THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA-U.S. RELATIONS By John A. Ayam*

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA-U.S. RELATIONS By John A. Ayam* INTRODUCTION The emergence of Nigeria as an independent country in 1960 and its admission into the United Nations Organization (UN) signaled the beginning of the development of foreign policy positions on key issues of international significance. Nigeria-U.S. relations began within the context of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Interaction between the two countries in the 1960s was influenced by U.S. policy of containment and Nigeria's non-aligned posture. Containment had been used as a policy by the United States to stop the spread of communism. While communism did not gain any foothold in Nigeria, even at the height of Soviet support for the federal government during the civil war, the desires of both countries was for good and cordial relations. America's high level of development, technology and wealth, remain a source of assistance to Nigeria. In a similar vein, the United States has benefitted-and would continue to beneflt-from friendly relations with Nigeria, a country that possesses a wealth of natural resources and the largest population in Africa. With the end of the Cold War, the circumstances of Nigeria-U.S. relations have undergone significant transformation. Relations between the two countries have been dictated by the need for democratization in Nigeria, trade, the fight against the sale of illegal drugs, and peace keeping within Africa. In the specific case of peace keeping, the United States is increasingly becoming hesitant to deploy its military forces in Africa, especially after the fiasco in Somalia. This has paved the way for Nigerian peace-keeping forces to intervene in conflicts within the West African sub-region as the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown. A eogent point about Nigeria-U.S. relations is the fact that even when political and diplomatic relations were at their worst, economic relations seem to continue unhindered. Robert R. Shepard observed, in relation to the diplomatic conflict between Nigeria and the United States over the independence of Angola in 1975 that "political relations remained acrimonious John A. Ayam, PhD, formerly a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, is currently the Head of the Department of Political Science at Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State Nigeria. He was a 1997-1998 Senior Fulbright Fellow at Howard University, Washington, DC, where research for this paper was conducted.. Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 2 2008 by Association of Third World Studies, Inc. 117

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES. FALL 2008 while economic relations were left undisturbed by the two governments and continued to fiourish."' Even at the height of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections, when the United States selectively imposed sanctions on Nigeria, the sanctions, however, did not extend to other cmcial aspects of the economy, such as trade in crude oil. Both countries have been hesitant in undertaking policies that could jeopardize their economic self-interests despite serious diplomatic and political disagreements. THE COLD WAR ERA The first officially recognized contact between Nigeria and the United States was when Govemor Nelson Rockefeller of New York represented President Eisenhower at Nigeria's independence ceremonies on October 1, 1960. U.S. policy towards Nigeria in the Cold War was guided by two key issues: (1) containment of communist expansion; and (2) the provision of aid and the strengthening of bilateral economic ties. Then U.S. President Eisenhower's message, for instance, assured Nigeria's leaders of U.S. support but cautioned on possible threats coming from without-an ostensible reference to the former Soviet Union.^ But Nigeria's Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, did not wish his country's newly won sovereignty and independence to be dragged into the Cold War rivalry between the East and West. In his speech on the admission of Nigeria into the United Nations, the Prime Minister stated that the country, as a matter of policy, would not be a member of any power bloc' Subsequently actions by Nigeria at the intemational level proved the country's relative neutrality. During the Congo crisis of 1963, Nigeria supported the work of the U.N. by providing troops to the peacekeeping efforts in that crisisridden county. Nigeria also demonstrated moderation when the Brazzaville and Casablanca groups emerged as options to a future Organization of African Unity (OAU). Nigeria, along with Sierra-Leone, Liberia and Togo called for a separate meeting in Lagos, whose moderate blueprint was subsequently adopted at Addis Ababa in 1963 as the Charter of the new OAU. Much as the country professed political neutrality as far as East-West rivalry was concemed; it, nonetheless, was receptive of Westem economic aid."* It was in this context that a five-man U.S. delegation visited Nigeria in June 1960 to study areas of possible economic cooperation. On the basis of the economic mission's recommendations, the United States announced that it would provide Nigeria with $225 million in economic development aid over five years. According to the U.S. State Department, "the primary interest of the U.S. in Nigeria is to see it grow and prosper, within the Free World, as a leader and good example for other African countries."' Although the U.S. share of trade and investments in Nigeria during the early years of independence was small compared to Britain's, these bilaterial ties were to sow the seeds of future 118

John A. Ayam/The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations economic relations. On the whole, diplomatic relations between Nigeria and the United States remained generally amicable. By January 15,1966, a military coup had overthrown the government of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and a gradual, though clearly discernible slide toward disunity and civil war was imminent. General Ironsi's military administration which lasted a mere six months had itself been overthrown in a counter coup leading to the emergence of Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon as Head of State, who was not recognized by Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu of the Eastern region. The outbreak of war in 1967 did not initially mean much to the United States because the Vietnam War was on and Israel had launched a pre-emptive air strike on Arab capitals, which touched off the Six-Day War'-the United States was a staunch ally of Israel and supported the latter in its struggles against the Arab states. President Johnson's approach to Nigeria's civil war was that it was a "British Affair," and considering that there were no tangible American interests at stake, it was better to steer off the conflict as much as possible. An arms embargo was imposed on both sides and no serious consideration was given to recognizing Biafra. The Nigerian Federal Government's request for arms from the United States and Britain was refuted, compelling Nigeria to turn to the Soviet Union. U.S. criticism of the Soviet supply of aircraft was that it was an act in self-aggrandizement and was condemned by Lagos, which accused the United States of disguised support for the Ibos.' As the war intensified, and although the Federal government's criticism continued unabated, American reaction to the Civil War remained one of minimal intervention that was restricted to relief supplies through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and urged compromise and settlement by the conflicting parties. At the end of the war in 1970, and despite the slight hitches in Nigeria-U.S. relations, diplomatic relations remained cordial. Moreover, increased oil revenues for Nigeria after the Civil War increased trade with the United States, which was worth some $1.65 billion by 1974.* Much as the Civil War did not result in any serious rupture in Nigeria- U.S. relations, by 1975, when General Murtala Muhammad overthrew Gowon, the calculus on foreign policy had changed. Murtala took hard foreign policy positions unlike Gowon who relied more on building consensus among African states. The differences in style were manifested in Nigeria's recognition of the MPLA as the sole representative of the Angolan people after it became clear that the United States supported South African military intervention in support of UNITA. At an extra-ordinary O.A.U. Summit, Nigeria launched a diplomatic offensive, which resulted in the recognition of the Movimento Popular da Libertaçà de Angola (MPLA) by most African governments. A letter sent to Nigeria by U.S. President Ford offering to use his influence on South Africa to withdraw its troops while Nigeria used its good offices to get 119

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008 the Cubans out of Angola was publicized in the press as an "insult to the dignity of the black man." The issue that was decisive in persuading Nigeria to change its reconciliation policy in Angola was the military intervention of South Africa in support of the Frente Nacional de Libertaçào de Angola (FNLA) and Uniào Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNIT A). In addition, the United States began to pressure African states not to recognize the MPLA as the representative of the Angolan people unless Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola. Moreover mercenaries from the Westem world were busy infiltrating and boosting the ranks of FNLA and UNITA forces in their fight against the MPLA. Nigeria's policy towards the Angolan crisis, which subsequently led to a a clash of interests with the United States, was informed by its desire for a general liberation of Southem Africa. The military intervention of South Africa-with the tacit support of the United States-was bound to led to a clash of interests judging from Nigeria's strong anti-apartheid policy. Indeed, Nigeria considered an MPLA victory in Angola as a springboard for the total liberation of Southem Africa. Secondly, Nigeria opposed South Africa's strategy of seeking to establish a string of client states within the continent to act as a buffer to apartheid. These client states were expected to protect Westem interests and their existence could have interfered with the fight against apartheid by the national liberation movements in southem Africa. Indeed, the Nigerian Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed, noted that due to its strategic importance in the South Atlantic, "Angola has become an area of great interest. Strategically, there are those countries including South Africa and obviously the United States who are frightened by the emergence of a truly nationalist government who will insist on the sovereign rights of Angola to control both its territory and the sea."' Thirdly, Nigeria rejected the United States' insistence that a withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military personnel from Angola be made a condition for the recognition of the MPLA-led government. Angola, Nigeria argued, had the right to invite assistance from any friendly country to enable her protect her security and territorial integrity. Even more important was that the Soviet Union and Cuba had long identified themselves with African liberation struggles. Fourthly, Nigeria insisted that the resolution of the Angolan crisis be undertaken within the rubric of the then OAU (now African Union) and that firm recognition be accorded to. the MPLA-led government. Only close collaboration between the OAU, MPLA and other liberation movements could have achieved genuine national reconciliation and cessation of hostilities. Seven months after the incident, Muhammed was assassinated in an attempted coup. Relations with the United States further worsened with the alleged complicity of the United States in the coup plot. A tirade of anti-u.s. 120

John A. Ayam/The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations sentiments was whipped up by the Nigerian govemment, leading to a virtual breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two countries. President Jimmy Carter's style and approach towards Nigeria, which did not necessarily represent any change the substance of U.S. policy, seemed different from that of President Ford's. Carters belief that our "attitude toward questions such as majority mle and racial justice has a direct bearing on American society," and that "foreign relations will be strengthened by the moral promise inherent in our stance on these questions,"'" fumished the basis for better relations with Nigeria. In addition. Carter's approach of consulting and coordinating policy with Nigeria, rather than orchestrating Cold War rivalry as Kissinger did, further strengthened relations between the two countries. Indeed, Zbignew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, observed that one cardinal principle of the Carter Administration was to "weave a world wide web of bilaterial, political, and where appropriate, economic relations with new emerging regional "influentials."" Nigeria, in view of the Carter Administration, was one such influential country. Andrew Young's visit to Nigeria in February 1977 completely changed the tone of relations from an adversarial to a cordial one. Although the Reagan administration reverted U.S. policy to one of viewing Nigeria within the context of East-West rivalry during the Cold War, relations remained fairly stable until the end of his administration. Discordant political relations between Nigeria and the United States are explainable by a variety of policy trends pursued by governments of both countries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Nigeria-U.S. relations were shaped by three basic undercurrents, namely: (1) the pursuit of the policy of containment by the United States; (2) commitment to the policy of nonalignment by Nigeria; and (3) the negative legacy which militated against the capacity of the African-American lobby to compel their govemment to adopt a more positive policy towards Nigeria.'^ Basically, containment policy committed the United States to act to prevent the spread of communism. The application of the policy of containment to Africa placed the United States on a collision course with Nigeria over the issue of decolonization in Africa. Containment created political tensions between Nigeria and the United States because Nigeria's policy of non-alignment stipulated that the idological confiicts between the East and the West was not the only consideration in determining relations with other nations. The US often foimd itself supporting the European colonial powers against the forces of nationalism and independence, which Nigeria supported. It is in this context that the diplomatic row over the independence of Angola could be understood. On the issue of Namibia's independence, U.S. policy linked Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Nigeria opposed such a linkage. Consistently, the practice of the policy of 121

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008 containment placed the Untied States on the side of colonial and oppressive forces, which viewed apartheid South Africa as part of the fi"ee world while Cuba was unfree because it is a socialist country. U.S. relations with apartheid South Africa further strained relations with Nigeria during the Cold War era. The Reagan administration adopted a policy of constructive engagement towards South Africa, which sought to cooperate with the apartheid state with a view to persuade it to carry out political reform. Nigeria opposed the policy of constructive engagement because such a policy sought to neutralize the power of the overwhelming black majority in South Africa. The United States, at other times, sought to criticize apartheid South Africa in conformity to majority public opinion of the international community while her behavior condoned it. In 1981, the United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution, which recommended the imposition of sanctions on South Africa. In the same year, it relaxed embargoes imposed on the export of equipment to the South African military and police. Moreover, many multinational flrms and banks in the Untied States continued to operate in the South African economy. Nigeria's position on these issues conflicted with those of the Untied States. Nigeria consistently called for UN resolutions which imposed sanctions on South Africa. In addition, she condemned the South African constitutional reform, which was introduced in 1984. When the U.S. Congress passed the 1986 comprehensive anti-apartheid act over the veto President Reagan imposed on a UN resolution, Nigeria commended the action. The act imposed comprehensive sanctions on South Africa, which were to be lifted only after the following conditions had been met: (1) repeal of the apartheid legislation; (2) lifting of the ban imposed on the ANC by the South African government; (3) release of all political prisoners; (4) lifting of the state of emergency; and (5) the entering of the South African government into meaningful negotiation with the ANC. Despite tensions in political and diplomatic relations there was considerable economic cooperation between Nigeria and the United States. The oil dominant character of the Nigerian economy is the very basis on which economic ties with the United States are hinged. American oil companies are engaged in mining and sale of crude oil from Nigeria. Up to 90 percent of Nigeria's foreign exchange is earned from the sale of crude oil. A substantial quantity of Nigeria's crude oil is sold in the United States. In 1980, at least 46 percent of Nigeria's oil exports went to the United States. This accounted for approximately 12 percent of U.S. imported oil.'^by 1988, Nigeria's oil exports to the United States had increased to 54.5 percent of the total value of oil exported from the county.'''however, the fact that Nigeria is highly dependent on oil exports as a major source of foreign exchange places serious constraint 122

John A. Ayam/The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations on her capacity to pursue important national interests because of her susceptibility to manipulation by foreign forces. By 1981, U.S. exports to Nigeria had increased tenfold. This increase in exports by the United States to Nigeria was intended to offset the trade deficit incurred from the import of Nigeria's oil. This deficit stood at $9 billion in 1980. Exports to Nigeria continued to increase in spite of sharp declines in imports from Nigeria. The subsequent fall in the price of crude oil plunged Nigeria into an economic crisis, thus, necessitating the introduction of austerity measures aimed at restructuring and revamping the economy. The restructuring measures introduced by the Nigerian govemment led to a decline in the value of goods imported from the United States by almost 50 percent.'' In addition to direct trade, Nigeria has expressed interest in attracting more U.S. investments. But the United States has often emphasized the importance of creating a conducive atmosphere for investment to be made in the Nigerian economy. In the early 1980s, U.S. direct investment in Nigeria amounted to $492 million and has been on the downward trend in subsequent years." This may not be unconnected to the heightening political tensions in Nigeria from the mid-1980s up to 1990. THE POST COLD WAR ERA AND NIGERIA-U.S. RELATIONS There has been some optimism among policy-makers and scholars that with the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Africa, previously viewed within the prisms of East-West rivalry, could be transformed for the better. Michael Clough, for instance, argues that U.S. policy towards Africa was "free at last" of cold war schisms and could therefore settle to tackle some of Africa's intractable problems of economic development, conflict resolution and democracy. Other scholars argue that Añica still remains America's "back bumer."" Whatever the consensus over U.S. policy towards Africa, the post- Cold War era has seen America increasingly getting concemed over lowintensity confiicts, threat of Islamic fundamentalism to its interests, conflict resolution, promotion of multi-party democracy as a precondition for improved economic and political relations and abandonment of ideologically based policies in favor of economic self-interest. In the specific case of Nigeria-U.S. relations, all the above-mentioned policies have bene pursued by the Untied States. Due to its "economic self-interest," the United States is increasingly becoming disturbed by developments in Nigeria. As George Moose, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs noted, "Nigeria is a critically important country and significant United States interests are at stake."'* Concem over developments in Nigeria is directly inextricably linked to U.S. interests in Nigeria, namely: 123

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008 Ensuring that there is a continued and uninterrupted supply of Nigerian oil to the U.S.: This is in addition to the fact that U.S. interests in Nigeria are based on significant private U.S. investment in the economy, which is mainly in the oil sector and amounting to some $4 billion." The increasing wave of narcotics activities (mainly heroin, but also other lethal drugs, such as cocaine and marijuana), which is specifically targeted at U.S. markets: While the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) recognizes that Nigeria is not a producer of these drugs, it nonetheless, has a substantial number of couriers who ferry these dangerous drugs into the United States from the Far East and Latin America.^" Concern over progress towards democracy: The main argument of the Clinton Administration was that, while many African countries, and indeed the entire globe, were moving towards democracy, the Nigerian government was retrogressing towards military dictatorship, violence and violation of human rights, especially of pro-democracy groups.^' Fourthly, is the fact that, due to Nigeria's large population, territorial size, human and material resources, the Clinton Administration needed to elicit the support and cooperation of the Nigerian government over a wide range of regional and international issues. In specific terms, the strategic importance of Nigeria from U.S. perspectives lies in the country's economic, political and military power (which) has provided some anchor of stability for the region. If the Nigerian state degenerates, so will regional stability." In addition is, "the danger of chaos in Nigeria spreading through the already troubled and fragile West African region. Several of Nigeria's West African neighbors...which share most of Nigeria's borders would be seriously destabilized by state collapse or large scale deadly conflict in Nigeria."^^ These four key issues have dominated Nigeria-U.S. relations since 1985 when General Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General M. Buhari's administration. The issue of exporting Nigerian oil, and indeed, trade generally is not unnecessarily jeopardized by strained political and diplomatic relations. Between 1989-1995, U.S. net income from foreign investment in sub-saharan Africa has been largely dominated by Nigeria. With the exception of the years '124

John A. Ayam/The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations between 1992-1994 when Nigeria was going through political turmoil, and in which U.S. net income from foreign investment dropped, there has been an increase from $200 million in 1989 to $779 million in 1995 ; about 71.4 percent of total U.S. net income in sub-saharan Africa (see Table 1). Table 1: Net Income from U.S. Foreign Investment in sub-saharan Africa, 1989-1995 (U.S. $, millions) Year Nigeria Other Sub- Saharan African Countries Total 1989 200 147 347 1990 197 119 316 1991 642 29 671 1992 620 70 690 1993 571 242 813 1994 570 335 905 1995 779 491 1,270 Total 3,579 1,433 5,012 Percent of Total 71.4% 28.6% 100% Source: Bennel, P., "Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Rhetoric and Reality," SAIS Review; A Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (Summer 1997), p. 132. Although conventional theory about the relationship between politics and the economy suggests that the one follows the other, economic relations between Nigeria and the United States have not been unduly hindered by strained political relations. Smooth economic relations went unhindered even when General Ibrahim Babangida badly wanted to visit the United States, and was denied, and air links between the two countries were severed because Lagos airport was considered unsafe for U.S. citizens. The fight against illegal 125

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008 drugs in the United States has led to the emergence of divergent views between Nigeria and the United States. While Nigeria argued that it has done the best it can in the prevailing circumstances, the United States has been of the opinion that, in light of fmance and training provided Nigeria's Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), not much has bene done by the authorities to stymie the continued flow of drugs into the United States. Indeed, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has stated that up to 50 percent of the heroin coming into the United States passes through Nigeria. The latter's anti-drug agency, the NDLEA, has, instead, put forward the point that it has attacked the drug barons headlong through the promulgation of decrees, which limit amounts of money that can be deposited in banks and has also seized cars purchased with dmg money and are being sold on the streets of Lagos and other towns in the country. Progress towards democracy is another contentious issue between the two countries. Nigeria began a tortuous move towards retum to civilization democratic mle in 1985 under General Babangida. The process had faltered and stalled on numerous occasions-the most celebrated being the annulment of the June 12,1993 Presidential elections. A second attempt was made under General Sani Abacha's military regime, however, the United States continued to insist that there was lack of progress towards the institutionalization of democracy in the country. On the other hand, Nigeria argued that the United States and other developed countries should allow it to evolve a democracy suitable to its environment and which is more likely to stand the test of time. Also contentious at the time was the incarceration of Chief Moshood Abiola, the alleged winner of the June 12 presidential elections along with Generals Olusegun Obasanjo and Musa Shehu Yar'adua for "plotting" a coup against Abacha. Of particular importance was the extent to which the Untied States could bring pressure to bear on the Abacha regime. Unlike in Eastem Europe where the Clinton Administration was able to link the provision of foreign aid to progress towards democracy-in a similar fashion as was done in Kenya, Zambia and Malawi-it was unable to effect the same pressure in Nigeria. Nigeria was not heavily dependent on foreign aid, and, hesitant not to impose an embargo on Nigerian oil due to its economic interests, the leverage was limited. Debate in the U.S. Congress, which discussed Senate Bill S.1419 (Nigeria Democracy Act), had instead, urged that "in the specific context of Nigeria, promotion of those goals (democracy and human rights) is served by engagement and dialogue calculated to build the institutional foundations of democracy and the culture of respect for the rights of the individual," rather than outright oil sanctions. The maintenance of regional security and peace is perhaps an important area where the interests of the United States and Nigeria converge, 126

John A, Ayam/The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations but one in which there was no mutual reinforcement due to glaring divergences over democracy and human rights and drug trafficking. Indeed, General Sani Abacha observed that "while the U.S. accepts our efforts in Liberia, it nonetheless turns around to impose sanctions on us over democracy, human rights and the drug problem." The statement is a pointer to growing misunderstanding in U.S.-Nigeria relations. At the economic level, there was burgeoning trade while political and diplomatic schisms endured. Sanctions were imposed on Nigeria while it was keeping the peace in a Liberia that is an American creation. Indeed, at the point Nigeria spearheaded an ECOWAS peacekeeping force in Liberia, the U.S. was preparing for war in Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait." While Nigeria provided the bulk of ECOMOG troops and a financial bill of $4 billion,^" American role in Liberia was mainly one of providing humanitarian assistance and logistical support towards the Presidential elections in which Charies Taylor emerged winner. Clearly the vacuum created by the unwillingness of the Untied States to deploy its military forces in Liberia, except of course to ferry out its citizens and diplomats, has provided Nigeria the opportunity to project its power capabilities in the West African sub-region. To that extent, Nigeria became a guarantor of peace, which underscored American fears of "chaos in Nigeria spreading through the already troubled and fragile West African region." Of course, Nigeria had its fair share of domestic problems ranging from military rule that prevented democracy from maturing to eeonomic and social malaise that threatened domestic unity. But Nigeria has contributed in no small measure to the maintenance of regional stability in the West African sub-region. THE POLITICS OF SANCTIONS The response of the United States to Nigeria's political crisis was the imposition of limited sanctions. Immediately after the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections were annulled, the Untied States cancelled $11 million in assistance intended as budgetary support to Nigeria's Ministry of Health; terminated development assistance, except humanitarian aid through nongovernmental organization; ended military assistance and export of defenserelated materials, denied entry into the United States of Nigerians who formulate and implement policies that hinder transition to democracy; decertified Nigeria for not doing enough to counter trafficking by its citizens in illegal drugs; and requested the withdrawal of Nigeria's defense attaehé in Washington, D.C." As earlier argued, both Nigeria and the United States have been hesitant in undertaking policies that could jeopardize their economic selfinterests, and despite political and diplomatic disagreements, economic activities have been allowed to continue unimpeded. Several political and economic factors make it difficuh for the U.S. 127

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008 government to impose an oil embargo on Nigeria. For oil sanctions to be effective it needed the concerted effort and cooperation of its European allies. The United States has been unable to sustain a coalition of Westem nations against Nigeria. Just as the Westem-backed coalition against Iraq faltered in the wake of confiicting national interests,^* so did the one against Nigeria. The French, for instance, did not intend on imposing sanctions on Nigeria for the simple reason that French economic investments in Nigeria by far outweigh investments in several ex-french colonies combined." The Germans and Japanese have not indicated any keen interest in sanctioning Nigeria. Indeed, "there is little intemational political support for imposing a multilateral oil embargo. This lack of support refiects the fact that most nations do not view Nigeria as a major threat to world peace and security."^^ Unilateral U.S. embargo on Nigerian oil would not have any impact on exports due to the highly integrated nature of world oil market. A dismption of supply from one source caused a unilateral embargo could easily be contained by switching to other sources. In this case, a ban on purchase of Nigeria oil by the U.S. will result in other markets absorbing oil exports from Nigeria. In addition, much as an embargo is not likely to affect availability of petroleimi products on a national scale, "there may be some adverse effects on the sections of the [U.S.] economy and in those regions...involved in importing, refining and using Nigerian oil."^' For all intents and purposes, much as the American govemment has imposed limited sanctions, it has been careful to safeguard its key economic interest in Nigeria. THE POST 1999 ERA AND NIGERIA-US RELATIONS Nigeria witnessed a retum to democratic mle in 1999 with the election of Chief Olusegun Obassanjo as President and commander in chief of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The onset of democratic mle in the coimtry was shrouded in an intimidatingly negative image of the country within the comity of nations. Not only had the Commonwealth of nations suspended Nigeria but the United Nations was consistently mounting all sorts of pressures. The EU had declared Nigeria a pariah state. Within this context, it was imperative on any leadership emerging from long years of military dictatorship to attempt to rectify this negative intemational image. Even before his inauguration as President of the Federal Republic, Chief Obasanjo undertook a long, drawn out tour of several European, American, Añ"ican and Asian states in an effort to restore Nigeria's battered image so that it is accorded some level of respectability and confidence. A number of contentious issues in Nigeria-U.S. relations, which often resulted in misimderstanding seem to have been resolved. One is the issue of 128

John A. Ayam/The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations the war on illegal drugs. The intensification of the war on the drug barons in Nigeria by the NDLEA has curtailed the incidences of large scale smuggling of drugs within the country's air and seaports. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has also coincidentally delisted Nigeria from the group of countries known to smuggle drugs into the United States. The second question relates to safety at Nigeria's airports. Here too, the U.S. aviation authorities have recertified Nigeria's airports as safe, although US airlines are yet to begin flights into Nigeria's airports. Thirdly, improved relations between Nigeria and the United States has been extended to the area of international peacekeeping. While acknowledging Nigeria's past peacekeeping roles in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the United States has attempted to augment Nigeria's capability in future international peacekeeping. To this end, training has been extended to several Nigerian military contingents by U.S. personnel both in Nigerian and American military institutions. In addition, the United States has generously provided equipment to Nigeria's armed forces towards enhancing its capability at maintaining international peace in the West African sub-region. Despite improvements in these directions, Nigeria's approach to international peacekeeping has deviated form what it used to be during the era of military rule. Unlike in the past when Nigerian governments bore the financial burden of peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it has insisted that when it is compelled to commit troops to international peacekeeping, the international community (specifically the UN) must provide the financial resources. Perhaps the biggest signal to the effect that political and diplomatic ties between Nigeria and the Untied States are at a new height is represented by the visit of President George W. Bush to Nigeria after an earlier visit by President Obasanjo to the Untied States. The level of cordiality since the return to democratic rule has improved compared to the ear of military rule. CONCLUSION Nigeria-US relations since 1960 have undergone significant transformations. There have been periods of cordiality and improved relations which have been exemplified by the Kennedy, Carter and George W. Bush administrations while other periods depicted low-keyed relations and even outright hostile ties as the Ford and Clinton administrations have shown. This pattern is likely to persist for sometime to come. However the two nations would, in future, continue to explore close political, diplomatic and economic ties due to the significance of the economic interests that bind the two nations: the importance of Nigerian oil to the U.S. economy in addition to the large market for American goods while Nigeria would continue to search for 129

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008 technology and investment avenues from the American market. Indeed, Professor I.A. Gambari has observed that: "There are many things that bind the people of Nigeria and the people of the United States. We speak the same language. We share similar democratic spirits and traditions. Between us, we have the largest concentration of African people. We need American technology and investment in Nigeria. We have a fairly large volume of trade between the two countries. These are of such ñindamental importance that they cannot be pushed aside by a change of regime either in the United States or in Nigeria.^" A projection of relations into the future between Nigeria and the United States is indicative of the fact that while misunderstandings are bound to occur at the political level, the solidity of economic interest would always reverse adverse political relations. NOTES 1. Robert R. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States; From Kennedy to Reagan, (Indiana University Press, 1991),p.90.See also, Bassey E. Ate, Decolonization and Dependence; The Development of Nigeria-US Relations, 1960-84 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 181' George A. Obiozor, Uneasy Friendship: Nigeria- American Relations (Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1992). 2. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States; From Kennedy to Reagan, p. 16. 3. For a discussion on Nigeria's Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives, see Philips Claude, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Northwestern University Press, 1964) Gordon Idang, Nigerian; Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, 1960-66 (Ibadan University Press, 1983); A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism (Ibadan University Press, 1974); Ibrahim A. Gambari, Party Politics and Foreign Policy; Nigeria Under the First Republic (Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1980); Akiba Okon, Nigeria Foreign Policy Towards Africa; Coniinwiiyani/CÄa/Jge (Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1998). 4. Douglas Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-Alignment and Economic Alignment," Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, 1964. 5. U.S. Department of State, National Policy Paper: Nigeria, May 15, 1964, SP70D19114862,p. 3. 130

John A. Ayam/The Development of Nigeria-U.S. Relations 6. R. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States: From Kennedy to Reagan, p. 34. 7. John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 29. 8. Intemational Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade: Yearbook, 1980, p. 288. 9. Speech to the OAU Summit, 11 January 1976 (Lagos: Ministry of Information). 10. Quoted in R. Shepard, Nigeria, Africa and the United States: From Kennedy to Reagan, p. 101. 11. Zbignew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), pp. 53-54. 12. Mae C. King, Basic Currents of Nigerian Foreign Policy, (Howard University Press, 1996), p. 213. 13. United States Department of Agriculture, Nigeria: Agricultural and Trade Policies (Washington, DC, 1981). 14. Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report, 1989, p. 102. 15. King, Basic Currents of Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 219. 16. Ibid, p. 220. 17. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "The Marginalization of Africa," Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 2, Winter 1992, pp. 1-14; Michael Cox, U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Without a Mission? (Royal Institute of Intemational Affairs, 19960, p. 109; Peter Schraeder, United States Foreign Towards Africa: Increamentalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 250; Ibrahim Gambari, "The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing Africa's Security Issues" in Edmund J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in the New International Order (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 29-31. For altemative view, which argues that, rather than focus on the relegation of Africa to the background of world polit9ics, we should instead focus on lessons Africa can leam from Easter Europe, see Eboe Hutchful, "Eastem Europe: Consequences for Africa," Review of African Political Economy, No. 50, 1991, pp. 51-59. 18. See Update on U.S. Policy Towards Nigeria. Hearing before the Sub- Committee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 104'* Congress, May 15, 1996. 19. Ibid 20. See Nigeria White Collar Crime, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Intemational Relations, Washington, DC, September 11, 1995. 131

JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2008 21. Goncerning Movement Toward Democracy in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, U.S. House of Representatives, 1995. 22. Hearing on Recent Development in Nigeria. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, December 12, 1995. 23. U.S. News and World Report, "Time Out in the Gulf," December 1, 1997, pp. 42-45. 24. Adekeye Adebayo and Michael O'Hanlon, "Africa: Toward a Rapid Reaction Force," SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs. Summer-Fall, 1997, Vol. XCII, No. 2, p. 161. 25. "The Situation in Nigeria," Hearing before the Sub-Committee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 104"^ Congress, First Session, July 20, 1995, p. 8. See also The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1995, PA 19 (W) lal and The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1995, PA 19 (W) PAl. 26. U.S. News and World Report, December 1991. 27. P.J. Schraeder, "France and the Great Game in Africa," Current History-Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 610, May 1997, pp. 207-211. 28. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Issues Regarding Imposition of an Oil Embargo Against Nigeria," GAO/GGD-95-24, November 1994, p. 2. 29. Ibid. 30. Sunday New Nigeria, July 16, 1984. 132