Sudan after the Loss of the South

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Meeting Summary Sudan after the Loss of the South Yasir Arman Secretary-General, SPLM-North Chair: Sally Healy OBE Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House 3 October 2011 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document s author(s). The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery.

Yasir Arman: What is the Northern question? Since independence, Sudan has often been perceived in terms of dichotomies: of North-South, Muslim-Christian, Arab-African. These are oversimplifications, and not an accurate record of what Sudan represents. The independence of the Republic of South Sudan means that the North now stands on its own. For a long time, Sudan s problem was seen as a long war of North versus South, but it has actually been the central government versus different regions: the East, the Nuba Mountains and the South. The government has fought everyone including professionals, farmers and workers, especially in the last twenty years. The Northern question should be seen as a crisis emanating from the lack of an inclusive national project of nation-building and a correct national formation process based on the objective realities of Sudan. The present national project is based on limited parameters that marginalise and exclude the majority of the Sudanese people on a cultural, religious, economic, political and gender basis. Most of the marginalised are women. This marginalisation and dictatorship has produced continuous wars, inequality, injustice and instability in Sudan. An inclusive national project would incorporate and acknowledge historical and contemporary diversities, democratisation, social justice and balanced relations between the centre and the regions or the peripheries. Mismanagement, non-recognition of diversities, lack of democracy and social justice led the people of South Sudan to choose an independent state. A new political and geographical South has emerged in the North, and the situation created is more complicated than the old South, because it involves a mix of many issues. It is obvious that the old South was not just geographically distant from the North; there was in the first place a human dimension to the difference. There was a long struggle for recognition of diversity, democracy and social justice which continues in the new South within Sudan. It is worth mentioning that the new South of the North politically includes women, Arab and non-arab tribes all over Sudan including the Rizeigat, Misseriya and Rashaida people in eastern Sudan, and many others. It also www.chathamhouse.org 2

includes the marginalised of the rural areas and the urban poor who are the majority. Now this South is geographically close to Khartoum. The policies and decisions of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) created a full-scale war in the new geographical South of Sudan, from Darfur to Blue Nile. In addition, there is much unfinished business in relations between Sudan and the newly-independent Republic of South Sudan. There can only be two viable states and strategic relations between Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan when Khartoum is transformed and the two states share the same values. Democratic states rarely fight against each other. The North is now to be an Islamic Arab state, but when Omar al-bashir says this he is not talking about Arabs but about himself. He wants to introduce a new version of Islam to repress and oppress social movements in the new South. The intransigence of the NCP leadership in seeking to maintain the old policies led to the split with the South as these policies were based on hegemony, limited parameters and a bankrupt ideology. None of these policies recognise the diversity of Sudan as described in General Omar al- Bashir speeches, such as the famous Gaddaref speech and many others that followed. Based on the above policies the NCP targeted the Sudan People Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which is viewed by them as a formidable imminent political and military threat. As a consequence, they started the war in South Kordofan, the Nuba Mountains and in Blue Nile which resulted in the displacement of more than 300,000 civilians. Many others crossed the border as refugees into the Republic of South Sudan and Ethiopia. Atrocities and war crimes have been committed in this war. Many lost their lives and were injured, many were detained, and mass graves were found in Kadugli. Up to today the Sudanese Army Air Force continues to bombard the civilian population and civilian installations. Access for humanitarian operations is being denied by the NCP in the face of the international community. The SPLM-N has been banned, an elected Governor of Blue Nile has been removed from office, a state of emergency has been declared and more than 140 SPLM-N leaders all over the North are currently detained. www.chathamhouse.org 3

If Khartoum does not change, then the situation will remain problematic. There are lots of heavy problems with no plans in place for their resolution. The issue of the transportation of oil from South Sudan through Sudan is one example. In a similar oil pipeline in Cameroon, transportation of oil costs about $1 per barrel, but Sudan is asking South Sudan for $72 per barrel. Characteristics of the present situation in Sudan The economy is in deep crisis with a wide and complex scope. This current economic situation will produce more marginalisation, and will definitely lead to social unrest and more wars in the North if it is not resolved soon. The Sudanese pound has very quickly gone down in value from $1 to $4 - $5. There is a full scale war from Darfur to Blue Nile, the new South of the North, and a governance crisis that can only be resolved through democratisation and re-structuring in the centre. Around Sudan, there have been a sea of revolutions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia and all have de-legitimised the rule of the one-party system. Khartoum still has serious unresolved issues with the Republic of South Sudan. This is not helped by the intense rivalries and power struggles within the different groups in the NCP and within the Sudanese army. What do we need from the international community? The international community needs to place strong pressure on Khartoum to allow the delivery of immediate humanitarian assistance, and safe corridors to deliver this assistance should be given to credible international organisations such as the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as to indigenous NGOs. We ask for an independent international committee to investigate the war crimes and human rights violations committed by the Sudanese government against the civilian population. Impunity would encourage more atrocities. War crimes should be punished. The civilian population needs to be protected from air bombardment, and air bombardment should stop. www.chathamhouse.org 4

My final message to the international community is that it is hightime for all of us to adopt a holistic approach to resolving the Sudanese crisis by addressing the essence of the crisis, not its manifestations. The seedbed of the crisis is Khartoum, not Kadugli, Nyala or Port Sudan. The way out The only way to resolve the war issue and governance crisis in Sudan is for the NCP regime to be removed. It is necessary to transform and restructure the seat of power in Khartoum, and to establish a democratic government that will emerge as the result of uniting all of the opposition forces and civil society. If the same situation that led to separation with South Sudan continues, the North will face disunity. The SPLM-North is seeking an alliance which wants change and democracy in the context of a broad national Sudanese consensus; an umbrella of resistance with a new blueprint which will lead to a paradigm shift from the old politics. SPLM-N is committed to developing the political and military structures of the Kauda Alliance between armed resistance movements in shortest possible time, as well as reaching out to the rest of the opposition. General al-bashir disowned the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement, which had been an opportunity for the NCP to become stakeholders in the transformation. The government has failed to reach an agreement with any of the Sudanese political and resistance movements. They will either change or they will be changed. What is left for all of us now is to change them. As Dr. John Garang used to say, 'they are too deformed to be reformed'. Lastly, the SPLM-N will continue to work for the unity of Sudan on a new basis. This unity between the two independent states of Sudan and South Sudan should be established in order to create two viable states in a new Sudanese union, working in harmony and building strategic relations with the region and neighbouring countries, and adding value to regional peace and stability worldwide. There should be free movement of people, as within the European Union. We are determined to do it as many would like to see Sudan united again. Bashir is worse than Hosni Mubarak Mubarak did not divide Egypt. There needs to be a better system at the centre, and sooner or later we will achieve that. www.chathamhouse.org 5

Q&A SESSION When the NDA formed the Sudanese opposition in the mid-1990s, it depended militarily on the SPLM. Can you expand on your relations with other political opposition groups in the North? Discussions are already taking place with some Darfuri opposition forces. We intend to form a structure and fight together for negotiations, and we will reach out to other political forces. We do not want to repeat experience of the NDA, we want to work for a new agenda to address all of Sudan s problems. As I said the issue is in Khartoum, not everywhere. Please can you comment on the experience of the Beja people in Eastern Sudan during the war? The Beja are still marginalised, they signed an agreement with the NCP which meant that they would at least get peanuts, but even this is not being delivered. Eighty percent of women die of malnourishment in the area this is a serious situation. I believe it will get international attention because the same issues and values are shared by the north. Bashir thinks that this will go his way I don t think this will happen. If things turn tough in the face of the alliance, what can the international community do for the NCP? Problems between the South and the North started before South Sudan s independence. The SPLM fought against different regimes in Sudan, including against multiparty systems. It is not a matter of them versus the NCP. There was a process of partnership with the SPLM, and the agreement to transform Sudan began in 2005.There is a multiparty system and elections www.chathamhouse.org 6

were held last year which were free, fair and internationally monitored. By July this year, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was supposed to have been completed. The Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA) was supposed to have been demobilised and reintegrated into society. What is going on in Sudan right now is planned by the SPLM, and is being financed by the SPLM in the South, therefore the government of Sudan has filed a complaint against the government of South Sudan at the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, people like Yasir Arman act as proxies by trying to make people forget the agenda of the SPLM. Fortunately, the SPLM has formed the government in South Sudan, so if people in the North like what is going on in South Sudan they should follow the situation there. You have spoken as the ambassador of the NCP not as ambassador of Sudan, because the Embassy is not representing the Sudanese people. You are supposed to be civil servants, and not be involved in politics, but you are always treating people outside of Sudan by political colour. In Sudan s present situation, the NCP is the state. Imagine if in the UK, David Cameron started dismissing officers in the army because of the how they voted. This is happening now in Sudan, where the police have become a political entity, and the army is administered by an Islamic movement. The civil service is the same. I have been to many trials of activists where the judges are told what to do by the government. I m not saying that Sudan should take the South Sudan model, I am saying that power should be given back to the people, and that the people should be allowed to decide who they want to represent them. Sudan s parliament is 98 percent NCP, so it is a Shura Council rather than a parliament. On the issue of disarmament, this was all that was suggested to the SPLM/A. There are over 2000 SPLM members in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and they have been fighting for over twenty years. The security arrangement offered to them which included disarmament was based on the idea that Sudan would be united. On the instructions of the President the SPLA were told to give up and surrender their arms in a very short time, just between 27 June and 30 June. NCP leaders were asked to review the situation, but for people who fought for www.chathamhouse.org 7

a political cause, it is impossible to expect them to give up without a political argument. President Bashir insulted the international efforts of Meles Zenawi, the UK and the US in a speech at a mosque run by his family. He said that he did not want to hear anything about the agreement. The NCP is acquiring arms and should be disarmed itself. The country needs a professional police force and army. The Sudanese state is a failure as a result of the NCP. I am a committed member of the SPLM, but the Sudanese people should be permitted to elect a new government in free elections. If Sudanese people want to vote for he SPLM then it will flourish, if not it will die. Do you think there is a need for international mediators? Can the UN or EU investigate in a more constructive way? Is there any contact between the defence and intelligence agencies of the North and South? We are not warmongers. There needs to be a truth and reconciliation process. We need to end the war and crises of government in Sudan. As I said, there needs to be a holistic approach the problem is not in the Nuba mountains, but in Khartoum. 300,000 people need food, but Bashir is refusing to give access. A mass grave with 8000 bodies has been found in Kadugli. We are not asking for an international committee, because we have to protect those who have not died. I am from the centre of Sudan, and people from this region are being agitated. The government is running out of Islamic reasons for what it does because its actions are un-islamic. It is now using the racial element to mobilise people. When Machakos was signed, there was an acceptance of the idea that the North is Islamic and the South is non-islamic. This definition came as the result of a high-level conference at the Centre for Strategic Studies. But labelling the North as Arab and Islamic, and the South as African and Christian was tantamount to dividing Sudan, and not true on the ground. I m not against the separation with South Sudan, but don t you agree that if we www.chathamhouse.org 8

stuck with the NDA principle of Sudan as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, we would have had a different outcome? The relationship between North and South will not be judged today, but if the NDA principle had continued it could have been lovely and achieved a lot. We saw it as time for us to end the war and have a transformation of Sudan. On what basis do you place your dream of uniting Sudan when 98.93 percent of South Sudanese people have voted to form their own independent sovereign state? You would be better off talking of Sudan and South Sudan becoming good neighbours, anything else is just a dream. Life is based on dreams. South Sudan would not have been possible without dreams. I believe in pan-africanism, and I believe this feeling is shared by Southerners. If you look to history: no-one in 1945 could imagine that the EU could exist, or that a strategic relationship could be established between France and Germany. The North and South have shared communities and a legal border with 9,000 people living on it. The Dinka is now the biggest tribe in South Sudan, but before independence the region did not have international borders with any country now they share borders with Sudan. The Nuba people do not feel like they have a president or a government because the government in Khartoum is diverting food for the Nuba to Somalia, simply because the Somalis are Muslim. The government continues to bomb civilians who feel they have nothing in common with the centre. I have seen satellite pictures of military vehicles moving towards Damazin I do not know which side these vehicles belonged to. Please can you explain what is happening there, why, and when the violence will stop? www.chathamhouse.org 9

Yasir Arman has said that Sudanese diplomats are not representing the Sudanese people, but when he was a candidate for the 2010 elections the SPLM withdrew. He does not have political support or the mandate to speak on behalf of the Sudanese people. I asked for something straightforward; for an international independent investigating committee to investigate this situation. If I am a liar, such a committee would agree with you and say that everything in Sudan is fine, there is no problem and the government in Khartoum is perfect. A committee should be accepted because there are serious accusations, including from human rights groups. It is unconvincing that ninety-eight percent of Sudanese people like the NCP. The president is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Given how infectious democratic movements have been across North Africa as a region and East Africa to some extent, can you expect support from Ethiopia and Sudan? Across the world there is increased political energy of the young. We need political support which will help the Sudanese people to build a new Sudan. www.chathamhouse.org 10