Chad (Reinsertion, 2005-2010) Basic data Population: 10 million (2006) Yes Food emergencies: IDPs: 179,940 Refugee population: 36,300 GDP: $6.5 billion (2006) Per capita income: $480 (2006) HDI 0.388, 170th GDI: 0.370, 153th Military expenditure: 0.91% Social / military expenditure: Social greater than military Military population: 0.25% Arms embargo: No Summary Type of DDR Groups to demobilise Executive bodies Budget Timeline Status / synopsis Bilateral demobilisation of militias and armed forces with child soldiers in a situation of regional insecurity 9,000 soldiers, some of whom were already demobilised in previous years National Committee for Reinsertion The World Bank calculates a cost of $10 million From December 2005 to 2010, in total 60 months The government signed an agreement with UNICEF, in which it promised to cooperate in demobilisation tasks for hundreds of child soldiers who operate both in the armed forces (some 300 according to a study conducted by UNICEF) and in armed opposition groups. Context Conflict A thwarted coup d état in 2004 and constitutional reforms boycotted by the opposition in 2005 are responsible for the insurgency whose aim is to overthrow the authoritarian government of Idriss Déby and whose activities intensified in 2006. The opposition group aggravating this is led by the volatile United Front for Democratic Change in Chad coalition (FUC, in French Front Uni pour le changement démocratique au Tchad), which is composed of diverse groups and soldiers disaffected by the regime, including the Foundation for Change, National Unity and Democracy (SCUD, in French Scole pour le changement, l unité nationale et la démocratie). We can add to this antagonism between Arab tribes and the black population on the border with Sudan. This tension is linked to the spread of the war in the Darfur region of Sudan, as a result of crossborder operations by Sudanese armed groups and the Janjaweed Sudanese pro-government Arab militias. The Janjaweed have attacked Darfurian refugee camps and villages in the east of Chad. This has contributed to a rise in tension between Chad and Sudan, who support the respective insurgencies which favour them. 1 1 Adapted from School for a Culture of Peace (2008:27).
Peace process On 24 December 2006, the government of Chad and the FUC signed a peace agreement to end all military action, free prisoners held by both sides, proclaim a general amnesty, and conduct a reinsertion and resettlement process for FUC combatants. The peace agreement specified a Joint Commission to apply the agreement. Later, at the start of October 2007, the government and four main armed opposition groups from the east of Chad reached a peace agreement with assistance from Libyan President Muammar al- Gaddafi in Tripoli. Whilst the Chadian authorities assert the agreement is definitive, the armed groups consider it to be a simple declaration of principles. According to one group of signatories, the agreement is a framework containing the broad lines of a national agreement. As such, the agreement established a ceasefire lasting until the end of October 2007, which would permit time to advance negotiations, an amnesty, to gather insurgents, to have rebel leaders enter government, and to integrate combatants into the armed forces. However, technical questions and modes of application for this await negotiations (Accord de Paix 2006). Transitional justice In February 2007, the government announced a project to grant a general amnesty to militants and sympathisers of the FUC armed opposition group, who signed a peace agreement with the government in 2006. Later, the government freed more than 400 FUC prisoners (School for a Culture of Peace 2006). Other disarmament initiatives In 1993, the National Commission for Disarmament was founded. However, it has not fulfilled its role of collecting small arms from the population. In 2000, the Mixed Security Committee was created to explore paths to disarmament. At the regional level, Chad denied, at the start of 2006, accusations it was equipping Sudanese armed opposition groups operating in Darfur with military materials. It said these accusations were being utilised to justify attacks by Khartoum on its national territory. Background to DDR The government of Chad already has experience with DDR. In addition to demobilisations carried out from 1992 to 1997, the government conducted a pilot project in 1999 involving 2,800 demobilised persons, with $3 million support from the World Bank and $1.1 million from the German S, but it was interrupted before the end of its term due to malfunctioning (Dingamadji 2004). Period Demobilised persons Support Budget 1992-1996 20,000 soldiers French cooperation $8.3 million 1996-1997 7,179 officials and sub-officials World Bank $8.3 million 1992-97 (pilot programme) Programme design 2,800 ex-combatants World Bank GTZ Source: Dingamadji (2004) $3 million $1.1 million Type and designation of DDR National Programme for Disarmament and Reintegration (NPDR) Bilateral demobilisation of militias and armed forces in a context of regional insecurity
Executive bodies In 2003, the government of Chad asked the National Committee for Reinsertion, an affiliate of the Ministry of Economic Planning and Cooperation, to design a new partial demobilisation programme for the armed forces. This programme became the National Agency for Reinsertion at the start of 2005. Its duties are to identify groups to target, understand necessities, and identify income-generating activities, whether through orientation to job searching or through specific programmes. Its offices became the Interregional Sections for Reinsertion (ISR) and now cover all Chad (Channel Research 2005). Basic principles The basic goals of the programme in Chad involve the reintegration and resettlement of members of armed opposition groups and security-sector reform. Groups to demobilise There are 9,000 soldiers to demobilise, some of whom were already demobilised in previous years but who did not benefit from reintegration programmes then. Regarding the FUC and the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT, in French Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad), the number of combatants to demobilise remains undetermined. Attention to dependents of these demobilised persons is being taken into account. According to reports published in May 2007, armed opposition groups contain more than 1,000 child soldiers in their ranks. Negotiations are in the works for the demobilisations of these youth. Budget The World Bank calculates an expense of $10 million. The World Bank has contributed $5 million, according to a decision approved in June 2005. However, Chad s breaking of agreements over the management of benefits from oil triggered the World Bank to freeze all credit and donations it had approved with Chad. Japan contributed $437,000 (World Bank 2005). Schedule From December 2005 to 2010, in total 60 months (World Bank 2005). Phases Demobilisation Demobilisation involves a preparation phase which includes awareness-raising, advice, orientation, and training adapted to the necessities of ex-combatants, as well as offers from the market on income-generating activities. For combatants demobilised during the 1992-97 period, the initial phases of awareness-raising and orientation will be excluded (Channel Research 2005). Reintegration The reintegration phase consists of a control agency taking charge of demobilisation in accordance with the interests combatants express in the orientation phase. Once inserted into the proper regional agencies, the phase of re-adaptation to civil life commences. For this, three basic economic activities have been identified. These include - Vocational training - Placement in a Control Agency, in the public or private sector - Realisation of preferably collective micro-projects for employment-generating activities
There is also a social component involved in providing assistance to demobilised persons. This is centred on sanitary services, principally awareness around HIV/AIDS, education, and accommodation via state social services (World Bank 2005). Evolution Reinsertion and reintegration The government of Chad signed an agreement with UNICEF in which it promised to cooperate in demobilisation tasks for hundreds of child soldiers who operate both in the armed forces (some 300 according to a study conducted by UNICEF) and in armed opposition groups. UNICEF Representative in Chad Stephen Adkisson denounced the heavy use of minors in armed groups and said his task to demobilise them would not be simple, since they needed to be identified and efforts needed to be consolidated to return and reintegrate them into communities. Human Rights Watch stated in a report on child soldiers in Chad that the government has not complied with the promise it made in May 2007 with UNICEF to demobilise and reintegrate child soldiers present in the armed forces and in paramilitary groups. Thousands can still be found in military and paramilitary ranks. Human Rights Watch stated also that despite the demobilisation of a few hundred minors, none belonged to the armed forces but to paramilitary groups allied to the government. The government did not permit UNICEF to visit two military bases in conflict zones in the east of the country. In answer to the Human Rights Watch report, the Chadian government claimed the process is unravelling slowly but surely and highlighted difficulties in implementing the project, such as the large number of minors to demobilise and the lack of infrastructure for guaranteeing adequate reintegration. The government also claimed that the fact that minors had not demobilised did not mean they were active in the armed forces. Lessons learned - Bad past experience - Poorly defined legal framework - Inadequate institutional framework (Alusala, 2007) Bibliography and resources Accord de Paix entre la République du Tchad et le Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique (FUC) (2006). Tripoli: 24 December. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/khii-6wv5sb>. Alusala, N. (2007). Disarmament in Chad. Inability or incapability?, in Armed Conflict and Disarmament. Selected Central African Case Studies. ISS Monograph, No. 129. Pretoria: ISS. pp. 57-70, March. Channel Research (2005). Projet de Démobilisation et Réinsertion des ex-soldats au Tchad. Résumé des rapports de la mission. Brussels: Channel Research. <http://www.channelresearch.com/dwnld>. Dingamadji, S. (2004). Synthese du Programme de Demobilisation et de Reinsertion en Republique du Thchad. Presented at the Séminaire sur les méthodes de suivi et d utilisation de systèmes de gestion de l information dans les programmes de DDR, MDRP, Kibuyé, Rwanda, 10-13 August, 2003. Eschborn: GTZ, 2004. <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/fr-mdrp-seminar-compl-2003.pdf>. School for a Culture of Peace (2006). Chad. Ficha de Justicia Transicional. Bellaterra, Spain: SCP. <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/derecho/justicia/ficha002.pdf>.
(2008). Alert 2008! Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding. Barcelona: Icaria. <http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/alerta/alerta/alerta08i.pdf>. World Bank (2005). Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Fund Annual Report 2004. Washington: World Bank. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/intphrd/resources/phrd2004_ar.pdf>. Glossary FUC GTZ HRW ISR MDJT NPDR SCUD UNICEF Front Uni pour le Democratique Change German Cooperation Agency Human Rigths Watch Interregional Sections for Reinsertion Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad National Programme for Disarmament and Reintegration Socle pour le Changement et l Unite Democratique United Nations Funds for Children