Governm ent 94im : COM P AR ATI VE ELECTOR AL SYSTEM S Fall 2017

Governm ent 94im : COM P AR ATI VE ELECTOR AL SYSTEM S Fall 2017 Professor Daniel M. Smith Time: Tuesdays 2-4 pm Location: CGIS K109 Office hours (CGIS Knafel 407): Tuesdays 11 am- 12 pm; Wednesdays 3-4 pm; or by appointment Email: danielmsmith@fas.harvard.edu Website: https://canvas.harvard.edu/courses/30348 Ballot samples: India, Ireland, Japan, and Israel For representative democracy to work, it requires a set of rules to determine who wins elections and gets to govern. However, these rules can vary greatly in terms of how votes are cast, counted, and translated into seats, and differences in the rules can produce significantly different political outcomes, both directly (due to the way in which votes are counted) and indirectly (due to incentives that affect the behavior of political actors, such as voters and political parties). The set of rules that structure the process of voting and election is what we call the electoral system. This seminar will survey and analyze electoral systems from around the world to explore how electoral rules can affect voters, politicians, parties, policymaking, and representation. Course objectives: By the end of the course, you should be able to: Know and understand the basic mechanical differences between electoral systems. Use electoral results to obtain key measures of analysis, such as the effective number of parties and level of (dis)proportionality. Compare and contrast the electoral systems used by different countries, and evaluate how observed differences in the politics of those countries may be related to the electoral systems. Recognize the possibilities and limitations of electoral system design and reform. Note: This syllabus is only an outline of the course, and not any sort of contract from which you can claim rights. If deviations from the syllabus are required for any reason, they will be announced in class. Such announcements always trump this document. GR ADES/ EX P ECTATI ON S You are expected to keep up with assigned readings and to attend and actively participate in each meeting (see DI SCUSSI ON / P AR TI CI P ATI ON section below). In addition, your grade will be based on several writing assignments. The components of the grade will be weighted as follows: 1

40% Discussion/participation (including leading discussion at least once) 30% Response papers (3 during quarter, each 10% of grade) 30% Election analysis paper and presentation No student will receive a passing grade without turning in every assignment on time. No extensions will be offered, except in the event of serious emergencies (for which proper documentation will be required). Accommodations for students with disabilities: Students needing academic adjustments or accommodations because of a documented disability must present their Faculty Letter from the Accessible Education Office (AEO) and speak with me by the end of the second week of the term. Failure to do so may result in the inability to respond in a timely manner. Academic integrity policy: You are expected to maintain high standards of academic integrity in your work for this and all courses you take at Harvard. You are encouraged to discuss the material and exchange ideas with your classmates, and may consult with your classmates on the choice of paper topics and to share sources. However, you should ensure that any written work you submit for evaluation is the result of your own original research and writing, and that it reflects your own approach to the topic. You must also adhere to standard citation practices in this discipline and properly cite any books, articles, websites, lectures, etc. that have helped you with your work. Plagiarism will not be tolerated. If you received any help with your writing (feedback on drafts, etc.), you must also acknowledge this assistance. DISCUSSION/PARTICIPATION You are expected to come to class meetings having done the readings for that week, and prepared to discuss central questions and puzzles that arise from them. A few times during the quarter (depending on the number of students enrolled), you will be expected to take the lead in orienting the discussion of that week s readings. These may be the same weeks that you prepare a response paper, but they do not have to be taking the lead in discussion means more than simply presenting your response paper. It means organizing the material in a way that helps to draw out interesting questions or gaps in the arguments of the readings, and raising questions for discussion. Note also that for a discussion to be led, there must be others involved so, everyone is required to participate actively in discussion. Each week, the person(s) responsible for leading discussion will meet with me some time in advance to go over the planned discussion questions. RESPONSE PAPERS You must submit a minimum of three response papers over the course of the semester. These are short papers (3-5 pages, double-spaced), which must be submitted to me by email by 9 am on the day of our class meeting. Your response papers must do at least one of the following: (1) offer a synthesis and critical review of the week s readings;; or (2) pose some thoughtful question(s) that would be valuable for discussion and somehow relevant to the topic of the week. In weeks in which you write a response paper, you are especially encouraged to read the recommended readings. One model (but not the only one) for these papers is to respond to events in the news that are related to the week s topic. For instance, you could research events in one of the countries we discuss and say something about how the electoral system may be shaping the events you have read about in the news. Such events could be a recent election, a change of government, or a current policy or reform debate. Note: At least one response paper must be turned in on a date of your choosing by Week 5. ELECTION ANALYSIS PAPER You will also prepare an election analysis paper (~10 pages, double-spaced). Imagine you are a country expert who has been asked to write a post-election analysis for the State Department, an NGO, or the news media. You will choose a specific election in some country, explain the electoral system, and describe the parties or candidates that contested the election. Most importantly, you will discuss the outcome, focusing in particular on how the electoral system helped shape the results, and applying the key measures of analysis (e.g., indices of 2

fragmentation and disproportionality), you have learned from the course. Some examples of such analyses can be found here: The Monkey Cage Election Reports. You may choose any election in any democracy after 2005 (the last year covered in PES, the main textbook), except for an election that is included in the readings or already extensively covered on The Monkey Cage. In addition, you may not analyze a national-level (i.e., presidential or congressional) election from the United States, though state and local-level elections are permitted. The election case you choose must be approved by October 24. You must consult (and cite) a minimum of four sources, including at least one academic source meaning a peerreviewed journal article or a book published by a major press. You may also make use of web-based sources, such as newspapers, specialized blogs, or data archives. In addition, it would be helpful to consult primary sources (e.g., government, NGO, or international organization publications about electoral systems or elections). Since the point of the election analysis is to advance an argument that helps the reader understand what was significant in your considered judgment about the election and the electoral system, your paper should have a clear thesis statement and your argument should be carefully developed with supporting evidence. Topics may include such questions as: How did the electoral system shape the conduct of the campaign and/or the outcome of the election? How might the results (i.e., the distribution of seats) have been different under a different electoral system? Was there any coordination failure among parties or candidates? Why, and how did this affect the results? Was some party or minority group advantaged or disadvantaged by the electoral system? Would a reform of the electoral system help resolve some perceived problem related to the current electoral system? Students with more advanced statistical skills are welcome to analyze the raw election data, if such data are available, but this is not required. If you need help narrowing your topic, or finding information or data for the election you ve chosen, please consult me. You will also give a brief PowerPoint presentation of your analysis during our scheduled exam time. READINGS There are two required books that you should acquire for this course: 1. The Politics of Electoral Systems (PES). 2008. Eds. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell. Oxford University Press. 2. Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook (IDEA). 2008. Eds. Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. The IDEA Handbook is available online, for free! Other readings are available via links in the syllabus or the course webpage. PES contains country-specific chapters, which are usually divided into the following sections: (1) Historical background of the country s political system (2) Origins of the current electoral system (3) The electoral system as it stands today (4) Political consequences of the electoral system (5) The politics of electoral reform Sections 1, 2, and 5 can be read relatively quickly. When thinking about the origins of electoral systems and debates about their reform, it is important to remember that they are usually adopted by the very actors politicians and parties who will be most affected. Ask yourself: who stood to benefit from the adoption of certain rules, and who were the major players in these deliberations? 3

Sections 3 and 4 should be read more carefully. Pay attention to the critical electoral variables in Section 3. When you are done reading, you should be able to answer the following types of questions: - What is the ballot s structure (does it allow for intraparty competition)? - How many votes does each voter get and are they cast at the party or candidate level? - When the election is over, to what level do votes pool (can votes for one candidate help another)? - How many seats are allocated in each district? By what rule or formula? Section 4 will help you think about the theoretically relevant consequences of these rules for important dimensions of the political system: - How do political parties or candidates interact with their (potential) supporters? - What types of campaigning activities do candidates or parties pursue? - What types of candidates are attractive to parties, and to voters? - How cohesive are party members in terms of legislative voting? - What kinds of parliamentary activities are important to legislators? - What is the process of government formation (e.g., coalitions, cabinet post distribution)? - How stable (long-lived) are governments? As you read about each country case, you should focus on getting the basics of the rules correct, and then thinking about how those rules help to determine which behaviors make the most sense for politicians and parties to pursue. The above types of questions may also help to motivate your response papers and class discussion. COURSE SCHEDULE Week 1: September 5 Introduction and Orientation to the Topic 1. PES: Ch. 1 (pp. 3-23) 2. IDEA: Ch. 1-2 (pp. 1-33) 1. Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew S. Shugart. 1989. Seats & Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press: Ch. 1-3 (pp. 1-37) 2. Bormann, Nils-Christian, and Matt Golder. 2013. Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011. Electoral Studies, 32 (1): pp. 360-369. Week 2: September 12 Interparty Effects I: Duverger s Law 1. PES: Appendix A (pp. 579-597) 2. PES: Ch. 2 (pp. 25-55) 3. Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World s Electoral Systems (Chapter 4, pp. 69-98). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 4. Singer, Matthew. 2013. Was Duverger Correct? Single-Member District Election Outcomes in Fifty-three Countries. British Journal of Political Science, 43(1): 201-220. 5. Colomer, Josep. 2017. Party System Effects on Electoral Rules. In Erik S. Herron, Robert Pekkanen, and Matthew Søberg Shugart, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems. New York: Oxford University Press. 4

1. Riker, William. 1982. The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science. American Political Science Review, 76(4): 753-766. 2. Reed, Steven R. 1990. Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case. British Journal of Political Science, 20(3): 335-356. 3. Harada, Masataka, and Daniel M. Smith. 2014. You Have to Pay to Play: Candidate and Party Responses to the High Cost of Elections in Japan. Electoral Studies, 36(1): 51-64. Week 3: September 19 Interparty Effects II: Party System Fragmentation and Government Stability 1. PES: Appendix B (pp. 598-606) 2. IDEA: Annex D (pp. 188-190) 3. Cox, Gary W. 1990. Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science, 34 (4): pp. 903-935. 4. Taagepera, Rein. 2007. Electoral Systems, in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, pp. 678-702. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Farrell, David M. 2001. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction (Ch. 9 pp. 192-207). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 1. PES: Appendix C (pp. 607-620) 2. PES: Appendix D (p. 621) 3. Rogowski, Ronald, and Mark Andreas Kayser. 2002. Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power: Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3): 526-539. 4. Taagepera, Rein, and Allan Sikk. 2010. Parsimonious Model for Predicting Mean Cabinet Duration on the Basis of Electoral System. Party Politics, 16(2): 261-281. 5. Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Week 4: September 26 Intraparty Effects I: Candidate Selection and Candidate Characteristics 1. IDEA: Ch. 3 (pp. 119-126) 2. Rosen, Jennifer. 2013. The Effects of Political Institutions on Women s Political Representation: A Comparative Analysis of 168 Countries from 1992 to 2010. Political Research Quarterly, 66(2): 306-321. 3. Canon, David T. 1999. Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority Interests in Legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24(3): 331-385. 4. Shugart, Matthew S., Melody Ellis Valdini, and Kati Suominen. 2005. Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators Under Proportional Representation. American Journal of Political Science, 49(2): 437-449. 5. Golder, Matt and Benjamin Ferland. 2017. Electoral Rules and Citizen-Elite Ideological Congruence. In Erik S. Herron, Robert Pekkanen, and Matthew Søberg Shugart, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems. New York: Oxford University Press. 1. Salmond, Rob. 2006. Proportional Representation and Female Parliamentarians. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 31(2): 175-204. 2. Moser, Robert G. 2008. Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Evidence from Russia. Comparative Politics, 40(3): 273-292. 3. Childs, Sarah, and Philip Cowley. 2011. The Politics of Local Presence: Is there a Case for Descriptive Representation? Political Studies, 59: 1-19. 4. Lundell, Krister. 2004. Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective. Party Politics, 10(1): 25-47. 5

5. Smith, Daniel M. and Hidenori Tsutsumi. 2016. "Candidate Selection Methods and Policy Cohesion in Parties: The Impact of Open Recruitment in Japan." Party Politics, 22(3): 339-353. Week 5: October 3 Intraparty Effects II: Candidate and Legislator Behavior 1. Carey, John and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas. Electoral Studies, 14(4): 417-439. 2. Stratmann, Thomas, and Martin Baur. 2002. Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science, 46(3): 506-514. 3. Carey, John M. 2007. Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1): 92-107. 4. Chang, Eric C.C., and Miriam A. Golden. 2007. Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption, British Journal of Political Science, 37(1): 115-137. 5. Tavits, M. (2010). Effect of Local Ties on Electoral Success and Parliamentary Behaviour: The Case of Estonia. Party Politics, 16(2): 215-235. 1. Grofman, Bernard. 2005. Comparisons Among Electoral Systems: Distinguishing Between Localism and Candidate-Centered Politics. Electoral Studies, 24(4): 735-740. 2. Persson, Torsten, Guido Tabellini, and Francesco Trebbi. 2003. Electoral Rules and Corruption. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(4): 958-989. 3. Bawn Kathleen, and Michael F. Thies. 2003. A Comparative Theory of Electoral Incentives: Representing the Unorganized under PR, Plurality and Mixed-Member Electoral Systems, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15(1): 5-32. Week 6: October 10 Single-Member District Systems 1. IDEA: Ch. 3 (pp. 35-53) 2. PES: Ch. 8 (pp. 157-184) The United Kingdom 3. PES: Ch. 7 (pp. 137-156) India 4. Cox, Gary W. 1999. "Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination." Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1): 145-161. 1. PES: Ch. 5 (pp. 99-118) Canada 2. PES: Ch. 9 (pp. 185-205) The United States 3. PES: Ch. 6 (pp. 119-136) France 4. Blais, André, and Indridi H. Indridason. 2007. Making Candidates Count: The Logic of Electoral Alliances in Two-Round Legislative Elections. Journal of Politics, 69(1): 193-205. 5. Gaines, B. J. 1998. The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage in British Elections, 1950-92. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23(2): 167-195. 6. Chhibber, Pradeep, and Ken Kollman. 1998. Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States. American Political Science Review, 92(2): 329-342. 7. Diwakar, Rekha. 2007. Duverger's Law and the Size of the Indian Party System. Party Politics, 13(5): 539-561. 8. Play the redistricting game. 9. Play Slate.com s gerrymandering jigsaw puzzle. 6

Week 7: October 17 Proportional Representation: Closed, Open, and Flexible-List Systems 1. IDEA: Ch. 3 (pp. 57-90) 2. PES: Ch. 16 (pp. 333-351) Israel 3. PES: Ch. 21 (pp. 433-452) Chile 4. PES: Ch. 23 (pp. 473-489) Finland 5. IDEA: Case studies of Chile (pp. 78 81) and Brazil (pp. 86 89) 6. Cox, Gary W., Jon H. Fiva and Daniel M. Smith. 2016. "The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout." Journal of Politics, 78(4): 1249-1263. 1. PES: Ch. 18 (pp. 375-394) Spain 2. PES: Ch. 20 (pp. 417-432) Belgium 3. PES: Ch. 24 (pp. 491-510) The Netherlands 4. PES: Ch. 22 (pp. 453-471) Denmark 5. Latner, Michael, and Anthony McGann. 2005. Geographical Representation under Proportional Representation: The Cases of Israel and the Netherlands. Electoral Studies, 24(1): 709-734. 6. Lago, Ignacio, and Ferran Martínez. 2007. The Importance of Electoral Rules: Comparing the Number of Parties in Spain s Lower and Upper Houses. Electoral Studies, 26(2): 381-391. 7. Eggers, Andrew C. 2015. Proportionality and Turnout: Evidence from French Municipalities. Comparative Political Studies, 48(2): 135-167. 8. Ames, Barry. 1995. Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation. American Journal of Political Science, 39(2): 406-433. 9. Nemoto, Kuniaki, and Matthew S. Shugart. 2013. "Localism and Coordination under Three Different Electoral Systems: The National District of the Japanese House of Councillors." Electoral Studies 32(1): 1-12. Week 8: October 24 Ranked-Choice Ballots: AV and STV Systems 1. PES: Ch. 4 (pp. 79-97) Australia 2. PES: Ch. 25 (pp. 511-532) Ireland 3. Marsh, Michael. 2007. Candidates or Parties? Objects of Electoral Choice in Ireland. Party Politics, 13(4): 500-527. 4. Martin, Shane. 2014. "Why Electoral Systems Don't Always Matter: The Impact of "Mega-seats" on Legislative Behavior in Ireland." Party Politics, 20(1): 467-479. 1. IDEA: Case study of Ireland (pp. 72-74) 2. Sharman, C., A. M. Sayers and N. Miragliotta. 2002. Trading Party Preferences: the Australian Experience of Preferential Voting. Electoral Studies, 21(4): 539-681. 3. Smith, Daniel M., and Shane Martin. 2016. Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 42(1):131-165. 4. Read about the local electoral system in Cambridge, MA. ELECTION ANALYSIS CASE DUE BY THIS DATE Week 9: October 31 Electoral System Reform 1. PES: Ch. 3 (pp. 57-76) 7

2. IDEA: Ch. 6 (pp. 159-164) 3. PES: Ch. 12 (pp. 253-276) Italy 4. PES: Preface (pp. xiv-xvi) update on Italy 5. Carey, John M., and Simon Hix. 2011. The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science, 55(2): 383-397. 1. Reed, Steven R. 2001. Duverger s Law is Working in Italy. Comparative Political Studies, 34(3): 312-327. 2. Benoit, Kenneth. 2004. Models of Electoral System Change. Electoral Studies, 23(3): 363-389. 3. Bowler, Shaun, and David M. Farrell. 2006. We Know Which One We Prefer but We Don't Really Know Why: The Curious Case of Mixed Member Electoral Systems, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 8(3): 445-460. 4. Scheiner, Ethan. 2008. Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons from Reforms of the 1990s. Annual Review of Political Science, 11: 161-181. Week 10: November 7 Mixed-Member Systems 1. IDEA: Ch. 3 (pp. 90-119) 2. PES: Ch. 10 (pp. 209-229) Germany 3. PES: Ch. 14 (pp. 295-312) New Zealand 4. Shugart, Matthew S. 2001. Electoral Efficiency and the Move to Mixed-Member Systems. Electoral Studies, 20(2): 173-193. 1. Cox, Karen E., and Leonard J. Schoppa. 2002. Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence From Germany, Japan, and Italy. Comparative Political Studies, 35(9): 1027-1053. 2. Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. 2004. Mixed Electoral Systems and Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Cross-national Analysis, Electoral Studies 23(4): 575-856. ELECTION ANALYSIS MEASURES DUE BY THIS DATE Week 11: November 14 Japan: from SNTV to MMM 1. PES: Ch. 13 (pp. 277-293) Japan 2. Reed, Steven R., and Michael F. Thies. 2001. The Causes of Electoral Reform in Japan. In Matthew Søberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?, pp. 152-172. New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Reed, Steven R., Ethan Scheiner, and Michael F. Thies. 2012. The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan. Journal of Japanese Studies 38(2): 353-376. 4. Reed, Steven R., Ethan Scheiner, Daniel M. Smith, and Michael F. Thies. 2013. The Japanese General Election of 2012: The LDP Wins Big by Default. In Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed, and Ethan Scheiner, eds., Japan Decides 2012, pp. 34-46. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 1. Reed, Steven R., and Michael F. Thies. 2001. The Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan. In Matthew Søberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?, pp. 380-403. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Hirano, Shigeo. 2006. Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities - Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms. World Politics, 59(1): 51-82. 8

Week 12: November 21 Electoral System Effects in New Democracies 1. Carey, John M. 2017. Electoral System Design in New Democracies. In Erik S. Herron, Robert Pekkanen, and Matthew Søberg Shugart, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. PES: Ch. 15 (pp. 313-330) Russia 3. PES: Preface (pp. xvi) update on Russia 4. Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. 2009. Strategic Voting in Established and New Democracies: Ticket Splitting in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. Electoral Studies, 28(1): 51-61. 1. PES: Ch. 17 (pp. 353-373) South Africa 2. PES: Ch. 11 (pp. 231-252) Hungary 3. Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies. American Political Science Review, 97(3): 379-390. 4. Birch, Sarah. 2005. Single-Member District Electoral Systems and Democratic Transition. Electoral Studies, 24(2): 281-301. 5. Keefer, Philip. 2007. Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4): 804-821. 6. PES: Ch. 26 (pp. 535-578) Conclusion Week 13: November 28 Review or bonus material TBD Week 14: Reading Period and Final Presentations (TBD) RESOURCES Textbook: http://www.tcd.ie/political_science/staff/michael.gallagher/elsystems/ Psephos, Adam Carr's Election Archive: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/ Fruits & Votes, Matt Shugart s blog: http://fruitsandvotes.com/ The Monkey Cage Election Reports (older): http://themonkeycage.org/category/election-reports/ World Elections: http://welections.wordpress.com/ ECPR Political Data Yearbook: http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/ Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA): http://www.electiondataarchive.org/ NSD European Election Database: http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ Election Passport: http://www.electionpassport.com/ Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE database: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp More resources are listed in Appendix E of PES (pp. 622-630). ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR FALL 2017 Source: http://www.electionguide.org/calendar.php Norway: Parliament (Storting), 2017-09-11 Macau: Chinese Legislative Council (Macau), 2017-09-17 New Zealand: House of Representatives, 2017-09-23 Germany: Federal Diet (Bundestag), 2017-09-24 Liberia: House of Representatives, 2017-10-10 Chile: Chamber of Deputies and Senate, 2017-11-19 Honduras: National Congress, 2017-11-26 9