Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century Meliha Benli Altunisik, Professor in International Relations. Dean of Graduate School of Social Sciences, Middle East Technical University, Ankara The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - hereafter AKP) has put its stamp on Turkish foreign policy in the first decade of 21 st century. This party, which was established in 2001 by people who split from the Felicity Party that represented the political Islamist line in Turkish politics, came to power in November 2002 enjoying absolute majority in the parliament. The AKP is in power since then as it again came out as the first party in 2007 elections and formed a majority government. Foreign policy has been one of the areas that the AKP governments have been quite assertive and ambitious about. Ahmet Davutoglu, who first served as the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Rcep Tayyip Erdogan (2002-2009) and then became Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2009, has been the main architect of AKP s foreign policy. Davutoglu developed a vision of foreign policy which framed Turkey as a central country in global politics based on geography, history and identity. Thus according to Davutoglu particularly in the new constellation of global politics, Turkey could no longer be content with being a flank county as it was in the Cold War or even a bridge country as it was generally characterized, but rather a central country that enjoys an area of influence in its immediate environs and also beyond. This vision is based on several principles. First is the principle of zero problems with neighbors. This concept not only provided a criticism of earlier policies but also conceptualized a positive direction for the future. Second principle is multi-dimensional foreign policy, which underlined the complementarity between Turkey s new engagements and old alliances. Thus, it is argued that Turkey s developing ties with the Middle East or Russia are not in competition with its strategic relations with the US or its relations with the EU. Third principle emphasized the importance of Turkey s mediation in regional and global conflicts. It is argued that Turkey has the will and necessity to play this role to promote peace and stability in its regions. Finally, the new vision emphasized de-securitization of Turkish foreign policy. Instead, concepts like soft power, engagement and economic interdependence are claimed to be the new tools of Turkey s engagement with the world. Turkey was defined as an actor that could talk to everybody and anybody. Turkey s strength was not only coming from its military might, but more so from its democracy and economic strength. Many of these principles are not necessarily new, except may be to some extent Turkey s new eagerness to mediate in regional conflicts (Altunisik, 2009). Under AKP governments Turkey s involvement in regional conflicts has been particularly noteworthy in the Middle East, a region traditionally Turkey was very reluctant to get involved in regional conflicts. Turkey attempted to mediate between Israel and Syria, Hamas and Fatah, Iraq and Syria, Iran and the Western powers and in Lebanon and Iraq. Turkey s acceptance in mediating Middle Eastern conflicts pointed to increasing credibility of Turkey as a third party and thus contributed to its prestige in the region and in the world. However, ultimately Turkey s successes in these efforts remained limited and thus raise the issue of overstretching. Yet Turkey s efforts to mediate have not been limited to the Middle East but extended to other regions. An example of a successful mediation occurred in the Balkans where Turkey has been contributing to the reconciliation efforts between Bosnia and Serbia. Other AKP principles shared important similarities with previous attempts to locate Turkey in the post- Cold War global politics. However, the AKP governments have been able to present these principles in a more comprehensive way, but more importantly has had more opportunities to implement them. This was partly due to the fact that the party has come to power alone. In addition, one also needs to focus on international, regional and domestic changes to understand the context that has affected Turkish foreign policy and in some ways enabled the AKP governments to implement some of these policies. Internationally, September 11 attacks on the US and the consequent strengthening of the discourse of clash of civilizations has increased the importance of Turkey as an example that refuted that dichotomy. (Keyman and Onis, 2007)Turkey, a country with a majority Muslim population has been presented as a successful model of modernization, democratization and globalization. The implications of this can be seen in several policies. 195

Country Profile: Turkey " power, Soft engagement and economic interdependence are claimed to be the new tools of Turkey s engagement with the World CIDOB International Yearbook 2011 One typical example has been the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC), which was established in 2005, with the initiative of Spain and Turkey, under the auspices of the UN. Similarly Turkey s participation in ISAF in Afghanistan has had significance beyond its NATO membership as it is the only country with a Muslim majority population in that organization. Finally, particularly the transformation of Turkish political Islam into AKP has become an important model as regards to the issue of engaging the political Islamists in the Arab world. Thus, post-september 11 global politics provided Turkey and particularly the AKP government an opportunity to increase its significance in the world. Regionally, the consequences of the Iraq War in 2003 also increased opportunities for Turkey in the medium term. Although Turkey s decision to not to participate in the war led to a crisis in Turkey-US relations, it opened the way for Turkey s influence in the region. First, Turkey s resistance to the Bush administration undermined the image of Turkey as gendarmerie of the US in the Middle East and thus opened the way for Turkey s acceptance in the region. Second, the geopolitical transformations in the region, particularly the Arab fragmentation, the decrease in the US power, and the rise of Iranian influence in the post-2003 Middle East provided Turkey with new opportunities to be more active and influential in the region. Finally, domestic transformations of Turkey also provided new opportunities. Economic program after 2000-2001 crisis that was adopted by the previous government were mainly overseen by the AKP. Particularly between 2002 and 2007 Turkey enjoyed highest average annual per capita growth rate as well as highest cumulative growth rate in its region. Furthermore, foreign trade indicators also improved and Turkey became a manufactured goods exporter. This economic transformation led Turkey to aggressively engage neighboring regions and even beyond economically. Thus economic motivations have also been a driving force in Turkish foreign policy. (Kirisci, 2009) Finally, the EU factor could be cited as an enabler for AKP s foreign policy. In the post-helsinki period Turkey has engaged in new reforms to be able to start accession negotiations. The first AKP government continued the reforms that began during the rule of the previous government and made the goal of starting accession negotiations with the EU as one of its major goals. Within this context there was also increasing harmonization with the EU policies in foreign policy as well which was also documented in European Commissions progress reports. But more significantly in the long run the Turkey has successfully adopted EU foreign policy tools, such as dialogue, engagement, peaceful resolution of disputes etc. Relations with the US: Complex Relationship Turkish-US relations in the post-cold War era have become more complex with the disappearance Cold War parameters. Although the two countries continued to cooperate on different issues and in different regions, Turkey has started to act more independently and at times openly clashed with Washington. Iraq issue has been an example of this complexity. In the 1990s Turkey cooperated with the US in the Gulf War and became critical for the continuation of the post-gulf War regime that was imposed on Iraq by allowing the US to use Incirlik air base for Operation Provide Comfort. However, US s Iraq policy soon became a source of frustration and mistrust in Ankara, due to the security threats it was posing in relation to the Kurdish issue as well as economic loss Turkey suffered for losing its important trading partner. Turkey s concerns culminated in March 1 st 2003 decision of the Turkish parliament to refuse to participate in the Iraq War. In fact, eventual US invasion of Iraq led to a further deterioration of US-Turkish relations and contributed to a rise in anti- Americanism in the country (Larrabee, 2011).Although especially since 2008 Ankara and Washington has begun cooperating in Iraq, other points of contentions emerged again in the Middle East. Washington became quite critical of Turkey s relations with Iran as well as the crisis in Turkey s relations with Israel. Thus, although the US President Barack Obama in his visit to Turkey in April 2010 defined Turkey-US relationship as a model partnership it is still not clear how this is being defined. Under AKP governments as well the post-cold War pattern in Turkish-American relations seems to continue as the two countries engaged in cooperation in certain areas and issues whereas they continued to diverge in significant ways on others. The EU: The Crisis in Accession Negotiations The 20 th century ended with a very significant milestone in Turkish-EU relations: In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council recognized Turkey as a candidate country. This was a very powerful incentive to reform and Turkey in fact has adopted several constitutional and legal reforms during this period. In October 2001, 34 constitutional amendments were made, including reduction of police powers of detention, expansion of human rights, lifting of the ban on Kurdish language broadcasts and increasing civilian representation in the National Security Council (NSC). A new Civil Code and three harmonization packages were adopted in 2002. These changes expanded political and civil rights in Turkey. The new Civil Code aimed to improve freedom of association and 196

assembly as well as introducing improvements in gender equality. Finally, reforms in the penal code were introduced, including outlawing of death penalty. These reforms culminated in the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 where the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey once it fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. This decision, together with the availability of financial assistance, provided further incentive to reform. Four harmonization packages were adopted during this period which expanded freedom of thought, expression and assembly and new measures were taken to prevent torture. In 2005 the new Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were adopted. The following reforms also decreased the role of the military in Turkish politics and initiated a process of dealing with Turkey s longstanding issues, such as the Kurdish issue. As a result, the Brussels European Council Summit in December 2004 decided to open negotiations without further delay. However, since the beginning of the accession negotiations ironically Turkey-EU relations began to deteriorate. One reason for this emanates from the EU countries themselves. In fact, the opening of the accession negotiations mobilized parties and groups that oppose to Turkey s membership. Within this context coming of power of Nicholas Sarkozy in France and Angela Merkel in Germany have been detrimental to the progress in the accession negotiations since the leaders of these two very important EU countries are openly anti-turkish membership. Especially France under Sarkozy became a quite vocal critic of Turkey s accession. As a home to largest Muslim population in Europe, the rise of anti-muslim sentiments made Turkey s membership a significant element in French domestic politics. In the meantime France has been blocking five chapters of Turkey s accession negotiations. On the other hand, the issue of Cyprus continues to be a major obstacle to negotiations. After the full membership of Republic of Cyprus in the EU in 2004 this issue has been effectively become part of Turkey-EU relations. Thus, Turkey s fulfillment of commitments under the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement has become a benchmark for the opening of negotiations on eight chapters with 2005 decision of the EU Council. So far out of 35 chapters only 13 could be opened. On the Turkish side there has also been a waning of interest. The AKP government has been criticized for slowing down the reform process. The limited reform efforts, such as the adoption of a law to limit the power of the military courts in 2009 or the constitutional amendments, mostly about the judiciary, that were adopted by a referendum in 2010, were not enough to change this perception. On the contrary, some in Turkey began to argue that the AKP s reformism in its first term was mainly aiming to consolidate its power at home through external support, that is the EU, as well as to limit the power of domestic institutions such as the army and the judiciary that were seen as undermining the power of the AKP government. The EU seemed to share at least some of these concerns. After the referendum EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle, after welcoming the positive outcome of the referendum, stated that We share the views of many in Turkey that the 12 September vote needs to be followed by other much needed reforms to address the remaining priorities in the area of fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion and any future constitutional changes should be prepared through the broadest possible consultation, involving all political parties and civil society in a timely manner and a spirit of dialogue and compromise. 1 The AKP government, on the other hand, blamed the EU and some EU countries for the deterioration of Turkish-EU relations. In the meantime, the public support for EU membership in Turkey also dropped from a peak 72 percent in 2002 to 54 percent in 2006. 2 The Middle East: Increasing Engagement Under the AKP governments there have been some significant changes in Turkey s relations with the Middle East. Although Turkey had already been actively involved in the post-gulf War Middle East politics, its activism changed nature in the 2000s. The AKP progressively de-securitized Turkey s Middle East policy and continued to improve its relations with the regional countries. Particularly the changes in Syria and Iraq policies were remarkable in that context. Turkish- Syrian relations were improving after October 1998 crisis during which the two countries almost came to a brink of war. In the 2000s the relations between the two countries developed 1 in all fields. Security cooperation increased especially after 2003 Iraq War. Economic relations began to take off after the ratification of Free Trade Agreement in 2007. As a result the volume of trade reached to USD two billion by the end of 2008. Border trade also flourished, providing economic development and employment on both sides of the border. The elimination of visa requirement in 2009 further contributed to the proliferation of tourism and trade. Turkey s Iraq relations were more difficult to transform. When Turkey did not cooperate with the US in the war against Iraq, it was effectively excluded from post-war Iraqi politics. During those years Turkey became disturbed by the growing power of the Iraqi Kurds and the establishment of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) due to its concerns about Iraq s territorial integrity as well as PKK s influence in that region. In 2008 Turkey adopted a new strategy towards Iraq. This strategy aimed to improve relations with all groups in Iraq, including the KRG. Improving political and economic relations constituted the backbone of improving ties. In addition to its embassy in Baghdad, Turkey opened consulates in Mosul, Basra and Erbil and thus established its presence in all parts of Iraq. Instead Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century 197

Country Profile: Turkey " Turkey has successfully adopted EU foreign policy tools, such as dialogue, engagement and peaceful resolution of disputes CIDOB International Yearbook 2011 In the 1990s Turkish-Russian relations were characterized by developing economic relations and yet several political crises. Particularly problematic has been the mutual accusation for supporting each other s separatist movements in Kurdish and Chechen issues. The Rusof emphasizing threat, Turkey has begun to talk about economic integration with Iraq, focusing especially on the north. 3 The intensification of relations was reflected in the movement of people: the consulate in Erbil alone is said to issue as many as 300 visas a day. 4 The 2000s witnessed a general improvement of Turkey s relations with the Middle East. Visa-free travel has been agreed with Libya, Syria, Jordan,Lebanon and Yemen. Free trade agreements have been signed with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Palestine and Tunisia. The AKP government has been stressing its aim of creating a zone of free movements of goods and people. As a result of suh policies the trade volume between Turkey and the Arab countries which was only 13 billion USD in 2004 soared to 33.5 billion USD in 2010. Total direct investments of the Middle East, Gulf and North African countries in Turkey reached 14 billion USD over the last six years. In addition intense political dialogue meachanisms have been established between Turkey and the regional countries. All this marked a major change from the Turkish policy of perceiving the Middle East as a source of threats. The recent uprisings in the Arab world provided Turkey both opportunities and challenges. Especially the first AKP government was vocal in its emphasis on the need for reform in the region. Turkey has also become an interesting example for the reformers in the region due its image of success, its foreign policy as well as the transformation of Turkish political Islamist movement. Thus, political transformation of the region towards more popular and accountable governments in the long run could enhance Turkey s cooperation with the region. However, in the short run the AKP government faced familiar dichotomies. After all Turkey had invested a lot in improving its relations with the region, which meant it has political, strategic and economic stakes in status quo. This dilemma has been reflected in Turkish policy towards Arab Spring. Turkey, like others, was caught unexpectedly to the Tunisian uprising. In Egypt, although the AKP government was criticized at home for being slow, Erdogan s call for Mubarak to listen to the people was welcomed. Libya, on the other hand, once again exposed Turkey s limitations. There was about 30,000 Turkish workers in that country, most of which were evacuated in a successful campaign. The fact that the Turkish companies have about USD 10 billion investments in that country further complicated the situation. Thus the AKP government has been uneasy about outside intervention in Libya and worked to move the intervention to NATO when it could not be avoided. In the meantime the government has continued to work for a negotiated end to the conflict which would open the way for a political transition. The events in Bahrain, Yemen and especially Syria continue to present more pressing challenges. The best to hope for Turkey is to contribute to a more managed and peaceful transition in these countries as it suffers from the instability the Arab Spring has created. Finally, the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations constitutes another element of Turkey s foreign policy in the region and provides particular challenges. The coming of power of the AKP did not immediately effect Turkey s relations with Israel. The AKP government initially adopted a pragmatic position and continued Turkey s relations with Israel as usual for some time. Turkey s close relations with Israel and Syria allowed Ankara to mediate in the conflict between them. The AKP government also arranged a meeting between Israeli and Pakistani officials in Istanbul in 2005. All this changed with the Gaza War. Prime Minister Erdogan heavily criticized Israel s conduct of the war at the 2009 World Economic Forum Conference at Davos. The so-called Davos affair became a turning point in the relations between the two countries. From then on especially Prime Minister Erdogan increased his tone of criticism against Israel both in international and domestic forums. On May 31 st, 2010 a Turkish ship, which was part of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, a convoy of six ships carrying nationalities of 37 countries to challenge Israel s Gaza embargo by carrying humanitarian aid to the Strip, was raided by the IDF soldiers in the international waters and nine Turkish citizens were killed during the raid. The flotilla attack caused an enormous harm to Turkish-Israeli relations. The deterioration of relations with Israel provided a challenge to the previous positioning of Turkey above regional divisions and its claim to talk to everybody. This evolution was also not welcomed by the regimes, although became quite popular with the public in the Arab world. Another controversial aspect of Turkey s Middle East policy has been its relations with Iran. In addition to deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, improvement of Turkey s relations with Iran led to some claims in the US and EU countries that Turkey s turning to the east. In the 2000s Turkish-Iranian relations continued to be complex. Turkey increasingly engaged Iran, which is the number two provider of natural gas to Turkey, both politically and economically. Ankara also worked for the diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis as it feared for the consequences of military solution as well as sanctions. However, Turkey did not want a nuclear Iran and also sought to limit Iran s influence in the Middle East. Russia: Emergence of Pragmatism 198

sian Federation was also disturbed by Turkey s political and economic activism in the Caspian region. Thus, the two countries engaged in competition in these areas and to limit each others influence in the region. In the Balkans too Russia and Turkey were on opposing sides in Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite political competition, economic relations came to a new level with the signing of an agreement for Blue Stream Project, which would carry Russian natural gas through a pipeline across the Black Sea to Turkey. Finally, during then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit s visit to Russia in 1999 the two countries accepted the principle of non-involvement in their internal affairs. This understanding opened the way for further cooperation. In December 2004 then-russian President Putin s visit to Turkey was another turning point and six agreements in the areas of military and economic cooperation were signed. Since then Turkish-Russian relations have been marked by intensity of high-level visits and a close working relationship at the leadership level. The volume of bilateral trade reached USD 38 billion in 2008. Russia has been the largest trading partner of Turkey and number one provider of natural gas with more than 60 percent. Turkey s construction sector is also quite active in Russia. The total value of projects undertaken by Turkish contractors in Russia is more than USD 26 billion, making Russia by far the most important market for Turkish construction services. As for Turkish direct investments in Russia, they are estimated to have reached USD 6 billion. Finally, tourism from Russia has reached to significant numbers; 2.8 million Russian tourists visit Turkey annually (Aras, 2009) In May 2010 during a visit by Russian President Medvedev again several agreements were signed. Three of these agreements are quite significant: First of all, the two countries lifted visa requirements for short visits. Second, they signed a nuclear power plant deal which will be built by a Russian company, will be Russia s first built and owned foreign power plant. Finally, an agreement to develop the pipeline project that would carry oil from Turkey s Black Sea coast to the port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean, the so-called Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline was signed. Turkish-Russian relations are also developing in military and defense industry area. The most limited area of cooperation remains to be the political field. Turkey and Russia continue to differ on issues related to the South Caucasus, particularly Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Furthermore, the Georgian War of 2008 also underlined some divergences in the policies of the two countries. There are also competitive elements in energy issues. On the one hand, Turkey cooperates closely on energy issues with Russia. On the other hand, Turkey promotes itself as an alternative route to Russia for the EU which is looking to diversify its energy sources. Despite these limitations, however, Turkish-Russian relations have improved remarkably in the 2000s. In conclusion, during the 2000s Turkish foreign policy aimed to increase Turkey s importance in the neighboring regions as well as global politics. Turkey has been actively engaging its regions and increasingly utilizing tools such as soft power, dialogue, mediation, economic interdependence rather than military power in doing so. Parallel to its regional roles, Turkey seems to be aspiring to increase its importance in global politics, aiming to be considered as one of the emerging powers. Turkey s activism in international organizations, such as the UN or the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), is a case in point. Notes 1. Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle on the result of the referendum in Turkey, available at http:// europa.eu/rapid/pressreleasesaction.do?reference=m EMO/10/402&type=HTML 2. Eurobarameter 66, Public Opinion in the European Union, December 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf Biblography ALTUNISIK, Meliha. Worldviews and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. New Perspectives on Turkey, Special Issue on Turkish Foreign policy, No. 40, Spring 2009. ARAS, Bulent. Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional Partnership. Ankara: SETA Policy Brief, 2009. KEYMAN, Fuat and ONIS, Ziya. Turkish Politics in a Changing World.Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2007. KIRISCI, Kemal. The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of Trading State. New Perspectives on Turkey, Special Issue on Turkish Foreign policy, No. 40, Spring 2009. LARRABEE, Stephan. The New Turkey and American-Turkish Relations. Insight Turkey, Winter 2011. Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century 199