PRESIDENT TRUMP DISAVOWS THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

Similar documents
6 Possible Iran Deal Scenarios

Five Things to Watch Out for with Iran Deal Decertification

Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement

Security Council (SC)

Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement

[ ] Restoring U.S. Credibility Returning to the Iran Nuclear Agreement

The Mirage of Renegotiating the Iran Deal

Nuclear Energy and Proliferation in the Middle East Robert Einhorn

Strategic Folly in the Framework Agreement with Iran

How to Prevent an Iranian Bomb

Brexit: A Negotiation Update. Testimony by Dr. Thomas Wright Director, Center for the U.S. and Europe, and Senior Fellow The Brookings Institution

The veiled threats against Iran

On the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Its Consequences

Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy 02/12/2005

The United States and Russia in the Greater Middle East

Remarks by High Representative/Vice- President Federica Mogherini at the press briefing during her visit to Washington D.C.

Report. Iran's Foreign Policy Following the Nuclear Argreement and the Advent of Trump: Priorities and Future Directions.

US Mid-Terms: Possible Repercussions

Summary of Policy Recommendations

Conflict on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea and the Nuclear Threat Student Readings. North Korean soldiers look south across the DMZ.

THE EU AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL: HOW TO PROCEED?

Iran Oil Focus in Foreign Response to Trump

Iranian Nuclear Deal and Its Aftermath

Implementation of the JCPOA: Risks and Challenges Ahead

Reasons Trump Breaks Nuclear-Sanction Agreement with Iran. Declares Trade War with China and Meets with North Korea. James Petras

18. Whether Multilateralism Is Better or Worse than Unilateralism Is, Well, Situation-Dependent

BBC World Service Poll Shows Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Cause Concern, But People Want a Negotiated Settlement

Foreign Policy Insight. July 29, 2015 Issue 19

Chapter 6 Foreign Aid

Iran and Russia Sanctions Pass U.S. Senate

United States Policy on Iraqi Aggression Resolution. October 1, House Joint Resolution 658

U.S.-Japan Opinion Survey 2017

Next Steps on the JCPOA Richard Nephew

2017 National Opinion Ballot

Montessori Model United Nations. Distr.: Middle School Thirteenth Session Sept First Committee Disarmament and International Security

A New US Persian Gulf Strategy?

Iranian Public Opinion After the Protests

2015 Biennial American Survey May, Questionnaire - The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2015 Public Opinion Survey Questionnaire

Valid from 28 th January 2019

Non-Proliferation and the Challenge of Compliance

Relations between the EU and Iran are currently at a low

COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) /... of

The Middle East and Russia: American attitudes on Trump s foreign policy

CRS Report for Congress

Two Global Leaders with Very Different Global Perceptions

Remarks by High Representative/Vice- President Federica Mogherini at the press. conference following the Foreign Affairs Council

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2016: PROFILE OF SENATOR BERNIE SANDERS

IPS Survey of Iranian Public Opinion on its Nuclear Program, Recognition of Israel, Relations with the US, and the Removal of Sanctions

Scope of Research and Methodology. National survey conducted November 8, Florida statewide survey conducted November 8, 2016

Joint Statement between Japan and the State of Kuwait on Promoting and Expanding Cooperation under the Comprehensive Partnership

Closed for Repairs? Rebuilding the Transatlantic Bridge. by Richard Cohen

National Security Policy. National Security Policy. Begs four questions: safeguarding America s national interests from external and internal threats

Discussion paper Christian-Peter Hanelt and Almut Möller

Understanding and Assessing the New US Sanctions Legislation Against Russia

United Nations General Assembly 1st

Domestic policy WWI. Foreign Policy. Balance of Power

The Middle East and Russia: American attitudes on Trump s foreign policy

29 th ISODARCO Winter Course Nuclear Governance in a Changing World

Overview of Prevailing Conditions Surge of geopolitical developments across the Middle East Brisk Concurrent Unsolved and kinetic Dysfunction of tradi

H. RES. ll. Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to United States policy towards Yemen, and for other purposes.

IPIS & Aleksanteri Institute Roundtable 11 April 2016 IPIS Tehran, Iran

GR132 Non-proliferation: current lessons from Iran and North Korea

S To ensure the compliance of Iran with agreements relating to Iran s nuclear program. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

The failure of logic in the US Israeli Iranian escalation

Name: Adv: Period: Cycle 5 Week 1 Day 1 Notes: Relations between the US and Russia from 1991 Today

AS DELIVERED. EU Statement by

NATIONAL YOUTH MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2018

Russian and Western Engagement in the Broader Middle East

Report of the 10th International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Conference. Astana, Kazakhstan, August 2017

Security Council. The situation in the Korean peninsula. Kaan Özdemir & Kardelen Hiçdönmez

The College of Behavioral and Social Sciences

G l o b a l V a n t a g e M a y

Finding the Sweet Spot: Can the Iran Nuclear Deal Be Saved? GLOBAL SECURITY POLICY BRIEF

The EU in the Asia-Pacific: Crisis Management Roles?

Prospects for U.S. Russian relationship during D. Trump s presidency (pre)viewed through the prism of the two countries vital national interests.

The referral of the alleged misuse of the Iranian nuclear programme for non-civilian purposes from the IAEA to the UN Security Council

THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS. US HISTORY Chapter 15 Section 2

Working Together as a Global Company

Germany and the Middle East

Iranian Public Attitudes toward Iran s Nuclear Program

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN THE BEGINNING OF A NEW STAGE OF POLITICAL TURBULENCE LEVAN ASATIANI

Overview East Asia in 2006

The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East - A longstanding partnership

Nuclear Negotiations with Iran

Introduction to the Cold War

U.S.- Gulf Cooperation Council Camp David Joint Statement

EUROPE AND AMERICA: LOSING THEIR BEARINGS?

CRS Report for Congress

Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament

Progressive Policymaking in a Changing Region:

RT HON SIR ALAN DUNCAN MP

Australia and Japan Cooperating for peace and stability Common Vision and Objectives

Position Papers. The Iran Nuclear Deal:

The 25 years since the end of the Cold War have seen several notable

Americans on Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Program. Sample Size: 727 MoE includes design effect of

Reactions to Britain s decision to ban Hezbollah. Main reactions

2. The State Department asked the American Embassy in Moscow to explain Soviet behavior.

NATO and the United States

Puzzling US Policy on North Korea

Is This the Right Time for NATO to Resume Dialogue with Russia?

Transcription:

PRESIDENT TRUMP DISAVOWS THE IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL AJC.org /AJCGlobal @AJCGlobal

President Trump s Announcement President Trump on Friday (10/13) announced his intention not to certify Iran s compliance with the nuclear deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reached between the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) and Iran in July 2015. But the President stopped short of unraveling it. We will not continue down a path whose predictable conclusion is more violence, more terror, and the very real threat of Iran s nuclear breakout, the President declared in a televised speech from the White House. He said he would ask Congress to establish trigger points, which could prompt the U.S. to reimpose sanctions on Iran if it crosses certain behavioral or threat thresholds. In the event we are not able to reach a solution working with Congress and our allies, then the agreement will be terminated, he warned. The President accused the Iranian regime of sponsoring terrorism; developing, deploying and proliferating missiles; threatening American troops and allies; threatening freedom of navigation in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea; fomenting civil wars in Iraq, Yemen and Syria; and violating the human rights of its own citizens. He also charged that Iran is committing multiple violations of the agreement, and not living up to the spirit of the deal. The immediate consequence of the President s announcement is not that sanctions snap back into effect. Rather, it s that the issue gets kicked back to Congress giving the latter a 60-day window to reimpose Iran sanctions suspended by the nuclear deal using a special, expedited process. What Is Decertification? The JCPOA does not require the American President to certify that Iran is complying with the deal s terms. That requirement is a matter of U.S. law, called the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), which was enacted in May 2015 to give Congress oversight over an Obama administration agreement. INARA requires the President to publicly certify every 90 days that Iran is in technical compliance with the deal and that suspension of sanctions is vital to the national security interests of the United States. The latest INARA deadline was October 15, which is the reason President Trump made his decertification announcement on Friday.

The decertification won t automatically nullify the deal. If the U.S. doesn t impose new sanctions, it s not technically in violation of its obligations under the agreement. Enacting new legislation would require a simple majority in both the House and Senate, and given the Republican control of both chambers that seems possible. However, congressional leaders have expressed reservations about reimposing sanctions that could instigate another major international crisis (in addition to the North Korean crisis), and divert Congress from other legislative priorities. The administration could have chosen to kill the deal on its own, without Congress s help. Every 120 days, the administration issues waivers to keep old sanctions from being reimposed. Skipping that step, the administration could have restarted sanctions unilaterally next January. However, the President chose not to do that. Instead, he has taken what has been portrayed as a middle ground between his own position in favor of withdrawing from the agreement completely, and that of congressional leaders and senior administration officials, who said the deal is worth preserving with changes if possible. International Reaction International reaction to President Trump s announcement was prompt. We encourage the U.S. administration and Congress to consider the implications to the security of the U.S. and its allies before taking any steps that might undermine the JCPOA, such as reimposing sanctions on Iran lifted under the agreement, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Theresa May said in a joint statement. In Brussels, Federica Mogherini, the EU foreign policy chief, said the Iran deal is an international agreement and it is not up to any single country to terminate it. She added: It is not a bilateral agreement, it does not belong to any single country. The President of the United States has many powers, but not this one. Russia said President Trump had no basis for disavowing the deal. Iran is abiding by the nuclear agreement, said Mikhail Ulyanov, a director at the Russian foreign ministry. Everyone agrees with that. And an attempt to somehow heighten the tensions in this situation looks like unmotivated aggression.

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres very much hopes the nuclear deal with Iran can be salvaged, his spokesman said. The spokesman further said that Guterres considers the deal to be a very important breakthrough to consolidate nuclear non-proliferation and advance global peace and security. Also reacting to Trump s speech, Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the UN watchdog tasked with overseeing compliance), said that Iran was under the world s most robust nuclear verification regime. The nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran under the JCOPA are being implemented, he said. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani denounced President Trump and called the United States an outlier that had become more lonely than ever in the international community. The statements of Mr. Trump are nothing but abuse and threats against the people of Iran, he said. An international agreement cannot be disregarded. Rouhani made it clear that he would not renegotiate the terms of the deal. Israel praised President Trump s announcement, and so did Saudi Arabia. President Trump has just created an opportunity to fix this bad deal, to roll back Iran s aggression and to confront its criminal support of terrorism, Prime Minister Netanyahu said in a statement. Meanwhile, other Israeli personalities, including former Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, have said that the nuclear deal, however bad it is, remains our best chance to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Given the highly critical reactions from the P5+1 partners and other international actors, it is apparent that reinstating the pre-jcpoa international sanctions regime would be extremely difficult. What Next? White House officials said that decertification was not meant to simply push Congress to reimpose sanctions against Iran. The goal, they said, was to lay the groundwork for legislation that would define what would provoke the U.S. to reimpose sanctions. In his speech, the President alluded to three such triggers: the deployment of international ballistic missiles by Iran, Iran s refusal to negotiate the extension of the deal beyond the deadlines stipulated in it, and evidence that Iran could manufacture a nuclear weapon in less than 12 months.

But even if Congress were to enact such legislation (which is by no means certain), the question would still remain whether the other P5+1 members (especially the three EU members among them), and key industrialized nations such as Japan, Korea, Canada and Australia, would go along with such a strategy. The joint statement issued by Germany, France and the UK, and the tough comments made by the EU foreign policy chief Mogherini, raise serious doubts about the willingness of key U.S. allies to do so. The other P5+1 members, Russia and China, would almost certainly not cooperate. As for Iran, it has stated that it would not agree to re-negotiate the JCPOA. Proponents of resumed sanctions argue that even countries that appear to reject the U.S. administration s strategy will most likely reconsider their position when they realize that they have to choose between doing business with Iran (with a GDP of $412.2 billion) and with the U.S. ($18.57 trillion). Skeptics point out that such tactics might backfire, as foreign countries might take measures to protect their companies against U.S. sanctions, and/or take counter-measures to penalize U.S. companies. If Congress does not act and the President, consistent with his warning, terminates the deal, the U.S. will be in violation of the JCPOA. This could strain relations with America s allies and isolate the U.S. diplomatically. Under such conditions, it would be extremely difficult to persuade even America s closest allies to reinstate the international sanctions regime. The prospect of U.S. exit from JCPOA followed by its imposition of potent extraterritorial sanctions in the form of secondary and tertiary boycotts against foreign companies doing business with Iran, sanctions that would rely on the powerful tools inherent in the central American role in the global financial system, could theoretically persuade other world powers to join forces with Washington and heighten pressure on Iran; in this scenario, the world would stand united against the Iranian threat, and would be in a strong position to demand Tehran modify its behavior and accede to new constraints on its nuclear program. Alternatively, critics have pointed out that such U.S. action could prompt a global trade war. Some analysts have suggested that if Iran were to respond to an unraveling JCPOA by withdrawing from the deal and resuming its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. could face the dire choice between taking military action against Iran and acquiescing to Iran s nuclear ambitions.

AJC s Position Following are excerpts from a press release issued by AJC after the President s announcement: For AJC, the heart of the matter is addressing key issues that have long troubled us because they were not adequately covered, if at all, by the original agreement, and that led in the first place to our decision to oppose it in 2015, specifically: (a) Iran s ballistic missile development, which continues aggressively and menacingly; (b) the sunset clause in the JCPOA, which means a pathway to the nuclear bomb no later than 2030, if not sooner; and (c) the weaknesses in the inspection regime because Iranian military sites are totally off-limits. In addition, it is abundantly clear, or at least should be, that those supporters of the JCPOA who argued that the agreement would moderate Iranian behavior were flat wrong in their prediction. To the contrary, Iran has only become still more emboldened in its destabilizing activities in the region from Syria to Iraq, from Lebanon to Yemen, from Bahrain to Gaza. Nor has its abysmal human rights record in any way abated. At this point in time, whatever earlier views were, it is absolutely essential that the Administration, Congress, and our key allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia work as collaboratively as possible on the Iran threat. This is not, nor must it be allowed to become, about partisanship, legacy, or, as the Germans say, schadenfreude. Rather, it is about grappling with one of the most complex and high-stakes issues in the world today, and seeking to ensure that Iran does not flaunt the spirit of the JCPOA, clandestinely work around it, drive a wedge among allies, or, exploiting the flaws in the original deal, simply follow the long-term glide path to nuclear status that it was essentially given in 2015.