Estimating the Margin of Victory for Instant-Runoff Voting*

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Transcription:

Estimating the Margin of Victory for Instant-Runoff Voting* David Cary v7 * also known as Ranked-Choice Voting, preferential voting, and the alternative vote 1

Why estimate? Overview What are we talking about? Estimates Worst-case accuracy Real elections Conclusions 2

Why Estimate? Trustworthy Elections Risk-limiting audits Margin of Victory 3

Why Estimate? IRV Trustworthy Elections IRV Risk-Limiting Audits IRV Margin of Victory (not feasible) 4

Why Estimate? IRV Trustworthy Elections? IRV Risk-Limiting Audits IRV Margin of Victory (not feasible) 5

Why Estimate? IRV Trustworthy Elections IRV Risk-Limiting Audits IRV Margin of Victory (not feasible sometimes) IRV Margin of Victory Lower Bound 6

Proposals for IRV Risk-Limiting Audits Risk-limiting audits for nonplurality elections Sarwate, A., Checkoway, S., and Shacham, H. Tech. Rep. CS2011-0967, UC San Diego, June 2011 https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/irv.pdf 7

Overview Why estimate? because we can; to do risk-limiting audits What are we talking about? What is Instant-Runoff Voting? What is a margin of victory? Estimates Worst-case accuracy Real elections Conclusions 8

Model of Instant-Runoff Voting Single winner Ballot ranks candidates in order of preference. Votes are counted and candidates are eliminated in a sequence of rounds. In each round, a ballot counts as one vote for the most preferred continuing candidate on the ballot, if one exists. In each round, one candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated for subsequent rounds. Ties for elimination are resolved by lottery. s continue until just one candidate is in the round. That candidate is the winner. 9

Consistent IRV Features Number of candidates ranked on a ballot: require ranking all candidates limit maximum number of ranked candidates can rank any number of candidates Multiple eliminations: required*, not allowed, or discretionary* Early termination: tabulation stops when a winner is identified* * may require an extended tabulation for auditing purposes 10

Defining the Margin of Victory The margin of victory is the minimum total number* of ballots that must in some combination be added and removed in order for the set of contest winner(s) to change with some positive probability. * the number of added ballots, plus the number of removed ballots 11

Overview Why estimate? because we can; to do risk-limiting audits What are we talking about? Estimates Worst-case accuracy Real elections Conclusions 12

Estimates for the Margin of Victory Last-Two-Candidates upper bound Winner-Survival upper bound Single-Elimination-Path lower bound Best-Path lower bound Time O(1) O(C) O(C 2 ) O(C 2 log C) (C = number of candidates) Space O(1) O(1) O(1) O(C) 13

Example IRV Contest 1 2 3 4 5 Wynda Winslow 107 112 114 186 332 Diana Diaz 130 133 134 146 Charlene Colbert 35 46 84 Barney Biddle 40 41 Adrian Adams 20 Candidates are in reverse order of elimination, with the winner first. 14

Last-Two-Candidates Upper Bound 1 2 3 4 Wynda Winslow 107 112 114 186 332 Diana Diaz 130 133 134 146 Charlene Colbert 35 46 84 Barney Biddle 40 41 Adrian Adams 20 40 5 Margin of Survival for Winner in round C 1, the round with just the last two candidates. 15

Winner-Survival Upper Bound Wynda Winslow 107 112 114 186 332 Diana Diaz 130 133 134 146 Charlene Colbert 35 46 84 Barney Biddle 40 41 Adrian Adams 20 Margin of Survival for Winner 1 2 3 4 87 71 30 40 5 Smallest Margin of Survival for the Winner in the first C 1 rounds. 16

Vote Totals Not In Sequence By Value 1 2 3 4 5 Wynda Winslow 107 112 114 186 332 Diana Diaz 130 133 134 146 Charlene Colbert 35 46 84 Barney Biddle 40 41 Adrian Adams 20 17

Vote Totals Not In Sequence By Value 1 2 3 4 5 Wynda Winslow 130 133 134 186 332 Diana Diaz 107 112 114 146 Charlene Colbert 40 46 84 Barney Biddle 35 41 Adrian Adams 20 18

Single-Elimination-Path Lower Bound Margin of Single Elimination (MoSE) 1 2 3 4 130 133 134 186 332 107 112 114 146 40 46 84 35 41 20 15 5 30 40 5 Smallest Margin of Single Elimination in the first C 1 rounds. 19

Single Elimination Path 1 candidates {a, b, c, d, w} 15 = MoSE(1) 2 candidates {b, c, d, w} 5 = MoSE(2) 3 candidates {c, d, w} 30 = MoSE(3) 4 candidates {d, w} 40 = MoSE(4) 5 candidate {w} 20

Single-Elimination Path Bottleneck Edge weight = a limited capacity (a bottleneck) for tolerating additions and removals of ballots, while still staying on the path. 1 candidates {a, b, c, d, w} 15 = MoSE(1) 2 candidates {b, c, d, w} 5 = MoSE(2) 3 candidates {c, d, w} 30 = MoSE(3) 4 candidates {d, w} 40 = MoSE(4) 5 candidate {w} 21

Exceeding a Bottleneck Easy guarantee of same winner: Stay on the single-elimination path 1 candidates {a, b, c, d, w} 15 = MoSE(1) 2 candidates {b, c, d, w}? 3 5 = MoSE(2) candidates {c, d, w} Different Winner? Different Winner 30 = MoSE(3) 4 candidates {d, w} 40 = MoSE(4) 5 candidate {w} 22

Path Bottleneck 1 candidates {a, b, c, d, w} Path Bottleneck is the smallest individual bottleneck on the path = Single- Elimination- Path lower bound 15 = MoSE(1) 2 candidates {b, c, d, w} 5 = MoSE(2) 3 candidates {c, d, w} 30 = MoSE(3) 4 candidates {d, w} 40 = MoSE(4) 5 candidate {w} 23

Multiple Elimination as a Detour 1 candidates {a, b, c, d, w} 15 = MoSE(1) 2 candidates {b, c, d, w} 5 = MoSE(2) 3 candidates {c, d, w} 30 = MoSE(3) 4 candidates {d, w} 40 = MoSE(4) 5 candidate {w} 24

Multiple Elimination of k Candidates A usable multiple eliminaton, if combined vote total is still the smallest 1 2 3 4 5 130 133 134 186 332 107 112 114 146 40 46 84 87 + 35 41 20 25

Margin of Multiple Elimination 1 2 3 4 5 130 133 134 186 332 107 112 114 146 40 46 84 35 41 20 MoME(2, 2) = 112 (46 + 41) = 112 87 = 25 26

Multiple Elimination as a Detour 1 candidates {a, b, c, d, w} 15 = MoSE(1) 2 candidates {b, c, d, w} MoME(2, 2) = 25 3 5 = MoSE(2) candidates {c, d, w} 30 = MoSE(3) 4 candidates {d, w} 40 = MoSE(4) 5 candidate {w} 27

Usable Multiple Eliminations 1 15 137 19 2 119 12 523 53 196 25 3 87 30 237 264 4 5 40 351 Which path has the largest path bottleneck? 28

Best-Path Lower Bound The largest path bottleneck... of all paths from round 1 to round C... that consist of usable multiple eliminations. A best path: Guarantees the same winner Maximizes tolerance for additions and removals among usable multiple elimination paths 29

Best-Path Lower Bound Algorithms O(C2 log C) time to sort the vote totals within each round. The best path can be found in O(C2 ) time. Using a bottleneck algorithm, which is A longest path algorithm for a weighted directed acyclic graph, but calculating the length as the minimum of its component parts, instead of the sum. 30

Estimate Relations Single-Elimination-Path lower bound Best-Path lower bound margin of victory Winner-Survival upper bound Last-Two-Candidates upper bound 31

Early-Termination Estimates For tabulations that stop before C-1 rounds when a candidate has a majority of the continuing votes more than two candidates are in the round Accuracy is degraded must allow for possible extreme behavior in the missing rounds of the tabulation. 32

Overview Why estimate? to do risk-limiting audits What are we talking about? Estimates quick: O(C2 log C) time Worst-case accuracy Real elections Conclusions 33

Asymptotic Worst-Case Accuracy Ratio with margin of victory is unbounded. Winner-Survival Upper Bound Margin of Victory Margin of Victory Best-Path Lower Bound No estimate can do better if based only on tabulation vote totals. 34

Asymptotic Worst-Case Example Identical Tabulation Vote Totals 2 C-3 Winner-Survival Upper Bound 2 C-3? Margin of Victory? Best Path 1 1 Lower Bound contest 1 contest 2 35

Asymptotic Worst-Case Example 2 C-3 Ballots Show Different Margins of Victory Winner-Survival Upper Bound 2 C-3 Margin of Victory Best Path 1 1 Lower Bound contest 1 contest 2 36

Overview Why estimate? to do risk-limiting audits What are we talking about? Estimates quick: O(C2 log C) time Worst-case accuracy unbounded ratios Real elections Conclusions 37

Estimates for Real Elections Australia elections, 2010 national House of Representatives 150 contests All California IRV contests since 2004 local, non-partisan elections 53 contests 36 from San Francisco, 2004-2011 12 using early termination estimates 17 from Alameda county, 2010: Berkeley, Oakland, and San Leandro 38

Evaluating Estimates There are many ways to analyze the data. What are relevant metrics? A full evaluation requires a context of: specific risk-limiting audit protocols profiles of audit differences. Look at: best available lower bound and upper bound, as a percentage of first-round votes. What is the distribution of estimates? 39

Selected Stats Assessment Total Contests Contests with LB > 10% Contests with LB < 5% Contests with LB < 1% Contests with LB=MoV=UB and LB < 5% and LB < 1% Contests with UB/LB > 2 and LB < 5% and LB < 1% Australia 150 100% 85 28 2 71 21 1 34 7 1 57% 19% 1% 47% 14% 1% 23% 5% 1% California 53 100% 35 14 7 16 4 0 10 7 7 66% 26% 13% 30% 8% 0% 19% 13% 13% 40

Australia Elections 41

California Elections 42

Overview Why estimate? to do risk-limiting audits What are we talking about? Estimates quick: O(C2 log C) time Worst-case accuracy unbounded ratios Real elections some estimates useful, some need improvement Conclusions 43

Conclusions Risk-limiting audits can use lower bounds for the margin of victory. Estimates can be quickly calculated from tabulation vote totals. Worst-case ratios with the margin of victory are unbounded. The Best-Path lower bound can be used for some risk-limiting audits, but some contests will need better estimates. 44

Thanks Members and associates of Californians for Electoral Reform (CfER) especially Jonathan Lundell San Francisco Voting System Task Force especially Jim Soper anonymous reviewers for many suggestions for improving the paper especially for the idea of the Winner-Survival upper bound 45