UNIONIST POLITICAL ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT

UNIONIST POLITICAL ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT Taylor FIPS190106.sgm 10.1080/1356347042000269756 Irish 0790-7184 Original 2004 Political 1000000Summer RogerMacGinty rm17@york.ac.uk Political and Studies Article print/1743-9078 Francis Studies 2004 Association Ltd online of Ireland Roger Mac Ginty Department of Politics, University of York Introduction Unionism s recent history has been dominated by reactions to the peace process and the Belfast Agreement. The November 2003 assembly election results, which saw gains for the anti-agreement Democratic Unionist Party, are merely the latest instalment in the long-running intra-unionist competition. Data from the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey of political attitudes provides fascinating insights into unionist attitudes in the postagreement period. Time series data reveal the leaching of unionist support away from the Belfast Agreement and the extent of unionist disaffection. But the survey also encourages us to move beyond mono-dimensional caricatures of unionism and instead points to a political community with both fixed and fluid positions, and a political community that maintains positive attitudes towards two of the fundamental pillars of the peace process: powersharing and the principle of consent. So, while Democratic Unionist electoral gains may have encouraged the British and Irish governments to consider modifications to the Belfast Agreement, the survey shows that two fundamentals of the peace accord are secure. About the survey The Northern Ireland Life and Times survey was launched in 1998 as an annual survey of social attitudes. It has a political attitudes module, funded in 2000, 2001 and 2003 by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 1 The survey is a joint initiative from the University of Ulster and the Queen s University of Belfast, and the fieldwork is conducted over a two month period in the autumn of each year. 1,800 adults are interviewed face-to-face and issued with an additional selfcompletion questionnaire. Response rates have averaged 67 per cent in the 1998 2002 period, a figure that compares well with similar attitudinal Irish Political Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 87 99 ISSN 0790-7184 print/1743-9078 online DOI: 10.1080/1356347042000269756 2004 Political Studies Association of Ireland

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES surveys in England, Scotland and Wales. Addresses (a simple random sample) are selected from the Postcode Address File. Interviewers select one adult for interview at each address via a Kish Grid method. Interviews are carried out using computer-assisted personal interviewing. A pilot survey is conducted prior to the main survey to assist questionnaire design. 2 The independent variable used throughout this research report is Protestant rather than unionist. The survey shows a strong equivalence between self-identification as Protestant and unionist (over 70 per cent) although a substantial number of Catholic and Protestant respondents refuse to identify themselves as nationalists or unionists. The use of the religious labels thus yields a higher sample. Indeed the use of religious identity as a virtual proxy for political identity is further legitimised as the survey repeatedly reveals the salience of Northern Ireland s sectarian differential as the key fault-line in society. The Extent of Unionist Disaffection Unionist political disaffection has been a prominent feature of postagreement Northern Ireland, and has helped frame much of contemporary unionist political discourse. The basic complaint centres on the peace process and subsequent agreement that apparently prioritised nationalism above unionism. Many of the most deeply felt grievances focused on security and symbolic issues rather than constitutionalism. Concern was expressed that Catholic grievances were being assuaged at the expense of Protestant opinion. The Church of Ireland Primate, Archbishop Robin Eames, warned that it would be a tragedy of immense proportions if the removal of alienation and injustice of one community made alienation of another inevitable. 3 A similar point was made by Northern Ireland Secretary of State Dr John Reid, who warned that Northern Ireland must not become a cold place for Protestants (Reid 2001). While the British and Irish governments were keen to stress the balanced benefits accruing from the agreement, Northern Ireland s citizens, and particularly unionists, were unconvinced by this equivalence of benefits. Over the 1998 2002 period Protestant opinion betrayed a steep decline in the belief that the agreement benefited unionists and nationalists equally (Table 1). At the same time, the view that nationalists benefited either a little more or a lot more than unionists gained popularity. In autumn 1998, 41 per cent of Protestants thought that nationalists and unionists had benefited equally from the agreement. By 2002 this notion of equivalence of benefit had declined to 19 per cent. It 88

UNIONIST ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT TABLE 1 PROTESTANT ATTITUDES ON BENEFICIARIES FROM THE AGREEMENT, 1998 2002 Question: Thinking back to the Good Friday Agreement, would you say that it has benefited unionists more than nationalists, nationalists more than unionists, or that unionists and nationalists have benefited equally? a 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Unionists have benefited a lot more 1 0 0 1 1 Unionists have benefited a little more 1 1 1 1 1 Unionists and nationalists benefited equally 41 32 29 19 19 Nationalists have benefited a little more than 19 13 14 11 12 unionists Nationalists benefited a lot more than unionists 31 46 42 52 55 Neither side has benefited 9 5 Don t know 8 8 13 8 8 a The neither side has benefited code was only allowed from 2001 after the pilot study showed that this was a common response. It was not offered on the questionnaire card but was accepted if respondents gave it as an answer. is worth noting that in 2002, 55 per cent of Catholic respondents felt that nationalists and unionists benefited equally from the agreement. Protestant opinion on the degree to which nationalists have benefited from the agreement bears further interrogation. In 1998, 50 per cent of Protestants believed that nationalists benefited more from the agreement. This figure is in keeping with the virtual 50 50 split within unionism in the 1998 referendum on the agreement. It also reflected the negative prior interpretation of the agreement by the Democratic Unionists, the United Kingdom Unionists and others who had boycotted the multi-party negotiations since September 1997. By 2002, Protestant belief that the agreement benefited nationalists more than unionists increased to 67 per cent. Protestant opinion started from a position more pre-disposed to the notion that nationalists had benefited a lot more (31 per cent) rather than a little more (19 per cent). This position was reinforced to the extent that by 2002 an outright majority of Protestants (55 per cent) believed that nationalists benefited a lot more from the agreement, with 12 per cent believing that nationalists had benefited a little more. So the survey records a deepening of the agreement s legitimacy crisis among Northern Ireland s Protestants. 89

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES TABLE 2 PROTESTANT VOTING INTENTIONS IF THE REFERENDUM ON THE BELFAST AGREEMENT WAS RE-RUN, 2000 2002 Question: If the vote on the Belfast Agreement was held again today, how would you vote? 2000 2001 2002 Yes 35 34 34 No 41 36 38 Wouldn t vote 12 13 14 Not registered to vote 1 1 1 Don t know 10 11 12 Refused 0 5 1 Survey respondents were asked how they would vote if a referendum on the agreement was held again (Table 2). In 2000, 2001 and 2002 just over one-third of Protestant respondents said that they would vote Yes in a re-run of the referendum. This figure underlines the legitimacy problem facing the agreement among the majority community. The consistency of the Yes vote over the three years surveyed also suggests that Protestant support for the agreement may have declined to its core level; the rump of voters who will stand by the agreement as long as elements of the Ulster Unionist Party and others are prepared to do so. The proportion of Protestants saying that they would vote No outstripped the Yes voters in the 2000 2002 period, standing at 39 per cent in 2002. Yet this figure does not represent the overwhelming majority of Protestants that some anti-agreement political leaders might expect. 4 Instead it suggests that the intra-unionist battle for supremacy is a close one and unlikely to have a definitive outcome. While the Democratic Unionist Party triumphed in the 2003 assembly elections, the Ulster Unionist Party still remains a major force within unionism. Interestingly, significant numbers of Protestant respondents said that they wouldn t vote in a referendum re-run or that they didn t know how they would vote. Even if we take account of an understandable reluctance to answer the question in a public attitudes survey, this represents significant political disaffection within the Protestant community. Attitudes to one of the core elements of the agreement, police reform, also reveal the extent of Protestant disenchantment. Survey respondents 90

UNIONIST ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT TABLE 3 ATTITUDES TO POLICE REFORM, 2001 Question: Do you think that the reform of the police in Northern Ireland has gone too far, has not gone far enough, or is about right? % Catholic % Protestant % No religion % All Gone too far 3 59 19 31 Not gone far enough 44 4 13 21 About right 38 27 41 33 Don t know 15 11 24 14 Other 1 1 2 1 were asked to say if reforms had gone too far, not far enough, or were about right (Table 3). Responses had a polar quality, with 59 per cent of Protestants believing that police reform had gone too far and only 3 per cent of Catholic respondents sharing this view. On the other hand, 44 per cent of Catholics believed that police reform had not gone far enough a view shared by a mere 4 per cent of Protestant respondents. This sectarian differential is recorded elsewhere in the survey and points to politicosectarian communities who hold entrenched and different worldviews on a range of issues. Attitudes Towards Devolution While the survey has recorded significant political disaffection among unionists in relation to the agreement, it also recorded more mixed opinions with regard to devolution. Protestant survey respondents were not immediately dismissive of devolution and its governance potential despite negative opinions of the agreement and the obvious difficulties experienced in the infant years of devolution. In simple terms, devolution in Northern Ireland had proved to be unsustainable, with multiple suspensions and chronic mistrust between unionists and republicans. Moreover, devolution had left a slight footprint in terms of the delivery of public goods and services. Much time has been consumed by establishing new systems for devolved governance and extensive consultation exercises rather than the actual innovation and implementation of policy. Yet, by autumn 2002, when the survey was in the field, the Executive had formulated its Second Programme for Government, was operating under its second budget and could point to a modest raft of policy changes. 5 The 91

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES TABLE 4 PROTESTANT ATTITUDES TO ASSEMBLY ACHIEVEMENTS, 2002 Question: Overall, do you think that the Northern Ireland Assembly achieved a lot, a little, or nothing at all? Anti-agreement Who would not vote or DK how would vote Pro-agreement All Protestants A lot 5 6 37 17 A little 57 56 48 53 Nothing at all 37 24 12 25 Don t know 1 14 3 5 survey respondents had at least some evidence upon which to base judgements on the performance of the assembly. Although the survey was in the field in the immediate aftermath of the October 2002 suspension of devolution, strong majorities in both communities (86 per cent of Catholics and 70 per cent of Protestants), thought that the assembly had achieved either a lot or a little (Table 4). While 10 per cent of Catholics felt that the assembly had achieved nothing at all, a quarter of Protestants shared this view; a significant problem for any reincarnated devolved government. This disaffection notwithstanding, the responses for anti and pro-agreement Protestants are interesting. Unsurprisingly, anti-agreement Protestants are most likely to say that the assembly achieved nothing at all (37 per cent), yet 62 per cent felt that it achieved something. Exactly the same percentage of Protestants who saw themselves as neither particularly for nor against the agreement said that the assembly achieved something. Unsurprisingly, supporters of the agreement were the most positive with 85 per cent endorsing at least some achievements. Of course the response that the assembly had made some achievements, whether minor or major, cannot be interpreted as wholehearted approval for the institution. It is perfectly possible for opponents of the agreement to admit that the assembly has made some achievements but to hold deep misgivings about both the agreement itself and the power-sharing form of government. The survey went on to ask respondents if they thought that the assembly and executive did a good job in the day-to-day running of Northern Ireland (Table 5). The question is posed in this way to encourage respondents to think beyond constitutional interpretations of government. 92

UNIONIST ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT TABLE 5 PROTESTANT ATTITUDES TOWARDS DAY-TO-DAY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE ASSEMBLY, 2002 Question: And how good a job do you think the Assembly and Executive did in the ordinary day-to-day running of Northern Ireland? Anti-agreement Who would not vote or DK how would vote Pro-agreement All Protestants A good job 18 13 54 30 Neither a good 55 57 38 49 nor a bad job A bad job 24 13 7 15 Don t know 4 16 1 6 Perhaps the most noticeable finding here was the relatively low figures (6 per cent of Catholics and 15 per cent of Protestants) who said that the assembly and executive had performed poorly. This seems odd when juxtaposed against the depth of Protestant political disaffection recorded in the section above. Survey respondents were much more inclined to opt for positive or neutral responses than for a definitively critical position. However there are very large intra-group differences among Protestants in response to this question. While 54 per cent of pro-agreement Protestants feel that the institutions did a good job, only 18 per cent of antiagreement respondents and 13 per cent of doubters would agree. The most popular response was a neutral one and while nearly a quarter of anti-agreement Protestants felt that the institutions did a bad job, only 13 per cent of the doubters agreed. So the survey revealed a more textured picture than one of simple Protestant rejection of the assembly and executive. Instead graduated responses (neutral and wait and see ) attracted most support. Somewhat remarkably, a majority of anti-agreement Protestants (55 per cent) took the neutral position that the assembly and executive did neither a good nor bad job in the day-to-day running of Northern Ireland. This may reflect the fact the main anti-agreement party, the Democratic Unionists, were represented in both the assembly and executive. The majority antiagreement support for the neutral position figure challenges the notion of rejectionist unionists as opposed to all aspects of the agreement and its consequences. While a simple bifurcation of unionism into pro and antiagreement camps is attractive in terms of intellectual manageability, it fails to capture the nuances within contemporary unionism. 93

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES Internalisation of Key Ideas Underpinning the Agreement and Peace Process While many within unionism opposed the peace process and then the agreement, it is interesting to examine attitudes towards two key principles that have underpinned the peace process: powersharing and the principle of consent. Unionist opposition to the peace process was often articulated in terms of issues of personality, tactics, sequencing and the extent of change. Yet if we go beyond this to examine public attitudes to issues of principle, the survey records unionist acceptance of the two principles of consent and powersharing. Both issues presented unionists with challenges. On the one hand, the principle of consent offered comfort to unionists. With a pro-union majority in Northern Ireland it acted as a safeguard against any arbitrary changes in the territory s constitutional status by the British government. On the other hand, the consent principle contained a danger for unionists. It made Northern Ireland s constitutional position entirely conditional on popular support and offered a permanent mechanism for a transition to a united Ireland. To a certain extent, it institutionalised unionist insecurity, and republicans were happy to exploit this in the run-up to the release of the 2001 census results. The principle of powersharing for a Northern Ireland government was also potentially problematic. While a Northern Ireland government offered many attractions to the unionist position, implicit in the notion of powersharing was cooperation with parties that fundamentally opposed the unionist position. In other words, power would have to be shared with those who held a very different constitutional position. Moreover, the involuntary coalition model of powersharing at the heart of the Belfast Agreement guaranteed that Sinn Féin would be a partner in government. Unionist abhorrence of Sinn Féin s links with republican violence added an affective dimension to the calculation. The survey results show that unionist attitudes towards the principle of consent have been largely consistent since the Belfast Agreement was reached. All survey respondents who did not identify a united Ireland as their primary constitutional choice were asked if they would accept a united Ireland if a majority of Northern Ireland s citizen s voted for one (Table 6). Even though the consent question was posed with explicit reference to a united Ireland, a plurality of Protestant respondents in the 1998 2002 period said that they could live with a united Ireland, even if not relishing the prospect. Over a quarter of Protestants said that they would happily accept the wishes of the majority. If we take these two types of acceptance together, then on average over the past five years 72 per cent of Protestants would accept a united Ireland under the consent rule. 94

UNIONIST ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT TABLE 6 PROTESTANT ATTITUDES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENT, 1998 2002 Question: If the majority of people in Northern Ireland ever voted to become part of a united Ireland, do you think you 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Would find this almost impossible to accept 23 29 22 26 28 Would not like it, but could live with it 48 44 48 44 41 Or, would happily accept the wishes of the majority 26 25 26 26 27 Don t know 4 3 4 4 4 Turning to the issue of powersharing, in 2002 Protestant survey respondents were clear in their acceptance of the role that powersharing must play in any Northern Ireland government; 80 per cent support the proposition (Table 7). The results are also shown for different groups within the Protestant community; the first are those people who would vote no if they could vote on the Belfast Agreement again today; the second group are those who are not sure how they would vote or who would not vote at all and the third group are those who are supporters of the agreement. Clearly survey respondents may have been on their guard against giving socially unacceptable (or bigoted) answers, but the results do indicate a widespread internalisation or acceptance of the idea TABLE 7 PROTESTANT ATTITUDES TO POWERSHARING, 2002 Question: How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? Any Northern Ireland government should have to ensure that Protestants and Catholics share power. Anti-agreement Who would not vote or DK how would vote Pro-agreement All Protestants Agree 68 78 94 80 Neither agree 14 10 3 9 nor disagree Disagree 15 4 3 8 Don t know 3 7 3 95

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES of powersharing across the Protestant community. Even among Protestants who stated that they would vote against the agreement (if the referendum was to be re-run) only 15 per cent disagreed with the principle. It is worth noting that the survey question did not make an acceptance of powersharing conditional on the inclusion of Sinn Féin in government or the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons; conditions likely to temper Protestant enthusiasm for the idea. 6 Nevertheless, the acceptance of the powersharing principle, together with the consent principle, seems crucial to the survival of the Belfast Agreement. It is highly unlikely that any modifications to the agreement, or alternatives to it, could attain the support of the British or Irish governments or nationalists and republicans without the inclusion of a consent principle and powersharing. Solidity of Core Unionist Beliefs The peace process has presented unionism with a series of challenges. These have resulted in prolonged tension and division within unionism, the prospering and waning of smaller unionist and loyalist parties, and a strong sense among many unionists that their views are being ignored by the British and Irish governments. 7 In many cases, the peace process heralded change that many unionists found difficult to accept: for example, the inclusion of Sinn Féin in peace talks and then in the power-sharing executive, the release of paramilitary prisoners, and the proto-federalising implications of the North South dimension of the Belfast Agreement. In the words of one prominent opponent of the agreement, it came at too high a price. 8 Norman Porter notes how a wider series of socio-cultural trends have changed the character of Northern Ireland making it a less comfortable habitat for many unionists: unionists feel less and less comfortably at home in a society that they can no longer run and no longer bears their exclusive imprint. They crave a security that they think is slipping further from their grasp as they see the cause of nationalism and republicanism making more and more progress. Valued practices, such as Orange marches proceeding along traditional routes, cannot be taken for granted any more. Population shifts, brought about by the conflict and ongoing sectarian attitudes and practices, are changing the character of local areas. Increasing numbers of district councils across the North now have nationalist and republican majorities. (Porter 2003: 192 3). Despite the intensity of the unionist political experience of the 1990s, often depicted in cataclysmic language by its political representatives, a number of core beliefs in the unionist political canon have remained constant. For example, the percentage of Protestants who identified 96

UNIONIST ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT TABLE 8 PROTESTANT POLITICAL IDENTITY, 1998-2002 (PERCENTAGE DESCRIBING THEMSELVES AS UNIONIST ) 1998 72 1999 71 2000 68 2001 70 2002 73 themselves as unionist averaged at 71 per cent in the post-agreement period (Table 8) and showed no sign of diminishing. The stability of the self-identification rate does not indicate a political community in the midst of a crisis, deterred by environmental conditions from a pro-union stance. Nor does it suggest that divisions within unionism have discomforted Protestant respondents from choosing the label unionist. Indeed, this fixity of Protestant self-identification as unionist may owe something to the Belfast Agreement and its legitimization of Northern Ireland s two main identity blocs. (It is worth noting that over the 1989 2002 time period the willingness of Catholic survey respondents to identify themselves as nationalist displayed a marked increase, from 40 per cent in 1989 to 65 per cent in 2002). Another touchstone issue for many unionists has been the right to march. The issue has resonance far beyond actual parades and marches. Instead it has developed into a litmus test for relationships between Northern Ireland s communities, and relationships between the community, the state and its law enforcement authorities. The issue was particularly politicized during the peace process, becoming a public expression for unionist discontent and a site of contestation with an increasingly assertive and confident nationalist population. The survey found that Protestant attachment to the right to march has remained strong in the post-agreement period and showed no indication of erosion (Table 9). By 2000, 81 per cent of Protestant respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the right to march was an important freedom. Bryan has produced compelling evidence that the Orange Order and the rituals associated with marching have undergone significant changes in recent decades, for example, experiencing a flight in middle class support and the increasing display of symbols associated with loyalist paramilitaries (Bryan, 2000: 172). Yet the survey evidence would suggest that Protestant support for the principle of marching is extremely high. Clearly there is a difference between tacit support for marching and actual participation in marches, but the survey illustrates a strong Protestant attachment to the 97

IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES TABLE 9 PROTESTANT ATTITUDES TO THE RIGHT TO MARCH, 1998 2000 Question: How much do you agree or disagree that the right to march is an important freedom? 1998 1999 2000 Strongly agree 36 34 40 Agree 41 41 41 Neither 12 15 11 Disagree 7 6 4 Strongly disagree 2 1 1 Can t choose 3 2 2 right to march and challenges notions that marching may increasingly be the preserve of extremists. Conclusion The survey provides a fascinating insight into unionist political attitudes at a crucial juncture in Northern Ireland s political development. While the peace process and Belfast Agreement mean that large-scale political violence has come to an end, devolution has proved to be unsustainable and the peace accord suffers from a crisis of legitimacy among many Protestant-unionists. The survey records the extent of Protestant political disillusion in the post-agreement period. Notwithstanding the certainty that nationalists were the chief beneficiaries from the Belfast Agreement, many Protestant survey respondents eschewed a simple rejectionist position in relation to the achievements of the assembly, and instead adopted neutral, wait-and-see stances. Moreover, the survey recorded a strong Protestant acceptance of key ideas (powersharing and the consent principle) that underpinned the Belfast Agreement, and perhaps any alternatives to it. This will be useful information for the co-guarantors the agreement, the British and Irish governments, as they grapple with the arrested implementation of the agreement and the need to accommodate an ascendant DUP. Finally the survey revealed the solidity of key unionist beliefs in relation to self identity and the right to march. Acknowledgements The author is indebted to Lizanne Dowds, Deputy Director of ARK (the Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive) for invaluable assistance in accessing the survey results. 98

UNIONIST ATTITUDES AFTER THE BELFAST AGREEMENT Notes 1. ESRC projects Political Attitudes to Devolution and Institutional Change in Northern Ireland (L327253045) and Public Attitudes to Devolution and National Identity in Northern Ireland (L219252024). 2. Discussion of the sensitivities of conducting public attitudes research in deeply divided societies can be found in Mac Ginty et al. (2001: 482 4) and Brown and Mac Ginty (2003: 87 8), 3. Archbishop Calls for New Vision in Northern Ireland, BBC News Online, 20 March 2002. 4. According to DUP Deputy Leader Peter Robinson, The vast majority of unionists are against the Agreement. Cited in DUP press release UUP is now Beyond Redemption, 16 June 2003, available at http://www.dup.org.uk. 5. Democratic Dialogue s Monitoring Devolution programme provides regular and informed commentary on the performance of devolved government in Northern Ireland: http://www.democraticdialogue.org/devolution.htm. 6. Brendan O Leary notes that it was precisely the type of power-sharing on offer that was problematic for UUP negotiators in the run up to the Belfast Agreement (2001: 75). 7. Norman Porter (2003: 77) observes that many unionists have a sense of the pendulum having swung too far against them. 8. Jeffrey Donaldson: Too Tough to Trade?, Fortnight, October 2002, p.13. References Brown, K. and R. Mac Ginty. 2003. Public Attitudes towards Partisan and Neutral Symbols in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 10, pp.83-108. Bryan, D. 2000. Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control. London: Pluto Press. Mac Ginty, R., R. Wilford, L. Dowds and G. Robinson. 2001. Consenting Adults: The Principle of Consent and Northern Ireland s Constitutional Future, Government and Opposition, 36/4, pp.472 92. O Leary, B. 2001. The Character of the 1998 Agreement: Results and Prospects, in R. Wilford, ed., Aspects of the Belfast Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.49 83. Porter, Norman. 2003. Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan). Reid, John. 2001. Becoming Persuaders British and Irish Identities in Northern Ireland, Speech by the Secretary of State Dr John Reid MP to the Institute of Irish Studies, Liverpool University, 21 November 2001, Northern Ireland Office Press Archive ( www.nio.gov.uk ). ROGER MAC GINTY is a lecturer in the Department of Politics, University of York. His latest book (co-edited with John Darby) is Contemporary Peacemaking: Violence, Conflict and Peace Processes (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 99