the most first-place votes wins the election and is represented by the prime minister. The numbers on the map below represent the number of ridings for each province: 1 1 1 42 34 14 14 121 78 10 4 7 11 How is our Canadian electoral system similar to the warm-up that we did today? No matter how many votes you get for a certain riding, that riding only has a weight of 1. Therefore, if the second-place party in Toronto had millions of votes, they would not count for anything, but if the first-place party in Yukon had a few thousand votes, they would get a seat (win the election). Page 9

Problems 1. Determine the type of ballot used in the following cases: a) Choose one candidate Bruno Mars The Weeknd Ed Sheeran Kendrick Lamar b) List your top 3 favourite tennis players in order of preference c) Rank all candidates in order of preference Famoso Subway The Keg Swiss Chalet d) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th List all candidates in order of preference 2. Determine the type of outcome from the following elections: a) The Oscars choose one winner from a list of nominees b) You and your friends rank your top 10 favourite songs c) Dancing with the Stars ranks the contestants, eliminating one each week. d) The top three students are recognized for having the highest marks in math class. 3. Build a preference schedule and then use the plurality method to find out the results of the following election: Petey s office is trying to decide what type of food to eat at their retreat next month. Their options are pizza (P), hamburgers (H), salad (S), noodles (N) and chicken (C). 49 people choose the following ballot: Pizza, hamburgers, noodles, chicken, salad; 48 people order their choices as hamburgers, salad, chicken, noodles, pizza; and 3 people prefer the order of noodles, hamburgers, salad, chicken, pizza. Page 10

4. The Bowerman award is an award given to the top male and female track and field athletes in the American College system (NCAA). The winner is decided using a preference ballot: voters rank the 3 finalists. Below is the preference schedule for the male finalists in 2017: Athlete 1st (3 pts) 2nd (2 pts) 3rd (1 pt) Total points Christian Coleman 20 3 7 Fred Kerley 10 20 0 Lindon Victor 0 7 23 Based on the Borda count method, who won the Bowerman Men s Award in 2017? Who came 2nd and 3rd? 5. Using the plurality with elimination method, find out who won the rights to host the 2024 Olympic Games (as well as the final rankings): Number of voters 8 7 5 4 3 2 1st Paris LA Budapest Hamburg Budapest Hamburg 2nd Rome Rome Paris LA Hamburg Paris 3rd Budapest Hamburg LA Paris Rome LA 4th LA Budapest Hamburg Rome LA Budapest 5th Hamburg Paris Rome Budapest Paris Rome 6. The Toronto Maple Leafs are moments away from the 2017 NHL Entry Draft. They are using pairwise comparison to try to figure out in what order the first 5 draft picks will be chosen. The top five draft picks will be chosen from Cale Makar, Nico Hischier, Nolan Patrick, Miro Heiskanen and Elias Petersson. Here is the preference schedule as voted by TSN analysts: # of voters 2 6 4 1 1 4 4 1st Hischier Patrick Patrick Heiskanen Heiskanen Makar Petersson 2nd Makar Hischier Hischier Patrick Makar Hischier Heiskanen 3rd Heiskanen Heiskanen Makar Hischier Hischier Petersson Makar 4th Patrick Makar Petersson Makar Patrick Heiskanen Patrick 5th Petersson Petersson Heiskanen Petersson Petersson Patrick Hischier Who will be drafted in what order? Page 11

7. In an election of 7 candidates, how many pairwise comparisons do we need to do to find the winner? 8. In a preference ballot Borda count election of 7 candidates with 32 voters, what is the maximum possible points a candidate can get? 9. How many different ballots are available if there are 4 candidates in an election? 10. For each of the four voting methods, find which of the four fairness criteria are broken. Solutions 1. a) single-choice ballot b) truncated preference ballot c) preference ballot d) Preference ballot 2. a) winner-only b) Partial ranking c) Full ranking d) Partial ranking 3. Number of voters 49 48 3 1st P H N 2nd H S H 3rd N C S 4th C N C 5th S P P Pizza wins with 49 first-place votes under the plurality method. Hamburgers get 48 votes and noodles get 3 votes. Notice though that even though pizza won, it has 51 last-place votes! Looks like the plurality method is an interesting choice. 4. Athlete 1st (3 pts) 2nd (2 pts) 3rd (1 pt) Total points Christian Coleman 20 3 7 73 Fred Kerley 10 20 0 70 Lindon Victor 0 7 23 37 Page 12

Using the Borda Count Method, Christian Coleman wins the Bowerman award with 73 points. Fred Kerley comes second with 70 points and Lindon Victor comes third with 37 points. 5. Round 1 Candidate Paris LA Budapest Hamburg Rome Number of first-place votes 8 7 8 6 0 Rome has the fewest first-place votes, so they are eliminated. Since they had 0 first-place votes, none are transferred. Round 2 Candidate Paris LA Budapest Hamburg Number of first-place votes 8 7 8 6 Hamburg has the fewest first-place votes (6), so they are eliminated. 4 of their votes go to LA and 2 go to Paris. Round 3 Candidate Paris LA Budapest Number of first-place votes 10 11 8 Budapest has the fewest first-place votes (8), so they are eliminated. 5 of their votes go to Paris, and the other 3 go to LA. Round 4 Candidate Paris LA Number of first-place votes 15 14 Paris has 15 votes, which is more than the majority (there are a total of 29 votes). Therefore, Paris is the host of the 2024 Olympic Games! Page 13

6. Pairwise comparison Votes Winner (points) Hischier v Patrick Hischier (7); Patrick (15) Patrick (1) Hischier v Heiskanen Hischier (16); Heiskanen (6) Hischier (1) Hischier v Makar Hischier (13); Makar (9) Hischier (1) Hischier v Petersson Hischier (18); Petersson (4) Hischier (1) Patrick v Heiskanen Patrick (10); Heiskanen (12) Heiskanen (1) Patrick v Makar Patrick (11); Makar (11) Patrick ( 1); Makar ( 1) 2 2 Patrick v Petersson Patrick (14); Petersson (8) Patrick (1) Heiskanen v Makar Heiskanen (12); Makar (10) Heiskanen (1) Heiskanen v Petersson Heiskanen (10); Petersson (12) Petersson (1) Makar v Petersson Makar (18); Petersson (4) Makar (1) In total, Hischier has 3 points and will be drafted first, Patrick has 2 1 points and will 2 be drafted second, Heiskanen has 2 points and will be drafted third, Makar has 1 1 points 2 and will be drafted fourth, and Petersson has 1 point and will be drafted fifth. 7. We will need 7(6) 2 = 21 pairwise comparisons to find a winner in an election of 7 candidates. 8. If the winning candidate got first-place votes from all 32 voters, they would have 32 7 = 224 points. 9. 4 candidates in an election would have a total of 4! = 4 3 2 1 = 24 different ballots. 10. Criterion Plurality Borda count Plurality with elimination Pairwise comparisons Majority No Violated No No Condorcet Violated Violated Violated No Monotonocity No No Violated No IIA Violated Violated Violated Violated Plurality The plurality method only needs the majority of first place votes, so it does not violate the majority criterion. The Condorcet candidate will not necessarily win: preferences other than first-place votes are not taken into account. It does not violate the monotonocity criterion: first-place votes won t be affected by being Page 14

moved up (they can t be). It violates the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives (IIA) criterion because if we remove a third, irrelevant candidate, those votes could go to the runner-up who could then win. Borda Count If many voters vote for a candidate in second or third, they will get a lot of points and can surpass the candidate who wins the majority of first place votes, so the majority criterion is violated. The Condorcet criterion is also violated: the one who wins in pairwise competition will not necessarily get the most points. Moving the winner higher up someone s ballot will not influence their win, so the monotonocity criterion is not violated. The IIA criterion is violated because moving irrelevant alternatives will allocate points differently, which could hurt the winner. Plurality with Elimination The majority criterion is not violated since the winner needs to have a majority in order to win the election. The Condorcet criterion is violated since a candidate could win pairwise against another but then receive more votes from a third candidate who is eliminated, giving them the edge in a future round. The monotonocity criterion is violated since a third party being eliminated in one round could hurt the winner. This is due to the fact that the voter s second choice is taken into account. In political elections, we call this splitting the vote. The IIA criterion is violated since more irrelevant alternatives means more second choices in other places, which could hurt the winner. Pairwise Comparison The majority criterion is not broken since first-place votes will help in head-to-head competition: the winner will be higher up on the ballot. The Condorcet criterion checks pairwise comparison, so it is clearly not violated. The monotonocity criterion is not violated: once a candidate is higher up on the ballot than another, it doesn t matter how much higher up they are. The IIA criterion is violated since removing irrelevant alternatives may give other candidates higher votes, which would change how pairwise comparisons work. Page 15