Theories of European integration Dr. Rickard Mikaelsson 1
Theories provide a analytical framework that can serve useful for understanding political events, such as the creation, growth, and function of the European Union. It provide structure to our interpretation of a complex and multidimensional reality. Four different theories/conceptual approaches to the study of European integration is covered by the course material. Federalism and Federation Neo-functionalism Inter-governmentalism Alternative (new) theories of European integration. 2
Neo-functionalism 3
Neo-functionalism, the dominant theory between 1950-1970. 1970. Received critique and became widely dismissed between 1970-1990s. Revival as the European integration process progressed during the 1990s. Primary publication; Ernst Haas (1958) The uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic forces 1950-1957 1957.. Haas has however declared the theory obsolescent, at two occassions. Studied the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), with the ambition to create a grand theory that could explain similar developments in other areas of the world. Remains closely associated with the study of European integration. n. 4
Neo-functionalists expects states to cooperate on economic matters in order to gain economical advantages. This would lead to increased political cooperation in order to secure the economic advantages. Increased cooperation and coordination would result in the creation of supranational institutions. These institutions would over time become increasingly independent, formulating their own agenda, and thereby serve as a driving force for continued integration and transfer of political power to the supranational level. 5
Core hypothesis, the spill-over effect. Supranational cooperation in one area will result in the need/desire to cooperate in closely ly surrounding areas. Spill-over refers to the process whereby members of an integration scheme agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment), or both. 6
Example; the objective is to promote the free movement of workers within the EU. Problem arises because of differences in national certifications, for instance for health care professionals. That establishes a need to cooperate with regards to harmonizing these national certification, possible with regards to educational demands, in an attempt to remove the obstacle for the movement of workers. Different forms of spillover effects. Functional (or technical spillover) and political spillover. 7
Functional spillover is when cooperation in one are creates a functional pressure to cooperate in other areas (as in the example given before). The development of the Single market is another good example. Political spillover is a more deliberate process, where actors creates package deals that establish common agreement in a range of policy areas. Political actors, with separate interest, may decide to support each other and thereby link their separate interests together. Progress in one are may similar require progress in another area, in order to reach political consensus. 8
Through the spillover effect, neo-functionalists are able to connect economic integration to political integration. They refute the notion of a zero-sum game between states. Through cooperation and the spillover effect all cooperating countries can gain while propelling the integration process along. Neo-functionalist also believe in the power of supranational institutions. Over time, they are believed to be able to triumph national interests. Which in turn progresses and strengthens the political integration process. 9
Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing existing ones. (Haas) 10
The role of political elites are especially emphasized, in another core hypothesis called elite socialization. Politicians, diplomats, and bureaucrats, working regularly on the European level, may develop new loyalties to the integration process, making them loyal to supranational institutions and not the national polity. These political elites would then serve as a driving force for continued European integration. 11
Organized interest groups can in a similar manner develop supranational orientations; Union of Industrial and Employer s Confederation of Europe (UNICE), renamed 2007 to BusinessEurope. These actors can also place pressure on national governments and push for more integration. in the process of reformulating expectations and demands, the interest groups in question approach one another supranationally while their erstwhile ties with national friends undergo deterioration. 12
Neo-functionalist expects; The Commission to act like a political entrepreneur; pushing for greater cooperation and strengthening of supranational institutions. The European Court to favour political integration and the expansion of Community law into new areas. The European Parliament to function as a supranational institution, working in connection with the Commission for the European idea The Council of Minister to function as the defender of national interest, but also influenced by spillover and political socialization, which can lead to support for continued integration. 13
Critiques of neo-functionalism; The slow progress of political integration after the empty chair crisis (1970s and 1980s). Arguments of possible spillback.. Reaction against integration measures resulting in setbacks. The arguments about elite socialization being wrong. National interest still important, national actors maybe even more nationalistic on the European level. The EU an example of liberal interdependence, occurring world- wide. That caused European integration, and the limits had been reached. Underestimation of the importance of national states. Failure to understand the importance of the EU having public legitimacy. Integration by stealth. 14
Revival of neo-functionalism in the 1990s. Caused by the continued integration process. Some modification of the original theory. Stone Sweet & Sandholtz.. Avoids the division between supranational and intergovernmental. Avoids the spillover hypothesis. Instead the introduction of a transactionbased theory. Increased transaction in a area will lead to increased desires for cooperation and integration. Despite the revival, not considered at the forefront of contemporary research on the EU. 15
Intergovernmentalism 16
Intergovernmentalism,, the primary theory on European integration since late 1960s. Reaction to federalist and neo- functionalism. Main contributors; Stanley Hoffman & Andrew Moravcsik. State-centric theory, or conceptual approach. Primary actor, nation states. Integration functions as a zero-sum game. Integration only in areas not of vital importance for nation states. Integration is driven by the interest and actions of nation states es 17
Intergovernmentalism,, similarities to international relations theories. Realism, international anarchy, states as the primary actor. Intergovernmentalism can therefore be used to study decision- making procedures in all international organizations. Intergovernmentalists focuses on cost and benefits attached to European cooperation. Cooperation driven by a positive qualitative cost-benefit analysis. Cooperation not based on ideology, but on state interest channeled through the European level. These interests are not uniform, but can change over time. 18
State sovereignty as a foundation. States able to cooperate on European level without ceding sovereignty. States in control of the process. Pooling or delegation, not transfer, of resources and political power. Rejection against the notion of spillover and snowballing as a driving force for European integration. Nation states attempting to gain influence and secure national interest in new ways. Logic of diversity,, exemplified by the interest and actions of different member states. 19
Empty chair crisis, highlighted the difference. High and low politics. Political (high) and economic (low) sphere. Cooperation within low politics and not in high politics. Nations prefer the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blender (Hoffman) Critic of this hypothesis. Integration has stretched into high politics. Blurred distinction between high and low politics. The approach has nonetheless been very influential. 20
Confederal approaches. A state centric core but allowing for integration/cooperation. the scope of integration is extensive but the level of integration is low.. The EU stuck between integration and sovereignty. Domestic politics approach. Europeanization and domestic policy making. Linkages between national and supranational dimensions. Five elements. National polity as primary unit Each national polity different than the others European policy only one dimension of national political activity. National polity positioned in-between national and European politics. Policy style concept as analytical instrument. 21
Fusion thesis (Wessels( Wessels). Growth of welfare states, need for economic growth, need for economic cooperation, need for political cooperation. Interdependence undermining the ability for autonomous action, locking states into the integration process. Joint-decision trap, retreat not a option. Compromises causing suboptimal outcomes. 22
Liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik). Foundation in Putnam s two-level-games. Putnam s s core point is that national executives play games in two arenas more or less simultaneously. At the domestic level, power-seeking/enhancing office holders aim to build coalitions of support among domestic groups. At the international level, the same actors seek to bargain in ways that enhance their positions domestically by meeting the demands of key domestic constituents. 23
Liberal intergovernmentalism, furher development of intergovernmentalism,, influential theory. Combines liberal assumptions with integovernmental assumptions. State as rational actors. the actions of states are assumed to be based on utilizing what are judged to be the most appropriate means of achieving their goals.. Integration benefits states. States as primary actor. All EU decisions reflect state bargaining. European integration outcomes created by demand (national polity) and supply (interstate negotiations). 24
Liberal theories Intergovernmental theories Underlying social factors: Pressure from domestic societal actors as represented in political institutions Underlying political factors: Intensity of national preferences Alternative coalitions Available issue linkages NATIONAL PREFERENCE FORMATION Configuration of state preferences INTERSTATE NEGOTIATIONS OUTCOMES 25
The creation of international (European) institutions are made to t improve the efficiency of interstate bargaining. European integration strengthen the executive, weakens the parliament, and loosen the grip of powerful domestic interest groups, like trade unions. Possibility of a positive-sum sum outcome, primary between states. All gain, but not necessary evenly. Primary focus on large and power states. Outcomes reflect relative bargaining power of the states. Delegation reflect the wishes of nation states to ensure that agreed commitments will be b respected. 26
Critique. Problems explaining harder cases and the day-to to-day politics. To narrow understanding of how national preferences are created. Focus on economic interest, meanwhile numerous different interest can influence national preferences. Multi-level, level, not two- level polity. Not enough emphasis on the role of supranational actors. EU institutions not only a instrument for member states. Failure to recognize the independent role of these institutions. Failure to recognize the influence of transnational actors, like European firms and European interest groups. Only formal bargaining, no focus on informal bargaining. 27
The End 28