FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DOMESTIC SUPPORT *

FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DOMESTIC SUPPORT * Vinsensio Dugis ** Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. You are either with us or you are with the terrorists. (George W. Bush, September 20, 2001) We have been working very hard to clean our house and courtyard, and are closely cooperating with other countries to fight the global network of terrorism. (Megawati Soekarnoputri, September 23, 2003) Introduction Terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 in New York City and Washington D.C. (hereafter September 11) have undeniably brought about significant impacts to the United States of America (US) and its relations with the rest of the world. Domestically it has forced the US government to re-evaluate the position of the US as a superpower because, as Cox argues, September 11 has proven that just like other nations the US is deeply vulnerable. 1 Internationally, September 11 has also affected the manner in which the US has since managed relations with other nations. Others argued that it had marked the end of the post- Cold War era, 2 and had transformed the agenda of US foreign policy. 3 Nevertheless, September 11 impelled the Washington administration to declare a war against terrorism, a war that has prompted different responses from other nations. What did September 11 mean for Indonesia? How did initially Indonesia respond to the US war on terror, and what should be consistently done in facing the challenge of terrorism toward international security? Learning from what has happened since September 11 and taking into consideration to what has been going on since Bali Bombing * Presented as a background paper in the One Day International Seminar, International Security: Facing the Challenge of Terrorism conducted by The Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Airlangga University, held in Surabaya on November 10 th 2009. ** Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Airlangga University, Surabaya, Indonesia. 1 Philip B. Heymann, Dealing with Terrorism, An Overview, International Security, Vol. 26 no. 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 24-38; Michael Cox, American power before and after 11 September: dizzy with success? International Affairs, Vol. 78 no. 2, 2002, pp. 262-3. 2 Stephen M Walt, Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy, International Security, Vol. 26 no. 3, Winter 2001/2, pp. 56-78. 3 Barry R. Posen, The Struggle against Terrorism, Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics, International Security, Vol. 26 no. 3, Winter 2001/02, pp. 39-55; Joseph V. Montville, New Foreign Policy Directions Like Harry Truman, George W. Bush has been forced to shoulder tremendous problems outside America, World and I, Vol. 17 no. 2, February 2002, p. 32. 1

in 2002, this paper would ague that international cooperation coupled with full domestic support should be constantly carried out in facing the challenge posed by terrorism toward international security. The Onset of the War against Terrorism Terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 were unparalleled in scale, symbolism and impact. These attacks were highly destructive in terms of loss of lives, property, and economic opportunities. Three thousand civilians lost their lives as a result. 4 It was against this backdrop that the US soon adopted and carried out policies aimed at countering terrorism. In his first speech on the day of the attacks, the US President, George W. Bush, assured the Americans that immediate responses were underway to search for those acting behind those attacks, and for that he would use all intelligence resources and law enforcement communities. He promised to make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them, and also mentioned that the US and its allies would stand together and join with other parties wanting peace and security in the world in order to win the war against terrorism. 5 This was clearly an indication that the US saw the event of September 11 as a declaration of war by the terrorists; a war which obliged the US to launch a counter-war against it. At about the same time, the US Attorney General proposed a new Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (ATA). Eventually the President signed it into law, titled the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act. It is since known widely by its acronym USA PATRIOT. This has been a far-reaching legislative package intended to strengthen the US defence against terrorism. Its provisions vastly expand the authority of US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to monitor private communications, even access to personal information. 6 Equally, it has brought many changes to criminal, immigration, banking, and intelligence law. 7 Thus, it has become a powerful legislation offering a strong legal foundation for the US to conduct 4 The Associated Press database of those confirmed dead, reported dead or missing in the September 11 attacks. http://www.attacksvictims.ap.org/totals.asp (accessed 15/4/2003). 5 Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200/09/20010911-16.htm (accessed, 13/2/2003). 6 USA PATRIOT Act as Passed by Congress. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism At (Oct. 25, 2001) http://www.eff.org/privacy/surveillance/terrorism/20011025_hr3162_usa_patriot_bill.html (accessed, 13/2/2003). 7 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, Double Standards and Constitutional Freedom in the War on Terrorism, (New York and London: The New Press, 2003), p. 57. 2

war against terrorism, as it is clearly worded in the Act s opening sentence, To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes. 8 The US administration has since continued to develop its national and international security strategy in order to bring it into line with what it perceives as the terrorist threat and the urgent need to decisively counter it. A series of speeches were delivered by President Bush culminating with the publication of a document titled The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) on 20 September 2002. The NSS is a grand strategy defining US policy priorities in eight substantive sections. It pronounces that the US views itself as possessing unprecedented and unequalled strength and influence in the world but obliges the US to use it for the promotion of a balance of power that favours freedom. It proclaims the US acknowledges that catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few pose a more dangerous threat than fleets and armies of states, and therefore these threats must be prevented and defeated. The NSS also advocates the attainment of peace, prosperity, and liberty that will be based on a distinctly American internationalism by embracing political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. In order to achieve this, the US will simultaneously strengthen alliances to prevent and defeat global terrorism including threats of using weapons of mass destruction and if necessary act preemptively, ignite economic globalisation through free markets and trade, uphold democratisation by building the infrastructure of democracy, and transform the US security institutions to meet future challenges and opportunities. 9 While many seem to agree that the release of the NSS has marked fundamental change in the US international security policy, it has also sent waves around the world and has invited wide criticism. 10 Some critics see the NSS as a reflection of the US intention to apply a unilateral approach in handling security issues, an approach that will eventually make the essence of institutional organizations such as the UN irrelevant. Others have been of the view that the call for pre-emptive strikes as written in the NSS is dangerous because of its unpredictable nature and the possibility of the notion to spread. 11 8 USA PATRIOT Act as Passed by Congress, loc. cit. 9 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, D.C., September 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed, 5/7/2003). 10 Anthony York, Bush doctrine makes waves overseas, downloaded from the following source http://salon.com/news/feature/2002/09/24/overseasreaction/print.html (accessed, 5/7/2003). 11 These views are based on an analysis of 40 reports (editorials) between September 21 23 from 23 countries. Steven Wangsness, Bush Doctrine Viewed as Fundamental Policy Shift, cited in 3

Others even have called it as a manifesto for world dictatorship because the NSS has implied that the US will rule not according to the international law and norms but by what is in the US interests. 12 Regardless of different views about the NSS, nonetheless, it is certain that its establishment was shaped by the event of September 11 and its development has been influenced by the US post-september 11 efforts of waging war against terrorism. In other words, the NSS was a product of the events of September 11 and therefore it has become a basis for the US long-term war against terrorism. Indonesia & September 11; Challenge and Opportunity At the time of September 11, Indonesia was in a unique position as far as its relations with the US went, because President Megawati was preparing for her already scheduled first visit as President to the US where the main agenda of the visit was to seek economic assistance for solving Indonesia s economic difficulties. Indeed Indonesia had just passed through a domestic leadership change that had brought Megawati to power but faced formidable challenges; one being to continue improving the economy that had been badly affected by the 1997 economic crisis. Arguably, Indonesia s unique position influenced the way Jakarta viewed and responded to September 11. On hearing of the terrorist attacks on September 11 in New York and Washington D.C., Jakarta immediately joined other nations condemning those attacks. The Indonesian government expressed its deep sorrow and sent its condolences and sympathy. 13 Indonesia joined global and regional organizations issuing declarations and statements similarly condemning those attacks. At the 7 th Summit of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) on 5 November 2001, together with other ASEAN members, Indonesia issued a declaration on joint action to counter terrorism with the view that the act of terrorism is a profound threat to international peace and security, which requires concerted actions to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and the security of the world. With ASEAN Indonesia jointly rejected any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race. 14 The September 11 terrorist attacks happened at a time when Indonesia had just passed through a difficult domestic political change. The Megawati-led government had come into power only two months earlier following the successful impeachment of http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/09/mil-020923-wwwh2923.html (accessed, 5/7/2003). 12 Margo Kingston, Manifesto for world dictatorship, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 September 2002. 13 RI extends deep sorrow to U.S. govt, condemns attack on WTC, Pentagon, Jakarta Post, 13 Sept. 2001. 14 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 5 November 2001. 4

President Gus Dur by the MPR on 23 July 2001. The newly installed government was still haunted by unresolved economic difficulties worsened by the postponement of the IMF s loan following a long political battle between Gus Dur and the parliament. President Megawati s cabinet, announced on 19 August 2001, was still less than a month old and her economic team were still in the process of resuming relations with the IMF and the World Bank. Thus from the beginning Megawati s government had to face formidable challenges. It was under this context that the timing of the September 11 terrorist attacks could not have come at a worse time for Indonesia. It happened when President Megawati was preparing for her first official visit to the US, scheduled on 19 September 2001, only a week later. One of its agreed agenda items was to be a summit meeting with President Bush. From the Indonesian perspective, President Megawati s visit to the US embodied a substantial economic agenda, with the chief aim being to seek economic assistance and further cooperation for normalising Indonesia s economic life. Taken into account all this, it would certainly not serve Indonesia s interests if Washington ended up cancelling it. In fact, it would be an unfortunate situation for Indonesia if, due to those terrorist attacks, Megawati s scheduled visit did not occur. The events of September 11 entirely changed the situation. The war on terrorism immediately became the US prime interests with a priority being to search for the parties acting behind the attacks. As well as pledging to use all its own intelligence resources and law enforcement apparatuses, Washington challenged other nations to join it in the war against terrorism. 15 The US objective was certainly to win the war. This meant therefore that, when dealing with the US, others should anticipate that Washington would be almost certain to use its main objective of the war against terrorism as its bargaining position. In other words, Washington would provide what other nations wanted from it, but in exchange it would require them to support US campaign on the war against terrorism. Thus, looking from other nations perspectives, while the US challenged them to be either with the US or with the terrorists, at the same time the US provided opportunity for others to achieve what they sought after from the US. The question was then, how far did other nations want to take advantage or use the offered opportunity from the US? In the case of Indonesia, although there was initial concern in Jakarta that the September 11 attacks might result in the cancellation of Megawati s scheduled visit, the Indonesian authorities were well aware of the new situation the US was facing. The 15 As stated in Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200/09/20010911-16.html (accessed, 13/2/2003). 5

Indonesian authorities were of the view that if Megawati s visit did go ahead, it would certainly attain more significant political meaning because of the new situation. In other words, Megawati s visit would not just become important for serving Indonesia s interests, but Washington could equally use it for the purpose of its overall call on the war against terrorism. Not only would Megawati have the best chance to directly make a point to her counterpart about Indonesia s position on the events of September 11, including Jakarta s position on the likely retaliations that would be taken by the US, but she would be the first leader from a country with the largest Muslim population visiting the US in the immediate wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Within this context, Indonesia not only would directly face the challenge from the US ( either you are with us or with the terrorists ), but also was presented with an opportunity to take advantage from the situation in further pursuing Jakarta s interests from Washington. Jakarta appeared to not only be aware of the new situation mentioned above, but equally eager to take advantage from it. But how far was it willing to compromise with the US if Jakarta did want to take advantage of the opportunity? Was it ready to fully support the US led-war against terrorism? On 14 September 2001 President Megawati held a ministerial cabinet meeting after Washington informed Jakarta that Megawati s summit meeting with President Bush would go ahead as scheduled. As the notion of taking advantage from the opportunity provided by the US in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks was building, however, concerns also emerged. Some non-pdi-p legislators, including the Speaker of the MPR, Amien Rais from the PAN Party, and religious leaders, suggested that it would be appropriate for Megawati to postpone or even cancel the visit. After meeting Vice-President Hamzah Haz from the religious party PPP, Yusuf Hasyim, the leader of a noted Islamic Boarding School, Tebu Ireng in Jombang, East Java, argued that it would not be in Indonesia s interest if something happened while Megawati was in the US. 16 The Speaker of the DPR, Akbar Tanjung from the Golkar Party, made the concern obvious. Although stopping short of saying that Megawati should not be going ahead with her scheduled visit to the US, Tanjung warned her to take precautions when the visit did take place, emphasising that she needed to make measured comments about September 11, avoiding Indonesia being 16 Megawati s Trip to USA Still On, Kompas, (online English version), 15 September 2001. 6

involved too far in the ongoing events because Washington s reactions would be likely have significant international ramifications. 17 In the meantime, public opinion concerning the appropriate time of Megawati s visit was almost half divided. An opinion poll conducted by Tempo magazine showed 50.1 percent respondents supporting Megawati s visit and 48.3 percent opposing it, while around 1.6 percent did not know. The support view reasoned that President Megawati s visit would benefit the Muslim world because it would allow her to show the friendly face of Islam. In contrast, the opposing view suggested that by visiting the US at the time Washington was preparing a retaliatory war would risk Indonesia being in the US side; indicating that Indonesia was bowing to the US. 18 As President Megawati was on her way to the US other signs of resistance emerged, this time from Vice President Hamzah Haz. In a statement that appeared to sour Indonesia s earlier sincere strong condemnation of the terrorist attacks on September 11, Haz expressed his doubt about what really happened on September 11, 2001. He stated in front of a Muslim gathering after Friday Prayers at Jakarta s main mosque that, hopefully, this tragedy [terrorist attacks on September 11] will cleanse the sins of the United States. We [Indonesia] are also concerned and regret deeply and condemn the act of terrorism toward the United States. But we also ask America not to make Islam a scapegoat. 19 The Vice President s comment paralleled statements by several leaders of known militant Muslim groups in saying that the September 11 terrorist attacks should serve as a lesson for the US, particularly in relation to Washington s policies toward Israel and Palestine. 20 These statements clearly indicated that there would be strong domestic resistance if Megawati opted to take sides with the US in the war against terrorism regardless of what Indonesia could gain from the US in return. This seemed to be a notion that went along with President Megawati when she eventually left Jakarta on 17 September 2001 for her visit to the US. 21 On 19 September 2001 President Megawati held a meeting with President Bush. Their meeting seemed to have touched many issues, reflected in a joint statement released 17 Tanjung urges Megawati to be cautious, op. cit. 18 Tempo, 30 September 2001, p. 11. 19 This is a full statement he gave to Kompas. Quoted in Anthony L. Smith, What the Recent Terror Attacks Mean for Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001, p. 16. 20 Vice President suggests anti-terrorism law, 19 Sept. 2001 http://www.laksamana.net (accessed, 13/3/2003). 21 Megawati to visit U.S. Sept. 17-24 as planned, loc. cit. See also Megawati Off to US amid Controversy over Deputy s Remarks, Associated Press, 17 September 2001. 7

following the meeting. 22 Acknowledging that the US and Indonesia are the second and the third largest democracies respectively, President Bush and President Megawati vowed to open a new era of bilateral cooperation on shared democratic values and a common interest in promoting regional stability and prosperity, and agreed that a strong bilateral partnership would not only benefit both countries but also the region, and the international community. President Megawati again condemned barbaric and indiscriminate acts against innocent civilians and assured Indonesia would work together with the international community in tackling terrorism. 23 The issue of terrorism, both within the context of the US-led war against terrorism and the issue of terrorism in Indonesia itself, was strongly believed to had been discussed in the meeting between the two Presidents. By this time, the US had developed significant intelligence information about terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia including Indonesia. 24 It can be guessed that President Bush presented part of this information to his counterpart, because it was then stated in the Joint Statement that both leaders agreed for their respective officials to soon discuss concrete ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism, in particular on capacity and institution building, and further affirmed an intention to expand cooperation to combat other transnational crimes, including piracy, organized crime, trafficking in persons, narcotics, and smuggling of small arms. 25 This resulted in the invitation by President Bush for Indonesia to participate in the US Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Afterwards, the US State Department sent a survey team to Jakarta to find out the Indonesian government s counter terrorism needs. 26 However, against what seemed the US high expectation, President Megawati only gave reserved support to the US-led war against terrorism. It was true that Megawati joined Bush to make the strongest condemnation of the September 11 terrorist attacks and pledged to join international cooperation to combat terrorism. Equally, both leaders reaffirmed commitments to the principles of religious freedom and tolerance in relations within and among nations, and underlined the importance of differentiating between the religion of Islam and the acts of violent extremists. 27 But President Megawati kept a 22 Joint Statement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 19, 2001. http://www.usembassyjakarta.org (accessed, 13/2/2003) 23 Ibid. 24 William M. Wise, Indonesia s War on Terror (Washington, D.C: United States-Indonesia Society, 2005, p. 26. 25 Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Republic of Indonesia, op. cit. 26 William M. Wise, loc. cit. 27 Bush, Megawati agree on separating religion from terror acts, Kyodo News, 24 September 2001. http://www.findarticles.com (accessed, 13/2/2003). 8

distance from making any direct involvement with the US in the course of war against terrorism. Apart from the promise of joining international cooperation in combating international terrorism, President Megawati did not make any further commitments. The reserved support President Megawati presented to the US indicated that she was fully aware of the potential backlash to her government and leadership should she offer full support toward the US-led war against terrorism. One source revealed that President Megawati did express her concern to President Bush during their meeting that her visit to Washington would create a political backlash in Indonesia. 28 From Afghanistan to Bali; Looking in the Future Afghanistan was the first target of the US war against terrorism on the grounds that Osama bin Laden operated al-qaeda with the full support of the Afghanistan s Taliban regime. It is argued here that domestic public pressure and the dynamics of domestic politics significantly influenced policies the Indonesian government adopted prior to and after the invasion took place. At the public level, oppositions to the US threat had already been aired soon after President Bush declared his threat to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It came out in the form of statements of leaders from various Muslim organizations, especially those known as militant groups 29, as well as mass demonstrations involving their members. Another form of public opposition to the US threat was public demonstrations, involving particularly mass Muslim groups that often took turns to participate. Most demonstrations began in the capital city, Jakarta, but by the third week of September 2001, the occurrence of similar demonstrations had also spread out to other major cities such as Surabaya, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Malang, Makasar and Jember, to name a few. While at the public level oppositions toward the US threat to Afghanistan was clear, this was not so at the government level. There was an impression that the government was indecisive in giving its response. This was particularly so, because even when President Megawati was on her visit to the US, none of her statements indicated clearly whether or not Indonesia rejected the US threat. 28 William M. Wise, loc. cit., based on Wise s interview in Washington, 4 May 2005, p. 97. 29 The term militant groups here refers specifically to organizations that often use violent acts in their efforts to achieve their aims. 9

When declaring the war against terrorism, the US pledged to use any resource and employ any strategy. 30 An integral strategy was to pressure governments whose countries were allegedly being used as terrorist breeding grounds to take necessary measures against the claimed terrorist groups and their activities. 31 As the US began preparations to strike Afghanistan, a handful of seemingly speculative press reports were published referring to Indonesia being a possible new shelter for Osama bin Laden. Several local newspapers and internet sites cited claims by Indian newspapers on 15 and 16 September 2001 that bin Laden might have left Afghanistan and set up a new sanctuary in Indonesia. Then a month latter, serious press revelations started to come out. On 10 October 2001, The New York Times ran a report that American Action Is Held Likely in Asia. 32 Citing unnamed US official sources, it claimed that Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were among the likely targets of future covert and overt activities of the US-led war against terrorism, because there were indications of al-qaeda s presence. Muslim militias in the three countries were believed to have received training with financial, equipment and personal support from al-qaeda. Soon other press reports followed with their revelations mostly strengthening the notion that the US might intend to launch another operation against terrorism outside Afghanistan. Washington was reported to have declared Southeast Asia as the second front 33 and another important front in the war against terrorism. 34 In December 2001, The International Herald Tribune reported that the US Department of State had identified the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia as a potential al-qaeda hub, and depicted the 30 In his first speech following the events of September 11, many regarding it as a declaration of counter-war against terrorism, President Bush assured Americans of immediate responses searching for those responsible and promised to use all intelligence resources and law enforcement communities. See Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html (accessed, 13/2/2003). This response was made even bolder in his State of the Union Address on 20 September 2001, that in order to achieve the aims of the responses toward the attacks, the US government will direct every resource at its command and will use every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed, 13/2/2003). 31 This is implied in Bush s well-known statement, Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists, ibid. See also, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed, 5/7/2003); and Philip B. Heymann, Dealing with Terrorism, An Overview, International Security, Vol. 26 no. 3, Winter 2001/02, pp.23-38. 32 Tim Weiner, American Action Is Held Likely in Asia, New York Times, 10 October 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/10/international/asia/10inte.html?ei=5070&en=214 (accessed, 13/3/2002). 33 US Steps into Asian Minefield, Australian Financial Review, 12 October 2001, p. 81. 34 Dana R. Dillon and Paolo Pasicolan, Southeast Asia and the War against Terrorism, Heritage Foundation s Backgrounder, No. 1496, 23 October 2001, p. 1. 10

presence of militant groups and their possible links with al-qaeda as a threat to the region and a challenge to the US; Indonesia s position within this hub was expounded. 35 By mid-october 2001, the US began openly confirming the allegations via a series of statements from its senior officials. On 17 October 2001, an Indonesian television network, Metro TV, interviewed the US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. Asked to comment about the presence of bin Laden s network, he bluntly responded that the links did exist in many more locations than the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, but added assurances that, in order to contain their threat, the US would prefer to act with the assistance of the government where the links existed. 36 In early November 2001, the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, who had been the US Ambassador for Indonesia from 1986 to 1989, made it clearer in an interview with the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) when he disclosed an apparent need for confronting al-qaeda in Indonesia, saying that this was not something that should wait until after it had been uprooted from Afghanistan. The reason, he argued, was that al- Qaeda has figured out that Southeast Asia was an easier place to operate, while a democratic Indonesia is just wide open. He insisted that, like the US, Indonesia faced similar challenges to preserve a fairly open democratic society and at the same time weed out terrorists. 37 Wolfowitz s statements went even further in an interview with the Indonesian Tempo magazine on 13 November 2001, when he declared that some terrorist incidents in Indonesia had been infiltrated by al-qaeda. He argued that one of the weaknesses of democratic states such as Indonesia and the US is the freedom for anyone to enter and leave the country, but unfortunately, al-qaeda s people were aware that they could enter and leave Indonesia without fearing police arrest. The US had proof that al- Qaeda took advantage of these circumstances, and therefore was more dangerous to Indonesia than to the US. 38 On 28 November 2001, Wolfowitz gave a similar account in another interview with the Indonesian SCTV television network, confidently asserting that 35 Michael Richardson, Southeast Asia Bars Help of US Troops, International Herald Tribune, 4 December 2001; and Chatarin E. Dalpino, Southeast Asia: A Second Front, Knight Ridder Newspapers, 21 December 2001. 36 Transcript: Armitage, October 17 Interview on Metro TV, Indonesia, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, for immediate release, October 17, 2001. 37 Interview by Michael Vatikiotis and Murray Hiebert with Paul Wolfowitz, Of Missiles and Terrorism, FEER, 8 November 2001, pp. 22-23. 38 Paul Wolfowitz: Aksi Teror di Indonesia Disusupi Al-Qaeda [Paul Wolfowitz: terror acts in Indonesia infiltrated by al-qaeda], Tempo, 25 November 2001. 11

al-qaeda s network existed in at least 60 countries including definitely the United States and pretty definitely Indonesia. 39 Initially, the media revelations appeared to surprise the Indonesian government. This prompted the Minister for Defence, Matori Abdul Djalil, to immediately send the Pentagon a letter seeking clarification of The New York Times report. 40 However, in what seemed to be a response, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, assured him that there would not be any plan of action outside Afghanistan and al-qaeda. Yet, Powell did not rule out American apprehension concerning the threat posed by the radical Muslim groups in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines as had been reported by the New York Times. 41 Apart from that quick response, however, scores of statements from many other Indonesian government officials generally dismissed the allegation. Denials came also from the DPR. The DPR Speaker, Akbar Tandjung contended that the US allegations could not be accepted as long as they came without concrete proof. 42 The number of denying statements from individual Indonesian government officials inevitably led many to view these denials as being the Indonesian government s official response to the allegation. However, the fact was that up until that stage there was no official response announced in regard to the allegation, a fact that only strengthened the view that denial was the government s official stance. The absence of Jakarta s official response, however, was not suggesting that Indonesia had a complete unwillingness to act. Apparently by this time authorities in Jakarta had started working in response to the United Nations (UN) resolution requesting collective international cooperation in blocking terrorist access to international financial support. This matter was specifically examined in a cabinet meeting involving ministers under the portfolio of the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs in late October 2001. The Minister for Communication, Syamsul Muarif, who participated in the meeting, acknowledged that the government was seriously determined to uproot all financial networks that aided the presence of terrorists, and its response would be based on Indonesia s existing laws. He added that the government would act in accordance with the 39 Transcript: Wolfowitz on Indonesian Television November 28. Official Text, Embassy of the United States of America, Jakarta, Indonesia, Public Affairs Section. Italics added by me. 40 Al-Qaeda di Asia dan Ketakutan Amerika [Al-Qaeda in Asia and America s apprehension], Tempo, 21 October 2001, p. 159. 41 Powell limits war to Afghanistan, BBC News, 10 October 2001, the printable version is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americs/1591396.stm (accessed, 13/3/2003). 42 Ibid. 12

UN Resolution No. 1373 stipulating international cooperation to freeze international financial support of terrorism. 43 In general, these earlier responses signalled domestic obstacles the Indonesian government might encounter in dealing with the pressure resulting from the allegations of a terrorist presence. However, judging from the denying statements mentioned above, concerns were lingering that Jakarta might not be prepared to take as tough actions against the allegations as the US had expected. A journalist suggested, the denying statements from Indonesian officials indicated that the government was divided on the issue. 44 On 12 December 2001 the Chief of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), Hendropriyono, after meeting with President Megawati, openly stated to the press in front of the Presidential Palace that Poso, a District in Central Sulawesi Province that has been torn by sectarian violent conflict between Muslims and Christians since 2000, was now a link-up spot for international terrorist and domestic radical groups. It was said that Poso s geographical location relatively far from control was ideal and conducive for the groups to convene and use the area as a training camp. Although he declined to provide details about which domestic radical groups he meant, claiming that details were being preserved for further investigations, 45 many believed that he was referring to Laskar Jihad, widely known for its involvement in sectarian conflicts both in Ambon and Poso. 46 Understandably, the statement came as a big surprise to many as this was the first time a senior Indonesian government officer had publicly stated that he believed that international terrorist organizations such as al-qaeda were in any way linked to Indonesia. It repudiated all previous denials by other government officials. However, instead of repudiating all doubts, it immediately sparked wide criticisms. Members of the DPR cast doubts, arguing that conflict in Poso was local in nature and had been going on for quite some time whereas the al-qaeda phenomenon had been international in scale and a 43 Akan Ratifikasi, Konvensi Terorisme [Indonesia will ratify convention on terrorism], Kompas, 1 November 2001. 44 Michael Richardson, Fearing backlash, Jakarta Doesn t Join in Crackdown on Radicals: Indonesia Divided Over Extremists, International Herald Tribune, 23 January 2002. 45 Muklis Ali, Jakarta says foreign terrorists involved in Sulawesi, Reuters, 12 December 2001; Kepala BIN Hendropriyono: Poso Jadi Ajang Link-Up Teroris Internasional [BIN s Chief Hendropriyono: Poso becomes link-up spot for international terrorism], Kompas, 13 December 2001. 46 Kirsten E. Schulze, Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon, op. cit; George Aditjondro, Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges (Paper prepared for the Conference on Conflicts and Violence in Indonesia, Humboldt University, Berlin, 3-5 July 2000); and George J. Aditjondro, Orang- Orang Jakarta Di Balik Tragedi Maluku, http://www.geocities.com/naulu67/gja08061.htm. (accessed, 15/9/2005) 13

relatively new issue for Indonesia. 47 Among the public, strong doubts and criticisms about Hendropriyono s statement prevailed as well. Maulani, Hendropriyono s predecessor as Chief of Intelligence, disputed his successor s statement, arguing that al-qaeda was an elite group that mainly targeted the US vital interests and did not involve itself in domestic communal conflicts; Poso was not the sort of typical region for al-qaeda s operation. 48 Joining in the criticising was former-president Abdurrahman Wahid who opined that such statements could lead to the notion of a necessity to invite in foreign forces in the name of the war on terror. Such a notion potentially instigated an unwanted domestic radicalisation. 49 The secretary of the Indonesian Muslim Ulema, (MUI) Din Syamsudin, echoed similar concerns. 50 Meanwhile militant groups such as the Laskar Jihad, the Committee for International Solidarity for World Islam (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI), and Hizbut Tahrir greeted the statement suspiciously. The Chairman of Hizbut Tahrir accused Hendropriyono of asking a favour from Washington 51 while the Laskar Jihad denied having any links with al-qaeda. 52 Analysts, intelligence experts, and even Western diplomats in Jakarta voiced similar scepticisms toward Hendropriyono s statement. 53 Harold Crouch, a widely regarded Australian foreign expert on Indonesia who at that time headed the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Jakarta was quoted as saying that [s]o it s been suggested to me by people, even within the [Indonesian] military, that Hendropriyono might be basically trying to blacken the name of Laskar Jihad by linking them with al-qaeda and it s also a way of impressing the Americans that Indonesia is taking firm action, even though the evidence that Laskar Jihad is deeply involved with al-qaeda is still pretty flimsy. 54 Clearly, Hendropriyono s statement resulted in a tug-of-war between him, supported by the Minister for Defence, and the doubters within the government and the public represented by the views of the figures mentioned above. It was this delicate 47 Sidang Kabinet: Sedang Diteliti, Keberadaan Jaringan Terorisme di Poso, op. cit. 48 Wawancara ZA Maulani, Mantan Kepala Bakin, al-qaeda Takkan Urusi Poso [Interview ZA Maulani, former Chief Intelligence, al-qaeda will not handle Poso], Republika, 14 December 2001. 49 Gus Dur: Jangan Undang Kekuatan Asing Masuk Indonesia [Gus Dur: don t invite foreign force to Indonesia], http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2001/12/15/0008.html (accessed, 15/9/2005). 50 Hendropriyono Dinilai Cari Muka [Hendropriyono accused of asking a favour ], Suara Merdeka, 14 December 2001. 51 Ibid. Hizbut Tahrir is a political party with Islam its ideology. It entered Indonesia in 1972 from its original establishment in Lebanon by Syaik Taqiyadin Al Nahan. After surviving Soeharto s oppression, it came to be known after his fall, S. Yunanto et al, op. cit., pp. 135-137. For more information, see Hizbut Tahrir s official website, http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id. 52 Laskar Jihad Bantah Keterlibatan al-qaeda di Poso [Laskar Jihad disputes al-qaeda s involvement in Poso], Tempo, 14 December 2001. 53 Indonesia to Begin War on Terror, op. cit. 54 Patricia Nunan, Sceptics Say No Proof of al-qaeda Links in Indonesia, op. cit. 14

situation that set up the tone of Indonesia s responses in dealing with the pressure to take actions against terrorist presence. On the surface it was constantly in denial mode, and was only able to cooperate with a limited capacity in facing the pressure to take action against suspected terrorist cells, until the Bali bombing tragedy in October 2002. The US pressure on Indonesia to take more concrete measures continued however. Citing a US official source, USA Today reported, Bush administration officials are pressing to get U.S. forces into the giant archipelago [Indonesia]. 55 Foreign pressures and warnings, however, were greeted sceptically and defiantly in Jakarta. Signs of scepticism and resistance became apparent. One scholar stressed that Vice-President Hamzah Haz, who also led the largest Islamic party, the United Development Party (PPP) was one of the chief sceptics. 56 Overall, the denials had two consequences. On the one hand, it frustrated the US and other Asian countries that had expected Indonesia to take a tougher stance. On the other hand, the domestic political situation presented obstacles hampering the Indonesian government from taking tougher measures against terrorist suspects. Clearly, as a leader of a weak coalition government depending on the support of Islamic political parties, President Megawati was reluctant to take strong actions against alleged terrorist or Muslim militant groups suspected to have links with terrorist organizations. This was in large part out of fear of Muslim backlash, because the government thought that a security crackdown on them could radicalise the moderate Muslim majority, if it were perceived as unjust and taken at American behest. 57 Faced with all the considerations mentioned above, Indonesia was only able to provide quiet support to the US, which, to a certain extent, was also possible after the US administration realised the likely difficulties the Indonesian authorities had to face if Washington continued to press Jakarta taking tougher action. At some point in early 2002 the Bush administration once thought of sending US troops to Indonesia. But by March 2002, Washington dropped the idea knowing that it would be counterproductive. In mid- March 2002, the FBI director, Robert Muller visited Jakarta and discussed other ways where cooperation was possible. Washington appeared to be aware that increasingly pushing Jakarta could work against the US. Therefore, with all the obstacles mentioned 55 Jonathan Weisman, Pentagon wants to send troops to Indonesia, USA Today, 19 March 2002; and Gay Alcorn, US push to hunt Indon al Qaeda, Age, 22 March 2002. 56 Michael S. Malley, Indonesia in 2002, the Rising Cost of Inaction, Asian Survey, Vol. 43 no. 1, 2003, p. 137. 57 Tatik Hafidz, op. cit., p. 6. 15

earlier, Indonesia s cooperation with the US was done behind the scenes. One field where the-behind-scenes cooperation took place was exchanges of intelligence information. Top US security officials, including the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Robert Muller, visited Indonesia and exchanged intelligence information with their Indonesian counterparts. 58 On the night of 12 October 2002 a bomb blast shattered the Sari Club and Paddy s Bar, two popular nightspots in Bali. The tragedy claimed 202 innocent lives from 21 countries, including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 22 British, 7 Americans, 6 Germans, 5 Swedes, 4 Dutch, 4 French, 3 Danish, 3 New Zealanders, 3 Swiss, 2 Brazilians, 2 Canadians, 2 Japanese, 2 South Africans, 2 South Koreans, 1 Ecuadorian, 1 Greek, 1 Italian, 1 Pole, 1 Portuguese, 1 Taiwanese, 3 unknown, and injured many more. 59 Indeed, the loss went beyond quantification because, as one journalist argued, we may be able to count the lives lost and shattered, compute the cost in dollars and cents, but we will never be able to add up the psychic and emotional toll of what happened that night. 60 On the same night, smaller bombs exploded near the US consulate in Bali and the Philippines consulate in Manado, the Indonesian city closest to the Philippines, but neither caused any casualties. As well as turning Bali from paradise into a smouldering hell, 61 the bombing compelled Indonesia to respond to the world s deadliest terrorist incident since the September 11 attacks. The bombing tragedy vividly brought to Indonesia the reality and immediacy of international terrorism. 62 For Indonesians in general and the Indonesian government in particular, the Bali bombing operated as an eye opener and wake-up call because it provided very clear 58 BI Belum Temukan Rekening Teroris [BI has not yet found terrorist account], Tempointeraktif, 25 October 2002. 59 Based on information from experts involved in the investigation, the Australian Herald Sun reported that due to its poor preparation, most of the 1.1 tonne mixture of chemicals used as bomb material had burnt instead of blowing up. That suggested that the bomb had not gone off fully as planned, which meant that the toll could have been even higher and worse. See, Keith Moor, Bali Bombing Could Have Been Worse, Herald Sun, 1 October 2003. For a more detail account, see also Keith Moor, Murder in Bali, Herald Sun, 2 October 2003. 60 Karl Taro Greenfeld, You Can t Put A Price On It, Time International, 28 October 2002. 61 Elisabeth Feizkhah, Slaughter of Innocents: A terrorist attack in peaceful Bali turns a paradise for young Western travellers into a smouldering hell, Time International, 21 October 2002. 62 Richard W. Baker, After Bali, Before Iraq, Comparative Connections, Vol. 4 no. 4, 2003, pp. 57-62. 16

evidence of the presence of at least home-grown terrorists 63 and marked an important watershed in recognising the presence of terror networks in Indonesia. 64 The Indonesian government immediately condemned the tragedy. The Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, argued that enough is enough to exclaim war against terrorism, but what would be urgently needed was to take concrete actions without hesitation. He publicly warned there should be a stop to making non-objective statements saying that there was no terrorism in Indonesia and asserted that the government would immediately increase international cooperation in order to eradicate terrorism. 65 The Minister for Defence, Matori Abdul Djalil, pointed to al-qaeda and its local associates as the parties responsible for the Bali tragedy. He was quoted as saying that, We are sure al-qaeda is here. The Bali bomb blast is linked to al-qaeda with the cooperation of local terrorists. 66 Similarly, Amien Rais, the Chairman of Indonesia s highest legislative body, the MPR, was quoted as saying that certainly the Bali bombing convinced Indonesians and the Indonesian government that Indonesians are involved in international terrorism. 67 When Minister Yudhoyono read out to the Indonesian public audience the government s general responding policies, he said, The Bali bombing should be a momentum for us [Indonesia] to deeply and seriously contemplate on what we [Indonesia] have done and what we [Indonesia] have to do as a nation. We will do so not because of pressure from the international community, but precisely because of our concern for the future of our own nation and our responsibility to protect the people and guarantee their safety from the cruel acts of terrorism. 68 But more importantly, as far as Indonesia s response to the allegation of terrorist presence was concerned, the Bali bomb significantly altered Indonesia s attitudes and responses. The tragedy eventually freed the government of President Megawati from major 63 Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesia dan Terorisme Internasional [Indonesia and international terrorism], Kompas, 17 October 2002; Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and the War on Terror on Southeast Asia, Asia Views, Vol. 24 no. 1, June 2004. 64 Bilveer Singh, The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58 no. 1, 2004, p. 47. 65 Pemerintah Nyatakan Perang terhadap Terorisme [Government declares war against terrorism], Kompas, 14 October 2002. 66 Menhan: Pelaku Insiden Bom Bali al-qaeda [Defence Minister: al-qaeda behind Bali Bombing], Kompas, 14 October 2002; Defence Minister blames al-qaeda for Bali Bombing, USA Today, 14 October 2002; BBC Indonesia, Matori tuding al-qaeda [Matori pointing to al-qaeda], 15 October 2002, http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesian/news/021014_balialqaeda.shtml (accessed, 15/3/2003); and Menhan Tetap Yakin al-qaeda Dibalik Peristiwa Bom Bali [Defence Minister convinced al-qaeda behind Bali Bombing], Kompas, 19 October 2002. 67 The Outlook Is Gloomy : An Interview with Amien Rais, Time International, 28 October 2002. 68 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Save Our Country from Terrorism (Jakarta: Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, 2002), pp. 3-4. 17