Situation Assessment August 2011 Summary of findings INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND STABILIZATION SUPPORT STRATEGY For the Democratic Republic of the Congo In support of the Government Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC)
Table of contents 1. Foreword 3 Annexes: 2. Overview & key findings 4 A1. Methodology 15 3. Substantive components A2. List of indicators 16 Security 6 A3. Results matrix 18 State authority 9 Return, reintegration, recovery 12 About the Sit. Assessment 19 About the ISSSS The International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) is a framework to support the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The ISSSS supports the Government s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War- Affected Areas (STAREC); and the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1925 (2010) and 1991 (2011). Activities are supported by voluntary contributions, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO). The core strategy document is the Integrated Programme Framework (2010). The reference document for program information is the ISSSS Quarterly Report, the most recent being for April to June 2011. 2
1 Foreword This is the first exercise of its type for the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS). Simply put: It benchmarks where we are, against the core objectives defined for the ISSSS when it was launched in 2008. The process was driven at local level in the target areas of North, South and Ituri; the present document summarizes the key results. These results will be used looking backward, to evaluate impact for phase 1 of the ISSSS (2008-11). 242m USD has been committed and 167m of that spent along with contributions from the UN mission MONUSCO and we must account for it in a meaningful way. The Situation Assessment will also be used as a diagnostic for forward planning. In this regard, it is clear that there are many challenges. But the ISSSS is not an allpurpose state-building strategy. The objective is rather to assist the transition of Eastern DRC out of peacekeeping. The trick is thus to prioritize and accelerate the issues critical to local resilience; and ultimately to facilitate a hand off to Government security institutions and economic development actors. The Situation Assessment provides a mapping to support these very difficult policy decisions. At the same time, planning is already well-advanced through the structures established for the Government s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC). The results will be compared, contrasted and consolidated in the forthcoming Stabilization Priority Plan for 2011-13. Finally, a note on process. The SA is a common analysis. It is prepared by the local Integrated Mission Planning Teams (IMPTs), comprising MONUSCO, UN agencies and interested NGOs. And it builds on the data that is currently available from partners. This includes the Government-MONUSCO Joint Assessments (2010-11); the Cadastre des Infrastructures and Carte Routière for the STAREC program; and the bilateral cooperation between ISSSS partners and individual Government agencies. There remain many areas to strengthen data collection and analysis as we go forward, and we look forward to improving this initial product. Stabilization Support Unit August 2011 Foreword 3
2 Overview 2.1 Scope and objectives The Situation Assessment was conducted in the provinces of North and South, and the district of Ituri. These are a subset of target areas under the Government s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC). Map 1: STAREC target areas and the Situation Assessment. We focus on this area for two reasons: Relevance to transition: 90% of MONUSCO military are deployed here Relevance to impact: 85% of ISSSS programs are also located here. The Situation Assessment was conducted at the level of administrative territories: There are findings for a total 18 territories in the target area marked above. Substantively, the Situation Assessment covers three objectives: Security ( 3.1 below), Restoration of State Authority ( 3.2); and Return, Recovery and Reintegration Overview 4
( 3.3). An evaluation methodology has not yet been defined for the two remaining objectives of the ISSSS: Political Processes and Sexual Violence. 2.2 Key findings Section 3 measures progress against the separate objectives of the ISSSS. But the overall objective of the ISSSS is to assist the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. What can we say about this? Making the transition to peacebuilding Setting criteria for handoff to Government security forces, or to development & peacebuilding actors, is a difficult policy problem. The Situation Assessment provides a structured mapping three objectives, each territory. A multi-dimensional improvement suggests impact ; and improvements of a sufficient magnitude will mark the end-point for stabilization efforts. Where this end point falls will vary between areas; and we will ultimately need to be comfortable with some ambiguity and uncertainty. With this background: Are there areas that stand out from the Situation Assessment when we look at the three objectives in combination? The territories that first stand out are those in Ituri (other than Irumu). Since 2005-06, there are relatively limited security threats; population movements have stabilized; and state institutions are in need of technical reinforcement but are not challenged directly by combatants or parallel administrations. It is easy to conceive a hand-off to conventional development programming in these circumstances; MONUSCO has long since drawn down its military presence. Closest behind are the territories of Beni in North ; and Walungu in South. But it should be emphasized both share borders with less stable areas; threats from foreign and residual combatants remain mobile and within close proximity. Continuing work is needed to build resilience to these potential threats. Security remains the principal constraint Underneath these general findings: Security is the most powerful single explanatory factor. Civilians remain under imminent threat of violence in many areas, as explained under the Security component. This is significant by itself, but it also has considerable indirect consequences. It is clear that the State Authority and RRR components are marching to the same tune. In particular: State Authority: Partners highlighted militarization and pressure from illegal combatants as a key constraint for 10 out of the 18 territories assessed. These areas also experience elevated risks and delays for support projects. Return, Reintegration & Recovery: There is still substantial population displacement for 7 of 18 territories. Several more remain volatile with swings over the last two years. Overview 5
3.1 Security Objective: Threats to life, property and freedom of movement are reduced. Assessment criteria: 5 4 3 2 1 Threats to civilians are sporadic and rarely militarized. Serious threats, but confined to limited and predictable areas. Serious and widespread threats; but some major centres and axes are OK. Serious and widespread threats; with few exceptions. Generalized insecurity; capital and all populated areas are affected. Ituri Summary of findings Security remains a problem for large areas. Eight out of 18 territories are graded 3 or lower: with serious and widespread threats to civilians. A further five are graded 4, meaning serious but localized insecurity. On the positive side: The capital is not directly affected in any of the 18 territories. Likewise, serious insecurity does not encroach within a zone of 40-50km of the district capital Bunia, nor the provincial capitals of Goma and Bukavu. North With respect to causal factors the provincial assessments highlight the following: (1) Attacks by the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) affect nine territories. This varies from Rutshuru (NK), with dozens of small attacks per month, to Shabunda (SK) with an unpredictable and highly mobile threat over a wide area. South (2) Congolese residual combatants are cited as a serious factor for eight territories. No individual group affects more than two territories; but alliances with the FDLR are sometimes a dangerous force multiplier, for example in Fizi and Lubero territories. Map 2: Security assessments Security 6
(3) A heavy FARDC presence accompanies both of the above threats. Partners identify FARDC indiscipline as a major issue for 11 out of 18 territories. As at date of writing, a major restructuring ( regimentation ) process is ongoing, and it is unclear whether force levels and deployments will change significantly. How are assessments made? The Security component draws on four categories of indicators (see Annex 2): reported violence against civilians and security forces; presence of residual combatants; population displacement; and humanitarian access. With this data: The situation on the ground is matched against the assessment criteria on the previous page for best fit. Sample assessments Rutshuru territory 2 Serious and widespread threats, with few exceptions. Combatants: FDLR-FOCA; RUD (ex-fdlr); PARECO. Reported attacks: Widespread, affecting all major road axes. The capital is generally secure but affected occasionally; there have been increasing public protests through Quarter 2 of 2011. Displacement: Limited, under 5% of population. A significant refugee caseload in Rwanda and Uganda. Humanitarian access: Heavily restricted. Most axes require military escort; the territory accounts for 50% of attacks on humanitarians in North in 2011. Walungu territory 4 Serious threats, but confined to limited areas. Combatants: Minor Congolese residual combatants. Reported attacks: FDLR banditry, mostly from neighboring Kabare and Mwenga territories. Displacement: Limited: under 5% of population. Humanitarian access: Fair. Military escort required for some areas under UN rules; but no attacks in 2011. Security 7
Program targeting Based on the Security assessments, partners identify the zones rouges at right. These areas are considered nonpermissive or semi-permissive. This means that: clashes between the FARDC and illegal combatants are likely; attacks on civilians are expected; and there is a high degree of risk to program implementation. Ituri For several areas notably Walikale and Shabunda the threat is perhaps less intense but more fluid. There are low population densities, poor infrastructure and limited security forces; and thus few barriers to movement of residual combatants. For zones rouges, the immediate priorities are political and security interventions. Work under the State Authority and Return, Reintegration & Recovery components may be possible, but will require a specific security assessment to develop a concept of operations. Section 3.2, on State Authority, includes some such suggestions. Limitations The level of confidence in the assessment is generally high. Annex 2 notes that most planned data was available; the exceptions are community perceptions of security, and a reading of FARDC institutional capacity. These are serious omissions that need to be addressed going forward. The more general limitation is that the Security component concerns imminent threats to the civilian population. This needs to be supplemented with an assessment of political risk: zones rouges are not static and could expand or contract. South North Map 3: Zones rouges Security 8
3.2 Restoration of state authority Objective: Strengthen core state functions through reinforcement of capacity and the effective integration of former belligerents. Assessment criteria: 5 4 3 2 State can exercise core functions in all populated areas. Exercises core functions in most areas; but significant exceptions. Exercises core functions for some major areas; large areas are excluded. Exercises core functions only in limited areas such as the territorial capital. 1 No effective presence. Ituri Summary of findings It is clear that state authority remains weak in remote areas. 12 of the 18 territories are graded 2 or less, meaning that the state s effective jurisdiction drops off sharply away from the territorial capital. With respect to causal factors: North Poor security is a constraint for ten territories. Partners highlighted areas where residual combatants directly controlled the movements of police and elections officials; and engaged themselves in illegal taxation and policing. The same areas also tend to be highly militarized, with the FARDC taking on some civil functions. South Lack of technical capacity remains widespread. 10 out of 18 territories do not have the required judicial institutions. And the ratio of police to population varies widely, from approximately 1:1000 (Beni, North ) to 1:5000 (Djugu, Ituri). NB: Reinforcement of technical capacity under the ISSSS is a work in progress for five of these ten territories, with deployments of police, judicial and corrections officials still pending. Map 4: State Authority assessments State Authority 9
The last factor specific to North is the existence of parallel institutions. These actively compete with legal state authorities. In Masisi territory, for example, there are parallel police detachments in the same localities as detachments deployed under the STAREC / ISSSS, with understandings on who does what. How are assessments made? The State Authority component draws on three categories of indicators (see Annex 2 for details): Security conditions, and reported interference with civil officials. Presence and technical capacity ( footprint ) of police, judicial, corrections and administrative institutions. (Gathered jointly with Government counterparts.) Presence of competitor ( parallel ) institutions. With this data: The situation on the ground is matched against the assessment criteria on the previous page for best fit. Sample assessments Beni territory 3 GoDRC exercises core functions for some major areas; but large areas are excluded. Security: Presence of foreign armed group ADF in eastern areas along Ugandan border; periodic threats to security forces across a wider area. Footprint: Ratio of police to population is close to 1:1,000; judicial and corrections institutions are functional. However presence drops off sharply in rural areas, and transport and communications capabilities are low. Masisi territory 2 GoDRC Exercises core functions only in limited areas such as the territorial capital. Security: Encroachment of FDLR in the north-west, along with APCLS and Mai-Mai Cheka. Clear interference with police and civil officials in these areas. Unfinished integration: Nearly 1,000 police were rapidly integrated in 2009, and parallel police detachments persist in many areas. Appointment of parallel civil officials continues in some locations. Footprint: No functioning judicial or corrections facilities; new ISSSS works are not yet concluded. Without recent integrés, police ratio to population is about 1:2000. State Authority 10
Program targeting Based on the State Authority assessments, partners identify the zones bleues at right. These are areas where the reinforcement of civilian state authority appears to be feasible: the options for program support. The first criterion here is security: avoiding the zones rouges in Map 3, above. The second criterion is progressive expansion: To move outwards from the existing physical and institutional connections. In some cases Walikale, Shabunda this will require starting with the territorial capital. Ituri The straight lines represent the option of strategic axes: falling within the insecure areas identified in 3.1. The first phase of the ISSSS included six such axes, with mixed results. It is clear that the approach requires a significant commitment from both MONUSCO Force and the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC). North Limitations Overall confidence in the State Authority assessment is moderate. Data was received for most of the indicators listed in Annex 2, but it was variable in quality and in level of detail. South This is particularly acute for remote areas. Program design in these areas will require a preliminary needs assessment with provincial and local-level authorities. Map 5: Zones bleues State Authority 11
3.3 Return, reintegration, recovery Objective: Support the secure return and durable socio-economic reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees, and assist early recovery. Assessment criteria: 5 4 3 2 1 Few urgent risks; appropriate for development programs. Population mostly stable; risks for recovery are significantly reduced. Population mostly stable; but major risks for recovery. Substantial displacement; or risk factors / vulnerabilities extremely high. Widespread or volatile population displacement. Ituri Summary of findings Return and recovery remains problematic for most areas. Seven territories are graded 2, meaning that there is current population displacement at a substantial scale. Another five are graded 3, indicating that population movements have stabilized but there are pressing concerns about sustainability and the prospects for early recovery. North The exception is Ituri, outside of Irumu territory, where displacement is low and security generally permissive. Underneath these general findings: Poor security and ongoing displacement roughly tracks the zones rouges noted in 3.1. (There are exceptions where high levels of violence are not causing major displacement, notably Rutshuru and Fizi.) Local conflicts over land and customary authority are identified as a serious factor for nine territories. These impede durable return in the first instance; there is also the risk they become militarized and escalate to serious insecurity. South Map 6: Return, Reintegration, Recovery assessments RRR 12
Finally: Five territories have an acute food & livelihood crisis ; with five more at risk of falling into one. Data on other socio-economic conditions is weak; partners emphasized that socioeconomic profiling is itself a major process milestone as the security situation improves. How are assessments made? Assessment for the Return, Reintegration and Recovery component draws on four categories of indicators (see Annex 2): Recent history of displacement (IDPs and refugees); Availability of social services; Economic and agricultural recovery; Prevalence of local conflicts. With this data: The situation on the ground is matched against the assessment criteria on the previous page for best fit. Sample assessments Djugu territory 3 Population mostly stable; but risk factors or vulnerabilities remain serious. Displacement: Minimal (<1% of population). Local conflicts: Serious land issues aggravated by population returns from 2006 on. Tensions with excombatants over incomplete reintegration. Food security: Moderately / borderline food insecure. Other socio-economic data is limited but maternal mortality for hospital deliveries, for example, is not very high. Kalehe territory 2 Substantial displacement; or risk factors / vulnerabilities are extremely high. Displacement: Very high, reaching 300,000 (>50% of the population) in 2010. Significant drops in early 2011 to be verified. Also a significant source of refugees. Local conflicts: Some tensions driven by longstanding land conflicts; aggravated in 2010-11 by insecurity. Food security: Acute food & livelihood crisis, due to difficulties accessing land and rising food prices in 2010-11. RRR 13
Program targeting There are two conclusions for targeting under the RRR component. First: Partners noted that areas where population movements have stabilized, and with permissive security, could be suitable for area-based programs for basic services and economic / agricultural recovery. Accordingly: The map at right gives a preliminary indication of zones jaunes, based upon the assessments for the Security component. Conversely: the zones rouges identified in Map 3, above, will specific evaluation of the security environment. Ituri Second: We must also consider models that can work in areas where security is not fully established beyond the zones stables marked at right. This is particularly relevant for local conflict resolution capacities. North Limitations Generally: Confidence for the RRR component is low to moderate. Partners emphasized that collection of data is itself a process milestone for areas where security has recently improved. The socio-economic profile for many areas is accordingly thin. South Better diagnostic information on local drivers of conflict is also critical in order to shape international support in this area. Annex 2 provides details on specific indicators. Map 7: Indicative zones jaunes RRR 14
A1 Methodology Overview of process The Situation Assessment was conducted in North, South and Ituri. The process was facilitated at this level by the Stabilization Support Unit, as technical secretariat for the ISSSS. In each case, the Assessment was reviewed and adopted by the local Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT). Each IMPT is chaired by the MONUSCO Head of Office; it comprises heads of UN agencies and chiefs of MONUSCO substantive sections. International NGOs were also invited to participate based upon their previous involvement with ISSSS and STAREC planning. The findings will be used within the Government-led coordination structures for the STAREC, at provincial level, to inform planning. The present document the regional level summary reviews and summarizes these underlying documents without adding new data or findings. How assessments are made The methodology for the Situation Assessment was proposed at a stabilization planning workshop held from 7 to 9 June 2011. During this workshop, partners identified indicators for each planned outcome of the ISSSS, and for four overall objectives. (See Annex 2, below, for the full list.) The Situation Assessment is based on currently available data for these indicators. Using this dataset, we match the situation on the ground against the assessment criteria listed under each component in 3. This methodology is designed to be repeatable: to identify level changes over time, even if the available data changes. Limitations & caveats First, there are various data limitations. Annex 2 notes the indicators that were available for this first iteration of the Situation Assessment, out of the longer list identified by ISSSS partners. We have noted in the text, above, where there are particular weaknesses. More generally: The Situation Assessment is focused on the objective of the ISSSS: the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. It is not designed for technical assessments of governance or development outcomes; but rather when the hand-off to frameworks such as the UNDAF might occur. Likewise, a severe military crisis would move affected areas off the bottom of the scale. Tools used by protection actors would provide more actionable findings in this scenario. Methodology 15
A2 List of indicators The Situation Assessment draws on two categories of data: Existing needs assessments under the Government s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for the East (STAREC); including the Cadastre des Infrastructures and Carte Routière. Information collected by the Government and international partners within their respective areas of work. Specifically: The following list of indicators was agreed at the ISSSS planning workshop held from 7 to 9 June 2011, and modified in the course of this first Situation Assessment. The last column notes whether data was available for this iteration. (Note that data is gathered with relevant Government partners; the international focal point coordinates for the purposes of the Situation Assessment.) Focal Improve security point Avail? Objective level - Level of attacks against civilians SSU Y - Displacement of civilian population SSU Y - Humanitarian access SSU Y - % of population confident in their security and/or Government security forces SSU N FARDC deployments - % of FARDC units who are trained to minimum TBD N are effective and organized standards - % of FARDC units who are paid on-time TBD N FARDC conduct & - % of reported HRVs that are attributed to FARDC JHRO Y discipline is improve - % of FARDC units in adequate garrisons SSD Y - Change in prosecutions of grave HRVs SSD N DDR of residual - # Congolese residual combatants demobilized DDR/RR Y combatants - # Congolese residual combatants reintegrated PNUD Y Protective environment - Presence of MONUSCO Force in insecure areas Force Y Focal Restoration of State Authority point Avail? Objective level - Effective presence of civil institutions SSU Y - Absence of parallel administration SSU Y - % of population who trust civil institutions SSU N Reliable access to key - # of days per year that key centres are accessible SSU Y population centres Public safety & - # of police deployed and operational * UNPOL Y community security - Change in criminal incidents UNPOL Part Restoration of the penal - Prisons functioning to acceptable standards * Corrections Part chain - Tribunals which are registering cases and RoL Part processing them effectively * Administrative services - Availability of basic administrative services CAS Part Natural resources are under regulatory control - #kg of selected materials traded & registered via the Centres de Négoce JMAC Y Indicators 16
Focal Return, Reintegration & Recovery point Avail? Objective level - # durable returns of displaced persons UAS Y - Basic conditions in place for development programs UAS N Conflicts are prevented - % of population satisfied with mechanisms to PNUD N or resolved address community tensions - Existence of conflict resolution plan in targeted PNUD Part communities - % of conflicts identified that are resolved PNUD Part Restoration of basic - % primary school enrolment UNICEF Part social services - % maternal mortality UNICEF Part Agricultural and economic recovery in zones of return - % coverage potable water UNICEF Part - Availability of micro-finance, by area PNUD N - Coverage of local development plans PNUD N - Level of food security (IPC) FAO / Y WFP Focal Support to political processes point Avail? Objective level - Level of assessed political risk JMAC Y - Change in number and/or aggressiveness of PAD Y residual combatants Implementation of - [TBD] Integration of ex-combatants TBD N relevant agreements - # civil entities with a numerical dominance of PAD N integrated ex-combatants Serious blockages with other provisions PAD Y Serious engagement of - Coordination structures are functioning well at SSU Y Government under the STAREC national and provincial levels - $ budgetary contribution of Government to STAREC programs SSU N Focal Fight against sexual violence Avail? point Objective level Not yet determined. TBD N Indicators 17
A3 Results matrix The following table summarizes the assessments in 3: Province Orientale / District of Ituri North South Territory Component SEC RSA RRR Aru 5 2 4 Mahagi 5 2 4 Djugu 4 2 3 Irumu 3 2 2 Mambasa 5 2 5 Beni 4 3 4 Lubero 3 2 2 Walikale 3 1 2 Rutshuru 2 2 3 Nyiragongo 5 5 4 Masisi 3 2 2 Kalehe 3 2 2 Kabare 4 3 4 Walungu 4 3 4 Uvira 3 3 2 Shabunda 3 1 2 Mwenga 3 3 3 Fizi 2 2 2 Results matrix 18
About the Situation Assessment The Situation Assessment is a joint undertaking for the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS). It has two main objectives: A diagnostic for key issues underlying the general objectives of the ISSSS. The immediate linkage is with the forthcoming Stabilization Priority Plan for 2011-13. A baseline To facilitate trend assessment going forward. The data will also be used for impact assessment, looking backward to the launch of the ISSSS in 2008. This complements the Quarterly Report / Scorecard for the ISSSS, which is focused more specifically on the delivery of ISSSS programs. The Situation Assessment process is facilitated by the Stabilization Support Unit as the technical secretariat for the ISSSS. The Assessments are developed with the provincial Integrated Mission Planning Teams (IMPTs) in North and South, and the district IMPT in Ituri. Each IMPT is chaired by the local MONUSCO Head of Office; it comprises heads of UN agencies and chiefs of MONUSCO substantive sections. International NGOs were also invited to participate based upon their previous involvement with ISSSS and STAREC planning. The present document is a regional level summary of the underlying documents. It has been discussed with the Stabilization Working Group, comprising the technicallevel focal points for partners working under the ISSSS. Special thanks to Ian Quick, former SSU staff member, who coordinated this Situation Assessment. For more information, or to identify a correction: Stabilization Support Unit: monusco-ssu@un.org Contacts: Nao Iwamura Information Analyst iwamura@un.org Pierre Bardoux Deputy Team Leader bardoux@un.org Bruno Donat Team Leader donat@un.org About the SA 19