Who Surfs Café Europa?

Who Surfs Café Europa? Virtual Democracy in the U.S. and Western Europe Pippa Norris Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138 T: (617) 495 1475 F: (617) 495 8696 E: Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/people/pnorris Abstract: The rise of the Internet Era has generated widespread speculation about its consequences for civic engagement. Mobilization and reinforcement theories differ in how far they believe the World Wide Web will reach the parts of the polity that older forms of communication cannot reach. The literature based on the 1996 and 1998 U.S. elections serves to confirm the reinforcement perspective. But does this pattern also hold elsewhere? There are many plausible reasons why this may prove another case of American exceptionalism. To examine this issue this paper (i) briefly reviews the existing American literature and outlines the theoretical framework; (ii) compares the evolution and penetration of the information society in Europe and the US from the mid-to late-1990s; (iii) analyzes the social and political characteristics of European online users; and, (iv) considers the implications for political communications and virtual democracy in the emerging Internet Era. Paper for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1-5 th September 1999. Political Communications Panel 40-9T on Cybermedia and Informed Citizens/Voters on Friday 8.45-10.30am.

Who Surfs Cafe Europa? Virtual Democracy in the U.S. and Western Europe Like earlier periods witnessing the rise of radio, and then television, the birth of the Internet Era has generated extensive speculation about the potential consequences of this development for older news media, for political campaigns, and for civic society (see, for example, Negroponte 1995; McLean 1989; Budge 1996; Schwartz 1996; Dertouzos 1997; Rash 1997; Harper 1998; Bellamy and Taylor 1998; Neuman 1998; Kamarck and Nye 1999). As the internet has taken off, a growing body of survey research has explored the consequences for American parties, candidates and election campaigns; for new social movements, interest groups and organizational activism; and for the policymaking process and governing in an information age (Margolis, Resnick and Tu 1997; Hill and Hughes 1998; Davis and Owen 1998; Toulouse and Luke 1998; Selnow 1998; Norris and Jones 1998; Hauben and Hauben 1998; Davis 1999; Norris 1999a). Despite the growing literature it remains unclear whether we can generalize more widely from net activism within the context of the 1996 and 1998 American election campaigns to understand the online community as it rapidly expands over time, and we know even less about who surfs in other postindustrial societies. The background and cultural attitudes of the Internet population in America may well differ from the situation in Sweden, Singapore or South Africa. Accordingly this paper seeks to compare the social and political characteristics of net users in Western Europe and the United States, examining the evolution of the online community since the mid-1990s in eighteen postindustrial societies 1. The study falls into four parts. The first outlines the theoretical debate between mobilization and reinforcement theories of the Internet and briefly reviews what we know about net users in the United States. Part II summarizes the spread of the information society in Western Europe and the United States. The European analysis is based on successive Eurobarometer surveys monitoring net users from spring 1996 to the latest surveys in spring 1999 2. The results are compared with surveys of online users in America conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press during the same period 3. Part III examines the social and political characteristics of European net users. The conclusion summarizes the core findings and considers the implications for understanding political communications in the emerging Internet Era. Mobilization and Reinforcement Theories of the Internet Interpretations about the potential for virtual democracy through the Internet differ sharply. Mobilization theories claim that use of the net will facilitate new forms of civic engagement worldwide and level the playing field for political access. Enthusiasts such as Nicholas Negroponte (1995) and Michael Dertouzos (1997) believe virtual democracy promises a cornucopia of empowerment in a digital world. Schwartz (1996) emphasizes the potential for a virtual community. Rheingold (1993) argues that bulletin board systems are democratizing technologies, used to exchange ideas, mobilize the public, and strengthen social capital. Grossman (1995) anticipates the opportunities for shrinking the distance between governed and government using the new communication technology. Budge (1996) argues that the web will facilitate direct democracy 4. If mobilization theories are correct, then the online community should differ, in several significant ways, from traditional political activists. If information on the net reaches those such as young people, or people in isolated communities, or minority political groups, who have conventionally tuned out from traditional media or been less involved in public affairs, then this should have the capacity to expand civic engagement in important ways. By directly linking citizens worldwide, and reducing communications costs, the net may also foster new types of international mobilization by NGOs around the globe, such as the campaign against land mines. At societal level, potentially the new technology may also prove critical to the economic development of certain developing societies like Malaysia and India, facilitating the move 2

from a semi-agricultural to a service economy, as in Singapore. Bill Gates (1995) claims that the information society may thereby reduce global inequalities between rich and poor nations. Mobilization theories suggest that by sharply reducing some of the barriers to political participation, leveling some of the financial hurdles, and widening the opportunities for political debate, the dissemination of information, and group interaction, net activism may have the potential to broaden involvement in public life. For enthusiasts, the net promises to provide new forms of horizontal and vertical communication, which facilitate and enrich deliberation in the public sphere and produce a more egalitarian politics. Yet in contrast reinforcement theories suggest that use of the net will strengthen, but not radically transform, existing patterns of political communications and democratic participation. From this more skeptical perspective, the new media will serve to reinforce, and perhaps even widen, the existing gap between the have and have-nots. At societal level, the North-South divide may be exacerbated in a situation when most of the world s population lacks basic access to a telephone, let alone a computer (see UNESCO 1998:88-95). The gains in productivity produced by the new technology may widen differences in economic growth between the most affluent societies and those that lack the skills, resources and infrastructure to invest in the information society (Golding 1996; Mowlana 1997:104; De Bens and Mazzoleni 1998). At individual level, Owen and Davis conclude that in America the Internet provides novel sources of information for the politically interested, but given uneven levels of access there are good grounds to be skeptical about its transformative potential for democratic participation (Owen and Davis 1998: 185). Murdock and Golding (1989) warn that the socioeconomic biases which exist in nearly all conventional forms of political participation seem unlikely to disappear on the net, even if access gradually widens to the electronically disadvantaged. Hill and Hughes (1998: 44) argue that Internet activists are self-selecting so that the Internet does not change people; it simply allows them to do the same things (discuss politics, join parties, read newspapers) via a different channel. The conclusion from my earlier analysis of the social and political characteristics of net activists in the 1996 and 1998 American elections, based on Pew surveys of online users and the general public, serves to confirm the overall pattern of reinforcement rather than mobilization: net political activists were already among the most motivated, informed and interested in the American electorate (Norris 1999). In this sense, during the 1996 and 1998 campaigns, politics on the net was essentially preaching to the converted. The Internet still provided a valuable service in widening the range of information that was easily available to the online community (like you and I) during the campaign. But the web was used more often as a means to access traditional news sources, like the New York Times, rather than as a radical new source of unmediated information and communication between citizens and their elected leaders. A consensus supporting the reinforcement perspective is therefore starting to emerge in the American literature but the evidence remains limited and to test these generalizations further we need to extend our analysis of the online community both over time and to other countries. While the reinforcement pattern does seem to characterize Internet users in past American elections, if use broadens and evolves over the years it remains to be seen whether this pattern is maintained in subsequent campaigns. The Internet Era remains in its adolescence: the first packet-switching network started in the UK in 1968 and UCLA launched Arpanet the following year, but it was only in 1992 that the World Wide Web was born, with an explosion of use and the launch of Mosaic and Netscape, in 1993-94 (UNESCO 1998:50-51). Mobilization theorists could well argue that it will take more than a few years for the net to level the playing field and transform established patterns of political participation, and the 3

social profile of users could well change over time. Just as the early, more affluent, television audience in the 1950s had moved mainstream by the 1960s, in a process of normalization, so the massive surge in web access, and the fall in costs, means that early users may well prove atypical of later ones. Whether the Internet has the capacity to reach beyond the active group, and beyond traditional news sources, as access gradually ripples out to broader groups in the American electorate, and political uses of the web evolve in new ways, remains an open question at this stage. We also need to expand our generalizations beyond the context of the online community in American election campaigns to other post-industrial societies. 5 There are many reasons why observed patterns of net activism may prove yet another case of American exceptionalism 6. Mobilization theorists could well argue that the online community reflects the society from which it is drawn. If so, then the social inequalities that are so marked a feature of the online community in America could well be reduced in smaller welfare-state societies like Sweden and the Netherlands, characterized by a more egalitarian tradition and social structure. Moreover, claims about societal-level patterns of net use can only be examined in a cross-national setting. The Comparative Framework, Data and Hypotheses This study therefore seeks to compare the online community in Western Europe and the United States. The focus on EU member states allows us to compare a range of established democracies and advanced post-industrial service economies, with relatively similar levels of literacy, education and affluence. Despite considerable similarities, some countries in this comparison, like Sweden, Denmark and Finland, are at the forefront of the information revolution, while others like France, Portugal and Greece lag far behind. In this regard the comparative framework in this study follows the classic logic of comparing societies that share many social, economic and political characteristics but which differ in the dependent variables under analysis (Dogan and Pellassy 1984). Data comes from successive Eurobarometer surveys conducted among representative samples of the European public in the 15 EU member states: EB44.2bis (N.65, 178) in Spring 1996; EB47.0 (N.16, 352) in Spring 1997; EB50.1 (N. 16,201) in Fall 1998; and EB51.0 (N.16, 179) in Spring 1999. (Full technical details are available at europa.eu.int). Throughout the study, net users are defined as those who report having access to, or using, the Internet or the World Wide Web. One limitation of the available European data is that, unlike the Pew surveys, we cannot distinguish the broader online community from those who use the net for specifically political functions. The group of net users therefore includes those who surf primarily for social functions (such as to browse news about the stock market, read email from friends, compare software prices, check reviews of local movies) as well as net activists who engage in more strictly political functions (such as emailing an elected official, participating in a political discussion group, consulting local or central government services, or acquiring electoral information from a party/candidate, interest group, or newspaper web site). Although we cannot look specifically at the latter group, the series of Eurobarometer surveys lets us monitor the broader pool of online users from which net activists are drawn. The evolution of the online community can be compared from spring 1996 to Spring 1999, the emergent years of the Internet era in Europe. The previous literature provides us with a series of simple propositions that can be examined in this study. At societal level, if the reinforcement thesis were correct, we would expect to find that existing differences between information-rich and poor nations would be exacerbated by the growth of the Internet. In the adage, To them that hath, the most affluent and advanced post-industrial economies can be expected to have the investment in skills, technology, and infrastructure which could allow them to becoming leading players in the global information society, while poorer states could lag 4

further behind. Far from promoting greater equality between nations, the net could allow more advanced economies to pull further ahead. At individual level, based on what we know about the characteristics of the online community in the United States, we would expect to find that net users in Europe would be drawn disproportionately from the more affluent and well educated sectors of society, from the male population, from younger generations, and from those most attentive to the traditional news media (Hill and Hughes 1998; Davis and Owen 1998; Norris 1999). In these respects, except for age, the online community reflects the socio-economic biases that are common in conventional forms of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Lastly, the American literature suggests that we would also expect to find that the online community in Europe would include those already most engaged with, and knowledgeable about, public affairs. With the important exception of age, if the social profile of net users is similar to those who are already most likely to participate politically, the Internet may serve to reinforce existing social biases in civic engagement. The Evolution of the Information Society The online community represents one part of the broader phenomenon of the information society. The first issue to address is whether new communication technologies have spread evenly throughout Western Europe, or whether major cross-national disparities have emerged between the electronically rich and poor societies. Mobilization theories are certainly right to stress the dramatic explosion of use of the information society as the defining feature of late-twentieth century communications but the pattern across post-industrial nations, even within the EU, has proved highly uneven so far. The information society encompasses access to a wide range of mediated and interpersonal communication technologies. These are computer-related (including access to a computer, CD Rom and modem facilities, and the Internet), television-related (such as access to cable and satellite television, decoders for paid television programmes, teletext news services on television, the use of video recorders or VCRs), and telephone-related (such as use of minitel or other videotext service without TV, and fax machines). [Table 1 and 2 about here] European trends from the mid to late-1990s in Table 1 show that of all the communication technologies, the growth in computer-related formats have easily outstripped other systems. During just four years, the proportion of Europeans with access to a computer rose from 31 in spring 1996 to 40 percent in spring 1999. Even more dramatically, during the same period the proportion of European Internet users quadrupled from 5 to 20 percent, a dramatic increase in just a few years. In the late 1990s the Internet moved from margin to mainstream in Europe, reaching more people than many traditional media outlets. In addition, there was a related surge in those with access to a CD Rom on their computer or a modem connection. In contrast, during the same years demand remained largely flat for the use of television-related technology like VCRs, satellite TV and decoders for paid TV; only access to televisions with teletext news increased, in large part because this feature became fairly standard among TV manufacturers. About two-thirds of all television households in Europe now have access to a VCR and to teletext, while half have cable or satellite TV, a lower proportion than in the United States (see Table 2). The purely telephonerelated technologies also stayed fairly stable (with the exceptions of the allpervasive jangling mobile phones, not shown here 7 ); while use of older minitel systems, largely confined to France, declined during this period. The overall surge in the Internet, however, disguises major contrasts between European states that reflect deep-rooted differences in the spread of the information society (for a more detailed discussion see Norris 2000). Table 2 compares basic indicators of the newspaper and television environment in the mid-1990s in Western Europe and the US, including patterns of newspaper 5

circulation, the use of television (in terms of numbers of sets and viewing times), and the proportion of television households with access to cable and satellite TV, VCRs and Teletext. The pattern in this table provides the first indications of a major North-South divide within Europe in patterns of consumption of the traditional media, a pattern that is later reflected in use of the Internet. Figure 1 compares societies that can be categorized as predominately newspaper-centric, with high levels of newspaper readership and low hours of television viewing, and those that are primarily TV-centric, with the reverse pattern. The results show that the Scandinavian countries, as well as Austria and the Netherlands, all cluster in the newspaper-centric dimension. In contrast, countries in the Mediterranean region, including Italy, Portugal and Greece, as well as the United States, fall into the TV-centric category with relatively low newspaper sales and high viewing figures. The UK is exceptionally high on both dimensions 8, while Portugal is low on both. Without speculating further on the specific reasons for this phenomenon, discussed elsewhere (Norris 2000), the overall pattern highlights major contrasts in patterns of media use even within relatively similar postindustrial societies like Sweden, Germany and Italy. This alerts us to the difficulties of generalizing about the information society based on studies in the United States, which is in many ways an atypical outlier in its television habits. [Table 3 and Figure 2 about here] The importance of the North-South divide within Europe in use of the traditional mass media is reinforced if we examine trends in access to computers and the Internet (see Table 3 and Figure 2). In Spring 1996, only one in twenty Europeans went online and even in Sweden the figure only reached one in ten. By spring 1999, numbers have risen modestly in Portugal, Greece and Spain, but, in sharp contrast, net use had rocketed in Scandinavia and the Netherlands, and grown significantly in many other societies. By March-April 1999, the pattern shows by far the highest levels of net users in Northern Europe, where 39% are online, in contrast to the lowest penetration in Southern Europe, where only 8% are online. Strict comparisons between the United States and Europe are difficult, since measurements differ and alternative estimates about the proportion of Internet users, often varying substantially, are regularly published (see for example http://www.nua.ie/). If we turn to the latest estimates in the regular Pew surveys of online users, these suggest that access to the Internet in the United States has more than doubled during the last four years; in Spring 1999 almost half of the adult population in America (49%) had access to the Internet. This level of penetration is relatively high, again making the U.S. something of an outlier among post-industrial societies, although the penetration of the net was even higher in Sweden, where almost two-thirds (61%) of the adult population is net users. If these estimates are confirmed in other surveys, the revolution in Internet use transforming Swedish society in just a few years is remarkable. Denmark and Finland are also relatively wired societies. Slightly further down the rankings, from one fifth to one third of the public have access in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Britain and Northern Ireland. The lowest levels of Internet penetration are in Spain, Greece and Portugal, in that order. Patterns of net users are closely correlated, not surprisingly, with levels of access to computers (see Table 4 and Figure 3). Again Sweden leads the way in computer users, followed by Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. But affluent Germany and France remain low on both indicators, while Greece and Portugal are the least wired to the information society. [Table 4 and Figure 2 about here] These cross-national differences are open to many explanations, discussed more fully elsewhere (UNESCO 1998; Norris 2000). Without going fully into the possible reasons here, levels of Internet use in different countries may reflect broader patterns of socioeconomic development, as indicated by the level of per capita GNP, the size of the service sector, and the spread of 6

higher education and literacy. Societies with a large white-collar service sector can be expected to facilitate internet access in the workplace and those who have gone through higher education are likely to have acquired computing skills. Participation in the Internet requires telephone or broadband cable facilities, computer and software skills, literacy and a certain standard of living. When Europeans were asked in the Eurobarometer why they were not interested in participating in certain services over the Internet, cost proved a major factor. Yet on further examination the level of economic development of a country can only provide a partial explanation of the European patterns we have observed. After all low access to the Internet in Greece and Portugal cannot simply be blamed on the education skills of the workforce or the size of the service sector, since Austria, France and Germany also have few net users. Cultural and linguistic factors may also provide part of the explanation. Surveys of web sites indicate that the net remains an overwhelmingly Englishlanguage dominated medium (UNESCO 1998: 95). If so, we would expect that the level of Internet use would reflect a society s familiarity with English as the primary or secondary language. This could help to explain the size of the online community in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Britain and Ireland, compared with Germany or France. Lastly, technological developments, government policies and private sector initiatives within each country structure the opportunities for Internet use and access, including investments in scientific research, programs to facilitate Internet connections via public libraries and schools, computer training in schools, further and higher education, and communications policies regulating telephone charges, cross-media ownership and online server companies. Without doing more than speculating about potential explanations within this short paper, the comparison indicates that at present the information society has not spread evenly throughout post-industrial economies, instead there are major differences between leaders and laggards even within the European Union. Far from equalizing the playing field between European societies, the adoption of new technology has so far exacerbated a North-South divide that already existed in traditional patterns of mass media use. The Characteristics of the Online Community Moving to the individual-level, is there evidence that, as in the United States, the online community in Europe is disproportionately concentrated among the more affluent and well-educated strata, men, and the younger generation? Does it draw from those who are already heavy users of newspapers and television news? And is the online community normalizing over the years, if Internet usage gradually widens and broadens into mainstream society? [Table 5 about here] Table 5 compares European Internet users in spring 1996 and spring 1999 in terms of their social background and use of traditional news media. For multivariate analysis these variables were entered into a logistic regression model, shown in Table 6, along with each nation (coded as dummy variables) to examine the effects of societal level variations already observed. The pattern shows that the familiar social biases in the online community that are widely observed in the United States are also present in Western Europe. In spring 1999, age proved one of the strongest predictors of who surfs in Europe, with one third of the youngest generation (15-25 years old) going online compared with only 3% of the oldest generation (over 65 years). As many have observed, this provides some of the strongest evidence that the net may radically transform established patterns of mass communications, through the gradual process of generational replacement. The education gap also proved substantial; only 5% of those who left school at 15 went online, compared with one third of those with some higher education. The income gap was also marked, with net users disproportionately concentrated among the more affluent. The pattern by 7

occupational status was clearly defined, with 44% of managers online, compared with 15% of manual workers, and only 10% of the unemployed. Lastly, there was a modest gender gap, of 5 points, with women slightly less likely to go online despite their predominance in the keyboard occupations, but this gap was far less than the disparities by age, income and education. In terms of use of the traditional news media, as in the U.S., European online users were more likely than average to read a newspaper and listen to radio news, although there was no significant relationship with use of TV news. [Table 6 about here] The multivariate analysis in Table 6 confirms that all these variables proved significant. After controlling for individual-level social background and media use, the societal-level variations we have already observed remained significant. This suggests that the pattern we have already observed in the higher use of the net in Scandinavia is not just a product of the educational and occupational background of the population in these countries but does reflect broader societal patterns of access. That is, a Portuguese white-collar graduate would still be less likely to be online than his or her Swedish equivalent. If we compare the changes in Table 5, as use of the Internet expanded from the mid to late 1990s, it is apparent that the social divisions between net users and non-users has widened. The groups who have flocked most readily to the net are the young, the most affluent and the well educated, while other groups registered far more modest increases. For example, the proportion of managers online shot up by 30%, double the average rate of increase. It may be that the profile of online users flattens again in a few years if use spreads more widely throughout society, for example if the price of equipment and access drops, as seems likely, but during the emerging Internet period it is the younger generation with the educational skills and financial resources to get online who have taken most advantage of the opportunities on the internet. The gap between the information-rich and poor has widened substantially, at both individual and societal levels, in the emergent Internet era. The Political Characteristics of Net Users If the online community differs socially from the general public, do they also differ politically? If reinforcement theories were correct, we would expect to find that net users tend to be drawn from among the most politically knowledgeable and engaged. The first two columns in Table 7 show the mean scores for the online community compared with those who were not net users using a range of ten indicators of political attitudes, including scales for trust in government, trust in EU institutions, trust in the news media, satisfaction with democracy in one s own country and within the European Union, left-right ideology, political efficacy, support for the EU, voting participation, and political knowledge. (Details of the scale constructions are given in fn13.) The next column in Table 7 displays the zero order correlation between online use and the attitudinal scales. The last column shows the standardized coefficients (betas) in regression models monitoring the effects of online use on political attitudes controlling for prior education, gender, income and age. The aim in the analysis was not to develop a comprehensive causal model explaining these political attitudes, which would require many additional factors (Norris 1999b), but rather to examine whether the political characteristics of online users proved distinctive on a wide range of indicators even after controlling for some of the social factors that distinguish this group. [Table 7 about here] The results indicate that across all the mean scores those who went online were more likely to display positive attitudes towards the political system, including greater trust, efficacy, participation, and knowledge. The differences between net users and non-users were often only modest but in most 8

cases (with the exception of satisfaction with democracy in the EU) they were in the positive direction for the online community and the zero order correlations (without any controls) confirmed a significant relationship. Lastly, after the social controls were introduced, the pattern became more mixed. Nevertheless net users proved significantly more positive towards the political system on six out of ten indicators, they were more significantly negative on two, and there was no difference on the remainder. This suggests that, just as in the United States (Norris 1999a), the online community in Europe is drawn from the pool of those who are already most predisposed to be relatively positive towards the political system. [Table 8 about here] We can look more directly at evidence for potential political uses of the internet using a battery of items in the 1997 Eurobarometer survey which asked whether people were interested in going online for several services, ranging from email and travel information to contacting politicians and consulting local town or council services. Groups were also classified into actual users (who already accessed the internet), potential users (who did not currently use the internet but who remained interested in doing so), and non-users (who did not use and were not interested in using the net). The results in Table 8 show that across all groups the most popular uses of the Internet were for education and email. A third or less of all Europeans expressed interest in using the Internet to read newspapers, get health information or go online for banking and financial services. In terms of any broadly political activities, the most popular were consulting local town or council services for information (27%) and reading newspapers online (22%). In contrast, few Europeans expressed any interest in the more demanding forms of political engagement, such as participating in group discussions, or using the Internet to contact politicians 9. [Table 9 about here] Table 9 shows that there were some significant contrasts in the potential interest expressed in political activity in different European countries. While we can only speculate at this stage, probably many factors have contributed towards these cross-national variations, notably differences in political systems (such as in the role, services and powers of local governments), in the habitual use of the traditional news media, and in political cultures, as well as in the level of penetration and experience of the information society. For example, many Scandinavians expressed interest in accessing online newspapers, in a region characterized by relatively high readership of the traditional printed press. Yet potential interest did not necessarily reflect actual Internet experience, for example about a third of those living in Portugal, Spain and Greece expressed interest in consulting their local council through these channels, far more than in Scandinavia, despite extremely low levels of internet access in the Mediterranean region. We need to go much further to understand demand for political services on the web and how people use the Internet as it evolved in different societies. Conclusions: Activating the Active Many exaggerated hopes and fears surround virtual democracy in the emerging Internet Age. Internet research is sometimes in as much danger of irrational exuberance as the Nasdaq index. Much debate revolves around whether the distinctive structure and interactive format of the internet will provide a genuinely new form of political mobilization, enticing the disengaged and apathetic into public life, producing a more egalitarian democracy, or whether its primary function will be to reinforce those who are already most active through conventional channels like social organizations, community groups and parties. At present we often lack systematic evidence and much of the more speculative theoretical literature seems to treat the Internet as a Rorschach test, broadly reflecting technophile or technophobe beliefs about the future. 9

An emerging consensus in the American literature about net users seems to favor the reinforcement view: in the early stages of the Internet era, the online community in America is drawn from the more affluent and educated social strata, and net activists share many of the characteristics of conventional activists (Norris 1999; Hill and Hughes 1998; David and Owen 1998). If so, the new medium may merely reproduce divisions between the information-rich and information-poor. The findings in this study confirm that patterns of reinforcement within the context of American campaigns can also be found in this broader comparison of post-industrial societies. The familiar social biases observed among American users in the early years of Internet expansion are also evident in Western Europe, notably the appeal of the net for the more affluent and more educated. The mobilization of the younger generation in the online community provides some counter-evidence to this argument, since this is the group who are least involved in many traditional forms of political activism like voting turnout, and who are also least likely to watch television news. In the longer-term, this may provide some grounds for the mobilization thesis. At societal level the North-South divide in the information society is marked and seems likely to reinforce existing cross-national differences in use of the print and electronic news media. The European nations that have moved most rapidly towards the Internet tend to be those that are already heavy consumers of the printed press while the Mediterranean region, which is slowest to move online, is characterized a television-centric mass media. It remains to be seen whether this pattern is evident more generally in other post-industrial societies. This study broadens our understanding of the online community outside of the United States, which is helpful in seeking to generalize about this phenomenon. Nevertheless the results are inevitably limited and we can identify two issues that should be prioritized in further research. First, given the rapid pace of change we need to monitor use of the Internet in real time as it evolves. The snapshot of the social and political characteristics of the online community today may well differ substantially from the typical profile of users within the space of just a few years. It may be that the disparities we have observed will eventually diminish as experience of the net becomes more ubiquitous and gradually normalizes among the general public. After all, studies of the television audience clustered around the flickering black-andwhite cabinets in the early 1950s show a very different profile to typical users a decade later (Norris 2000). The other priority is to go much further to explore the diverse range of activities that people in many countries typically engage in when surfing the net, from use of online discussion groups to party web pages, use of broadband TV/radio and online newspapers, government information services, emailing politicians, and interactive community and group mobilization. In contrast with traditional studies of other mass media, like newspapers and television, there is no single experience of the Internet. My bookmarks are not your bookmarks. Just as conventional forms of political participation differ substantially, so does our experience of virtual democracy. We have not yet started to understand the complexities of how we gauge what it means to surf the net, let alone monitor the effects of this activity, when there is so little in common between someone trading shares, watching the BBC news online, emailing their friends, discussing the soaps, researching their term paper, viewing porn, or mobilizing to protest G.M. foods. Are there patterns of use starting to emerge in this Tower of Babel? We really don t know. Within the next few years as political uses of the net develop and evolve further, and as the online community widens and changes, we need to monitor the consequences for campaigns and elections, for civic engagement, and for virtual democracy in the Internet age. 10

Table 1: Trends in Use of Communication Technologies, EU-15, 1996-99 % With Access/Use Increase 1996 1997 1998 1999 1996-99 COMPUTER-RELATED Computer 31 30 35 40 +9 CD Rom 13 16 25 26 +13 Modem 8 8 12 23 +15 Internet/WWW Connection 5 6 12 20 +15 TELEVISION-RELATED Video Recorder (VCR) 72 73 74 73 +1 Teletext on TV 50 52 59 60 +10 Satellite TV 17 18 18 20 +3 Decoder for Pay TV eg Canal+ 10 11 11 10 0 TELEPHONE-RELATED Fax Machine 19 N/a N/a 19 0 Minitel or Videotext System 5 5 3 3-2 Note: Eurobarometer Q. Do you have access to, or do you use Sources: Eurobarometers 44.2 spring 1996; 47.0 spring 1997; 50.1 fall 1998; 51.0 spring 1999. Table 2: The Media Environment, EU and the US Country Newspaper Circulation per 1000 TV Sets per 1000 Viewing times per person (min.) % Of TV Households with Cable or Satellite % Of TV Households with VCR % Of TV Households with Teletext 1996 1996 1998 1997 1997 1997 Austria 294 518 142 75 71 65 Belgium 160 463 182 92 63 47 Denmark 311 592 162 69 75 81 Finland 455 605 150 46 74 62 France 218 591 193 20 74 Germany 311 564 188 84 69 73 Greece 153 238 219 0 50 Ireland 153 411 194 43 71 49 Italy 104 524 216 5 60 56 Luxembourg 387 88 53 Netherlands 305 514 162 99 73 82 Portugal 75 336 157 23 62 Spain 99 406 211 10 67 41 Sweden 446 499 144 64 76 78 UK 332 516 228 31 81 66 US 212 805 238 72 84 N/a EU15 250 478 183 50 68 64 Sources: TV Sets per 1000 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1998 (Paris, UNESCO) Households with Cable or Satellite, with VCR, and with Teletext Television 98 IP Deutschland (www.ip-deutschland.de) 11

Figure 1 500 The Media Environment, EU & US Finland Sweden Newspaper-Centric Newspaper Circulation per 1000 400 300 200 100 Austria Denmark Portugal Germany EU15 France Belgium Ireland UK US Greece Spain Italy TV-Centr 0 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 Average Hours of Television Viewing Source: Table 2 12

Table 3: Proportion of Internet Users, EU and U.S. 1996-1999 Spring 1996 Spring 1997 Fall 1998 Spring 1999 Increase 1996-99 Sweden 12 26 43 61 +49 U.S. (a) 21 36 42 49 +28 Denmark 10 17 26 44 +34 Finland 11 16 18 39 +28 Netherlands 9 16 19 32 +23 Luxembourg 5 13 16 22 +17 Britain 9 10 11 22 +13 Northern Ireland 4 8 10 20 +16 Italy 3 5 7 14 +11 Ireland 4 5 9 14 +10 Austria 4 10 7 11 +7 Belgium 3 6 8 11 +8 France 2 4 4 9 +7 Germany West 5 8 8 8 +3 Germany East 2 4 5 8 +6 Spain 2 2 5 8 +6 Greece 1 3 3 7 +6 Portugal 2 2 3 5 +3 EU15 5 9 12 20 +15 Note: The Eurobarometer question asks, Do you have access to, or do you use, the Internet or World Wide Web. 10 The Pew survey asks, Do you ever go online to access the Internet or World Wise Web or to send and receive email? Sources: Eurobarometers 44.2 Spring 1996; 47.0 Spring 1997; 50.1 Fall 1998; 51.0 Spring 1999. (a) US: successive surveys by The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. See www.people-press.org. Figure 2 % of Internet Users, EU and US 1996-1999 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Spring 1996 Spring 1997 Fall 1998 Spring 1999 Sweden U.S. Denmark Finland Netherlands Luxembourg Britain Northern Ireland Italy Ireland Austria Belgium France Germany West Germany East Spain Greece Portugal EU15 13

Table 4: Proportion of Computer Users, EU and US 1996-1999 Spring 1996 Fall 1997 Spring 1999 Increase Sweden 43 62 73 +30 U.S. (a) 60 66 69 +9 Denmark 49 61 65 +16 Netherlands 54 61 64 +10 Finland 36 43 52 +16 Luxembourg 41 49 48 +7 Britain 41 47 45 +4 Northern Ireland 25 34 39 +14 Italy 31 32 37 +6 Belgium 28 32 37 +9 Austria 23 41 33 +10 Spain 25 29 33 +8 Ireland 23 27 31 +8 France 25 34 30 +5 Germany West 31 32 29-2 Germany East 27 32 27 0 Portugal 21 20 22 +1 Greece 12 19 17 +5 EU15 31 38 40 +9 Note: The Eurobarometer question asks, Do you have access to, or do you use, a computer. 11 The Pew surveys ask: Q Do you use a computer at your workplace, at school or at home on at least an occasional basis? Sources: Eurobarometers 44.2 Spring 1996; 47.0 Spring 1997; 50.1 Fall 1998; 51.0 Spring 1999. (a) US: successive surveys by The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. See www.people-press.org. Figure 3.8 Use of Computers and Internet, EU 1999 Sweden.7.6 Neth Denmark % Computer Users.5.4.3 Belgium Italy Spain Austria Ireland W.Germ Britain NIre Lux Fin Port.2 Greece.1 0.0.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8 % Internet Users 14

Table 5: Social Profile of Online Community, EU-15 1996-1999 % Online Spring 1996 % Online Spring 1999 Change ALL EU-15 5 20 +15 AGE 15-25 9 32 +23 26-44 7 24 +17 45-64 5 16 +11 65+ 1 3 +2 HH INCOME CATEGORY -- 4 14 +10-3 14 +11 + 5 22 +17 ++ 10 37 +27 AGE FINISHED EDUC Up to 15 1 5 +4 16-19 years 4 15 +11 20+ 9 33 +24 GENDER Men 6 22 +16 Women 4 17 +13 OCCUPATIONAL STATUS Managers 14 44 +30 Other White Collar 8 29 +21 Manual Worker 3 15 +12 Home worker 2 8 +6 Unemployed 3 10 +7 Student 13 44 +31 READ DAILY NEWSPAPER Never 2 12 +10 Sometimes 5 21 +16 Everyday 6 23 +17 WATCH TV NEWS Never 5 20 +15 Sometimes 6 22 +16 Everyday 5 19 +14 LISTEN TO RADIO NEWS Never 4 16 +12 Sometimes 5 19 +14 Everyday 6 22 +16 Sources: Eurobarometers 44.2 spring 1996; 47.0 spring 1997; 50.1 fall 1998; 51.0 spring 1999 Online Community, EU-15 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 ALL AGE 15-25 26-44 45-64 65+ HH INCOME -- - + ++ END EDUC Up to 15 16-19 20+ GENDER Men Women WORK Managers Other White Collar Spring 1996 Spring 1999 15 Manual Worker Home worker Unemployed Student NEWSPAPER Never Sometimes Everyday TV NEWS Never Sometimes Everyday RADIO NEWS Never Sometimes Everyday

Table 6:Predictors of Use of the Internet, EU-15 1999 DEMOGRAPHICS USE OF MEDIA NATION Using Internet R Sig. B Operationalization Age -.168.000 -.642 In years Education.153.000.609 Age finished FT education Income.141.000.439 Harmonized HH income scale Class.077.000.574 Manual (0)/Non-manual HoH Gender.052.000.327 Male (1) Female (0) Newspaper Use.044.000.139 5-point scale Radio News Use.031.315.092 5-point scale TV News Use.000.315 -.031 5-point scale Greece -.073.000-1.72 0/1 Germany -.067.000-1.30 0/1 France -.057.000-1.24 0/1 Spain -.055.000-1.36 0/1 Portugal -.054.000-1.44 0/1 Belgium -.052.000-1.20 0/1 Austria -.041.000 -.93 0/1 Italy -.036.000 -.91 0/1 Ireland -.029.000 -.73 0/1 UK.000.432.23 0/1 Netherlands.021.000.45 0/1 Finland.035.000.65 0/1 Denmark.049.000.89 0/1 Sweden.099.000 1.77 0/1 Cox-Snell R2.278 Nagelkerke R2.431 % Correct 83.8 Notes: The table reports the coefficients predicting use of the Internet based on logistic regression models. Use of the Internet is measured as a dichotomy where 1=yes, 0=no. Luxembourg, which is close to the European mean, is excluded from the national dummies. Sources: EuroBarometer 51.0 Spring 1999. 16

Table 7: The Political Characteristics of Online Users, EU-15 1999 Attitudinal scales Online Users Non- Users Zero order Sig Standardized Sig beta (Mean) (Mean) correla tions [r] coefficients (B) (i) (ii) (iii) Political Efficacy 5.07 4.29.138 **.086 ** Knowledge of EU institutions 6.03 5.14.136 **.033 * Trust in government institutions 2.76 2.33.085 **.049 ** Satisfaction with democracy in own 2.83 2.67.079 **.051 ** country Trust in EU institutions 3.74 3.20.066 ** -.025 * Trust in news media 2.08 1.89.064 **.026 * Support for EU 4.19 4.07.049 * -.011 Left-right ideology 5.40 5.20.038 *.061 ** EU Voting Participation 3.09 2.96.036 *.002 Satisfaction with democracy in EU 2.43 2.48 -.029 ** -.075 ** Notes: (i) Mean score on the scales 12, comparing online users and non-users. (ii) Zeroorder coefficients between online use and dependent variables without any controls (iii) Standardized regression coefficients (betas) with prior controls for education, age, gender, and household income. Sig. P.**>.01 *>.05. Sources: EuroBarometer 51.0 spring 1999. 17

Table 8: European Interest in Uses of the Internet, EU-15 1997 % Of each group interested in using Internet to Use Internet Does not use Internet but interested Does not use internet and not interested Follow a training program from home 59 56 46 Email 41 34 16 Read news and magazines 36 27 17 Get a doctor s advice on a health problem 35 38 38 Banking and financial information 35 36 25 Consult local town or council services 28 31 28 Travel information 28 28 25 Consult employment offices 22 28 25 Museum tour 21 20 15 Get consumer information on products 20 21 14 Take part in group discussion 16 15 9 Contact a politician and take part in political debates 10 10 8 Note: Q. I am going to name several examples of services you could have access to by using one of these communication networks, for example, the Internet. For each of these services could you please tell me if it interests you or not? Source: Eurobarometer 47.0 Jan-Feb 1997. N. 16,362. 18

Table 9. Interest in the Political Uses of the Internet, EU-15 1997 % Of pop. interested Consult local town Read newspapers and Contact Politicians in using Internet to or council services magazines Greece 38 19 11 Portugal 37 25 20 Austria 36 22 14 East Germany 34 12 8 Luxembourg 34 32 14 Spain 33 25 8 West Germany 33 14 10 Italy 29 19 7 Finland 27 32 5 Denmark 25 35 12 France 21 21 7 Belgium 20 18 6 Netherlands 20 24 5 Sweden 19 33 8 Britain 18 17 6 Northern Ireland 15 15 7 Ireland 14 10 5 All 27 22 9 Note: See Table 8 for details of the question. Source: Eurobarometer 47.0 Jan-Feb 1997. N. 16,362. 19

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