Briefing Series Issue 69 The Killing of Bin Laden: Policy Implications for China Elzbieta Maria PRON May 2011 China Policy Institute School of Contemporary Chinese Studies International House The University of Nottingham Jubilee Campus Wollaton Road, Nottingham NG8 1BB, UK Email: CPI@nottingham.ac.uk Website: www.chinapolicyinstitute.org The China Policy Institute, part of the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at The University of Nottingham, was set up to analyse critical policy challenges faced by China in its rapid development. Its goals are to help expand the knowledge and understanding of contemporary China in Britain, Europe and worldwide, to help build a more informed dialogue between China and the UK and Europe, and to contribute to government and business strategies.
Executive Summary 1. Chinese media have reported on the US raid on bin Laden extensively, but have limited their sources to official Western accounts. Chinese public media, politicians and policy-makers refrained from evaluating their impact on Chinese security interests in the region. 2. The killing of bin Laden will neither affect Chinese commitment to, nor development of, its domestic counter-terrorist policies. However, the death of bin Laden will challenge Chinese regional policy and the balance of power vis-à-vis the US. 3. The elimination of the US main enemy (bin Laden) raises Chinese concerns over the scope and character of the US presence in the region. And, given the rapid rise of China, we have to ask the question, will China now attract more attention from the US as a foe? 4. China will likely utilize the potential change in the regional security environment to strengthen its stance in Central Asian republics, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and limit the impact of India and other potential regional actors. 5. The degree to which relations between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as well as within the SCO framework will be deepened will also depend on how the Western countries evaluate these states. 6. The additional stimulus for enhancing China s cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan is the Arab Spring, assessed as delivering more significant change to the Islamic World than the death of bin Laden. China and its Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) allies perceive democratization processes as an additional menace to regional stability. 7. In its relations with the US, China will remain, unless provoked, non-confrontational and will refrain from taking more hard-edged steps in regional geopolitics. This stance is also dictated by Chinese unwillingness to replace the US as a main terrorist target. 8. For the near future, the scenario of China ousting US forces from Western Asia is unlikely due to the security challenges this development would impose on China. Unbinding the US from Western Asia would enable it to potentially divert its attention (and hostility) towards Chinese interests. 9. By reaching agreement on comprehensive security issues with the US, SCO allies and Western Asian states, China will continue to consolidate its position in the region and balance the US presence. 10. Chinese official assessments of the implications of bin Laden s death do not indicate discrepancies with its behaviour at the international forum. China seems to be awaiting the formulation of the US new policy towards the region before taking an attitude towards it.
The Killing of Bin Laden: Policy Implications for China Elzbieta Maria Pron 1. Chinese official reaction to the death of bin Laden 1.1. As in many other places, the killing of Osama bin Laden by US troops generated wide media coverage in China. But all media and websites limited their coverage to reporting Western broadcasting and opinions. The Chinese government has remained reticent in articulating its own assessments. It seemed to scarcely remember the perceived existence of various operational and financial links between the militant East Turkestan Islamic Movement and Al Qaeda. 1.2. Chinese official behaviour indicated uncertainty over regional geostrategic dynamics in the future. To bide its time and secure its position in the region, China has formally recognized the efforts of all actors involved. It extended congratulations to the US for making a big step in combating global terrorism and formally appreciated Pakistani commitment to international anti-terrorism, underlining Pakistan s centrality in the war on terror. 1.3. Within two weeks of Osama bin Laden s death, China led or participated in three important acts of international security cooperation the anti-terrorist drill Tianshan-II (jointly with Kyrgyz and Tajik forces), the SCO Foreign Ministers Summit in Almaty, and the third round of the China-US Security and Economic Dialogue. In all of these, however, the bin Laden issue did not emerge within any official discussions. This issue seemed to have been consciously omitted. As the head of the SCO Regional Anti- Terrorist Structure (RATS) statement made it clear three days prior to the Summit, no issues related to bin Laden's elimination were to be put on the meeting's agenda. 1.4. The reserved official reactions of Chinese authorities and media were followed by more intense though probably also tightly controlled debate among Chinese internet users. The main issues dealt with were: - the evaluation of bin Laden s role in international terrorism and his anti-western agenda; - potential terrorist revenge against the US; Elzbieta Maria Pron is a Research Associate at the China Policy Institute and a PhD Candidate in the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, the University of Nottingham. She holds two M.A. degrees, from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (Poland) and the National Taiwan University. She would like to thank Professor Steve Tsang, Dr Stephen Morgan and Dr Zhengxu Wang for their comments and support while preparing this paper.
- the possible impact of bin Laden s death to the domestic and international stability of China; - the future direction of US foreign policy and China possibly replacing terrorism as the main US enemy. 2. China as an actor in the international counter-terrorist regime 2.1. China has been actively involved in domestic and regional (Central Asian) counterterrorism since the 1990s. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Chinese authorities officially supported the US War on Terror, though limited its contribution to offering police training to Afghan forces. China has remained formally committed to fighting international terrorism, while defining its Western borders and Central Asia as the main arena for counter-terrorist activity. Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime have never been primary focuses for Chinese anti-terrorism. 2.2. Chinese domestic counter-terrorism efforts began in the aftermath of the 1997 Yining (Ghulja) riots, which saw the death of over 100 rioters and a crackdown on several dozen protesters. While independent sources identified Chinese policies as the main stimuli of the protest, Chinese authorities identified splittism as the cause of Uyghur terrorism. Fighting terrorism in China took the form of violent suppression, amendments to Chinese law, and the establishment of operational structures. It was supported with efforts to raise the living standard of Uyghurs and limiting their exposure to Islamic teachings. Chinese accounts state that in the years 1990-2001, domestic terrorism led to 160 deaths and 440 injuries. Since the early 2000s terrorism in China has gradually decreased. 2.3. Accordingly to Chinese accounts, Central Asian militant Islamists maintained extensive contacts with both their Middle Eastern counterparts and Uyghurs. Therefore, China initiated regional counter-terrorist cooperation in 1996. This was formalized in the structure of The Shanghai Five consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The forum was further institutionalized in 2001, establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with the admission of Uzbekistan). 2.4. In 2001 and 2002 the SCO member states signed two important documents: the SCO Charter and the SCO Convention on Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. Security cooperation has remained the main focus of the organization and is supported by comprehensive cooperation in the economic and energy realms. The SCO established two permanently operating bodies the SCO Secretariat in 2003 and the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in 2004. 2.5. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the establishment of a Western counter-terrorist coalition legitimized the SCO s security agenda. These developments increased the
international profile of the SCO and facilitated the implementation of its counterterrorism. However, the SCO had shown extremely limited involvement in anti-terrorist activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, despite identifying long-term collaboration between Central Asian terrorists and Al Qaeda. The SCO has mainly concentrated on fighting terrorism in Central Asia, and has signed only generic security agreements with Western Asia. 2.6. China s desire to limit its counter-terrorism to Central Asia and Western China suggests that security policies have been largely driven by strategic motivations. This can be exemplified by the SCO assessment of the post-2001 US presence in the region as a challenge to the SCO. The establishment of US military bases in Central Asian states was unwelcomed by the two leaders of SCO China and Russia. It was further complicated with the consolidation of bilateral (military) ties between the US and several Central Asian states. 2.7. Chinese anxiety was additionally raised by the outbreak of colourful revolutions in Asia and the Caucasus, which China perceived as inspired by the US. China evaluated US counter-terrorism in Central Asia as a policy conducted with a negligence of regional security structures the SCO and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Since 2005 the SCO seemed to overcome these challenges, as it strengthened cooperation, imposed deadlines for the withdrawal of the US military presence, and consolidated its stance in regional politics. 2.8. The Chinese approach to security cooperation in Central Asia indicates that China aimed at utilizing the counter-terrorist agenda to meet other ends. These included securing a Chinese hold on the region, ensuring access to energy resources and opening up Central Asian markets for Chinese products. A stable security environment is seen as a precondition for achieving these aims. Joint agreements, military drills and specific cooperation helped the China-led SCO build mutual trust among its members, comprehensive collaboration and common ground for all actors involved. 2.9. The real incentives behind Chinese engagement in the region further explains the Chinese unwillingness to challenge its relations with Western Asia by applying harsher counter-terrorist measures towards it. China s political and strategic motivations also rationalize the SCO s uneasiness over, instead of appreciation of, the US presence in Central Asia. 2.10. The death of the Al Qaeda leader neither brings any direct challenges to Chinese domestic counter-terrorist policies, nor does it change the direction of regional counter-terrorism. The main actors in the region the SCO and the US formally agree on the need to continue with comprehensive security cooperation. The threat of a terrorist revival and revenge might temporarily increases emergency measures but is unlikely to transform regional policies pursued by the SCO.
3. China s role in post-bin Laden Western Asia 3.1. While the death of bin Laden does not seem to impact the character and scope of regional counter-terrorist efforts pursued by the SCO, it does create a new political dynamic in Central Asian republics as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. 3.2. Chinese authorities felt uncomfortable about the US entering the region in the early 2000s, as the China- and Russia-led SCO structure was pushed to the background of regional security cooperation. The US entry to the region, however, allowed China to avoid leadership costs associated with being at the forefront of anti-terrorism. It also allowed China to stay away from direct engagement in fighting terrorism and instead utilize the SCO to foster comprehensive security collaboration in the energy, economic, and political realms. This has helped bring about a number of Chinese-Central Asian infrastructure and economic projects securing Chinese ties with Central Asia. 3.3. The death of bin Laden, the destruction of Saddam Hussein s regime and the US continuing efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom have stimulated Chinese concern over the future of the US presence in the region. In some aspects China welcomes the scenario of a continued US role in ensuring Afghan stability and nation-building. It allows China to expand cooperation with Western Asia while not taking active part in potentially dangerous and controversial operations, which could create enmity in the region. It also ties the US down in Afghanistan and reduces its military and political capacity in other regions, including China. 4. The Chinese approach to a new facet in the Central Asian Great Game 4.1. The death of bin Laden and shift in regional security dynamics provide China with several opportunities. The initial weeks after bin Laden s death appeared to be crucial in filling the strategic vacuum, which was a result of controversies concerning the death and the vagueness of the Pakistani contribution to the operation. 4.2. China appears to be interested in utilizing this geostrategic transition point to secure its position in Western Asia. It supported Pakistan, praising its counter-terrorist efforts and role in fighting international terrorism. In order to secure its stance in Pakistan, China has also consistently played down the real terrorist menace it has faced there. China itself has never been a target for Western Asian terrorists, but Chinese nationals and businesses in the region have suffered from terrorist attacks since the 2000s. This aspect of the Chinese presence in the region has been accompanied by near-silence in media reports in China.
4.3. As for the SCO, bin Laden s death might stimulate the process of SCO enlargement along with the upgrading of the Pakistani position in the organization. Pakistan has been aware of the growing regional significance of the SCO and the multidimensional benefits it may provide. The SCO has also constituted a platform, where three major powers China, Russia and India (to a lesser extent) interact. SCO further allows for dialogue among states with nuclear potential. 4.4. Upgrading Pakistani status has been considered by the SCO, because this would facilitate the implementation of comprehensive security cooperation The SCO does not seem to be particularly committed to anti-terrorism in Pakistan, but the organization is interested in the transport, energy and economic potential of this country. Pakistan provides access to the Arabian Sea, the shortest route for gas exports from Central Asia, an entry point for energy supplies from the Gulf States and a strategic point from which to monitor US-Indian naval cooperation. 4.5. The SCO has also shown interest in admitting Afghanistan into the organization due to its centrality in regional security. The influence of Afghan-based terrorism on Central Asian counter-terrorism does not seem to be of the highest relevance, but Afghanistan has been identified as the main producer of narcotics. The anti-narcotic agenda is central to the SCO 2011-2016 Action Plan and unlike in counter-terrorism the SCO aims at strengthening multilateral cooperation in this aspect. 4.6. Important stimuli for the potential expansion of the SCO are the evaluation of Pakistan and Afghanistan by the Western world. The SCO has achieved a certain degree of international recognition, but is composed of actors vulnerable to political turbulence. The SCO cannot afford the risk of admitting potential pariah states due to the threat they might bring to the internal stability of the organization and the international evaluation of the SCO. 4.7. The prospective enlargement of the SCO will also depend on the quality of Western-inspired democratic change possibly affecting Western Asia from both the Middle East (through the Arab Spring) and the democracies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India. The SCO, despite official support for democracy, remains hostile towards its Western model. It was exemplified by SCO anxiety over the supposed US influence on the colourful revolutions in Asia. 4.8. The Arab Spring, although occurring far from Central Asia, is taking place in states of similar religious and cultural backgrounds. The Arab Spring also identifies two dimensions particularly unwelcome by the SCO potential for democratic change and an Islamic agenda. The Arab Spring has been evaluated as having greater impact for possible change in the Islamic world that bin Laden s death. Therefore, if the SCO enlargement succeeds in Western Asia, the organization will likely seek to preserve political regimes or promote its political patterns.
5. China-US relations and the regional balance of power 5.1. In 2001 the US had directed all efforts towards combating its new enemy terrorism. The US also went into two expensive military operations and faced the domestic challenges of the 2008 financial crisis. The existence of these costly and complex issues made it essential for the US tp pursue relatively cooperative and friendly relations with China over the last 10 years. Efforts to establish a workable relationship were made, with the US recognizing the Xinjiang-based East Turkestan Independence Movement as a terrorist organization and China allowing the FBI to open an office in Beijing. China and the US also jointly conducted the Security and Economic Dialogue. 5.2. International cooperation between the US and others over the last decade helped China to consolidate its rising power image and commitment to the promotion of a stable international order. But now, the removal of bin Laden, who has dominated US consciousness for so long, raises concerns in China. Is it time for the second largest economy in the world to be perceived as the US main adversary?. These concerns have been strengthened by the common Chinese perception that it had already experienced such labelling prior to 2001. 5.3. For China, the US has constituted the key economic, political and ideational challenge to its rise. It is carefully tracking all indicators of a US foreign policy shift, while at the same time trying to strengthen bilateral cooperation with the US. China has implemented some kind of non-confrontational assertiveness in international relations. Its amicable attitude towards Southeast Asia allows China to uphold the responsible power image, for example. 5.4. China will uphold its non-confrontational stance at the global forum and in all contacts with the US for as long as possible. China has been aware of the fact that any changes in the circumstances of current conflicts, such as the death of bin Laden and the bringing to a close of US military operations in Afghanistan, could bring a much greater threat to Chinese stability. More serious confrontation with the US would deliver serious security implications and possibly disrupt its economic development. This would be a disaster for the leadership, still perceiving a thriving economy as the prerequisite of domestic political stability. 5.5. China will also avoid taking more confrontational steps in security matters towards the US and the international community due to the fear of becoming a main terrorist target. China seems to contain terrorism domestically, but minor terrorist attacks against Chinese targets in the Middle East and North Africa have already been noticed. China would like to avoid the necessity to intervene in case of terrorist attack in those regions, as this would negatively impact on relations with host governments and limit economic benefits for China.
5.6. While upholding an amicable posture at the global forum, China will likely increase its engagement in regional matters. China will try to utilize the strategic repositioning of Central Asia to expand its influence and cooperation within the SCO and Western Asia. China will attempt to develop relations with South-West Asia but avoid any direct military commitment. China might participate modestly in peacekeeping operations, but will refrain from more substantial engagement. China will unlikely question the US military presence in Western Asia in the coming future, but will carefully track all facets of the US policy towards Asia in general and particularly towards China itself.