The Plurality and Borda Count Methods

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The Plurality and Borda Count Methods

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The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Lecture 10 Sections 1.1-1.3 Robb T. Koether Hampden-Sydney College Wed, Sep 14, 2016 Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 1 / 24

1 Definitions 2 The Debate Club Election 3 The Plurality Method 4 The Borda Count Method 5 Burying a Candidate 6 Assignment Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 2 / 24

Outline 1 Definitions 2 The Debate Club Election 3 The Plurality Method 4 The Borda Count Method 5 Burying a Candidate 6 Assignment Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 3 / 24

Definitions Definition (The Candidates) The candidates are the people running for office in an election. If we are choosing something other than people, we call them alternatives. Definition (The Voters) The voters are the people who have a say in the outcome of the election. All votes count equally. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 4 / 24

Definition (Single-choice Ballot) In a single-choice ballot, each voter selects one candidate. Definition (Preference Ballot) In a preference ballot, each voter ranks all the candidates from most preferred to least preferred. Definition (Truncated Preference Ballot) In a truncated preference ballot, each voter ranks some, but not all, the candidates by preference. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 5 / 24

Definition (Single-choice Ballot) In a single-choice ballot, each voter selects one candidate. Definition (Preference Ballot) In a preference ballot, each voter ranks all the candidates from most preferred to least preferred. Definition (Truncated Preference Ballot) In a truncated preference ballot, each voter ranks some, but not all, the candidates by preference. We will use preference ballots. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 5 / 24

Outline 1 Definitions 2 The Debate Club Election 3 The Plurality Method 4 The Borda Count Method 5 Burying a Candidate 6 Assignment Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 6 / 24

The Debate Club Election Example There are four candidates for History Club president: A, B, C, and D. There are 19 voting members. Their preferences are shown on the next slide. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 7 / 24

Voters Preferences Example 9 6 4 1st A C D 2nd B B B 3rd C D A 4th D A C The preferences. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 8 / 24

Who won? Example Who should be elected president? Who is more popular, A or B? Who is more popular, A or C? Who is more popular, A or D? Who is least popular? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 9 / 24

Who won? Example Who should be elected president? Who is more popular, A or B? Who is more popular, A or C? Who is more popular, A or D? Who is least popular? Do least popular and most unpopular mean the same thing? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 9 / 24

Outline 1 Definitions 2 The Debate Club Election 3 The Plurality Method 4 The Borda Count Method 5 Burying a Candidate 6 Assignment Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 10 / 24

The Plurality Method Definition (The Plurality Method) By the plurality method, the candidate with the most first-place votes wins. Example In the Debate Club example, A wins by the plurality method. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 11 / 24

Web Page Run the program Voting Methods on the web. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 12 / 24

Outline 1 Definitions 2 The Debate Club Election 3 The Plurality Method 4 The Borda Count Method 5 Burying a Candidate 6 Assignment Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 13 / 24

The Borda Count Method Definition (The Borda Count Method) By the Borda count method, the voters rank the candidates. Then each rank is assigned points, higher ranks receiving more points. The candidate with the most points wins. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 14 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) Reconsider the History Club election with 4 points for 1st, 3 for 2nd, 2 for 3rd, and 1 for 4th. 9 6 4 1st A C D 2nd B B B 3rd C D A 4th D A C Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 15 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) 9 6 4 1st A C D 2nd B B B 3rd C D A 4th D A C Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 16 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) 9 6 4 1st A C D 2nd B B B 3rd C D A 4th D A C Points for A : 9 4 + 6 1 + 4 2 = 36 + 6 + 8 = 50. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 16 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) 9 6 4 1st A C D 2nd B B B 3rd C D A 4th D A C Points for A : 9 4 + 6 1 + 4 2 = 36 + 6 + 8 = 50. Points for B : 9 3 + 6 3 + 4 3 = 27 + 18 + 12 = 57. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 16 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) 9 6 4 1st A C D 2nd B B B 3rd C D A 4th D A C Points for A : 9 4 + 6 1 + 4 2 = 36 + 6 + 8 = 50. Points for B : 9 3 + 6 3 + 4 3 = 27 + 18 + 12 = 57. Points for C : 9 2 + 6 4 + 4 1 = 18 + 24 + 4 = 46. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 16 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) 9 6 4 1st A C D 2nd B B B 3rd C D A 4th D A C Points for A : 9 4 + 6 1 + 4 2 = 36 + 6 + 8 = 50. Points for B : 9 3 + 6 3 + 4 3 = 27 + 18 + 12 = 57. Points for C : 9 2 + 6 4 + 4 1 = 18 + 24 + 4 = 46. Points for D : 9 1 + 6 2 + 4 4 = 9 + 12 + 16 = 37. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 16 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) Which candidate wins? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 17 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) Which candidate wins? Which candidate comes in last? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 17 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) Which candidate wins? Which candidate comes in last? Would the outcome be different if the points were 3, 2, 1, 0? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 17 / 24

The History Club Election Example (The History Club Election) Which candidate wins? Which candidate comes in last? Would the outcome be different if the points were 3, 2, 1, 0? What about 20, 15, 10, 5? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 17 / 24

Outline 1 Definitions 2 The Debate Club Election 3 The Plurality Method 4 The Borda Count Method 5 Burying a Candidate 6 Assignment Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 18 / 24

Burying a Candidate Burying a Candidate The Borda-count method is susceptible to chicanery. If the voters vote honestly, then there is no problem. But what if...? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 19 / 24

Burying a Candidate Example (Burying a Candidate) There are three candidates: Democrat (D), Republican (R), and Wacko (W). There are 9 Democratic voters, 7 Republican voters, and 4 Wacko voters. Their preferences: 9 7 2 2 1st D R W W 2nd R D R D 3rd W W D R Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 20 / 24

Burying a Candidate Example (Burying a Candidate) There are three candidates: Democrat (D), Republican (R), and Wacko (W). There are 9 Democratic voters, 7 Republican voters, and 4 Wacko voters. Their preferences: 9 7 2 2 1st D R W W 2nd R D R D 3rd W W D R Who wins? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 20 / 24

Burying a Candidate Example (Burying a Candidate) What if the Republicans decide to bury the Democrat? Their (false) preferences: 9 7 2 2 1st D R W W 2nd R W R D 3rd W D D R Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 21 / 24

Burying a Candidate Example (Burying a Candidate) What if the Republicans decide to bury the Democrat? Their (false) preferences: 9 7 2 2 1st D R W W 2nd R W R D 3rd W D D R Who wins? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 21 / 24

Burying a Candidate Example (Burying a Candidate) What if, in addition, the Democrats decide to bury the Republican? Their (false) preferences: 9 7 2 2 1st D R W W 2nd W W R D 3rd R D D R Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 22 / 24

Burying a Candidate Example (Burying a Candidate) What if, in addition, the Democrats decide to bury the Republican? Their (false) preferences: 9 7 2 2 1st D R W W 2nd W W R D 3rd R D D R Who wins? Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 22 / 24

Burying a Candidate Example (Burying a Candidate) What if, in addition, the Democrats decide to bury the Republican? Their (false) preferences: 9 7 2 2 1st D R W W 2nd W W R D 3rd R D D R Who wins? Oops. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 22 / 24

Outline 1 Definitions 2 The Debate Club Election 3 The Plurality Method 4 The Borda Count Method 5 Burying a Candidate 6 Assignment Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 23 / 24

Assignment Assignment Chapter 1: Exercises 11, 13, 17, 19, 21, 25, 27, 29. Robb T. Koether (Hampden-Sydney College) The Plurality and Borda Count Methods Wed, Sep 14, 2016 24 / 24