CHAPTER III JINNAH'S EFFORTS AT HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY FROM A NON-CONGRESS MUSLIM SHORE

CHAPTER III JINNAH'S EFFORTS AT HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY FROM A NON-CONGRESS MUSLIM SHORE

CHAPTER III JINNAH'S EFFORTS AT HINDU-MUSLIM UNITY FROM A NON-CONGRESS MUSLIM SHORE The Rowlatt Bill The course of the World War I was marked by widespread unrest and revolutionary activities in different parts of the country. The Government of India introduced the Defence of India Act in 1915. This conferred on the government vast powers which allowed it to arrest, detain, intern or expel any Indian without trial, warrant or stated cause. In the beginning, Jinnah believed that such harsh measures were necessary to deal with the extremist activities for he considered that those who resort to such activities as 'misguided'. 1 It was expected that the rights and legal safeguards which were suspended during the war, would be restored, but things turned out to be otherwise. Notwithstanding the Indian opposition, the Government of India appointed a sedition committee under king's Bench Justice Sir Sidney Rowlatt to investigate and report on the nature and extent of criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movement in India and suggest the legislative measures to deal with them. 2 The committee recommended immediate extension of the Criminal Law 89

(Emergency Powers) Act for at least six months. It recommended, among other things, that the government be given power to restrict the movement of offenders for a period of two years after their release from custody, and they should be prevented from addressing public meetings. It also called for the provision of trial by a commission of three High Court judges, without the benefit of juries, committal proceedings or right of appeal. 3 The committee also recommended to give the government powers to restrict the movement and residence of the suspected offenders, and demand security from them. 4 The most obnoxious recommendation, however, was that the subjects detained under the Defence of India Act were to be brought under the new provisions without notice. 5 The Bill, which came to be known as the Black or Rowlatt Act' gave rise to a great deal of controversy and the majority of Indians opposed it. Jinnah warned that "this was a wrong remedy for the disease, the revolutionary crimes... There was no precedent or parallel in the legal history of any civilized country to the enactment of such laws... If these measures were passed they will create unprecedented discontent, agitation and will have the most disastrous effect upon relations between the Government and the people. 6 In spite of the unanimous opposition of twenty - two members on the 90

council, the repugnant Act was passed into law in March 1919. Jinnah wrote to Chelmsford a few days later that the government "have ruthlessly trampled upon the principles for which Great Britain avowedly fought the war," and that " the fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State, by an overfretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion. 7 Having found that "I can be of no use to my people in the council" and that it was impossible to have co-operation with a government that showed utter disregard for the opinion of the representatives of the people, Jinnah offered his resignation to the Viceroy. 8 Jinnah who saw the prospective reforms as a springboard to national leadership found to his dismay that the Rowlatt Act dashed all his hopes. It opened the floodgates of agitation, sidelined a constitutionalist like Jinnah, and brought the advocates of agitation to the forefront of Indian politics. Gandhi, who responded to the Black Act by asking the people of India to suspend business on April 6 and observe the day as one of fasting and prayer, stole the show. It marked 91

Gandhi's sudden ascendance in the Indian political horizon. It marked a new era in Indian politics: the Gandhian era. Jinnah's opposition to the Rowlatt Act did not end with his resignation from the Legislative Council. Jinnah joined Gandhi when the latter organised protest marches all over India on 28 March and 6 April. 9 Gandhi, it must be noted, had not been seen previously as an opponent of the Raj, and had actively recruited for the British during the war. Gandhiji wanted Jinnah to make an emphatic declaration regarding recruitment and suggested to Jinnah that support to the recruiting programme would bring political reforms for India : "Seek ye first the Recruiting Office and everything will be added unto you... What I ask for is an emphatic declaration, not a halting one." 10 His views underwent a sea-change with the introduction of the Rowlat Act, and he held that, "our reforms will be practically worthless, if we cannot repeal Rowlat agitations. 11 Gandhi now began to concentrate his whole attention to this issue. Jinnah's activities during this period irritated the British so much so that Lloyd went to the extent of describing Jinnah as "one of the worst characters; attractive to meet, fair of speech, but absolutely dishonest in every way... the one who has consistently said one thing and gone straight away and done the other." 12 92

Gandhiji's protest against the Act was based on "humility and prayer", a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience which he successfully carried out in South Africa. The danger lay in involving in the campaign millions of untutored superstitious people. It only helped to awaken their passions he feared most. In Amritsar two of Gandhiji's lieutenants had been arrested which led to a protest march towards the British commissioner s bungalow in the cantonment. Soldiers opened fire at the crowd, killing a few of them and forcing the crowd to retaliate. They broke all bounds, and brutal acts of destruction followed. Military authorities, under the leadership of Brigadier Dyer, took charge of Amritsar and proclamations were issued giving warnings of "dire consequences if meetings were held or processions taken out and violence indulged in." A peaceful protest against the prohibition held in Amritsar led to the notorious Jallian Wallah Bagh massacre in which Dyer and his men massacred many innocent men and women who assembled there. the irony of it all was that "while the Government in England was announcing its intentions to train Indians for self- government through political reforms, its agents in India were actually giving Indians lessons in frightfulness to develop qualities of servility, cowardice, hypocrisy and psychophancy." 13 Pubjab, under martial law, returned to 93

comparative calm, and the reaction to the event outside Punjab was restricted by lack of information forthcoming from within the Punjab. Jinnah condemned the actions of Dyer in no uncertain terms, though the main thrust of his actions lay in the work relating to the Rowlatt Act. In spite of all this Jinnah had faith in British justice, and he pinned his hopes on Montagu. 14 On the other hand he had no positive opinion on Lord Chelmsford and his administration, and he said that "the sooner he is recalled the better for all concerned.'' 15 The Montague- Chelmsford Reforms Jinnah's mind now turned from the Rowlatt Act to the impending Reforms Bill. On 20 th August 1917 the British government made the following historic announcement: "The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self- governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire... I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by 94

successive stages. The British government and the government of India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples, must be the judges of the time and measure of each advance, and they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred and by the extent to which it is found that the confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility. 16 The British government's announcement was a reflection of the increasing Indian desire for political reform and Montague opined that in considering the Indian aspirations their consciousness that war was principally a struggle for nation's liberty and rights should not be overlooked. With a view to preparing the reform proposals, Montague visited India and met Indian leaders including Jinnah. Jinnah had appealed to the Secretary of State and Viceroy to take into consideration the various provisions laid out in the Lucknow Pact while preparing the reforms proposals. 17 When the reforms were finally announced, they did not contain anything for which to be grateful. 18 The emphasis was for a devolution 95

of power to the provinces. The system, which came to be known as Dyarchy, entrusted certain departments to Indian hands. Such departments as defence, finance and the home department were to be left in official hands. The executive power, however, remained with the government. Generally speaking, Jinnah, in spite of his objections to certain aspects of the reforms, was of the view that dyarchy was the only way out of the problem of transfer of power in India, and he believed that it would succeed. On the other hand, as far as the Central legislature was concerned, lack of reforms disappointed him. While there was transfer of power in the provinces, there were no like changes in the Government of India. Jinnah's objections in this regard is understandable. It was detrimental to a national level politician like him. Apart from this personal aspect, he was opposed to any reform which augmented provincialism in Indian politics. In spite of all this, he was ready to work them with a view to forming a united opposition to democratically force the government of India to make concessions. 19 Gandhi, who earlier remarked that the reforms were worthless in the face of Rowlatt Act, and that they did not mark a change of heart but they were only a method of further draining India of her wealth and of prolonging servitude," 20 agreed by the end of 1919 to Jinnah's stand for working the reforms. 96

When the reforms were on the anvil, there arose divergent views regarding the quantum of responsibility to be transferred to Indian hands. Leaders like Tilak and Annie Besant believed that India was fit for full responsible government, while others held that such a stand was too revolutionary. In the Congress session of Amritsar, Gandhi by rejecting the extremist stand said:" The King Emperor has extended a hand of friendship. Do not reject the advance. The Indian culture demands trust and full trust and if you are sufficiently manly we shall not be afraid of the future." 21 The Congress passed a resolution to "work the Reforms so as to secure an early establishment of full Responsible government. 22 Jinnah was full of praise for Montague for his labour in connection with the reforms. In the Muslim League session, held concurrently in Amritsar, Jinnah was elected as permanent president of the Muslim League for the next three years, and there he was able to carry the Muslim League to accept a resolution paralleling that passed by Congress. " The league calls upon the Indians to demonstrate their capacity for complete selfgovernment by availing themselves of such opportunity as is now offered to them in the reforms recently enacted, which the League recognized to be a defenite step towards the goal of full responsible government." 23 97

The Hunter Committee Report The success of Gandhi and Jinnah at the Amritsar Congress of 1919 was a success for those who supported the moderate politics. But its spirit was not destined to last long. The true story of Jallianwala Bagh massacre was not known at the time of its occurrence, and the formation of the Hunter committee to investigate the events in the Punjab effected a speedy and startling change in the situation and a reaction of horror set in both in England and India. The Duke of Connaught, who inaugurated the new constitution, found the "shadow of Amritsar lengthened over the fair face of India. 24 Gandhi, who stood for reforms, found that they did not mark a change of heart and they were intended only to prolong India's servitude. 25 Dyer's evidence before the Hunter Committee was proof of his arrogance and radicalism. There he boasted that he "fired and fired well" for "little firing was bad" 26 His revelations that he had intended to fire upon the crowd even before he arrived at the spot to set a moral example and that it was the narrow entrances to the Bagh which prevented him from using armoured cars and machine guns on the assembled crowd, astounded the listeners beyond measure. 27 Jinnah believed that Montague would see that the wrongs of the Punjab would be avenged to the fullest. 28 98

Political India was, however, prepared to wait till the Hunter Committee's enquires were made known. The Report was published in two forms- the Majority Report of the European members and the Minority Report of the Indian Members. The Congress alleged that the Hunter Report showed that British counted Indian life as of no serious consequence. 29 To Jinnah the report was a means to justify the officials of the country. The Parliamentary debates on the issue added to his disappointment, and he said of the debates that "the blue and brainless blood of England, to their crowning glory, carried the infamous resolution of Lord Finlay." 31 All this led Gandhiji to reintroduce his policy of non-co-operation. The special session of the Indian National Congress held in September 20 condemned the Hunter Report as being tainted by race prejudice, and added that the debate in the House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India. 32 The same session, in the face of doubts expressed by Jinnah, expressed the opinion that "there is no course left open for the people of India but to approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non- violent Non- cooperation inaugurated by Gandhi." 33 In the Muslim League session held at the same time, Jinnah said that if the government was dragging people to desperation, there would be no other course left open to the 99

people except to inaugurate the policy of non- co-operation, "though not necessarily the programme of Gandhi." However, he left the decision to the conscience of the individual members: "It is now for you to consider whether or not you approve of its principle; and approving of its principle, whether or not you approve of its details... it rests with you alone to measure your strength and weigh the pros and cons of the question before you arrive at a decision. 34 Here also Jinnah's views did not prevail. Jinnah Resigns from the Home Rule League as well as from the Congress Sooner than later Gandhi chaired a Home Rule League meeting in Bombay. There he proposed that League's name be changed to Swaraj Sabha and its constitution changed to bring it fully into line with his Satyagraha campaign: "To secure complete swaraj for India according to the wishes of the Indian people." 35 Jinnah, who opposed the change, argued that the old goal of " self- government within the British Common wealth" should remain as such, and that the new goal of "swaraj for India according to the wishes of the Indian people" seemed to him neither clear nor politically practical. When Gandhi's amendments were carried by the meeting, Jinnah resigned from the 100

, League "with great sorrow". 36 Gandhiji urged him to reconsider his decision and share the new life that had opened up before the country. 37 Jinnah's reply to this brought out his misgivings about Gandhi's methods and programmes: "If by 'new life' you mean your methods and programmes, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster... your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus, and Muslims and Muslims, and even between fathers and sons; people are desperate all over the country and your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganisation and chaos." 38 In 1920 both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League held their regular sessions at Nagpur. At the Congress session 101

Gandhiji moved the resolution that "the object of the Indian National Congress is the attainment of swaraj by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means." 39 Gandhiji added that there was no point in keeping the British connections as long as the British refused to redress the grievances of the Indian people. Jinnah at once objected that it was impractical and dangerous to dissolve the British connection without proper preparation for independence. Thereupon Gandhiji argued that " I do not for one moment suggest that we want to end the British connection at all costs unconditionally. If the British connection is for the advancement of India we do not want to destroy it. But if it is inconsistent with our national self- respect, then it is our bounden duty to destroy it... the British people will have to beware that if they do not want to do justice it will be the bounden duty of every Indian to destroy that Empire." 40 Jinnah tried his best to present his views but was voted down and howled down with cries of "shame" and " political impostor ". 41 Jinnah, deeply humiliated, resigned from the Congress. The Khilafat Non- co-operation Movement The years from his resignation from the Congress to his re- election to the Legislative Assembly in 1923 saw Jinnah totally 102

preoccupied with legal profession. 42 It did not mean that he stepped out of Indian politics completely. He was active in the backrooms of politics, trying to realise his political goals through negotiations and manipulations. Jinnah s political career either avoided these years or centred on Jinnah's political differences with Gandhiji rather than his attitudes towards the Khilafat movement. Some scholars like M. Naeem Qureshi try to place Jinnah in the Khilafat camp. 44 A close analysis would prove that this is far from true. When Turkey entered the war on the side of Germany, the Indian Muslims lost no time in expressing their staunch loyalty to the colonial administration. 45 Britain, in the circumstances, formally assured the Muslims of the safety of the Holy Places. 46 But the publication of the Treaty of Sevres in May 1920 revealed the allies intention to dismember the Khilafat, despite the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George's assurances to the contrary. Mahomed Ali saw in this an attack on the very basis of Islam. 47 The Treaty of Sevres could bring together Muslims on a common platform against the government. Jinnah had not been a staunch Pan-Islamist. He was a politician committed to secular politics and opposed to the mixing of religion 103

and politics. Jinnah's support for the Muslim community's concern for Turkey came out of sheer political expediency. His mind was full of political reform and political unity in India rather than the fate of the Turkish Sultan. At the Eleventh session of the Muslim League in Delhi in 1918 it was resolved that " the All Indian Muslim League considers it be its duty to place before the government of India and His Majesty's Government the true sentiments of the Muslim community... and requests that the British representatives at the Peace Conference will use their influence and see that in the territorial and political redistribution to be made, the fullest consideration should be paid to the requirements of the Islamic law with regard to the full and independent control by the Sultan of Turkey, Khalifa of the Prophet, over the holy places and over the Jazirat-ul-Arab as delimitated in the Muslim books". 48 Jinnah opposed this resolution saying that the League should not dabble in the foreign politics of the government which led to a heated response from the delegates assembled there, and Jinnah had to withdraw his statement and support the resolution. 49 Thus by 1919 when the question of the Khilafat became the foremost concern of the Muslim community in India, he had to become more active on the issue. 104

Thus when the All- India Muslim Conference formed the All- India Khilafat Committee with Seth Chotani as its President, Jinnah kept aloof from it. Jinnah, not steeped in the tenets of Islam and not sensitive to the spiritual significance of the Kaaba, took a legislative view and refused to join the massive protest against the British. 50 Jinnah also found to his dismay that the Khilafat issue reduced the relevance of the Muslim League as a political organisation. The monopoly of Muslim politics went to the Khilafatists during the period. Jinnah, however, tried his best to increase the League's role in the Khilafat movement. With this end in view, he led a delegation to London and placed a memorial before the British government, emphasising the significance of the Khilafat to Indian Muslims and requesting leniency for Turkey. 51 His main concern, however, remained the forthcoming government of India Bill, and in London he gave evidence before the Select Committee on the bill. On his return, he found the more radical Khilafatists well- entrenched in the Indian Muslim politics. In order to answer the criticism that the Muslim League was not attaching importance to the Khilafat issue, Jinnah actively campaigned for the Khilafat. He severely criticised the British government for its Punjab atrocities and the spoilation of the Khilafat: 105

"The one attacks our liberty, the other our faith." 52 In spite of all these attempts by Jinnah, the Muslim League came to be dominated by the Khilafat Committee until 1923-4. Though Gandhiji showed concerns for the issues related to the Khilafat earlier, his active involvement with it could be dated from 1919. He told the Muslims that it was his duty to share their sorrows. 53 Though his feelings in this regard were genuine and he was motivated by the justness of their cause, he was, in fact, trying hard to establish his position as a political leader after his Rowlatt satyagraha turned out to be a dismal failure. 54 This gave Gandhiji the much- needed Muslim support for his political programme, undermining the stand of constitutionalists like Jinnah. The Khilafatists at the same time thought that their alliance with Gandhiji would fetch them Hindu support for the Khilafat. They therefore offered him unreserved loyalty and complete obedience. The meeting of the All-India Khilafat Committee held in May 1920 endorsed Gandhi's non-co-operation compaign. 55 In the subsequent Congress session, Gandhi's non- cooperation resolution was passed, with the overwhelming support of the Muslims. Khilafat trainloads of delegates had been shipped crosscountry to pack the Congress Pandal and vote for their hero's resolution, transforming Congress into a populist political party. 56 106

Jinnah was not amused by Gandhi's ascendance on the Indian political horizon. He now thought that by gaining limited concessions for Turkey from the British government, he could keep off the Muslims from lending support for non- co-operation. He proposed to Reading, the Viceroy, a scheme to end the non-co-operation agitation. 57 Though desired to end the non - co-operation, he was not ready to encourage Jinnah who had a strong anti- British feeling. Thus Jinnah, in the face of the Viceroy's unwillingness to make concessions on the Turkish issue, tried to arrange a round table conference on India's problems. In the annual session of the Congress held at Ahmadabad Gandhi accepted the offer, but later he reversed the decision thanks to the influence of extremists within the non- cooperation movement. 58 Although Reading was unwilling to commit to the idea of a Round Table Conference, he encouraged Jinnah and Jayakar to continue the threads of reconciliation. 59 Jinnah then took up the initiative in organising a representative conference, inviting all the major political leaders of the nationalist movement. Gandhiji suspended the Civil Disobedience Movement until 31 January so as to help in conducting negotiations with the government. Gandhiji's insistence on the release of all internees for attending the Round Table Conference stood in the way of the settlement of the dispute. The 107

government was not ready to concede such a demand. 60 Jinnah and Jayakar personally approached Gandhiji to avoid the immediate resumption of non-co-operation but their efforts proved to be fruitless. Gandhiji warned Reading that unless the internees were freed, he would relaunch his non- co-operation campaign. The government was unbending for it already knew that Gandhi's non-co-operation campaign had been in its last stages. 61 No sooner had the non - co operation campaign relaunched than it came to an end. Gandhiji had to call off the agitation when the protesters had burnt a police chowki with twelve policemen inside in Chauri Chaura. The campaign was also punctuated by sporadic communal violence in various places. Then there was the terror unleashed by the Mappilas of Malabar who revolted not only against the British authorities but also against the Hindu landlords who oppressed them. Though the British attributed the violence solely to the Khilafat agitators, the oppression and exploitation of the Muslim tenants by their Hindu landlords was the main driving force. 62 The Mappila revolt contributed to a series of Hindu- Muslim riots in various parts of the country. This was all due to the notorious British policy of "divide and rule". Jinnah, however, put the whole blame on Gandhiji's shoulders for the tragic turn the politics had taken. 63 108

Gandhiji's withdrawal of the non-co-operation movement left his Muslim supporters with a feeling of having been deserted. However the Khilafat committee tried to continue the campaign of non-co-operation, irrespective of Gandhi or the Congress decision, until satisfactory settlement of the Khilafat question was secured. But the movement had already lost its momentum. 64 The movement was further undermined by the publication of Reading's plea for revision of the Treaty of Sevres. It convinced many Muslims, particularly the conservatives, of the futility of continuing the protest against the government and the wisdom of switching their allegiance from Congress to the government. When the Turkish National Assembly voted to remove Caliph's secular powers, it turned out to be a severe blow to the Indian Khilafat Movement. 65 The Khilafat Movement got a final deathblow when Attaturk abolished the Caliphate and expelled the Caliph. As a result, the Muslim interest now turned to more domestic politics. Jinnah heaved a sigh of relief when the Non-co-operation Movement came to a naught. The failure of the movement led to an acrimonious break-up of the Hindu-Muslim alliance and an extended period of communal rioting and rivalry. Though Jinnah's assessment of the result of the movement proved to be correct, Jinnah drew little 109

satisfaction from this as it paved the way for the revival of communalism. Jinnah's absence from the non-co-operation campaign projected Azad and Ansari as leaders of Congress Muslims. Gandhi overshadowed Jinnah so much so that the latter was marginalised from mainstream politics. Jinnah felt that a Muslim politician might even become the President of the Indian National Congress but would never lead the Congress as Gandhi did. When he failed to win over the Congress, he became more and more aware of his role as a Muslim politician, and he slowly drifted towards the Muslim League as the vehicle of his political career. In the build-up to the 1920 Nagpur Congress, his relations with the Ali brothers worsened to such an extent that dislike between them spilled over into the post-khilafat period. 66 The Nationalist Party Gandhi's withdrawal of the Non-co-operation campaign brought to the fore the issue of council entry in the Congress. Two groups emerged in the Congress, one group which advocated a change of approach and the other group which did not want to waver from the path of Non-co-operation. Prominent among the first group was C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru. They formed the Swaraj party with Das as 110

President and Motilal as one of the secretaries. 67 The Swaraj party's attitude on the Assembly and the councils would depend upon the action taken by the Government on the demand formulated by them. If the Government refused to entertain the said demand, the party would resort to "a policy of uniform, continuous and consistent obstruction with a view to make government through the Assembly and Councils impossible." 68 In order to avoid a split in the Congress, Gandhi conceded the Swarajists the right to stand for election to the legislatures. Jinnah got himself elected to the Central Legislative Assembly from his old reserved Muslim constituency in Bombay. In the Assembly Jinnah along with seventeen other members who had no affiliation to any political party formed the Independent Party under his leadership. This group evolved a working relationship with the Swarajists there and this led to the formation of what came to be called the Nationalist Party. The alliance, however, proved short-lived, thanks to the differences in policy between the two groups and the efforts of the British to create a rift between the two parties. The alliance began to crumble by the end of 1924. The disintegration of the Nationalist Party came about mainly over the question of Non-cooperation. The Independent Party which was not in favour of a policy 111

of continued obstruction, advocated a policy of 'parliamentary obstruction' if necessary and treatment of issues based only on their merit. On the other hand, with the re-emergence of the non- cooperation as a dominant force in the Congress, the Swarajists came under the increasing compulsion to adopt a policy of obstruction within the Assembly. Jinnah firmly believed that the policy of wholesale obstruction and wrecking would only result in failure. 69 Jinnah thus found himself in an unenviable position of "having to choose between the agitational methods advocated by Congress and the Swarajists allied to a policy of Hindu-Muslim unity or adopting a purely constitutional approach and risk being seen as a communalist. In the event, he chose the latter course, becoming more closely tied to Muslim India and moving further away from his nationalist roots. This is not to suggest that he became a communalist at this point, but rather that he moved away from Congress and consequently was seen as such by his former colleagues. 70 Jinnah thereafter moved closer to the Muslim community, and he endeavoured to win greater Muslim support. With this end in view, he made concessions to the Punjab Muslims, whose influence increased tremendously because of the Montagu - Chelmsford Reforms. Thus he had to find a balance between his goals at the centre 112

and the demands of the provinces. In the fifteenth session of the League held in March 1924 at Lahore, Jinnah accepted some of the issues which were important to the Punjab in order to get the Punjabi support for his programmes. One important resolution in this related to provincial autonomy which stated: "the existing province of India shall be united under a common government on a fedaral basis so that each province shall have full and complete autonomy, the functions of the central government being confined to such matters only as of general and common concern." 71 Jinnah also lent his support to a resolution which made the 1916 Lucknow Pact obsolete." The basis of representation in the Legislature and in all other elected bodies should be population, except that very small minorities might be given representation in excess of their numerical proportion in those cases in which they would remain unrepresented in the absence of such exceptional treatment, subject however to the essential proviso that no majority should be reduced to a minority or even to an equality. 72 It was at this session the full provincial status of the NWFP was first raised. To Jinnah it would serve two purposes : one, it would augment the bargaining position of Muslim India and two, it would break the domination of Punjab and Bengal in Muslim politics. Naturally, it 113

formed one of the four main demands he was later to ask in return for the dropping of the Muslim demand for separate electorates. 73 Though Jinnah left the Congress for good, he continued to nurs the dream of uniting the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League on a constitutional platform. In the Lahore session he argued for such a unity:"......... one essential requisite condition to achieve swaraj is political unity between the Hindus and the Mohammedans... India will get Dominion Responsible Government the day the Hindus and Mohammadans are united. Swaraj is an almost interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity. If we wish to free people, let us unite; but if we wish to continue slaves of bureaucracy, let us fight amongst ourselves and gratify petty vanity over petty matters, Englishmen being our arbiters." 74 To fulfil the same he would re-establish the Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslim India and then negotiate with Congress on a basis of equality. The All-Parties Conference in Bombay during December 1924 and in Delhi during January 1925 would have become venues for such an agreement had it not been for the opposition by Mahasabha. In the January meeting there arose a dispute between Jinnah clamouring for majorities in Bengal and Pubjab, and communal Hindus such as Lala 114

Lajpat Rai and Chintamani stoutly opposing it. The committee divided into two groups - one to deal with the Hindu-Muslim question, and the other to outline a scheme of swaraj which should establish India as a self - governing dominion free from interference with her internal affairs Jinnah, who presented the Muslims' viewpoint with disingenuous cleverness, claimed for the Muslims special electorates in Councils, Local bodies and even the University. 75 His demands met with severe hostility. "It appeared that the apetite had grown by what it had fed on." 76 It was crystal clear that the Mahasabha had no intention of entering into any kind of compromise with the Muslim India. Thus the committee could not arrive at any agreement on the Hindu-Muslim question, and after the committee adjourned sine die, Jinnah thought of making direct negotiations with the Congress. 77 At the fifteenth session of the Muslim League at Lahore, Jinnah proposed the working together of the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress : "With a view to better the economic and political conditions of the workers and peasants of India, the All - India Muslim League considers it most essential that the organisation of the workers and peasants be taken in hand, and a movement be immediately started on the lines chalked out by the All - India Congress Committee in this connection, in order to achieve these 115

objects; the League therefore resolves that a committee of five members be appointed by the council of the League to meet the committee for the purpose to draw up a practical programme for the organisation of workers and peasants of India." 78 The work of the committee could not be carried on, thanks to the machinations of the Ali brothers who had been out to destroy the Muslim League and prevent Jinnah's prominence in Muslim politics. Though he was not successful in this, he was able to torpedo Jinnah's attempts to negotiate with Congress. Those elements in the Congress who were opposed to an alliance with the League used Mohammed Ali for their purpose. Mohamed Ali was trying his best to avert the possibility of a joint session of the League and the Congress. Though Motilal and Gandhi were enthusiastic about an agreement with the League, Jinnah's attempts to create a new Lucknow Pact remained just a dream. 79 However, Jinnah did not lose his faith in Hindu - Muslim unity and he continued to remind people about its urgency. "We desire nothing but justice and fairness, and I assure you that if we, the two communities, can settle our differences, it will be more than half the battle for responsible government won". 80 In response to the Congress President, Srinivasa Iyengar's call for Muslims and the Congress to involve joint reform proposals and 116

also to appease the Hindu Mahasabha, which accused him of as a communalist in the garb of a nationalist, he went to the extent of abandoning the claim for separate electorate. This was done when he was presiding over a representative conference of the Muslim leaders in Delhi on March 20, 1920. The conference came out with certain proposals which came to be known as the Delhi proposals. They included (1) separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency (2) Treatment of NWFP and Baluchistan on the same footing as the other provinces (3) electoral representation in the Punjab and Bengal in accordance with population and (4) one - third representation in the central legislature. 81 Thus Jinnah waived the right to separate electorates, the most controversial of the Muslim demands from the Hindu viewpoint, by demanding the four aspects mentioned above, for he knew that the Muslims would not surrender this right without getting something which would provide them with a sense of security. His demand for the creation of three new Muslim majority provinces was clearly intended to increase the bargaining power of Muslim India in regard to both Hindus and the Government of India. Moreover, addition of three Muslim majority provinces would provide him with an effective counterbalance to the Punjab dominance in the Muslim political scene. His final demand would enable him to play a 117

significant role in the government of an independent India. It would also not be possible for the Hindus to dominate the Government of India at the cost of Muslims. Jinnah wanted to ensure that the Muslims "should be made to feel that they are secure and safeguarded against any act of oppression on the part of the majority." 82 The Congress Working Committee subsequently formed a subcommittee to examine the implications of these proposals. The subcommittee accepted the Delhi proposals which were accepted later that year by the All Indian Congress Committee with minor changes. 83 No sooner had the Congress accepted the proposals than other influential groups came out in opposition to them. The Hindu Mahasabha attacked Jinnah as being unrepresentative of Muslim India and as such inconsequential as far as any negotiation between the two communities were concerned. Jinnah had no authority to bind anyone except himself and a few persons to his way of thinking. 84 Many Muslim leaders felt that in such an atmosphere of communal distrust, the Delhi proposals were not at all workable. 85 Shafi and Sir Abdul Quaiyum joined the Punjab Muslim League in the rejection of the Delhi proposals. Jinnah would have become irrelevant in the Indian political scene, but for the intervention of the British Government in the form of Simon Commission. 118

By 1927, the Tory government, anticipating that the Labour Party would form a government, appointed a commission before the due date. 86 The prospect of an early commission was greeted by most Indians. When it became known in India that it was an all-white Commission, Jinnah, along with the Congress, opposed its appointment.' It, however, brought about a kind of unity in the nationalist movement, which had been in some disarray. Jinnah, who found himself at the centre of protest, lobbied most of the prominent Indian leaders for a telegram of protest to the British government. 87 Jinnah thanked Lord Birkenhead and his lily - white list for boosting the nationalist movement: "A constitutional war has been declared on Great Britain. Negotiations for a settlement are not to come from our side. Let the government sue for peace. We are denied equal partnership. We will resist the new doctrine to the best of our power. Jallianwalla Bagh was a physical butchery, the Simon Commission is a butchery of our souls. By appointing an exclusively White Commission, Lord Birkenhead has declared our unfitness for selfgovernment. I welcome Pandit Malavia, and I welcome hand of fellowship extended to us by Hindu leaders from the platform of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. For to me, this offer is more valuable than any concession which the British government can make. 119

Let us grasp the hand of fellowship. This is indeed a bright day; and for achieving this unity, thanks are due to Lord Birkenhead." 88 However, within the Muslim League, a small group, mostly from Punjab, welcomed the appointment of the Commission. This in the long run led to the splitting up of the League into two. The Punjab Muslim response proved to be a welcome relief to the British. They cleverly used this as a weapon to break up the nationalist unity. Jinnah, however, tried to use the issue of the Simon Commission to bring Muslim League closer to the Congress. The League held its annual session at Calcutta which was also the venue of the Congress session. The League resolved to boycott the commission and proclaimed that it would accept joint electorates with reservation of seats on a population basis if the Congress accepted the recognition of Baluchistan, the NWFP and Sind as full provinces. The Congress meeting resolved in favour of joint electorates with reservation of seats on a population basis in each provinces, provided each community made reciprocal provisions for weightage to minorities. It also agreed to treat the NWFP and Baluchistan on equal terms with other provinces and the separation of Sind from Bombay. Nevertheless, concurrently with Jinnah's meetings, a section of the League, under the leadership of Shafi, met at Lahore and voted for co- 120

operation with the commission. It further paved the way for the splitting up of the League into two. Jinnah now went about with the task of convincing the Muslim community the need for boycott and he reiterated that co-operation with the Simon Commission amounted to betrayal of India. 89 However, Jinnah, fully aware of the importance of the Punjabi Muslims in Muslims polities, chose to belittle the importance of the split and not to offend Shafi's supporters too deeply lest it would prevent an early unification of the League. In the Calcutta session, the discussion centred on the positive aspects of the boycott campaign and the Delhi proposals, and there was hardly any public criticisms of the Punjabis. 90 Jinnah was, however, deeply worried about the split in the League for he feared it would undermine his political base. Further, the opponents were in a position to allege Jinnah's non-representative status. The Madrass session of the Congress (1927) decided to invite a number of political organisations, including the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha and the National Liberal Federation. Their representatives were invited for an All Parties Conference in order to initiate discussions for framing a new constitution for India. The first session failed to produce any concrete result with Jinnah and the Mahasabha taking opposite stands on the main issues. The story was 121

not much different when the adjourned session of the All Parties Conference met on 8 March 1928. In the circumstances, the conference adjourned after appointing subcommittees to investigate the individual elements of the Delhi proposals. Jinnah found himself in an embarassing situation : on the one hand his hopes of reaching an agreement with the Hindus were dashed and on the other hand he was isolated from the great majority of Muslims on the question of the boycott of the Commission and also on the questions of separate electorates. He, therefore, in utter disappointment, withdrew the League's representatives from the conference and boarded the ship for England before its next meeting in Bombay on 19 May. As the time for Bombay session drew near, many leaders were not amused by the prospect of Jinnah's absence and Motilal Nehru was particularly concerned by such a situation. However, the Bombay session appointed a committee with Motilal Nehru as Chairman and nine other members to consider and determine the principle of a Constitution for India. 91 The Nehru Report, as it came to be called, laid down that there would be joint or mixed electorates throughout India. The major recommendations of the NR included : 1) abolition of separate representation 2) reservation of a number of seats for Muslims in commensurate with their population in the Hindu - 122

majority provinces. 3) introduction of full adult franchise which would render the domination of Bengal and the Punjab by Muslims inevitable and communal representation redundant 4) separation of Sind from Bombay and full provincial status for Baluchistan and the NWFP and 5) only one quarter of seats in the Central Legislature for Muslims on the plea that the figure accurately reflected the proportion of the Muslim population. Mahasabha was greatly impressed as the report pleaded for the end of separate representation. Introduction of adult franchise pleased many younger nationalists, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru who described the report as marking the end of communalism in India. He, however, did not see eye to eye with the report s aim of Dominion status but instead advocated the goal of full independence outside the empire. With regard to the majority provinces, they supported the NR except for a small group of Punjab Muslims under the leadership of Shafi. The minority provinces, especially the UP, opposed the NR. The UP Muslims held that it deprived them of separate representation and weightage they were under the Lucknow Pact. Lack of weightage at the centre was also a reason for their opposition. It is no wonder that the Nehru Report caused a split in the Muslim Community. 123

Jinnah's return to India had been eagerly awaited by all the political sections of the country. His support was thought to be essential by Motilal for the Report's success and its widespread Muslim acceptance. This time Jinnah was not ready to take the Congress lead on the issue, thanks to the split in the Muslim League on the issue over the boycott of the Simon Commission. When Chagla went to receive him in Bombay, he castigated the former for having accepted the NR on behalf of the League. 92 Jinnah now concentrated all his efforts on reuniting the Muslim League. With this end in view, he asserted that in spite of the split in the League over the question of boycott, they were all one, and requested Shafi to attend the next session of the League to promote the interests of Muslims and India at large. 93 For him unity within the Muslim League was more important than the benefits to be gained from submitting to Congress recommendations. At the same time he found many of the recommendations of the report unacceptable. He wanted to give the Muslims one third representation at the centre, which alone would prevent the domination of the central government by one religious community. Moreover he was opposed to NR's advocacy of a strong central government. He advocated a federal structure mainly on two counts: one, it would guarantee him the support of the majority 124

provinces, particularly Punjab, and two, the existence of autonomous provinces would safeguard the rights of the Muslim community he represented. At the League's session in December, the League rejected the NR and suggested a number of amendments. Of these the four important points were: (1) one third representation for Muslims at both houses of central Legislature (2) reservation of seats for Muslims on a population basis in Punjab and Bengal for ten years subject to reexamination after that period, in the event of adult suffrage not being introduced; (3) the vesting of residuary powers with the provinces, and a revision of powers assigned to the centre and the provinces, with a view to ensuring a genuine federation; (4) separation of Sind should not be dependent upon the implementation of the Nehru constitution. 94 Point one and three reflect Jinnah's concern over Muslim representation in the Central Legislature and the granting of residuary powers to the provinces. The second point was aimed at getting the support of the Punjab Khilafatists at the meeting. When at the All- Parties Conference the amendments were rejected, a number of these Muslims performed a volte-face on the issue, and Motilal Nehru had lost much of the Muslim support vital for the success of the report. The rejection of the amendments was to be expected, thanks to the 125

domination of the convention by the Mahasabha and the Sikh League and to the domination of the Congress by the views of Jawaharlal Nehru and the younger nationalists. In the convention, majority favoured the NR and Jinnah's point of view was rejected. While liberals like Sapru were for conceding many of the Muslim League's demands, particularly those relating to the reservation of seats for Muslims, the Congress was not. Sapru suggested "to picture Jinnah, whom I have known intimately for fifteen years. If he is a spoilt child, a naughty child, I am prepared to say, give him what he wants and be finished with it." 95 It was Jayakar, the spokesman of the Hindu Mahasabha, who aired the argument which dashed Jinnah's amendments to the ground. After stating that such well-known Muslim leaders like Abdul Kalam Azad, Dr. Ansari, Sri Ali Imam, Raja Sahib or Mahmudabad and Dr. Kitchlew gave their full assent to the NR, he emphasised that Jinnah represented only a small minority of Muslims. 96 Jinnah, who firmly believed that Hindu-Muslim unity alone could usher in political advance in India, was offended by Jayakar's remarks. In his response to these reactions he stressed the need for Hindu - Muslim unity: "What we want is that Hindus and Muslims should march together until our object is attained... We are all sons of the land. We have to live together. We have to work 126