Session10 Raz, Authorityand Justification It shelpfultostartbycontrastingraz saccountofpoliticalobligationwithdworkin s. Dworkinarguedthattheobligationtoobeythelaw,likeobligationsarisingoutoffamily relationsorfriendships,isanassociativeobligation.thisgivestheobligationcertain features: Theobligationisgeneral applyingtoanymemberoftheassociation. Theobligationgivesrisetoanindependentreasontoperformthemandatedact,to beaddedintothebalanceofreasons. Otherassociativeobligationsarguablyhavethesequalities:friendships,forexample, generateobligationsforallmembersofthefriendship,andthereasonstheygenerateare reasonstobeaddedtothebalanceofreasons.examples:imayhaveareasontotellalieif doingthatwillprotectmyfriend(althoughitmaybeoutweighedbyotherreasons). Butwemightworrythatpoliticalcommunitieslacksomeofthefeaturesthatallowmore intimateassociationstogiverisetosuchreasons/obligations: First,family relationsandfriendships,iftheygiverisetoobligations,seemtodoso becausesuchassociationsarenon instrumentallyvaluable valuablefortheirown sake.thatis,theymakeupasignificantpartofwhatmakesourlivesworthliving. Second,loyaltyisconstitutiveofthesemoreintimateassociations thevalueof,say, friendshipgivesusreasonstoactinwaysthatareexpressiveofloyaltyandconcern (asopposedto,forexample,reasonstomakemorefriendship). Thesetwofeaturesofmoreintimateassociationshaveconsequencesforthenature oftheobligations/reasonsforactiontheygiveriseto: Thoseobligationsarebindingonusevenwhennotfulfillingthemwouldgo undiscovered; Thoseobligationsmightsometimesgiveusreasontoperformactionsthatwould bringthevaluablerelationtoanend(ifthisiswhatloyaltyrequires)! (Examples ) Becausethevalueoffriendshipsandfamily relationsis(arguably)noninstrumental,andindependentofanyroletheyplayinhelpingmecomplywith myotherreasons,suchrelationsgeneratereasonsthatareindependentofour otherreasonsforaction,andweighagainstthemwhentheyconflict. Butdothesefeaturesalsocharacterizepoliticalobligations? ConsiderthefugitiveslavelawspassedaspartoftheCompromiseof1850,requiring allcitizenstoaidintheapprehensionofrunawayslaves.(settingasidetheriskof punishment)didthislawprovideanymoralreason evenonethatcanbe outweighedbyotherconsiderations fordoingasitrequired? 1
Whatmakespoliticalassociationsvaluable?Arethey,likefriendships,non instrumentallyvaluable?andisloyaltyconstitutiveofthatvalue? Itcertainlyseemslessplausiblethatmembershipinapoliticalcommunityisin itselfasignificantelementofwhatmakeslifeworthliving. Andthevalueofsuchmembershipseemsmuchmoreabletosurvive undiscoveredbreachesofobligationthanthevalueofafriendship,suggesting thatloyaltyisnotconstitutiveofthatvalue.(relatedly:couldweeverbe requiredbypoliticalobligationtodosomethingthatwouldbringthepolitical associationtoanend?) Itseemslikethevaluewegetoutofmembershipinpoliticalassociationsis different:suchassociationsareinstrumentallyvaluable.membershipinapolitical communityisnotitself initsownright anessentialelementofagoodlife,but suchmembershipcanhelpussecuremanygoodsthatareessentialtolivingwell: health,security,etc. Ifthisisright,thenpoliticalobligationisnotprimarilyanobligationtoactoutof loyalty;ratheritisadutythatderivesfromthedutytopursuethosegoodswhich politicalassociationsareinstrumentalinattaining. Thissuggeststhatpoliticalobligationshaveinonewayamorelimitedscope than,say,obligationsoffriendship:unlikethecaseofobligationsoffriendship, theobligationmaynotbindustoobeyincircumstanceswheredisobedience wouldbeundiscovered,andwouldnotunderminetheabilityoftheassociation tofulfillitsinstrumentalrole(e.g.,thestop signinthedesert). Andunlikethecaseofobligationsoffriendship,politicalobligationcouldnever requireustoundertakeactsthatwouldresultinthedissolutionofthe association. Andfinally,andmostimportantlyforourpresentpurposes,thissuggeststhat politicalobligations,unlikeobligationsoffriendship,donotgeneratereasons thatareindependentofourothermoralreasons,tobeweighedintothebalance ofreasons.rather,atleastinthecaseoflegitimateauthorities,reflectand replacethoseotherreasons. This,ofcourse,isRaz sview. Razdefendsaserviceconceptionoflegitimateauthority,accordingtowhichtheprimary functionofgovernmentisto help[thegoverned]actonthereasonswhichbindthem. (p. 21) Thatis,incontrasttoDworkin,Razseesthevalueofmembershipinapoliticalcommunity asinstrumental. This,asRazargues,hasimportantconsequencesforthenatureofthereasonsforaction authoritativedirectives(andpoliticalobligation)cangiveus. 2
Raz sthreetheses TheNormalJustificationThesis [T]henormalwaytoestablishthatapersonshouldbeacknowledgetohave authorityoveranotherpersoninvolvesshowingthattheallegedsubjectis likelybettertocomplywithreasonswhichapplytohim(otherthanthe allegedauthoritativedirectives)ifheacceptsthedirectivesofthealleged authorityasauthoritativelybindingandtriestofollowthem,ratherthanby tryingtofollowthereasonswhichapplytohimdirectly.(pp.19 20) TheDependenceThesis Allauthoritativedirectivesshouldbebased,inthemain,onreasonswhich alreadyindependentlyapplytothesubjectsofthedirectivesandarerelevant totheiractioninthecircumstancescoveredbythedirective.(p.14) AsRaznotes,theDependenceandNormalJustificationThesesaremutuallyreinforcing: Ifthenormalandprimarywayofjustifyingthelegitimacyofanauthorityis thatitismorelikelytoactsuccessfullyonthereasonswhichapplytoits subjectsthenitishardtoresistthedependencethesis.itmerelyclaimsthat authoritiesshoulddowhattheywereappointedtodo.conversely,ifthe dependence 1 thesisisaccepted,thenthecaseforthenormaljustification thesisbecomesverystrong.itmerelystatesthatthenormalandprimary justificationofanyauthorityhastoestablishthatitisqualifiedtofollowwith somedegreeofsuccessthemoralprinciplewhichshouldgovernthe decisionsofallauthorities.(pp.20 21) ThePreemptionThesis Thefactthatanauthorityrequiresperformanceofanactionisareasonfor itsperformancewhichisnottobeaddedtoallotherrelevantreasonswhen assessingwhattodo,butshouldexcludeandtaketheplaceofsomeofthem. (p.13) ThePreemptionThesisrejectswhatDworkinasserts:thatthereasonforactionprovided bytheobligationtoobeythelawisareasontobeaddedintothebalanceofourother reasonswhenwedecidewhattodo. AsRazagainargues,thePreemptionThesisseemstofollowfromtheNormalJustification anddependencetheses. HereitsworthstoppingtoconsiderthecomplexstructureRazthinksreasonshave(which hedoesnotdefendexplicitlyinthispaper). 1 Razwrites independence,butthismust,ofcourse,beatypo. 3
RazonReasons Wecommonlyspeakof thebalanceofreasons,andtalkasifalldecisionscanbe madebysimplyweighingalltherelevantreasonsagainsteachother,andseeing whichwaythe balanceofreasons tips. Thissuggeststhatallreasonshavethesameunits,so to speak:thattheymayallbe weighedagainsteachother. ButRazargues(elsewhere)thatreasonsdon thavesuchasimple,one tiered structure:thesimpleaccountfailstoexplainourreactionstoseveralimportant kindsofdecisionspeoplemake.rather,differentkindsofreasonsoperateat differentlevels. Example:Instructionstoachild:parents reactionwhenchildrenactagainstour instructionsbutdotherightthingonthebalanceofreasons theydidrightinone way,andwronginanother.parentsintendedtheirinstructionsnottobetakenas simplyanotherreasontobeweighedintothebalance,butrathertoreflectthose reasons,andreplacedirectconsiderationoftheminthechild sreasoningabout whattodo. So,reasonsaren tallofakind.theordinaryreasons(e.g.,theonesthatapplyto thechildindependentlyoftheparentsinstruction)areadequatelyrepresented bythebalancemetaphor Razcallsthese firstorderreasons. Butthereasongeneratedbytheparents instructionsisa second orderreason (Razdefinesthisas anyreasontoactforareasonorrefrainfromactingfora reason).theinstructionsareanexampleofthelatter areasontorefrainfrom actionforotherreasons whatrazcallsan exclusionaryreason. o Thereareotherexamplesofexclusionaryreasons:Razthinks authoritativedirectives,advice,decisions,rules,andpromises,for example,canallactasexclusionaryreasons.(let sthinkofsome examples ) Unlikefirst orderreasons,exclusionaryreasonsarenottobeweighedintothe balanceofreasonswhendeterminingwhattodo,butserverathertoreplaceall orsomeofthefirst orderreasonsthatformthebalanceofreasons. Backtoauthoritativedirectives Theexampleoftheparents instructionstothechildisofcourseanexampleofan authoritativedirective.thinkingaboutitmorecarefullywillillustratehowraz s threethesesoperateinconcert: Theparentsarelegitimateauthoritiesfortheirchildbecauseheismorelikelyto complywiththereasonsthatapplytohimindependentlyifhefollowstheir instructionsthatifheactsonhisownassessmentofhisreasons(njt). Theyshapetheirinstructionstoreflectthereasonsthatapplytothechild independently(dt). Andtheywanttheirchildtoaccepttheirinstructionsasthefinalwordonthe questionofwhetheranactionistobeperformed,replacinghisownconclusions 4
onthebalanceofreasons,ratherthanasanadditionalreasonweighingagainst theperformanceoftheactioninquestion.(pt) o Thinkingaboutthefunctiontheinstructionsaresupposedtoservemakes itclearwhythereasontheygenerateshouldpreempt(someof)the child sotherreasons: (i) Ifthechildcountedtheinstructionsassimplyanotherreason (to,say,notopenthedoortostrangers),tobeaddedtohis otherfirst orderreasons,he dbedouble countingsomeof thosereasons. (ii) Ifthechildcountedtheinstructionsassimplyanotherreason tobeaddedtohisotherfirst orderreasons,theinstructions couldn tservethefunctiontheyweredesignedtoserve:to improve,asmuchaspossible,thechild soddsofcomplying withhisreasons(considerraz s financialexpert examplein thepaperweread). Razthinkstheexampleofthechildreflectstheroleauthoritativedirectivesshould generallyplayinourlives.ifsuchdirectivescanbejustifiedalongthelinesofthe NJT,thentheygenerateanobligationtoobey.Buttheobligationislimitedina numberofways: Wehavenoreasontoobeyalawwhenitclearlyfailstoreflectthebalanceof independentreasons(e.g.,fugitiveslavelaws,stopsignindesert). Wemayhavenoreasontoobeythelawincircumstancesinwhichunexpected first orderreasonsthelawclearlycouldnothaveforseenarepresent. (Examples?) Thereasontoobeymaybeoutweighedbythepresenceofotherreasonsthelaw wasnotintendedtoreflect(afterall,itpreemptsconsiderationonlyofthose reasonsonwhichitdepends).(examples?) Theobligationtoobeythatis,onRaz sview,generatedbylegitimate authoritativedirectivesmustbeverycheckerboardinnature,sincewhether allowingthelaw,ratherthanourownassessmentofthereasons,toguideour actionisgoingtoimproveourchancesofcomplyingwiththemwillvaryfrom lawtolaw,frompersontoperson,andperhapseven(asthedesertcasemakes clear)fromsituationtosituation. Questions: CanRaz saccountoftheobligationtoobeythelaw,givenitslimitednature,really justifytheuseofforcebythestatetoensureobedience? Hereitmaybehelpfultoconsidertherolethelawplaysinsolvingcoordination problemsandprisoner sdilemmas,whichmightexpandthenumberofsituationsin whichobeyingthelawwillbethebestwayofcomplyingwithourindependent reasons 5
Evenwhenthelawdoeshelpuscomplywithourreasons,whythinkthisjustifiesthe state sforcingustocomply?afterall,thestateisn tgenerallyjustifiedinforcingusto dowhatwehavemostreasontodo. DoesRaz saccountdotoolittletodistinguishpracticalfromtheoreticalauthorities? Doesitimplausiblysuggestthatthegovernmentisbestseenasinthebusinessof givingadvice? IsRazrightthathisaccountoflegitimateauthoritydoesnotcommithimtotheNo DifferenceThesis?Whencanthelaw,onRaz saccount,makeadifferentinwhatwe maydo? Razsuggestsfourwayslawsmightmakeadifference: (i) theauthoritiesmayalsoactonadditional,non dependentreasons(e.g. reasonsofbureaucraticefficiency) (ii) thefirst orderreasonsmaynotuniquelydeterminewhatweoughttodo, andlawmaybreachtheimpass(e.g.ruleoftheroad,precisespeedlimits) (iii) thelawmayestablishandsustainvaluableconventions(again,ruleofthe roadisaclearexample) (iv) thelawmayhelpbreakprisoner sdilemmas(e.g.votinglawinaustralia) IsRazrightthatthenormalwayofjustifyingauthority thewayofjustifyingitshapes ourunderstandingoftheroleofauthority istopointtoitsbeneficialeffects,rather than,say,tothemannerinwhichitwasadopted(it s pedigree,toborrowdworkin s term)?don twesometimesconsideranauthoritylegitimateifitwasdemocratically elected,evenwhenwethinkit slawswon thelpusconformtoourreasons? Inthiscontext,itmaybehelpfultothinkaboutsomeofthe deviant or secondary justificationsforauthoritythatrazconsiders:perhapspedigreebasedjustificationsare secondary inraz ssense??(i.e.,theyhaveforceonly becausedemocraticpedigreemakesanauthoritymorelikelytomeetthe conditionsestablishedbythenjt?) 6
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