Social and Legal Challenges of Growing Muslim Population in Brussels

Similar documents
Venue of the FG-DPM workshop European Commission, Avenue de Beaulieu 25, 1160 Auderghem, Brussels, Belgium Meeting Room: BU25 0/S1

Practical Information for Participants of Third ITU-T FG-DPM meeting

Interuniversity papers in demography

Internal mobility of international migrants: the case of Belgium

FINDINGS KEY. Corridor Report on Belgium: the case of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants

Press release. KBC Brussels out of the starting blocks

Information You have been the victim of a crime What steps must be taken?

The population of Brussels!: a demographic overview

Political participation of ethnic minorities in Belgium: From enfranchisement to ethnic vote

LOCAL WELCOMING POLICIES FOR EU MOBILE CITIZENS

Changing patterns of political participation of immigrant origin citizens in the Brussels Capital Region. The October 2000 elections.

The challenge of minority representation in Brussels

MULTICULTURAL POLICIES AND MODES OF CITIZENSHIP IN BELGIUM PART II. CITY TEMPLATE BRUSSELS

Interulliversity papers in demography

North Rhine-Westphalia: Land of new integration opportunities 1. Federal state government report

EUROBAROMETER 71 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION SPRING

Corridor Report on Belgium The case of Moroccan and Turkish Immigrants

UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Between local governments and communities van Ewijk, E. Link to publication

Norwegian Ministries. Immigration and Integration Report for Norway

EUROBAROMETER SPECIAL BUREAUX (2002) Executive Summary. Survey carried out for the European Commission s Representation in Germany

Organisation of justice Belgium

European Association for Populations Studies European Population Conference 2006 Liverpool, June

Human Population Growth Through Time

Immigrant Integration Policies in Belgium: Three-Levels Governance and the shrinking Role of the Federal State. Marco Martiniello

Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs

Interview With Neoklis Sylikiotis, Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Cyprus

Survey respondents 1.9% 19.6% 6.3% 9.1% 11% 11% 0.1% 21.1% Gender 23.6% 76.4% Age 0.3% 8.6% 22.9% 45.6% 2.7% 19.7%

Immigrant Integration in Federal and Decentralised states. Which Challenges?

Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Homelessness in Europe. Nicholas Pleace

The Age of Migration website Minorities in the Netherlands

STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION WITH A FOREIGN BACKGROUND, BASED ON POPULATION REGISTER DATA. Submitted by Statistics Netherlands 1

HISAR SCHOOL JUNIOR MODEL UNITED NATIONS Globalization: Creating a Common Language. Advisory Panel

Belgium's Constitution of 1831 with Amendments through 2014

How s Life in Belgium?

European Governments are asking themselves

3Z 3 STATISTICS IN FOCUS eurostat Population and social conditions 1995 D 3

Case Study on Youth Issues: Philippines

FEANTSA Toolkit. Free Movement of EU citizens! and access to social assistance! Guidance for Homeless Service Providers

Migration to Norway. Key note address to NFU conference: Globalisation: Nation States, Forced Migration and Human Rights Trondheim Nov 2008

Belgium: Far beyond second order

INTRODUCTION. Perceptions from Turkey

Social and Demographic Trends in Burnaby and Neighbouring Communities 1981 to 2006

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON RIGHT WING EXTREMISM IN SLOVAKIA

Population structure 2017

Measuring International Skilled Migration: New Estimates Controlling for Age of Entry

The Extreme Right in Belgium and France. The Extreme Right in Western Europe

New Moroccan Migrants in Belgium

Europe, North Africa, Middle East: Diverging Trends, Overlapping Interests and Possible Arbitrage through Migration

FP7 SP1 Cooperation Project Type: Collaborative Project Project Number: SSH7-CT MEDIA & CITIZENSHIP

8. United States of America

THE PROBLEM OF ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN SERBIA: WHAT ARE THE DRIVERS AND HOW TO ADDRESS THEM

Report of the EI/ETUCE Mission to Ankara

Deterritorialized state authority in a transnational world. Expert meeting on transnationalism.

What annoys me most is that all these measures lack any kind of vision

Mutual Learning Programme

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication [communication] reflects the views only of the author, and

Family reunification under strain: Restrictive v. flexible policies

Ideology or cherry-picking? The issue opportunity structure for candidates in France

The contribution of mothers of foreign nationality to the recent recovery of period fertility in Flanders (Belgium)

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND MOBILITY OF THE EU CITIZENS IN THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES: COMPARISON AND BILATERAL FLOWS

European Integration Consortium. IAB, CMR, frdb, GEP, WIFO, wiiw. Labour mobility within the EU in the context of enlargement and the functioning

On the occasion of the Day against Police Violence, "Stop-Repression" campaigners are

19 A Brussels Identity? A Speculative Interpretation

EUROBAROMETER 64 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

French Riots An Economic Mess or the End of the Civic Illusion?

Defining migratory status in the context of the 2030 Agenda

3. Does the economy need immigration?

Some Key Issues of Migrant Integration in Europe. Stephen Castles

65. Broad access to productive jobs is essential for achieving the objective of inclusive PROMOTING EMPLOYMENT AND MANAGING MIGRATION

ISBN International Migration Outlook Sopemi 2007 Edition OECD Introduction

FULL CURRICULUM VITAE AND PUBLICATIONS LIST Dr. Matthieu Burnay

Philippe Fargues. Temporary Migration: Matching Demand in the EU with Supply from the MENA

Migration. Why do people move and what are the consequences of that move?

SWEDEN AND TURKEY: TWO MODELS OF WELFARE STATE IN EUROPE. Simona Moagǎr Poladian 1 Andreea-Emanuela Drǎgoi 2

Popular Resistance, Leadership Attitudes, and Turkish Accession to the European Union Union

Youth labour market overview

Freedom of expression

SOURCES AND COMPARABILITY OF MIGRATION STATISTICS INTRODUCTION

The present picture: Migrants in Europe

The integration of immigrants and legal paths to mobility to the EU:

Levels and trends in international migration

Ghent, a city of people.

Outline of the project: Governing values, governing through values, governed by values? The European Union as a risk polity (ValEUR)

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARAB STATES

Migration as a theme of the electoral campaign in The Netherlands. A snapshot of the foreign population

CONTEXT. Chapter A: Integrating Immigrant Children. into Schools in Europe. Country Reports EURYDICE. Directorate-General for Education and Culture

EUROBAROMETER 65 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION SPRING

Working paper 20. Distr.: General. 8 April English

The history of prevention: the challenges of professionnalization

Program on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalization and Transnational Security

The Vulnerable Institutional Complexity The 2004 Regional Elections in Brussels

MIGRATION PATTERNS AND IMMIGRANTS CHARACTERISTICS IN NORTH-WESTERN EUROPE

Economic Insight. Population growth in Germany: New projections old challenges. Executive Summary. December 4, Authors:

LIGUE EUROPEENNE DE COOPERATION ECONOMIQUE EUROPEAN LEAGUE FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Problems and Challenges of Migrants in the EU and Strategies to Improve Their Economic Opportunities

Migration and Higher Education in Germany

Socio-economic Impacts of GCC Migration

2011 HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON YOUTH General Assembly United Nations New York July 2011

JOB MOBILITY AND FAMILY LIVES. Anna GIZA-POLESZCZUK Institute of Sociology Warsaw University, Poland

NCERT Class 10 Political Science Chapter 1: Power Sharing YouTube Lecture Handouts

Transcription:

Social and Legal Challenges of Growing Muslim Population in Brussels Summary Nicole Grmelová The growing population of Muslims in Brussels raises a number of social and legal issues including the scarcity of pre-school and school facilities, the creation of no-go areas, the rising number of Belgian Jihadi fighters leaving for Syria and coming back to Belgium, posing an elevated security threat. The aim of this paper is to examine the reaction of the original non-muslim population in Brussels with respect to the new demographic structure in the Belgian capital which serves at the same time as the headquarters of major EU institutions. Key words Brussels, Muslims, no-go areas, demographic structure, social challenges, legal challenges 1 Origins of the Muslim population in Belgium The Muslim population started arriving at Belgium in late 1950s during the period of an economic boom, especially from Morocco and Turkey. The first generation economic migrants from these countries was engaged particularly in the construction business, building e.g. the Brussels underground (Dassetto, 2011). Once the employment contracts of the first generation immigrants expired they decided to reunite their families in Belgium rather that to go back to their countries of origin. Combined with a high birth rate in Muslim communities in Brussels, the proportion of Muslim population in Brussels has been rising starting from the 1950s onwards. Mohammed has been the most common name of newborn boys in Brussels starting from the 1980s (Belgian Statistical Office, 2015). Berber is the second most spoken language in Brussels after French in a city which is formally bi-lingual, French and Dutch, however, only a small proportion of Brussels population (some 10 %) speaks Dutch (van Istendael, 2008). Recently, media have reported that a total of 62 % of the Brussels population is either non-belgium (high number of foreign employees and EU officials) or descending from originally non-belgium parents (Flanders News, 2015b). Belgian laws grant nationality to those born on the Belgium territory if at least one of their parents had 243

Economic, Social and Legal Problems of Demographic Development a five year residence within the Belgian territory (Code de la Nationalité belge), hence the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants are Belgian nationals, often keeping a double nationality together with the Moroccan or the Turkish one. 1.2 Growing Political Engagement of the Muslim Population in Brussels Brussels is the capital of Belgium, however, it is also the capital of Flanders (van Instendael, 2008) and the capital of the French speaking community. From an administrative point of view, Brussels is a region split into a number of districts called communes. There are a total of 19 communes (which include in alphabetical order Anderlecht, Auderghem, Berchem-Saint-Agathe, Bruxelles-Ville, Etterbeek, Evere, Forest, Ganshoren, Ixelles, Jette, Koekelberg, Molenbeek, Saint-Gilles, Saint-Josse, Schaerbeek, Uccle, Watermael-Boitsfort, Woluwe-Saint-Lambert, and Woluwe-Saint-Pierre). The highest proportion of Muslim population lives in Saint-Josse, Molenbeek and Anderlecht (Kern, 2013). Hence, also their political representation in these communes is more prominent than elsewhere. For instance, the controversial federal deputy and the mayor of Saint-Josse, Emir Kir, is of Turkish descent. Muslim politicians are often engaged at higher levels than those of district and regional politics. Generally, they represent left wing parties, such as the socialists and the greens, since these parties are likely to maintain generous social benefits, thus securing their ever growing number of votes in Muslim communities. Whereas most Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish origin are conservative Sunnites (Dassetto, 2011), there is a small proportion of more radical Shiites who have established a political party called Islam. This activist political party operates legally and has already invited the Belgian king to adopt Islam as the prevalent religion being practiced in this country (www.islam2012.be). So far, the Belgian king has not converted to Islam nor has he provided a formal reply to this invitation. Representatives of the Islam political party have posted a radically sounding video on youtube.com in which they announce that they wish to introduce the Muslim Sharia law in Brussels once the Muslim population in the capital city has reached more than 50 %. Also, the video says that non-muslims will not be killed, but they will be free to leave the city if they do not wish to convert to Islam (RTBF, 2012). Such political manifests obviously raise a number of security issues for the original non- -Muslim population of Brussels, which increasingly tends to leave the city. Opinion polls show that 55 % of Brussels population feels very insecure due to the presence of radical Muslims, whereas further 19 % of the population of the capital city feels rather insecure (La Libre, 2013). 244

However, there are a number of other related reasons for the emigration of the original Brussels population outside the Belgian capital and/or outside Belgium altogether. 2 Fewer non-muslim inhabitants in Brussels Middle class inhabitants of Brussels have discovered that there are insufficient pre- -school facilities and quality schools for their children in Brussels. When trying to place a child into a state pre-school facility, preference is given to the recipients of social benefits and low income groups. Those receiving a salary are obliged to pay 5% of their income as tuition for state pre-school facilities. However, since the number of places in state pre-school facilities is limited, there is no room for middle class and upper class children in state pre-schools. Private pre-schools, usually established as Catholic ones, cost around one thousand euros per month per child. This is a fee which can easily be afforded by highly qualified foreign employees and EU officials (Georgakakis, 2013). Nevertheless, a middle class family having two small children would have to reserve two thousand euros of their monthly budget for private pre-schools only. Given the average monthly net income of two thousand euros, these fees are not viable for the middle class, which prefers to leave Brussels to other regions of Belgium where there is room for children in state pre-school facilities. Data released by the Brussels Institute of Statistics and Analysis show that over the past ten years more than ten thousand middle class families left Brussels to settle in Flanders or Wallonia (La Libre, 2014). The missing presence of middle class families in Brussels having children in the age structure of the Belgian capital is apparent. The old age pensioners who have spent all their lives in Brussels still wish to stay there until the end of their days, however, their children and grandchildren increasingly decide to leave Brussels. The lack of quality pre-school and school facilities is not the only reason for the middle class to emigrate from Brussels. Another reason is the growing feeling of insecurity, since Brussels has a rather high crime rate and the police does not dare to enter in many no-go areas since it fears its own life. Recently, the Brussels police have started cooperating with the Moroccan police. Moroccan police officers were hired to train Brussels policeman how to deal with crime in areas having a large proportion of Muslim population. Also, a number of Brussels policemen were deployed to Morocco for training (Flanders News, 2015a). If this cooperation between the Brussels and Moroccan police sources encourages the Brussels policemen to 245

Economic, Social and Legal Problems of Demographic Development enter no go areas to prevent and investigate crime, the enforcement of law in the capital of Belgium may improve and so can the feeling of security. 2.1 Long Term High Unemployment Rate The long term average unemployment rate in Brussels is about twenty per cent (www.actiris.be), which is rather high for a capital city. There are many highly qualified foreign experts working in Brussels, whereas the offer of low-skilled professions is more limited in the capital of Belgium. Often, the qualification rate of job seekers does not match that of the labor market. Also, linguistic requirements are very high as employers are likely to seek French and Dutch bilingual employees. Combined with the religious discrimination by employers, it is more difficult for those of Muslim descent to find employment in Brussels. This is particularly the case because Muslim employees are known to leave their workplace for prayers several times a day and they are unable to assist at many business lunches and other events during the Ramadan which makes them less compatible with the requirements of a highly competitive and demanding Western labor culture. Many inhabitants of Brussels of Turkish origin prefer to set up their own little shops and be self-employed. Whereas their dropout rate from school is higher than that of Muslims of Moroccan origin, their engagement in economic activity is higher. On the contrary, Belgians of Moroccan descent in Brussels have a lower dropout rate from schools, but find it increasingly difficult to get employed at positions matching their higher educational levels (Gsir, 2015), which contributes to more frustration on the labor market. 2.2 Perfect Separation? Even tough, there are many mixed marriages between Muslims and non-muslims in Brussels, the feeling of separation (and failed integration) is prevalent. High income groups send their children to private pre-school and school facilities, which families of Muslim descent cannot afford. Muslims and non-muslims live in different parts of the city and attend different schools (Shore, 2012). The original non- -Muslim Brussels population has mostly left Brussels either renting or selling their apartments and houses to high income foreign experts and EU officials. With each subsequent EU enlargement the prices of housing in safe areas of Brussels have gone up. In no go areas the Brussels authorities are planning to build more social housing since the current quantity of housing facilities is clearly insufficient in the long run. 246

3 Conclusion The inadequate pre-school and school policy pursued by the Brussels authorities is the main reason for non-muslim middle class of Brussels to leave the capital of Belgium. This is coupled with a rising feeling of insecurity and a low rate of law enforcement, in particular when it comes to the investigation and punishment of violent crimes. The recently introduced training of Brussels police officers by their Moroccan counterparts, however, may encourage the policemen serving in the capital of Belgium to enter into no go areas to prevent and investigate crime to a much higher degree than has been the case in the past. Yet, even though this may be a step in the right direction, it is unlikely to bring the emigrated middle class back to Brussels as, obviously, more such constructive steps will be needed. Literature [1] Belgian Statistical Office, 2015. Prénoms des nouveau-nés 1995-2014. [online] Available at: http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/modules/publications/statistiques/population/prenoms_des_nouveau-nes_1995-2014.js [2] DASSETTO, F., 2011. L Iris et le Croissant.Bruxelles et l Islam au défi de la coinclusion. Louvain: Presses universitaires de Louvain. ISBN 978-2-87558-000-9. [3] FLANDERS NEWS, 2015a. Antwerp and Brussels to employ Moroccan police officers. [online]. Release date October 5 [cit. Nov-4-2015]. Available at: http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws.english/news/1.2461394 [4] FLANDERS NEWS, 2015b. Brussels: 62% of foreign extraction. [online]. Release date October 31 [cit. Nov-4-2015]. Available at http://deredactie.be/ cm/vrtnieuws.english/news/1.2484277 [5] GEORGAKAKIS, D., ROWELL, J., 2013. The Field of Eurocracy: Mapping the EU Actors and Professionals. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-29469-2. [6] GSIR, S.; MANDIN, J., MESCOLI, E., 2015. Corridor report on Belgium: the case of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. Series/Report no.: Migration Policy Centre; INTERACT Research Report. ISBN 978-9-290-84261-3. [7] ISTENDAEL, G.van, 2008. Lelabyrinthe belge. Bordeaux: Le Castor Astral. ISBN 9782859207564. [8] KERN, S., 2013. Confronting Sharia Law in Belgium. [online] New York: Gatestone Institute. [cit. Nov-4-2015]. Available at: http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3624/sharia-law-belgium 247

Economic, Social and Legal Problems of Demographic Development [9] LA LIBRE, 2013. L intégration? Un échec pensent les Belges. [online]. Release date June 3 [cit. Nov-4-2015]. Available at: http://www.lalibre.be/ actu/belgique/l-integration-un-echec-pensent-les-belges-51b8fd65e4b0de6db9cab0e5 [10] LA LIBRE, 2014. [online]. Release date April 30 [cit. 6-Nov- 2015]. Available at: http://www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/ pourquoi-nous-quittons-bruxelles-5360f36d35707e5aa80bc1ad [11] RTBF (Radio Télévision Belge Francophonne), 2012. Belgique: après l invasion musulmane voici la Charia. [online]. Release date October 29 [cit. Nov- 4-2015]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anwelzarcui [12] SHORE, C., 2012. Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-18014-7. JUDr. Nicole Grmelová, Ph.D. University of Economics, Prague Faculty of International Relations Department of Business and EU Laws Nám. W. Churchilla 4 130 67 Praha 3 e-mail: grmelova@vse.cz 248

249