CALGARY CITY COUNCIL PERFORMANCE REPORT: THE DEMOCRATIC TOOLBOX 2.0 JEROMY ANTON FARKAS MAY 28, 2014 KEY POINTS It s hard to follow what goes on at City Hall, but it can be made easier by expanding the democratic toolbox available. Since September 2013, the Manning Foundation pilot Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City Councillor Vote Tracking has been downloaded more than 10,000 times. The Democratic Toolbox, implemented online at CouncilTracker.ca, provides citizens with the technology they need to better track and hold accountable the level of government closest to them. This performance report assesses the official voting records and behaviour of the 2013-2017 Calgary City Council during its first six months after election (October 28 2013 to March 31 2014). Performance measures include attendance, how time is spent, questions asked, coalition analysis (who regularly votes with and against whom?) and voting positions on taxation. 1
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A WELL- INFORMED CITIZENRY IS THE ONLY TRUE REPOSITORY OF THE PUBLIC WILL. Thomas Jefferson 3
KEY FINDINGS CALGARY CITY COUNCIL PERFORMANCE OCTOBER 2013 TO APRIL 2014 1. 22% of Calgary City Council business is conducted in camera, up from 18.5% for the 2010-2013 term as measured by Manning Foundation Researcher Jeromy Anton Farkas. Topics discussed in private include snow removal, flood and tax scenarios, sporting events, and internet access. 2. 93% of council meetings proceeded with at least some portion being behind closed doors, up from 78%. About a fifth of council meetings spend more time in camera than in public. The previous council had some opposition to motions to move in camera, but this new council has been mostly unanimous in keeping deliberations closed. 3. Tax restraint by Calgary Ctiy Council has increased overall since the 2013 municipal election. The average Councillor voted to hold the line on taxation about 52% of the time, up from 40%. Some Councillors have made dramatic shifts since the previous term. On financial questions, Council appears to be divided into two coalitions of 6 Councillors each, with a group of 3 Councillors who are often the swing vote. One Councillor swings in favour of more tax restraint, and 2 swing in favour of less tax restraint. 4. Council average attendance remains high; however, most absences from meetings remain excused without any reason given and some Councillors miss large amounts of key roll call votes. Only one Councillor has abstained themselves so far from any Council business due to a conflict of interest. 5. Council typically doesn t ask many questions of the administration during Question Period. Six out of fifteen council members account for all questions asked. 6. Council tends to be relatively divided on roll call questions brought forward: 42% of roll call motions were decided by only a 1 to 3 vote spread. 5
THE DEMOCRATIC TOOLBOX 2.0 There are more than 25,000 elected municipal officials in Canada, compared to 757 elected provincial and territorial officials and 308 elected federal officials. Large urban municipalities such as Calgary, Toronto, and Vancouver have larger populations than many provinces. Despite this, the democratic needs of municipal government in Canada has received much less academic, media, and public attention than deserved. Most of Canada s public-policy think tanks and political science departments are far more focused on federal, provincial and international issues than municipal issues. Municipal government is most often seen as the third level of government rather than as the first level, closest to the people. Municipal government structures and practices - usually defined by provincial statutes - have generally failed to keep pace with the country s urbanization. In 2013, the Manning Foundation for Democratic Education conducted two large, city-wide public opinion surveys identifying municipal issues of most importance to Calgarians. Among the results of this poll were several results related to the democratic process: Calgarians rank making city hall more accountable fourth behind congestion, affordability, and safety; Calgarians very strongly oppose a party system in municipal politics; and Calgarians generally favour the Council holding the line on taxes as opposed to raising them. 6
Of particular use to all participants in the democratic process was a municipal tracking system developed by Manning Foundation researcher Jeromy Farkas for assessing 2010-2013 Calgary City Council performance on everything from Councillor attendance, to time spent on particular subjects, to votes and voting patterns on key issues. This system and its methodology are described in a pilot report Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City Councillor Vote Tracking. It has application for tracking the performance (for accountability purposes) of any municipal council where there is relatively free voting. Democracy itself was an invention of the city-state politics of ancient Greece, so it is appropriate that efforts toward democratic accountability be made at the municipal level. Essential to democratic accountability is the ability of the public to monitor and assess the representation they receive. However, this monitoring is an immense challenge for the public, whose time is valuable and who face many demands. In one year a council can meet for thousands of hours in total, while considering of thousands of motions, some of which have policy implications and many of which are merely procedure. In the process, they may also generate hundreds of thousands of lines of code published via government open data sources. The aim of this project is to develop a methodology that simplifies and summarizes the voluminous data emanating from Canadian council chambers and makes it available to the public. At the provincial and federal levels of government, and in some municipalities, this information is filtered through party lenses, so it is easy for the public to see what general positions an elected representative is likely to take. However in Calgary and likely in other municipalities, there is great opposition to this kind of party organization at the municipal level. The intent here is to provide the best of both worlds: independent candidates, and highly accessible information about how they vote. METHODOLOGY This research paper and its corresponding municipal performance report is a second attempt at a very ambitious project. It is designed to show what is possible by assembling quantitative data on a law-making body where representatives do not vote along party lines, as well as how their behaviour and representation can change over time. The Democratic Toolbox 2.0 expands on the initial pilot by comparing the previous Calgary City Council (October 2010 - March 2013) with the newly elected council (October 28 2013 - March 31 2014). This research paper incorporates data from 7
all sixteen City of Calgary Council Meetings held between October 28 2013 and March 31 2014, and in particular assesses all of the 100 recorded roll call votes performed during that time. This selection of roll call votes represents approximately 10% of the questions considered by council, and marked questions where council lacked unanimity. The motions used for this report are not a scientific sample, but instead were selected because firstly they were recorded and did not require subjective interpretation of a voice vote, and secondly that they demonstrated some amount of healthy debate. Such a selection is necessary for any exercise such as this because a great many votes are procedural and tell us little about the policy positions that each council member is pursuing. As such, this report should not be considered as a definitive conclusion on the behavior of any particular council member, but rather be indicative of what the record has shown. This research is based on the official City of Calgary minutes & agenda as approved by Calgary City Council. It simply reports what has occured and does not attempt to judge the merits of those events. There is no single measure that can determine the performance and effectiveness of an elected body or single representative, but given enough data and measures, clear patterns begin to emerge. 8
WHAT IS IN THE DEMOCRATIC TOOLBOX? The Democratic Toolbox is the application of technology to impartially assess the performance of elected representatives. Section A (pages 10-13) provides general analysis of all council roll call votes performed to date and incorporates the win rate by council member, no rate by councillor, motions forwarded and seconded by council member, and margins for how close roll call votes were decided. Section B (pgs 14-17) continues with who votes with whom analysis, incorporating all 100 roll call votes, budget votes, and close votes. It also examines how behaviour changes from a typical vote to a close vote. Section F (pgs 34-36) assesses attendance by council member, missed key votes, and breaks down reasons given for absence (if any), and contrasts those areas to the previous council. Section G (pgs 37-40) assesses questions asked of administration by council members, and breaks down the questions by topic. Section H (pgs 41-43) provides a tax restraint score that assesses how often, out of the financial roll call votes selected, each council member voted to hold the line on, or reduce, spending when given the opportunity. Additional comparison to the previous term is provided. Section C (pgs 18-21) provides who votes with whom charts for each council member. Conclusions, acknowledgements, notes, and author information follow. Section D (pgs 22-29) visualizes the relationships established in the previous section and highlights spending coalitions, swing votes. Section E (pgs 30-33) breaks down time spent by council in camera and in public, topics considered, and contrasts those areas to the previous council. 9
SECTION A: GENERAL VOTE ANALYSIS This report begins with a general assessment of all 100 roll call questions considered by the newly elected Council. Although these votes are not exhaustive or definitive, they provide an opportunity to gain some further insights on how members of City Council interact with one another on important issues. This is one area where impartiality in developing a metric for performance is possible; an effective Councillor may very well be one that has success in bringing forward motions, collaborates with other council members, or serves as a sober second thought. General analysis provides a glimpse into those interactions by showing whether council members are likely to move or second motions, vote no against a motion, and vote with or against the majority. Figure A2 depicts in percentage terms how often council members vote no to a given motion. Figure A3 breaks down the amount of motions put forward and seconded, by council member. Note that not all proposed motions or amendments are seconded. Figures A4 & A5 break down the margins of how close roll call questions were decided. For example, 17% of the time, roll call votes were decided by a margin of 1 vote (8-7 or 7-8). Note that with absences, even vote spreads are possible as well (ie. 2 point spread with 8-6 or 6-8). Figure A1 depicts the general win rate for each council member, or in percentage terms how often they were on the winning side of either passing or blocking a motion. 10
FIGURE A1 WIN RATE Percentage win rate for all roll call votes, by council member. 52% 54% 56% 57% 58% 58% 60% 63% 63% 63% 67% 69% 72% 77% 79% FIGURE A2 NO VOTES Percentage frequency of no votes for all roll call votes, by council member. 26% 37% 39% 40% 41% 43% 44% 44% 45% 45% 47% 50% 53% 54% 61% 11
FIGURE A3 MOVERS AND SECONDERS Amount of motions put forward and seconded for all roll call votes, by council member. MOTIONS BROUGHT FORWARD MOTIONS SECONDED 14 1 1 5 2 5 5 6 6 6 10 2 5 8 6 9 10 7 5 7 5 6 1 15 11 6 5 14 14 FIGURE A4 MARGINS OF VICTORY Percentage frequency of how close roll call votes were decided. 0 3% 3% 3% 8% 9% 12% 13% 13% 17% 18% 12
FIGURE A5 MARGINS OF VICTORY Proportional distribution of how close roll call votes were decided. Decided by 4-6 votes 29% Decided by 1-3 votes 43% Decided by 7-13 votes 28% 13
SECTION B: TARGETED VOTE ANALYSIS This section attempts to provide deeper insight into council s interactions as demonstrated by their voting record. This analysis draws upon three categories of votes for cross comparison: All 100 roll call votes, in order to provide a baseline for all interactions ( all votes ); A subset consisting of the 29 2013 year end budget deliberation votes, in order to develop a case study for coalitions during budgeting ( budget votes ); and A subset consisting of 43 votes with close margins, where the outcome was decided by a spread of 0 to 3 votes; in order to determine along which lines council is most often polarized ( close votes ). It s difficult to translate large sets of data into something workable, but there are a few different ways to map out the relationships between councillors. Figures B1-3 use similarity matrices in order to depict the individual agreement rate between council members. A similarity matrix highlights the likelihood in percentage terms that a given individual will vote the same way as another (either both in support or in opposition to a given motion). These matrices identify who votes with whom and shades agreement from red (zero agreement) to orange (50% agreement) to green (100% agreement). Using this method, you can quickly assess voting pairings between council members amongst the three sets of votes described earlier. Comparing who votes with whom data between sets of votes helps to better illustrate how relationships change depenging. For example, when considering all votes, Mayor Nenshi votes with himself 100% of the time, but only 32% of the time with Councillor Magliocca; this drops to only 9.3% when considering close votes. In contrast, Mayor Nenshi votes with Councillor Farrell 66% of the time on all votes, and that rises, rather than drops, to 79.1% for close votes. Figures B4 and B5 illustrate the relationships between councillors by comparing their baseline with how they vote on close and budget votes. This can be used in order to determine how council members actually interact on matters of substance, excluding votes like deciding when to take break. 14
FIGURE B1 WHO VOTES WITH WHOM: ALL VOTES Percentage scale depicting agreement on all votes, by council member. FIGURE B2 WHO VOTES WITH WHOM: BUDGET VOTES Percentage scale depicting agreement on budget votes, by council member. FIGURE B3 WHO VOTES WITH WHOM: CLOSE VOTES Percentage scale depicting agreement on close votes, by council member. 15
FIGURE B4 BASELINE VS. CLOSE VOTES In real points, comparison between all votes and budget votes. Increase in points (green) means that there is an increase in likelihood of that pair agreeing. Reduction (red) means less. 16
FIGURE B5 BASELINE VS. BUDGET VOTES In real points, comparison between all votes and close votes. Increase in points (green) means that there is an increase in likelihood of that pair agreeing. Reduction (red) means less. 17
SECTION C: COUNCIL VOTING COMPARISONS This portion of the report visualizes the data from the previous section in order to allow for deeper insight into council s interactions on budget questions. As more votes become available for assessment, similar comparisons will be possible on a multitude of issues. Budget questions were chosen for this section because they represent the largest substantive portion of the new council s deliberations to date. When council is divided and asks for a roll call, it has so far been most often along spending lines. Figures C1-C3 provide percentage scale comparisons of who votes with each council member on budget questions. For example, the graph titlted Who votes with Nenshi demonstrates that, on budget questions, Councillor Pincott votes with Mayor Nenshi 63 per cent of the time, whereas Councillor Magliocca votes with him 31 per cent of the time. Note that even budget questions allow for a certain element of strategic voting. Votes are not typically held simultaneously nor by secret ballot, dispersing advantages and disadvantages. For this reason, looking at council member voting comparisons on close votes may very well be more indicative of the relationships between them. 18
FIGURE C1 COUNCIL MEMBER VOTING COMPARISONS Percentage scale comparison of who votes with Mayor Nenshi, and Councillors Colley-Urquhart and Carra on budget questions. WHO VOTES WITH NENSHI 31% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 39% 43% 45% 45% 51% 55% 59% 59% 61% 39% 39% 41% 55% 57% 57% 59% 59% 61% 63% WHO VOTES WITH CARRA 63% 73% 76% 24% 27% 35% WHO VOTES WITH COLLEY-URQUHART 37% 39% 41% 41% 43% 51% 53% 59% 59% 65% 69% 19
FIGURE C2 COUNCILLOR VOTING COMPARISONS Percentage scale comparison of who votes with Councillors Chabot, Chu, Demong, Farrell, Jones, and Keating on budget questions. 33% 39% WHO VOTES WITH CHABOT 41% 41% 43% 45% 49% 51% 57% 57% 59% 69% 69% 80% 29% 31% WHO VOTES WITH CHU 35% 37% 39% 39% 39% 47% 55% 61% 65% 67% 69% 84% 35% 39% WHO VOTES WITH DEMONG 39% 43% 43% 51% 53% 53% 53% 57% 61% 61% 65% 80% 24% WHO VOTES WITH FARRELL 33% 37% 37% 39% 41% 43% 53% 55% 55% 63% 63% 65% 76% 39% 43% WHO VOTES WITH JONES 43% 47% 51% 51% 53% 55% 57% 57% 57% 57% 59% 71% 43% WHO VOTES WITH KEATING 49% 49% 49% 51% 51% 51% 53% 55% 55% 59% 59% 59% 65% 20
FIGURE C3 COUNCILLOR VOTING COMPARISONS Percentage scale comparison of who votes with Councillors Magliocca, Pincott, Pootmans, Stevenson, Sutherland, and Woolley on budget questions. WHO VOTES WITH MAGLIOCCA WHO VOTES WITH PINCOTT 31% 35% 37% 39% 43% 49% 51% 57% 59% 59% 61% 67% 67% 71% 27% 31% 33% 39% 39% 41% 43% 51% 51% 53% 57% 57% 61% 65% 65% 69% 73% 35% 39% 39% 49% 51% 51% 61% 63% 63% 63% 69% WHO VOTES WITH POOTMANS 35% WHO VOTES WITH STEVENSON 39% 41% 43% 43% 45% 49% 49% 49% 51% 51% 53% 53% 57% 33% WHO VOTES WITH SUTHERLAND 35% 35% 35% 37% 39% 43% 43% 59% 65% 67% 69% 69% 84% 29% 37% WHO VOTES WITH WOOLLEY 37% 39% 43% 49% 49% 49% 57% 57% 57% 61% 61% 63% 21
SECTION D: COALITION ANALYSIS Using the previously determined who votes with whom data, we can compare each Councillors outlook toward the rest of council to see if they, as groups, tend to disagree or agree with certain others. The following six case studies examine the voting relationships between council members. Figure D1 uses a technique called multi-dimensional scaling in order to visualize the virtual distances between, and groupings of, council members as manifested through budget decisions. As council members are persons with a range of preferences rather than fixed points on a map with fixed distances between them, this results in some loss of accuracy. However, this technique is still a useful method to visualize council s arrangement at a glance. This initial arrangement will be used to seed investigation into potential coalition case studies - for example, it demonstrates distance between Colley-Urquhart and Farrell s voting positions, as well as proximity between Sutherland and Chu, and will be assessed on the following pages. The following Figures D2-7 explore coalition case studies. 22
FIGURE D1 COUNCIL VOTING POSITIONS Council s arrangement as visualized through multi-dimensional scaling, on budget questions. 0.5 0.4 Stevenson Nens hi 0.3 Colley-Urquhart 0.2 Keating 0.1 Sutherland Pi ncott Pootmans 0 Chu -0.5-0.4-0.3-0.2-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Chabot Fa rrell Carra -0.1 Demong -0.2 Woolley -0.3Jones Magliocca -0.4-0.5 23
Figure D2 demonstrates a pronounced difference in how Councillors Colley-Urquhart and Farrell vote, and is used as the first case study. These council members were chosen because they had the most marked difference in voting patterns of any combination of councillors on budget questions. Colley-Urquhart and Farrell and Chabot rarely vote the same way (24%). Those that that Colley-Urquhart tends to agree with are those that Farrell tends to disagree with, and vice versa. There is substantial divergence. Colley-Urquhart seem to be less polarized on Jones, Keating, and Stevenson, suggesting that those Councillors pose a common ground. FIGURE D2 COALITION CASE STUDY 1 How Councillors Colley-Urquhart and Farrell vote versus the rest of council. 100% 100% 55% 76% 39% 35% 24% 59% 65% 53% 41% 37% 39% 24% 55% 43% 59% 51% 43% 37% 63% 65% 53% 27% 41% 41% 69% 33% 63% 37% Colley-Urquhart Farrell 24
Figure D3 demonstrates the similarities in voting behaviour between Councillors Chu and Sutherland, and is used as the second case study. These council members were chosen because they had the most marked similarity in voting patterns of any combination of councillors on budget questions. Chu and Sutherland very often vote the same way (84%). Both councillors vote often with Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Demong, Keating, and Magliocca. Both councillors vote often against Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Pincott, Pootmans, and Woolley. There is minimal divergence. FIGURE D3 COALITION CASE STUDY 2 How Councillors Chu and Sutherland vote versus the rest of council. 100% 100% 84% 84% 35% 39% 35% 69% 65% 69% 65% 61% 37% 33% 47% 55% 59% 43% 67% 35% 31% 43% 39% 39% 37% 29% Chu Sutherland 25
Figure D4 demonstrates the similarities in voting behaviour between Councillors Carra and Pootmans. These council members were chosen because they also had a marked similarity in voting patterns on budget questions. Carra and Pootmans very often vote the same way (73%). Both councillors vote often with Nenshi, Farrell, Pincott, and Woolley. Both councillors vote often against Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, and Sutherland. FIGURE D4 COALITION CASE STUDY 3 How Councillors Carra and Pootmans vote versus the rest of council. 100% 100% 59% 61% 73% 51% 53% 45% 41% 43% 39% 35% 76% 65% 59% 65% 57% 55% 51% 43% 69% 63% 73% 51% 45% 39% 35% 61% 57% Carra Pootmans 26
Figure D5 demonstrates the voting patterns of Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Woolley, Pootmans, and Pincott, and is is used as the fourth case study: Coalition A There is generally a close overlap between these six council members. These six council members do not agree with each other 100% of the time, but their support for each other is still stronger than the rest, as a trend. They regularly vote together and against all others. FIGURE D5 COALITION CASE STUDY 4 How council members Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Woolley, Pootmans, and Pincott vote versus the rest of council: Coalition A 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Nenshi Carra Farrell Pincott Pootmans Woolley 27
Figure D6 demonstrates the voting patterns of Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, Demong, Sutherland, and Magliocca, and is used as the fifth case study: Coalition B There is generally a close overlap between these six council members. As with case study 4, these six council members do not agree with each other 100%. However, their support for each other is still stronger than the rest, as a trend. They share those who they vote with as well as who they vote against. FIGURE D6 COALITION CASE STUDY 5 How councillors Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, Demong, Sutherland, and Magliocca vote versus the rest of council: Coalition B 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Colley-Urquhart Chabot Chu Demong Magliocca Sutherland 28
Figure D7 compares the previously established Coalitions A and B. Voting tendencies of the two groups have been average and overlayed. Coalition A percentage is determined by the average of Nenshi, Carra, Farrell, Woolley, Pincott, and Pootmans. Coalition B percentage is determined by the average of Colley-Urquhart, Chabot, Chu, Demong, Sutherland, and Magliocca. There is a marked difference in how the two coalitions perceive the rest of council. Councillors Jones and Keating seem to be positioned as key swing votes, as they are perceived equally by both groups. These two council members appear about as likely to support one coalition as the other. Stevenson is also a swing vote, but seems to swing slightly in favour of Coalition A (51%) rather than Coalition B (42%). FIGURE D7 COALITION CASE STUDY 6 How Coalitions A and B perceive the rest of council, overlayed. 66% 72% 68% 72% 74% 70% 70% 69% 70% 71% 76% 67% 36% 41% 34% 40% 35% 43% 35% 53% 54% 41% 34% 51% 44% 42% 35% 39% Coalition B Coalition A 29
SECTION E: SECRECY Calgary City Council met for a total of about 119 hours between election in October 2013 and April 2014. This represents about 7 hours and 26 minutes per meeting. More than a fifth (22%) of that time nearly 27 hours spanning 82 agenda items was conducted in camera: in secret and closed to the public. 64.6% of confidential items were planned for in advance, while the remaining 35.6% arose as urgent business. Council spent an average of 19.3 minutes per confidential item, but there is no accurate way to more deeply assess how much time is being spent on a given topic in secret. The majority of meetings (93.8% or 15 of 16) were closed to the public for at least some portion. Only one meeting was held in public for its entirety, for only 40 minutes (October 28 2013). Calgary City Council has so far been unanimous in keeping proceedings confidential. In contrast, there was opposition to closing deliberations at least 17% of the time from 2010-2013. Figure E1 provides a breakdown of topics of items discussed in camera, as classified by the Manning Foundation. Figure E2 provides breakdowns of meetings and how time is spent by Council, in camera and in public. EXAMPLES OF IN CAMERA TOPICS Labour and collective bargaining (various) Proposed acquisitions, sales, leases (various) Legal matters (various dates) Sports events recommendations (2013-12- 16) Utility rates, fee hikes, and taxation scenarios (2014-03-14) Internet access (2014-01-27) Personnel items/appointments/reviews (various) Auditors reports (various) South West Ring Road (various) 30
FIGURE E1 TOPICS IN CAMERA Breakdown of topics of items discussed in camera, as classified by the Manning Foundation. 31
FIGURE E2 TIME SPENT BY COUNCIL Breakdowns of meetings and time spent by Council, in camera and in public Some part was held in secret (15 meetings) No part was held in secret (1 meeting) Time spent in public (93.3 hours) Time spent in camera (26.4 hours) 32
NO GOVERNMENT IS PERFECT. ONE OF THE CHIEF VIRTUES OF A DEMOCRACY, HOWEVER, IS THAT ITS DEFECTS ARE ALWAYS VISIBLE, AND UNDER DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, CAN BE POINTED OUT AND CORRECTED. President Harry S. Truman 33
SECTION F: QUESTION PERIOD Members of council have the opportunity to question administration regarding the day to day operation of the City of Calgary. This allows them to better represent their constituents by raising areas of concern with those who are directly responsible for providing services. This section provides breakdowns of the questions asked and their subject matter. Although not a perfect metric, an effective representative will typically be one that takes advantage of the time allotted for queries, rather than not. EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS ASKED It appears to me that Light Rail Transit (LRT) has performed much better this year than in previous years. With an aging fleet, I am wondering if you can advise, what are some of the solutions you are using to make sure that it continues to perform as required for our transit users? (Pootmans, 2014-02-10) During the portion in the record identified as Question Period, 20 questions spanning about 1,200 words were asked by members of council. 6 of the 15 council members represented all questioned asked during this period. The remaining 9 did not ask any questions. With this small a sample size, fair language complexity analysis is not possible. Recently there were comments made and reported in the local media that the Calgary Police Service operating budget is determined without taking into consideration revenue from fines. Can you verify the accuracy of this statement and advise on actual budgetary practice? (Colley-Urquhart, 2014-02-10) Figure F1 lists the amount of questions asked during Question Period, by council member. Figure F2 breaks down the questions asked during Question Period, by topic. 34
FIGURE F1 QUESTIONS ASKED Amount of questions asked during Question Period, by council member. 1 3 4 4 4 4 35
FIGURE F2 TOPICS IN QUESTION PERIOD Breakdown of topics of items in Question Period, as classified by the Manning Foundation. Snow & ice removal 32% Historic buildings 11% Bylaws 5% Traffic 5% Development 5% Trans it 16% Other governments 11% Sales 5% Police 5% Road safety 5% 36
SECTION G: ATTENDANCE Attendance is an important measure for judging the performance of any elected assembly; before anything else, representatives must show up in order for them to represent their constituents. business. However, councillors usually gave no reason for their absence. Figure G3 breaks down the reasons given for absences, if any, by council member. Calgary council members were often not present at meetings for extended portions, but were not noted in the minutes to be officially be absent. This analysis avoids any subjective discussion regarding what it means to be present, and is based solely upon what is noted in the official record at the end of each set of council minutes. Representation is not as simple as being present at the beginning and ending of a meeting. An effective representative must also be present for the key votes in between. Figure G1 breaks down the percentage of key roll call votes missed, by council member. There were 8 absences observed out of 16 meetings, or in other words, a councillor was usually missing for every other meeting. Average attendance was 96.2%, very slightly down from 97.4% last term. Figure G2 breaks down the percentage attendance rate, by council member. Elected officials may sometimes be required elsewhere in order to perform official council Under City of Calgary Council policy, councillors may abstain from deliberations due to a declared conflict of interest (recorded in council minutes as Declaration of Pecuniary Interest ). Proactive disclosure is an essential part of open government and accountable democracy; such disclosures are not an area of criticism, but instead an element of transparency to be commended. If any elected official stands to gain monetarily or otherwise from matters being deliberated, it s imperative that they recuse themselves as well notify the public about it. Since election in October 2013, this new council has collectively spent very little time away from deliberations due to conflicts of interest. Only one such abstention occured in the official record: for 33 minutes by Councillor Sutherland with the stated reason that family members were employed by an applicant before council. Note that the accuracy of this analysis depends on the accuracy of the official record. 37
FIGURE G1 ROLL CALL VOTES MISSED Percentage of key roll call votes missed, by council member 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 8.0% 8.0% 38
FIGURE G2 ATTENDANCE RECORD Percentage meeting attendance rate, by council member. 78.6% 85.7% 92.9% 92.9% 92.9% 96.2% 97.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 39
FIGURE G3 MEETINGS MISSED Amount of meetings missed to date, by council member. PERFORMING OTHER COUNCIL BUSINESS NO REASON FOR ABSENCE 1 1 1 1 2 2 40
SECTION H: TAX RESTRAINT When given a list of relevant issues, Calgarians expressed concern about the city s cost of living and demonstrated a preference to hold the line on taxes rather than increase taxes to improve city services. Figure H1 uses a tax restraint score to depict how often, out of the financial roll call votes selected, each council member voted to hold the line on, or reduce, spending when given the opportunity. For example, Councillor Colley-Urquhart voted to hold the line on or reduce spending 86.2% of the time. Further analysis and subsequent scores on other issues, such as development and planning, will be possible when a larger sample pool of votes becomes available. Figure H2 compares the tax restraint scores of the newly elected Calgary City Council with that of the 2010-2013 term. Note that in the case of freshman council members, the score of the ward s previous representative is used for comparison. 41
FIGURE H1 TAX RESTRAINT SCORE Percentage scale. 100 points means that the individual always votes to hold the line 0n, or reduce spending when given the opportunity. 24.1% 24.1% 27.6% 37.9% 37.9% 40.3% 44.8% 44.8% 44.8% 52.0% 58.6% 58.6% 65.5% 65.5% 75.9% 82.8% 86.2% 42
FIGURE H2 TAX RESTRAINT SCORE COMPARISON Comparison of tax restraint scores measured from October 2010 - March 2013 and October 2013 - April 2014. Note: In the case of newly elected council members (*), the ward s previous representative s score is used for comparison. COUNCIL MEMBER 2010-2013 SCORE 2013-2014 SCORE CHANGE IN SCORE Stevenson 42.5 24.1-18.4 Woolley* 34.2 (Mar) 24.1-10.1 Chabot 75.3 65.5-9.8 Nenshi 50.7 44.8-5.9 Jones 49.3 44.8-4.5 Demong 68.5 65.5-3.0 Keating 58.9 58.6-0.3 Pootmans 28.8 37.9 +9.1 Farrell 16.4 27.6 +11.2 Sutherland* 63 (Hodges) 75.9 +12.9 Carra 28.8 44.8 +16.0 Pincott 21.9 37.9 +16.0 Magliocca* 21.9 (Lowe) 58.6 +36.7 Colley-Urquhart 31.5 86.2 +54.7 Chu* 20.5 (Macleod) 82.6 +62.3 All 612.2 779.1 +166.9 43
CONCLUSION As final test cases, Figures I1 & I2 overlay and combine the previously identified coalitions (pages 22-29) on the tax restraint (page 42) and council voting position data (page 23). It s hard to follow what goes on at City Hall, but it can be made easier through technology. The Manning Foundation for Democratic Education remains committed to developing technological tools to enable voters to monitor the effectiveness of the representation they receive. The Democratic Toolbox as a platform for city council vote tracking is able to simplify and summarize, in a highly accessible way, the large amount of raw data being produced by Canadian council chambers. Despite the inherent challenges of politics and subjectivity, it is possible to produce impartial and robust statistical measures of Councillor behaviour and performance. Technology and multimedia can also enable the public to better understand the substance of what is being discussed by City Council, both in public session and behind closed doors. Research is just beginning in this area, and will expand to tackle more policy issues and other municipalities. Since September 2013, the Manning Foundation pilot Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City Councillor Vote Tracking has been downloaded more than 10,000 times, demonstrating a clear demand for further efforts in this area. While this performance report only represents a snapshot of the record to date, subsequent analysis will be published digitally online and made available at CouncilTracker.ca, in order to provide citizens with the technology they need to better track and hold accountable the level of government closest to them. 44
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank policy analyst Angela MacLeod Irons for her help in collecting, summarizing much of the data on the newly elected Calgary City Council referenced in this report. John Whittaker was also instrumental in reviewing and compiling a portion of the data collected. Furthermore, the author is indebted to Dr. Tom Flanagan s work on Game Theory and Canadian Politics (University of Toronto Press, 1998) which broke ground in this area and highlighted how detailed analysis of legislatures not only challenges intuitions, but can produce new, and oftentimes, surprising conclusions. Last, but hardly the least: Morten Paulsen, Olivier Ballou, Brianna Heinrichs, Samantha Leclerc, David Seymour and Preston Manning have all provided tremendous creative support and encouragement throughout this project s various stages of development. The author, the Democratic Toolbox, and the pursuit of responsible government in Calgary and afar have been well served by those named above. 46
NOTES 1. This report s introduction and justification for theoretical framework largely reiterates that of the initial September 20 2013 Manning Foundation pilot Growing the Democratic Toolbox: City Councillor Vote Tracking and its accompanying November 6 2013 opinion editorial You can t slight city hall, (Preston Manning, Globe and Mail). For more information on that study please visit http://www.manningfoundation.org/our-work 2. For more information regarding the poll and its methodology please visit the Municipal Survey Report, hosted online at http://www.manningfoundation.org/our-work 3. For an expanded digital version of this report containing database copies of all the votes studied, as well as the source data used to build each of the figures composing this report, please visit the digital version of the Democratic Toolbox hosted at http://www.counciltracker.ca or http://www.manningfoundation.org/our-work 4. The following sixteen general, special, organizational, and strategic meetings of council were used to generate this report: 2013-12-02, 2013-11-04, 2013-11-05, 2013-12-10, 2014-02-10, 2014-03-10, 2014-01-13, 2013-12-16, 2013-01- 17, 2014-03-17, 2013-11-18, 2014-02-24, 2013-11-25, 2014-01-27, 2013-10-28, 2014-01-31, & 2014-03-31. 5. Records of meetings of Council and its Committees that have occurred since October 31, 2010 can be viewed on ELMS, the City of Calgary s Electronic Legislative Management Solution, hosted online at: http://agendaminutes. calgary.ca/sirepub/meetresults.aspx 47
UPCOMING PAPERS The Manning Foundation is building intellectual capital for municipal governance in five streams of public policy enquiry. Each stream will include a series of public policy papers designed to stimulate new thought about the role of municipal government in society. Manning Foundation research papers are placed in the public domain via the Foundation s website and are available for review, debate, criticism and support by Canadians regardless of their political affiliation. 1. ORGANIC CITIES An enquiry into how cities grow and what role government should play in regulating growth and providing infrastructure, with the goals of economic efficiency and liveability. Much of the debate around municipal development is based around what urban forms are desirable, with sprawlers and smart growthers alike arguing that land-use regulation and infrastructure provision should favour their optimal urban form. The Organic Cities project takes a different perspective: that what is important is not the urban form that emerges, but the processes that are in place, particularly the role of government. On this view, it is more important that the market is left free to serve consumer demand, with the important constraints being property rights and the real costs of infrastructure provision rather than land-use regulations. Upcoming papers include enquiries into the economics of consultation processes so in vogue at city halls across the country and the effects of future advances in vehicle technology. 2. APPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES An enquiry into the optimal role of government, with a positive analysis of what municipal government currently does and a normative analysis of what roles government is best equipped to fill. These roles broadly divide into an ownership role, a regulatory role, and an expenditure role each of which can be over or under played. This stream builds on concepts such as market failure, public goods and subsidiarity to identify which activities municipal government does or does not have a comparative advantage over other levels of government. Upcoming papers include enquiries into the proper role of municipal government as a regulator and as a distributor of wealth. 48
3. CITIZEN SOVEREIGNTY An enquiry into how well citizens can hold government to account, including monitoring of its activities and protecting their natural rights. This stream investigates standards of municipal accounting and performance reporting, open government, public safety and intergenerational equity. It considers concepts such as open government and open data, and property rights. Future papers in this series include enquiries into the quality of performance reporting, intergenerational equity with respect to municipal government and open data projects. 4. THE OPEN SOCIETY Open societies share power among a range of different institutions, unlike closed societies where it is vested in just one. The Open Society is an enquiry into the role of different institutions in the city, including the church, charities and associations. This stream has a historical element, it considers how these different elements have interacted in the past and may do so in the future. Upcoming papers include an account of the role of civil society in building Calgary. 5. MUNICIPAL ISSUE PAPERS This stream covers basic elements of public policy, including an introduction to the role of government at municipal level, briefings on areas of municipal policy and issue papers framed in terms of values, facts and ideas of conservatism applied to municipal policy. Particularly salient policy areas include public safety, mobility and affordability. MANNING FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION www.manningfoundation.org info@manningfoundation.org 403.536.8585 514 11 Ave SW Calgary, AB T2R 0C8 49
ABOUT THE AUTHOR JEROMY ANTON FARKAS is the creator of, and leads the Manning Foundation s Democratic Toolbox project to develop better tools to achieve effective democracy and responsible government. For six years prior to joining the Manning Foundation as a Senior Researcher, Farkas was the Program Administrator for the University of Calgary Israel Studies Doctorate Program. He has negotiated international policy projects and partnerships on behalf of the University of Calgary, and has served as a research team lead and data analyst for the Faculties of Social Sciences, Arts, Medicine, and Veterinary Medicine. 50
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