UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL INTRODUCTION The United Nations Security Council is the primary body of the organization in maintaining international peace and security, as defined by the UN Charter. The UNSC is formed by fifteen members, of which five are permanent and ten are selected by the General Assembly for two year terms. The five permanent members of the Security Council are the People s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and they hold what is commonly known as veto power. That means that if any of these five members vote against a resolution or clause, for instance, it will automatically fail. The remaining 10 countries are elected by the General Assembly, which has demonstrated through the years the tendency to elect five members from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and other states. The sessions of 2011 will be composed of the following States: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Presidency of the Council is held by its members in turns of one calendar month each, and the order of the presidencies is defined by the English alphabetical order of their names. The key feature of the UNSC, which detaches it from other UN organs, is that it is the only committee with the power to impose binding resolutions to all states. It is also in the Council s mandate the right to make use of force by authorizing military and peacekeeping operations. However, the organ s first action, when a complaint related to a threat to peace if brought before it, is to recommend to the parties to try and reach a peaceful solution. It may also help the ceasing of the dispute by investigating or mediating the conflict if so needed. The Council has also ordered ceasefires and imposed economic sanctions or collective military embargoes on many occasions of armed combats. Moreover, the body has the power to nominate Special Representatives or request the UN Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative of its own to follow more closely any crisis that might emerge. At last, the UNSC may recommend the suspension or expulsion, by the General Assembly, of a Member State that continually violates the principles of the Charter. This committee is, therefore, crucial to the peacekeeping objectives of the United Nations, and its relevance goes way beyond security and geopolitics, affecting also the lives of the populations directly involved in the conflicts it strives to solve. 1

This year, UFRGSMUN s UNSC proposes two very stimulating and pertinent, albeit intricate, topics to be discussed. Both of them are of great relevance to the international community, since they deal with self-determination, democracy among other key issues of the international agenda. The first one invites the delegates to consider the threats to international peace and security arising from the situation in Côte d Ivoire. The second topic handles with the situation in Libya, a significant episode of the so-called Arab Spring. 2

TOPIC A: The situation in Côte d Ivoire Isadora Loreto da Silveira, Alexandre Spohr, Luiza Olmedo, Josuá Gihad Soares and Giulia Barão 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1.1. The colonial period and the independence Côte d Ivoire was originally made up of numerous isolated settlements; today it represents more than sixty distinct tribes. In the 18 th century, the country was invaded by two related groups: The Agnis, which occupied the southeast, and the Baoules, which settled in the central region. Côte d Ivoire s main ethnic groups, therefore, are historically defended from refugee populations, escaping pressures in their own territories. In the 15 th century, the country attracted both French and Portuguese merchants that were in search of ivory and slaves. In the early pre-colonial period, however, because of the dense jungle vegetation and the lack of natural harbors, large-scale socio-political organizations could not be created, and the exploration of the area by Europeans was slowed. France made its initial contact with Côte d Ivoire in 1637, when missionaries landed in the region, but these were limited. In 1842, as part of the general European scramble for colonial possessions, the French government launched a policy of intensive exploration of the West African coast, gradually extending their influence along the coast and inland. In 1843 44, treaties were signed with regional kings, placing their territories under a French protectorate. However, given its forbidding coastline, there was little trade, and the military outposts were too hard to maintain. Disinterest on the part of the French government and losses in the Franco-Prussian War led the French to abandon their forts in West Africa. Only in 1885, the Berlin Conference of European Powers, which established spheres of influence in Africa for European countries, made France develop its presence in the African continent. In 1886 France exercised direct control over the trading posts on the Ivoirian coast and in 1893 Côte d Ivoire officially became a French colony. The first governor of French administrators named was Captain Binger. Initiating the establishment of the region as a defined geographical entity he negotiated who resisted French advance until he was beaten in 1898. Complete pacification, however, was not accomplished until 1915. The French have administered Côte d Ivoire in a more direct, systematic style than their British counterparts have done, who have preferred indirect rule. They have regrouped or consolidated villages in an attempt to impose a uniform administration throughout the country. The colonial power instituted a doctrine of extreme political 3

centralization in Côte d Ivoire, with little room left for Ivoirian participation. Until the period following World War II, governmental affairs in French West Africa were administered from Paris and all Africans in Côte d Ivoire were officially French subjects without rights to citizenship or representation in Africa or France. Inhabitants had no political rights and were under the rule of a separate law system. The French demanded all of its subjects to submit to the forced labor on public works and colonial legal system allowed suspected criminals to be imprisoned without trial. In 1937, a liberal French government came to power, and allowed them to organize a trade union for the first time and also restricted the use of the forced labor. World War II profoundly affected all of French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française AOF) after the pro-nazi Vichy regime took over the government of France. Discrimination and forced labor were again permitted in Côte d Ivoire. By 1944 sources of strong opposition to the French colonial administration had emerged: the African Agricultural Union (Syndicat Agricole Africain SAA), an anti-vichy organization formed by Ivoirian planters, under the leadership of Felix Houphouët-Boigny, which claimed for better prices for African products. The results of World War II, have led to far-reaching governmental reforms in colonial policies, demanded by the African elite. Owing to the loyalty that the African subjects had exhibited during the war, France has formed the French Union (political entity created by the French Fourth Republic to replace the old French colonial system); has abolished various forms of forced labor; and has granted African members rights of free speech, free association, free assembly and political organization. In 1946 the Lamine Guèye Law passed in the French parliament, granting French citizenship to all people in the French Union. In the same year an alliance was formed between the SAA and supporters of Félix Houphouet-Boigny, resulting in the rise of the Parti Démocratique de Côte d Ivoire (PDCI), the only political party in the country that challenged French policies. The subsequent confrontation led to violence and repression, making Boigny abandon radical politics in favor of practical cooperation with French authorities. Public confidence was regained by establishing friendly relations with the colonial administration. In 1956 the Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre) transferred a number of powers from Paris to elected territorial governments in French West Africa. Aided by such strong political power, Houphouet-Boigny secured grants of French aid for Côte d Ivoire and attracted European business interests to the colony. Having harmonized French policy with the political and commercial growth, Côte d Ivoire became peacefully independent in August 1960. 4

1.2. The Houphouët-Boigny Rule The political system that emerged in Côte d Ivoire after its independence is deeply rooted in the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who became the first president, and in the heritage of the French colonial rule based on the doctrine of high political centralization (RIEHL, 2007). Parallel to his precedent inter-territorial political activism, such as the representation of the Ivorian interests in the French National Assembly form 1946 to 1959, his leading role in contact with the metropolitan colony, helped him become Côte d Ivoire s first president in 1960 and establish the political system that guaranteed his long and stable rule, that only ended with his death, in 1993. The elected National Assembly of Côte d Ivoire, composed mainly by PDCI members, adopted a republican Constitution. Based on democratic principles, it was formally meant to be a presidential system, with executive and legislative power division and an independent judiciary. However, what actually rose was a one-party system, where the PDCI, calling for national unity, managed to obtain almost unanimous public support, controlling all government branches, under the sole leadership of Felix Houphouët-Boigny. This man established an image of Father of the Nation or the founding father of Côte d Ivoire (ALMAS, 2007). Although successively elected through democratic means, he relied his power on respect and popularity maintained by mixing an appeasing strategy towards society conflicts and autocratic rule when necessary, especially to neutralize opposition. One of the main political pillars of his popular government was the ethnic-balancing policy (RIEHL, 2007). Côte d Ivoire has ever since been a multi-ethnic society and surrounded by the multi-ethnic societies of its neighboring countries. From that point of view, it is even more surprising the stability and peace that prevailed during Houphouët- Boigny rule. Himself a representative of one of the ethnic families, he developed an open strategy towards immigration, extending to them some citizenship rights and the policy that the land belonged to the one who worked it. It attracted labor to Côte d Ivoire agriculture which main exports remain cocoa, coffee and cotton contributing to an impressive level of prosperity and life standards comparing to the rest of the region. Internationally, his policy was made favorably to the West and engaged in regional issues: Côte d Ivoire joined the UN in 1960 and held a constructive role in Africa, having president Houphouët-Boigny as a mediator to regional disputes. Therefore, Houphouët- Boigny s political and economic skills from mild means as persuasion and appeasement to harsh ones, as ethnic-balancing (RIEHL, 2007) and suppression of opponents are widely acknowledged as important factors explaining the political-social stability and the economic vigor of the first two decades of Côte d Ivoire s existence. 5

From 1980 on, however, the status quo began to change. It started with an economic crisis resulting of the steep fall in the international commodity prices. As already stated, cocoa, coffee and cotton exports as well as other primary products exports were the overriding economic sector; therefore, Côte d Ivoire suffered a huge decline in state revenues, followed by the stagnation of economic growth and the alarming rise of foreign debt. The first attempt to solve the crisis was the subscription to World Bank s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). It comprised a wide range of macroeconomic reforms, aiming at the resumption of economic growth. By the end of the 1980s, however, the situation was even worse, which compelled the government to take its own austere economic measures, such as forsaking the price guarantee system and cutting by half the salaries of the teachers in all education levels. The popular response came through impetuous and widespread protests by students and workers, and the opposition, who enjoyed the opportunity to demand democratic reforms with the change to a multiparty system and to call for new elections. Adding to this internal social tension, a speech given by French president François Miterrand, addressed to the African leaders at the Conférence de Baule, in 1990, introducing the policy that the future allocation of aid would depend on political conditions forced Houphouët- Boigny to abandon one-party rule and recognize the opposition parties in May 1990. Côte d Ivoire s founding father died in 1993. As the next polls were scheduled for 1995, a power struggle began within PDCI between Boigny s potential successors. One was Henry Conan Bédié, speaker of the National Assembly, and the other, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, Prime Minister. Bédié was the favorite, not only for his constitutional right of succession, but also for the mistrust the Ivoirian people held regarding Ouattara, because of his poor involvement in national politics, his long career within the IMF and also for having been the mentor of the austere economic reforms that had spurred the social crisis in 1990. Therefore, Bédié assumed the presidency, which was meant to last until the 1995 polls. Meanwhile, Ouattara and his followers had split off PDCI, forming their own party, Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), intending to run for presidency in 1995, when another competitor would rise Laurent Gbagbo from Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) 1, the main opposition party that during Huophuët-Boigny s rule operated clandestinely. Although short-lived, Bédié s mandate gave birth to the new pattern of conflict in Côte d Ivoire. He formulated the principle of Ivoirité, the Ivoirian national pride, which stated that in order to be a citizen of the country, the inhabitants had to prove their true Ivoirian nationality, which meant having been born in Côte d Ivoire to parents who had 1 A history teacher who was particularly popular in universities and student organizations. 6

also been born in Ivoirian territory. Therefore, a significant portion of the Ivoirian population whose parents were first-generation immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali or any other country had their rights severely curtailed, deepening Côte d Ivoire s social divisions. Although ultimately aimed at barring Ouattara from running for presidency in 1995, and to conserve the legitimacy of the PDCI, weakened after the departure of Ouattara s supporters, the Ivoirité policy ended up affecting millions of people, especially in the immigrant-packed North, to whom even identification cards were denied or made harder to obtain (QUENUM, 2011). Bédié s strategy of using the concept of nationality as a political tool ended up transforming the political conflict into an ethnic and religious one: that was the end of the ethnic balance long managed by Houphouët-Boigny. 1.3. Power struggles, the rise of Gbagbo and the civil war In 1995 what was supposed to have been a three-party run for Presidency, became a political disorder. Ouattara, for Rassemblement des Republicains and Laurent Gbagbo, for Front Populaire Ivoirien, both decided to boycott the polls. The former, for being legally excluded from the run-up by the Ivoirité policy, and the latter denouncing the polls manipulation. RDR and FPI joined forces to form the Front Republicain, through which they protested against the Ivoirité-based Electoral Code and set up the Active Boycott (ALMÁS, 2007), calling national and international attention over polls illegitimacy. Nevertheless, elections were not canceled, and Bédié won with 95% of the votes. In late 1999 a mutiny of soldiers demanding Bédié to step down ended up as the first coup d état in Côte d Ivoire s history, as Robert Gueï was conducted to power. Gueï, a former Ivoirian Army chief, was forced out of duty in 1997 after falling out of Bédié s favor. Claiming to have no political ambitions and supposedly aiming to eradicate corruption from governmental ranks, Gueï promised to call democratic elections as soon as the political situation was stabilized. In 2000, elections were held, but Ouattara was once again impeded from running for presidency by the Supreme Court because of his Burkinabe ascent. However, when vote counting signaled the opposition candidate, Laurent Gbagbo, was winning, Gueï interrupted the counting of votes claiming political fraud and tried to execute a coup by declaring himself the winner (ALMÅS, 2007). Severe popular demonstrations of support for Gbagbo followed, leaving no choice to Gueï but to relinquish power to his opponent. Until Ouattara s party, RDR, also recognized Gbagbo s victory, violence also sparked in the streets between supporters of both political leaders. Laurent Gbagbo s presidency was not free of the Ivoirité discourse. It is said that, beyond the already usual denial of rights based on citizenship, the concept was used to exclude northern army officers from promotion lists (QUENUM, 2011). In September 7

2002, rebellious military men and conspirators launched simultaneous attacks in Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo, killing high-rank politicians and military officers. The government in Abidjan was able to block a coup attempt, but nevertheless the rebel group, now selfentitled Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d Ivoire (Patriotic Movement of Côte d Ivoire, MPCI), retained control of the northern part of the country (US DEPT OF STATE, 2010). In October, Abidjan and the MPCI signed an agreement establishing a ceasefire line to be monitored by France. However, later that year, two new rebel groups emerged in the west, near the border with Liberia: the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (Ivoirian Popular Movement of the Great West, MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (Movement for Justice and Peace, MJP). The three rebel groups eventually went under unified command, with Guillaume Soro, from MPCI, as the chief operator. In early 2003, under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent approximately 1,500 peacekeeping troops from Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Niger to maintain an east-west ceasefire line, known as the Zone of Confidence, dividing the country. In addition to the line, the agreement set up a plan for a national unity government with participation of the biggest political parties and rebel factions (QUENUM, 2011). However, throughout the year, this governmental setting broke down, with officers either abandoning or being dismissed from their ranks, which led the peace process to a stalemate. In mid-2004, thus, the Accra talks took place in Ghana to reengage the rebels and renew deadlines for disarmament. These goals also failed due to mistrust among the parts, which sparked fresh violence between the government and the Forces Nouvelles (New Forces, the name adopted by the rebels under unified command). In that same year, the United Nations Operation in Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI) was established in the country. In April 2005, after intense negotiations among the government, the Forces Nouvelles leadership and the opposition parties brokered by Thabo Mbeki, then president of South Africa, the Pretoria Agreement was reached. Besides committing to reengage in the peace process and integrating the rebel forces into the national army, the agreement called for elections to be held on October, monitored by the United Nations. Due to the lingering political instability and suspicion amongst the parties, elections did not take place and were delayed six times between 2005 and 2010. The agreement did not completely end the fighting neither: the civil war continued intermittently until 2007. In November 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed a new resolution which, though again extended the transition period of Côte d Ivoire before elections thus maintaining Gbagbo in the presidency, also aimed at widening the powers of the prime minister, in order to make possible that different governmental stances, possibly 8

filled up with politicians from opposing parties, share power. Gbagbo rejected the resolution s determinations right away, and called for direct dialogue with the Forces Nouvelles command instead. These new negotiations were to be brokered by the president of Burkina Faso and then chairman of ECOWAS, Blaise Compaoré, who was believed to be the main backer of the rebels in Côte d Ivoire (INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 2007). After a month of negotiations, the Ouagadougou Agreement was signed on March 4, 2007. Among other considerations, the agreement dealt with the issuance and restoration of birth certificates, identity documents and residence permits, the normalization of the electoral process and the implementation of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (DDR). Later that year, Guillaume Soro was appointed as prime minister. 1.4. The Ouagadougou Agreement and further developments The Ouagadougou Agreement focused on three main issues: the reunification of the country and the Armed Forces and the establishment of new elections. Right after the signing, voter s registration and identification were re-launched, in order to hold new elections within 10 months. As for the territorial reunification, the agreement called for dismantling the Zone of Confidence, which was accomplished in September 2007, parallel to UNOCI withdrawal from the region and the institution of Mixed Brigades and impartial forces formed by both Forces Nouvelles and National Forces soldiers. It was part of the DDR strategy the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of rebel combatants, with the joining government forces in the settlement of a new Command Center. Defense and Security Forces were completely reintegrated by January 2008. The polls forecast, however, did not become reality. In November 2008 they were postponed, and in the next year, a new supplementary agreement was added to Ouagadougou, asserting that the DDR should be completed two months before elections. Although not interrupted, citizenship identification and registration were at a slow pace, due to operational obstacles. Because of that, elections were twice again put off. In November 2009, when finally a provisional electoral list was set, a new political crisis rose, related to the dispute over the names on the list. President Gbagbo decided to dissolute the government and the CEI (Independent Electoral Commission) in February 2010, alleging fraud. Widespread riots, however, forced him to allow the announcement of a new government and point a new CEI cabinet. New elections were only settled later on. In October 2010, the presidency was disputed by Gbagbo, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, and former president Henri Konan Bédié. In the first round Gbagbo and Ouattara garnered the most votes but neither candidate received a majority. The 9

second round of voting did not go as smoothly as the first, hence Gbagbo announced his intent to challenge the outcome of the election, alleging fraudulent practices and voter intimidation. International observers, however, deemed the election to be largely democratic. Côte d Ivoire s CEI, certified by the UN, showed that Ouattara won the election with 54.1% of votes. Gbagbo, however, appealed the IEC decision to Côte d Ivoire s Constitutional Council, stacked with members mostly nominated by him, declaring Gbagbo to be the winner, with 51% of votes. Both candidates then claimed to have won the runoff and separately inaugurated themselves as presidents, forming rival governments. On December 20, 2010, the United Nations extended UNOCI s mandate, in face of the post-electoral violence. ECOWAS and African Union attempts to negotiate a resignation with Gbagbo failed, while international pressure coming from the United States, other Western countries and the UN mounted. Meanwhile, fighting intensified between pro-ouattara and pro-gbagbo forces in several cities, including Abidjan. In April 2011, the French army moved swiftly and seized the Abidjan airport. In the same month, pro-ouattara forces surrounded the bunker where Gbagbo was hiding and a UN-France joint operation bombed pro-gbagbo forces (REPUBLIC REPORT, 2011). On April 8, Laurent Gbagbo was captured, putting an end to the imbroglio. Internationally-recognized president Alassane Ouattara has said that Gbagbo is going to be prosecuted in both national and international judicial stances, and has asked the International Criminal Court to investigate mass killings conducted throughout the country during the political dispute (INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, 2011). 2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2.1. The Ouagadougou Political Accord 2.1.1. Previous political developments Following a difficult conflict resolution process, belligerents in the Ivoirian conflict decided to solve their differences through direct dialogue. This brought to an end a mediation process that witnessed a synergy between the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations. On March 4, 2007, the armed resistance militia in the north and government signed the Ouagadougou Political Accord (APO) as a framework for addressing the key issues in the ongoing conflict. The conflict had started in September 2002, after an attempted coup was led by the northern Forces Nouvelles group, headed by Guillaume Soro, and President Gbagbo responded militarily, turning it into a civil war. The conflict further expanded and developed a regional 10

character as it became closely connected to the crises in Guinea (Conakry), Liberia and Sierra Leone; with Burkina Faso accused of supporting the Forces Nouvelles. At the heart of the accord is an attempt by the Forces Nouvelles and the government to secure their political survival in an uncertain environment, which was threatening to undermine their strategy of intransigence and radicalism. The first vowed to continue the struggle until identification papers and citizenship was given to northerners, while the latter insisted on keeping the powers of the president, as stipulated in the constitution. Gbagbo himself felt restricted and confined to a very difficult situation by the UNSC Resolution 1721, in which the Prime Minister had his powers extremely enlarged. This uncertainty was reinforced by the fact that both the Forces Nouvelles and the government had exhausted their military and diplomatic resources, with no victory in sight. Direct dialogue with the armed militia therefore presented Gbagbo with an opportunity not only to regain control of the peace process but also to sideline a diplomatically fatigued international community. It was also an opportunity to accumulate the leverage and pressure that comes with controlling such processes, as well as increase his maneuvering space to dictate the pace and shape of the transition, through the control of state institutions. Most importantly, the accord was aimed at severing an alliance between the armed militia and the political opposition, by effectively co-opting the armed militia. For the armed militia, the Ouagadougou Accord also presented a strategic escape from an untenable position. The rebellion has brought dire socio-economic consequences to the north, which had virtually been cut off from accessing state resources. The armed militia understood that this situation could strain their platform for mobilizing support among the population. Moreover, even among the rebel leaders, there were some concerns that there should be a change of strategy, since military confrontation had not produced the results they aspired for and the stalemate could last forever, considering that secession had never been contemplated. Thus, the Accord provided an opportunity for Soro to consolidate his position within the Forces Nouvelles. Also of critical importance was the political future of the rebellion s leadership. There is a belief that the political opposition strategically exploited the armed militia s struggle for their own ends. Consequently, abandoning the political opposition seemed like a strategic decision for the Forces Nouvelles (AYANGAFAC, 2007). The Ouagadougou Accord presented the Forces Nouvelles with an opportunity not only to solicit concessions that could not be made in a multilateral forum, but also to have a say in determining the political future of the country. It should be noted that the armed militia has always wanted the post of prime minister though the political opposition was against it, perceiving the move as effectively excluding them politically. Therefore, the 11

Accord presented the armed militia with an opportunity to at least plot their political future in a new Côte d Ivoire. The timing and dynamics in the international arena necessitated a change in the preferred strategy of the various stakeholders in the Ivoirian conflict. Of critical importance was the ECOWAS chairmanship, held by Burkina Faso s President, Blaise Compaoré; South Africa s position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; and the nomination of a new UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon. This explains the urgency with which ECOWAS, the AU and the UN adhered to the accord (AYANGAFAC, 2007). 2.1.2. The accord s main dispositions and their implementation Even though the Ouagadougou Political Accord did not substantively depart from the previous unsuccessful internationally negotiated agreements, in its preamble the two parties reaffirm their commitment to the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria Agreements as well as to all United Nations Resolutions on Côte d Ivoire, particularly Resolutions 1633 (2005) and 1721 (2006) of the Security Council (UNSC, 2007a, p. 3). In line with the Accord the transitional government should implement the operations already required by the UN Security Council Resolution 1721: general identification of the population; disarmament of armed militias, restructuring of the army and the reintegration of demobilized soldiers; reunification of the national territory and redeployment of the administration in the area under control of the former rebels; and organization of open and transparent elections. Differently from previous agreements that allocated this task to a prime minister equidistant from the parties involved in the conflict, in the APO responsibility for the conduct of the transition was transferred to the protagonists themselves, President Gbagbo and the new Prime Minister Soro (ICG, 2007). In order to ensure follow-up to this Agreement and continuation of the direct dialogue, the Parties agreed to establish a permanent consultation mechanism (CPC) and an evaluation and monitoring committee (CEA). Four complementary accords to the APO have already been signed since 2007 as well. Both parties in the conflict acknowledged that identity is a key issue underpinning the ongoing tensions in Côte d Ivoire (AYANGAFAC, 2007). And, for that matter, the lack of a clear and coherent identification process, and of unique administrative documents attesting to the nationality and identity of citizens, has fuelled conflict. The accord calls for the re-launching of mobile courts for the establishment of the judgment of birth certificates (AYANGAFAC, 2007). 12

Significant progress has been achieved, as fighting has stopped, disarmament has begun, substitute birth certificates have been issued to a significant number of people, and the identification and voter registration process has reached substantive results. However, these processes have been too slow and incomplete. Despite their commitment to the agreement, implementation has been hampered by logistical problems and strategic calculations by the belligerents not to be outwitted during the implementation process. By March 2008, the mobile courts had issued 372,810 substitute birth certificates. By the end of 2008, there were around 3,000 registration sites and approximately 2.8 million people had registered as voters (BAKARR BAH, 2010). Later the CEA has acknowledged in its seventh meeting that as of June 30, 2009, over 6,500,000 people in Côte d Ivoire and abroad had been enrolled as a result of the identification process and voter registration (CEA VII, 2009). On May 14, 2009, Soro announced that elections would be held on November 29, 2009. More than six million voters registered for these, which was postponed once again. On the military side, disarmament has been progressing, albeit slowly. By the end of 2008, 11,769 of the 34,678 profiled Forces Nouvelles combatants had gone through the cantonment exercise. Some FN combatants have been integrated into the security services, but disagreement over salaries and ranks has been slowing the process. Despite the peace, the gains of the Ouagadougou Agreement have been undermined the failure to hold elections. In February 2010, Gbagbo temporarily dissolved the government and the Independent Electoral Commission, which he accused of voter registration fraud. Elections would be held in October of that year (BAKARR BAH, 2010). 2.2. The 2010 elections and its consequences 2.2.1. 2010 elections Presidential elections were held in two rounds in Côte d Ivoire. The first round was held on October 31, 2010, and a second round, in which Laurent Gbagbo faced Alassane Ouattara, was held on November 28 of that year. Although originally scheduled to be held in 2005, the vote had been delayed several times. The national institution in charge of organizing and conducting the elections was the Independent Electoral Commission of Côte d Ivoire. More than 5.7 million Ivoirians registered to vote in 10,179 locations around the country, in 20,073 polling stations manned by 66,000 polling agents. The UNOCI provided technical, logistical and security support to the Government of Côte d Ivoire and to the CEI, including transportation and distribution of national identity and voters cards, transportation of equipment and other electoral materials, and security support. 13

International observers from the European Union, ECOWAS, AU, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the Carter Center, the US and Japan have monitored the voting process along with national observers. Moreover, the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme assisted the Ivoirian government with funding support for the electoral process. 2.2.2. Post-election crisis Côte d Ivoire has been marred in a political crisis since November 28 when the second round of presidential elections closed and the Electoral Commission declared Ouattara winner. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Choi Young-jin, in accordance with his mandate, certified the process and consequently also declared that Ouattara had won the polls. However, the Constitutional Court, the highest national authority on electoral matters, subsequently overturned the Electoral Commission s decision and declared Gbagbo winner. Hence, each candidate claimed victory. Ouattara was recognized as President by a number of States and International Organizations, including the AU and ECOWAS. At the same time, sanctions and asset freeze were imposed on Gbagbo and some of his closest supporters. Armed conflict soon began as Ouattara s supporters engaged in an offensive against government forces. In the economic capital, Abidjan, the situation turned volatile. Gbagbo s camp, among other things, accused France and the United States of America of masterminding a Western plot against him, and called for the withdrawal of UN Operation in Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI). Violence outbreaks quickly spread throughout the country, reaching alarming levels and drawing the international community s attention. It resulted in the military action of UN peacekeepers and French troops. On April 11, 2011, Gbagbo was captured by Ouattara s Republican Forces, after having refused to stand down for the four months subsequent to the result of the presidential elections. Ouattara has now then taken over the country s presidency. According the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, at least 900 deaths have been confirmed in Abidjan and western Côte d Ivoire as a result of the conflict, including retaliatory attacks. It is estimated that 800,000 people have been internally displaced inside Côte d Ivoire, and over 160,000 others have fled to neighboring countries. Liberia has received the majority of Ivoirian refugees (OCHA, 2011). 2.3. Ethnic division The situation in Côte d Ivoire is largely influenced by its domestic affairs, which depend on the ethnic dynamics of the country. The relations between the many different ethnic groups have great influence over the political decisions. 14

2.3.1. The ethnic composition Côte d Ivoire is commonly said to have 60 different ethnic groups, which can be gathered into four major groups with common linguistic and cultural traits: Mandé, Gour, Krou and Kwa (also called Akan). Their distribution over the country can be more or less understood as follows: the north, the savannah, is mainly inhabited by Mandé and Gour, while the south, coastal, is Kwa s and Krou s region. The biggest ethnic group is the Kwa, which corresponds to almost 45% of the Ivoirian population (SKOGSETH, 2006). Almost all Ivoirian ethnic groups are originally animists, which is still the most common religion in the country. However, Christian and Islamist expansions have led to the spread of such beliefs within the country. The northern groups were the most affected by Islamism, while the southern, by Christianity initially only Catholics, with later entry of the Pentecostal congregations. However, animist beliefs are still very strong, sometimes changing some aspects of other religions. It is important to bear in mind that those groups are not exclusive from Côte d Ivoire and that their relations with theirs brothers and sisters in the neighboring countries plays a major role in the regional dynamics, as some of them feel more connected to people of same ethnicity than those of same nationality. The connections between Ivoirian groups and their neighbors can be synthesized by tying the Krou to eastern Liberia; the Kwa to southern Ghana, Togo and Benin; the Mandé to Guinea, northeastern Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Burkina Faso; and the Gour to Mali, Burkina Faso, northern Ghana and northern Togo. Throughout Ivoirian history, migration flows have been reported both within the country and from outside. The neighboring countries have contributed largely to the formation of the Ivoirian people. The immigration of Kwa groups has also been encouraged, and this can partly explain its great participation in the country s population. Foreigners and people from foreign origin correspond to 25% of the Ivoirian population. Europeans and Lebanese have also moved to the country in a large scale, controlling now the private sector and the commerce, respectively (SKOGSETH, 2006). 2.3.2. Ethnic diversity and the political parties The location of the ethnic groups in Côte d Ivoire is of main importance to its political dynamics. A rivalry between northern and southern groups has also been present in the country. However, the southern privileged position, as they hold the administrative cities and the whole coast, is a major advantage for them. The historical conflict between the regions can be easily perceived when analyzing the political parties and its recent 15

developments. The three main parties, PDCI, RDR and FDI, are filled with ethnically based arguments and statements, each one representing different groups. The first Ivoirian political party was the Democratic Party of Côte d Ivoire (PDCI, Parti Démocratique de la Côte d Ivoire). Beginning as an agricultural union, it was one of the main advocates of the nationalist cause during the independence fights. It remained the only party during Houphouët-Boigny s rule, but his death and the succession question provoked a dispute among its supporters. The main leaders, Bédié and Ouattara ended up splitting the party, with the latter creating the RDR. Currently the PDCI represents mainly the Kwa s interests. The current ruling party, the Republican s Rally (RDR, Rassemblement des Républicains) of president Alassane Ouattara, is mainly composed by the northern groups. This represents a major change in the Ivoirian politics, as they have always been marginalized politically, even based on location argumentations. In the 1995 elections, Ouattara had his candidacy deeply damaged through statements on the Ivoirité of his party 2. This initiated a new debate on whether some ethnic groups are more Ivoirian than others and showed the ethnically based rivalry of the parties. Former president Laurent Gbagbo s party is the Ivoirian Popular Front (FDI, Front Populaire Ivoirien), which is mainly supported by Krou groups, especially since the beginning of the current century. The party was clandestinely created in 1982 by Gbagbo and other intellectuals, as a self-styled socialist [opposition] party. (JANE S, 2009, p. 54) FDI and PDCI have often gathered to counter the RDR influence, mainly because of their strategic positions in the country and their interest in politically marginalizing the northern ethnic groups. 2.4. The foreign influence and its recent consequences The former colonial power in Côte d Ivoire, France, played an important role not only in the colonial period, but also after its independence. The presence of French troops in the Ivoirian territory has been steady and increasingly important. The first Ivoirian president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, in many treaties with the French Republic, abdicated much of the Ivoirian army s (Forcés Armés Nationales de Côte d Ivoire, or FANCI) power and duties to the French troops. This resulted in the complete dependence of the armed forces, which cannot handle the country s external security and have troubles concerning the undermining of rebel groups (VAÏSSE, 2003). 2 The other candidate, Henri Konan Bédié, gave great importance in his campaign to the question of whether Ouattara, or other people of Mandé or Gour origin, were sufficiently Ivoirian to rule the country. The results of the elections were positive to PDCI, Bédié s party. (SKOGSETH, 2006) 16

The Ivoirian-French relations have always been extremely cooperative with a clear commercial and political dependence from Côte d Ivoire. However, the rise of Laurent Gbagbo in 2000 led to tensions with France. Gbagbo s regime was always a discomfort to France with recurring serious divergences. However, the Ivoirian regime still highly depended on French troops, which were responsible for the maintenance of stability in the country (JANES, 2009). The worsening of the relations between France and Côte d Ivoire was provoked by the steady disapproval of the French presence and actions by the hard core of Gbagbo s support and its reflections on the Ivoirian posture towards France. This culminated in clashes between the countries in 2004, beginning with an Ivoirian attack to the French military base in Bouaké, followed by the destruction of the Ivoirian Air Force (VAÏSSE, 2003). Following tensions with France, Gbagbo created many conflicts with its African neighbors, mainly Liberia. The Ivorian role in the Liberian civil war following the military coup of 1980 was vital, since the Ivorian government supported some rebel groups against the Liberian regime. This phenomenon persisted in the following decade, as both Ivorian and Liberian presidents incited rebels to undermine each other s regime, with accusations of both governments in multilateral forums (JANES, 2009). This has led to the escalation of political instability in both countries. Being one of the founders of ECOWAS, Côte d Ivoire experienced a period of extreme influence over this francophone organization. Nonetheless, the instabilities in the country have led to the loss of its major role and to the subsequent beginning of interventions in the country by the organization. The ECOWAS intervention in Côte d Ivoire is also very important, since it has become responsible for the supervision of the Ouagadougou Accord s implementation together with France. Their presence is unlikely to be withdrawn soon, though they aim to reduce the number of other foreign troops (VAÏSSE, 2003). 3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION Ever since 2002, when the rebellious military divisions started their national operations to overthrow Gbagbo s government, the United Nations Security Council has taken up the Ivorian conflict for deliberation. In 2003, through resolutions 1464 and 1479 respectively, the Security Council endorsed the results reached by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as well as gave full support to the deployment of ECOWAS and French Army troops, and established the United Nations Mission in Côte d Ivoire (MINUCI, acronym in 17

French) on May 13 (UNSC, 2003a; 2003b). The Council stressed the need for the constitution of a government of national reconciliation, in accordance with the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. On February 27, 2004, upon a request formally made by ECOWAS for the establishment of a peacekeeping mission in Côte d Ivoire, Resolution 1528 created the United Nations Operation in Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI) (UNSC, 2004). Beyond unifying the command of the ECOWAS mission and MINUCI which had limited procedural monitoring and reporting purposes 3, UNOCI assumed tasks of disarmament and demobilization of the rebel forces, monitoring the ceasefire, and maintaining law and order in the country (UNSC, 2004). Later that year, in face of renewed violence, the Council decided to create a committee to impose restraints on movement and to freeze financial assets of individuals understood to be impeding the implementation of the Linas- Marcoussis and Accra III provisions (S/RES/1572). Later, Resolution 1643 (2005) also instituted a ban on the exportation of rough diamonds from Côte d Ivoire to all UN member states (UNSC, 2005). In 2005, after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, the Security Council also started pushing for the proper registration of citizens to set up elections. UNOCI itself was entrusted with supervising this process, through Resolution 1739 (2007) (UNSC, 2007b). Amid the late 2010 post-electoral violence in Côte d Ivoire, both ECOWAS and the African Union suspended the country from its decision-making processes on December 7 and 9, respectively. Moreover, since the start of the factional violence between supporters of Ouattara and Gbagbo, the United Nations Security Council has passed five resolutions regarding the matter, condemning violations of human rights and urging all parts of the conflict to restrain from military action. Resolution 1967 (UNSC, 2011a) authorized the deployment of a further 2,000 troops under UNOCI s command, summing up to 8,650 personnel then already on field (UNSC, 2010). Under the same resolution, police unit personnel were also deployed to tackle threats posed by unarmed crowds (UNSC, 2011a). In order to strengthen UNOCI, resources from UNMIL, the United Nations Mission in (neighboring) Liberia, were channeled to Côte d Ivoire, such as helicopters (UNSC, 2011b). On April 28, 2011, the Security Council renewed a series of travel and financial operation bans on individuals regarded as a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d Ivoire, in particular by blocking the implementation of the peace process, as referred to in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (UNSC, 2011e, p. 3, 10a). 3 MINUCI s mandate did include, however, a small military component complementing the operations carried by ECOWAS and France. 18

4. BLOC POSITIONS Reiterating its firm condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as all violence committed against civilians; welcoming the steps recently taken toward national unification and stabilization in Côte d Ivoire, Bosnia and Herzegovina underlines its full commitment to UNSC Resolution 1980 (2011e). It also stresses the continuation of UNOCI, ECOWAS and AU efforts in assisting the Ivorian people in their way back to self determination. Brazil strongly condemns all threats and harms against civilians, regardless of its origin. Brazil s urges for the UNOCI s impartial authority to be respected by all parties in Côte d Ivoire, as means to being able to resume its mandate to protect civilians in an environment free of threats, attacks or movement limitations. Brazil continues to strongly support a political process that promotes a negotiated settlement to the crisis, while upholding the will of the Ivorian people, as reflected in the recent elections. Brazil strongly supports the efforts by the African Union and other regional actors in this regard. The People s Republic of China sees Côte d Ivoire as an important partner and seeks the safety and the well being of its citizens. The results of the 2010 elections, as the African Union announced them, were accepted by China and, therefore, its representatives to the UNSC approved Resolution 1975 (UNSC, 2011c). For China, it is vital that the African countries and organizations have their right to act in the solution of the conflict preserved. Thus, the country believes the ECOWAS and African Union s positions shall be respected and their participation shall be supported. Colombia reiterates its full accordance to UNSC Resolution 1980 (2011e) and the advancing steps taken by the Ivoirians toward national reunification and stabilization. Welcoming President Alassane Ouattara election accordingly to the Ivoirian Constitution, it stresses the continuity of UNOCI peacekeeping mission, and the consultation and arbitrage efforts assumed by ECOWAS and AU as assistant measures to the empowerment of Ivoirian people, as means to their sovereignty, independence and self determination. France has played a major role in Côte d Ivoire, as the country is a former French colony and the countries still hold close ties. However, the past few years have witnessed a perceptible deterioration of the bilateral relations, especially after the incidents of 2004. Furthermore, under the presidency of Gbagbo, the opposition to French military presence in the country started to become more exacerbated (JANE S 2009). France has supported Ouattara as the elected president of Côte d Ivoire and condemned the actions taken by Gbagbo both in the political and the military fields. The French government welcomed UN s initiatives and UNSC s resolutions on the matter, and, in the beginning of 2011, it 19