Why Scotland voted No

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Why Scotland voted No Presented at the IGS seminar on The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Future of the Multiethnic Nation State, UC Berkeley, September 2014 Rob Johns, Department of Government, University of Essex rajohn@essex.ac.uk

The campaign in three stages 1 2 3

Two waves of an multi-wave panel survey Conducted over the internet via YouGov: British Election Study Wave 2 June 2014 Data sources SRS pre-referendum wave 25 August-16 September 2014 Panel N =2,800 Marginals based on weighted data

Stage 1: why a big lead for No? Not a matter of identity

% of respondents Scottish > British identity 60 50 40 British Scottish 30 20 10 0 Not at all 2 3 4 5 6 Very strongly Self-reported national identities

Stage 1: why a big lead for No? Not a matter of identity Not a preference for multi-level governance

Where powers should lie Energy Welfare benefits Pensions Tax levels Immigration UK Scottish Defence & foreign affairs 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 % opting for UK/Scottish Parliament

Stage 1: why a big lead for No? Not a matter of identity Not a preference for multi-level governance Not widespread optimism about the Union

Consequences of remaining in Union UK government would cut spending available for Scottish public services Gap between rich and poor would get wider Westminster will transfer substantially more powers to the Scottish Parliament The UK will vote in a referendum to leave the European Union Trident submarines would remain based at Faslane on the Clyde Likely (%) Unlikely (%) 49 28 57 14 33 41 53 19 79 7 Welfare benefits will go down 54 14

Stage 1: why a big lead for No? Not a matter of identity Not a preference for multi-level governance Not widespread optimism about the Union Not widespread pessimism about independence

Consequences of independence The general economic situation in Scotland would be worse Likely (%) Unlikely (%) 41 38 Scotland would keep using the pound 56 26 Scotland would retain membership of the EU on similar terms Scotland would have a weaker voice in the world There would be passport and border controls between Scotland and England Scotland and the UK would arrange defence cooperation 41 39 47 35 25 57 48 25 I personally would be better off 23 42

Stage 1: why a big lead for No? Not a matter of identity Not a preference for multi-level governance Not widespread optimism about the Union Not widespread pessimism about independence So what, then? Fear, risk, uncertainty independence as an existential threat And how much people have to lose

Intending to vote 'Yes' 100% Yes voting by risk-willingness 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very How willing to take risks?

% intending to vote 'Yes' Yes voting by openness to experience 60 40 20 0 Least open 2 3 Most open

Q1: On a scale from 1 ( doesn t bother me ) to 10 ( utterly terrified ), what number best describes your reaction to that photo? Q2: Should Scotland be an independent country? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Yes No

Age Socioeconomic drivers of vote choice Female Lived ruk Age squared Born ruk Degree Protestant Catholic Income lowest 1/4 Income highest 1/4 Owner-occupier Social renter Fear unemployment -0.10-0.06-0.02 0.02 0.06 0.10 Effect on probability of Yes vote of 1 s.d. increase in predictor

Age Controlling for national identity Age squared Born ruk Degree Female Lived ruk Protestant Catholic Income lowest 1/4 Income highest 1/4 Owner-occupier Social renter Fear unemployment -0.10-0.06-0.02 0.02 0.06 0.10 Effect on probability of Yes vote of 1 s.d. increase in predictor

Stage 2: why did the gap narrow? More positive expectations of independence Personally better off Keep the pound Economy suffer Weaker voice in world Reduce inequality Stay in EU Sure about independence Sure about Union -0.4-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 Change in mean perceived likelihood

Expectations and decisions made Personal finances Economy Yes (vs. undecided) No (vs. undecided) Pound Inequality Voice in world EU membership Sure Independence Sure Union -0.4-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 Effect on probability of Yes/No of 1 s.d. increase in predictor

Stage 3: Why did the gap re-open?

Economic fears resurfacing

Identity provided core support for both camps But economic risk decided the outcome The median voter: Conclusions Feels more Scottish than British Wants almost all powers at Scottish level Questions legitimacy of Westminster government Optimistic about independence but economic doubts No campaign didn t change what Scots want; just scared them out of going for it Little Scottish support for this multi-ethnic state

Why Scotland voted No Presented at the IGS seminar on The Scottish Independence Referendum and the Future of the Multiethnic Nation State, UC Berkeley, September 2014 Rob Johns, Department of Government, University of Essex rajohn@essex.ac.uk