SAHEL Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Chad Humanitarian Crises Analysis January 2015

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SAHEL Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Chad Humanitarian Crises Analysis - 2015 January 2015 Each year, Sida conducts a humanitarian allocation exercise in which a large part of its humanitarian budget is allocated to emergencies worldwide. This allocation takes place in the beginning of the year as to ensure predictability for humanitarian organisations and to allow for best possible operational planning. In an effort to truly adhere to the humanitarian principles Sida bases its allocation decisions on a number of objective indicators of which the most important are related to the number of affected people, vulnerability of affected people and level of funding in previous years. One of the indicators is also related to forgotten crises in order to ensure sufficient funding also to low profile crises. Besides this initial allocation, another part of the humanitarian budget is set aside as an emergency reserve for sudden onset emergencies and deteriorating humanitarian situations. This reserve allows Sida to quickly allocate funding to any humanitarian situation throughout the year. Why the Sahel is analysed as a region when planning for humanitarian response The Sahel regional analysis highlights the humanitarian inter-linkages and commonalities between the different countries of the Sahel region. It is also a tool for shifting resources between the countries according to priorities and needs, as the food crisis situation may fluctuate quickly between the countries in the region on a yearly basis, depending on conflicts, rainfall and crops. The regional approach is also a way for Sida to explore how support can be given in a comprehensive, cohesive and effective way to respond to the underlying causes to humanitarian needs in the region. Given the chronic nature of the Sahel crisis this analysis proposes a number of complementary interventions and strategic linkages that aim at decreasing the humanitarian caseload by addressing predictable and cyclic disasters by other means than humanitarian funding. The analysis aspires to translate the commonly used phrase resilience into concrete and tangible measures. These measures aim at addressing the root causes of recurrent humanitarian crisis and reduce vulnerability to stress and chocks. The aim is to focus humanitarian resources to where they are most needed and to prepare for a hand over of the resilience oriented activities to longer-term development oriented funding and management based strategy wherever possible. The regional humanitarian analysis covers the following: Food insecurity and nutrition crisis Conflict and epidemics Disaster Risk Reduction and resilience Humanitarian coordination and access The humanitarian situation in the Sahel remains alarming in 2014 and is predicted to continue to be so during 2015. Conflict and displacement, erratic weather and epidemics continue to generate substantial humanitarian needs across the region. In 2015 humanitarian action in the Sahel will be guided by the 2014-2016 Regional Strategic Response Plan. The three-year strategy aims to deliver coordinated and integrated life-saving assistance to people affected by emergencies as well as kick-start a more tailored response to the chronic nature of much of the needs across the region. Background and root causes of the protracted and recurrent crisis in the Sahel Climate, geopolitical and economical background To fully understand the humanitarian needs in the Sahel it is essential to first grasp its unique geography, which has direct implications on the humanitarian situation. The climatic Sahel region, which covers a vast area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and encompasses parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Somalia, is more than 80 percent comprised of arid desert lands. Today, the population density of the Sahel remains in the vicinity of one inhabitant per square kilometre. This unique geographical context has two distinct humanitarian implications: Firstly, with few income-bringing industries in the region, there is a strong correlation between the variations in rainfall and humanitarian needs. Most inhabitants in the region are subsistence farmers and a drought, even if only affecting a small part of the region, may have devastating effects on household levels. Years of drought, such as up to 2012, resulted in a drastic reduction in cereal production and in subsequent vulnerabilities in food security, including malnutrition. Secondly, the vast desert landscape with porous borders between the countries has favoured a nomadic lifestyle with a lesser degree of geographically fixed community life. As a result, national parameters including the State and Judiciary become secondary for big parts of populations outside the main cities and capitals. The low 1

degree of national integration combined with porous and vast borders constitutes favourable grounds for rebellions, armed conflicts and insecurity. The geographical context of the Sahel combined with political and economic unfavourable realities has led to several humanitarian drivers (root causes), that in turn affect the humanitarian situation and determine humanitarian needs. Although a large number of humanitarian drivers could be outline below, the focus is on these two distinctive ones that are repeatedly posing the Sahel population to recurrent humanitarian crises. As the large parts of the population lack the means to rebound after each crisis and as crises erupt more frequently with little time for recovery the humanitarian crisis then becomes chronic and humanitarian needs are perpetual in the region. Each of the driving forces lead to a distinct humanitarian crisis which in turn lead to several other vulnerabilities. Food insecurity and its relation to malnutrition The harvest forecast for 2015 is predicted to remain stable compared to previous year s exempt from Mauretania, Senegal and the Gambia where there is a reduction of up to 75% estimated for this coming harvest. The relatively good harvests the latter years haven t reduced humanitarian needs in regards to needs of food support or equivalent. For 2015 it is estimated that at least 20,4 million people in the Sahel are food insecure. In 2013 the figure was 11.7 million and in 2014 it was 14 million. In 2015 it is estimated that 5,8 million children in the region will be acutely malnourished. Reasons for which food insecurity is on the rise despite the increase of food production in the region include high prices in cereal and other food products, population growth, and refined methods of calculating food insecurity. Cereal prices are in some areas as high as 50 per cent more than the five-year average in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger and parts of Senegal. In Nigeria, crop production might decrease further than the low of 2012-2013 due to conflict internally in the country, which also has a direct impact on regional markets as Nigeria represents around 50% of Sahel food production. In addition, the region remains vulnerable due to the uneven pastoral situation, flooding, the locust and avian invasion threat and high grain prices combined with widespread poverty (including high unemployment) and high vulnerability, in particular for those households that could not benefit from previous livelihoods support. This forces a large number of families into negative coping strategies to deal with the stresses. For example children are taken out of school, consumption of lesser quality food or seeds, animals are killed for sale that might have been intended for reproduction and survival migration, seasonal or permanent, to seek opportunities to livelihoods in another location that home, predominantly in the cities. These negative coping strategies have longterm consequences which cannot be reversed with one or a few good harvests. Complex emergencies and low level conflict generates refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) The on-going Mali crisis has resulted in the significant displacement of IDPs within the country and an exodus of refugees to neighboring countries. The strong inter-regional identity of the security crisis has led to destabilizing dynamics in the entire sub-saharan region. While the Mali crisis determines in large scale the IDP and refugee situation in the region, hardly any country is spared entirely from conflict (albeit being low level in some cases). The effect of the Libyan crisis is another example of how regional (rather than national) parameters affect the humanitarian situation. Many Tuaregs, who fled Mali in the 1990s, were conscripted into the Libyan army and fought on the side of the former Libyan leader. After the fall of Gaddafi, they returned stronger and with heavy weapons that could be used to invade the cities with the goal of expelling the regular army. The Tuaregs were not the only ones to benefit from the proliferation of heavy weapons resulting from the Libyan crisis. Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its branches - directed by former combatants of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, which recruits to a large extent among the Mauritanians and the Malian have now establishment in the Malian north and within the confines of Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. The CAR crisis continues to force people to flee to neighbouring countries Chad, Cameroon and DRC. The Nigeria crisis has flared up as an important trigger of refugees to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, as well as large numbers of IDPs in Nigeria. In 2015 it is estimated that 2,8 million people in the region will be displaced, which is an increase with 1 million since 2014. Current conflicts, crises and epidemics Cross border implications Conflicts in the Sahel region have both internal and cross border effects. The volatile situation in Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR) and Libya, despite not being included in the region, still affects the region by refugees seeking asylum in countries in the Sahel region. The crises in Mali and Nigeria are increasing in significance for determining humanitarian needs, and the recent coup d état in Burkina Faso shows how rapidly the political situation may change, also in a country assumed stable. In regards to epidemics, some Ebola cases have been reported in the Sahel countries and preparedness is of high importance despite both Nigeria and Mali have been declared Ebola free although they previous have had cases. The porous borders in the region increase cross border challenges not only within the region but also in countries bordering the Sahel. In Cameroon, particularly in the Sahel belt in the North, malnutrition, epidemics and food 2

insecurity constitute serious challenges. The influx of more than 280,000 refugees from CAR and Nigeria is straining host communities resources. Spill-over incidents from Cameroon s conflict-affected neighbors are occurring on a regular basis. Some 140,000 Malian refugees remain in Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso and at least 100,000 Malians are still internally displaced. The trends in the region are towards a higher degree and greater severity of conflicts, political instability and cross-border effects of conflicts and crisis. Natural disasters The previous levels of food insecurity are likely to persist in coming years, despite harvests that are predicted to be good in 2014-2015, with exemption of the fact that rains in some parts of the region were late and erratic in 2014 affecting farmers and pastoralists alike in a number of countries. Agriculturalists in The Gambia, Mauritania and Senegal were seriously affected by the late rains as were pastoralists in Niger. Assessments are conducted towards the end of 2014 to determine the most exact figure, but it is likely that overall number of food insecure people in the Sahel in 2015 may nevertheless come down from a recent high of almost 25 million people, with Niger, Nigeria, Mali and Chad representing over 70 per cent of this caseload to 20,4 million, which is the likely number for the beginning of 2015. Acute malnutrition persists at alarmingly high levels. An estimated 5,8 million children under five suffered from global acute malnutrition (GAM) in 2014, 3,2 million of whom required treatment for severe acute malnutrition (SAM). An estimated 1.2 million children under-five die annually in the Sahel and some 570,000 of these deaths are associated with malnutrition and related diseases. Resilience and coping mechanisms Coping mechanisms that traditionally have been elaborated by people, are not as effective or as feasible as they used to be a number of reasons; borders decided by colonial powers do not reflect traditional mobility patterns, population increase, conflict and world market prices on grains and seeds grown in the region. Households are not as resistant as they would need to be to cope with stress and chocks and lack resources to invest to become more resilient. 1.1 Geographical areas and affected population The most intense conflicts in the region are at the moment in Mali, Nigeria and CAR. The food security crisis is proliferated all through the region. The most vulnerable are persons without resources, safety nets and flexibility in livelihoods including women and men, girls and boys. The coping mechanisms that have evolved from long-term adaptation to the climate are still in practice such as the transhumance and cross border trade, and also diversification of livelihoods, migrant work, and diversified crops and livestock. Conflicts, climate change and epidemics hamper the existing coping mechanisms and together with population increase interact to render the crisis more severe. 1.2 Risks and threats Climate change and desertification in conjunction with population growth and conflict together with generally week states and poor social safety nets are constant risks and threats and keeps the region in a cycle of protracted and recurrent crisis interacting to expose people to more and more stress. The last two years rainfall having been relatively good is by no means an indication for how rainfall will be in the years to come. In governance, there is a negative trend in political stability in the countries in the region. All countries in the region rank high on risk for corruption. Low degree of mechanisms of transparency and accountability hampers the possibilities of changing this negative pattern. The population growth rate is 3+% per year with high fertility rate per woman (6-7 live births per woman). The highest nativity rates are noted among rural populations. The economic growth rate is usually high (5 or 6% per year), but dividends are not redistributed in an inclusive way, which is a great source of stress particularly for children who represent over 50% of the population. With so many underlying vulnerabilities (food insecurity and conflict) and so few safety nets (basic social services), the vulnerabilities are acute and high. The lack of basic social services increases peoples vulnerability - a population which otherwise could have remained in a chronically severe situation is more frequently tipped over to the emergency threshold. This is manifested by the extraordinary large numbers that need emergency humanitarian assistance in the Sahel. Lack of infrastructure such as roads and airstrips as well as lack of humanitarian access due to security deficits, leaves some populations with humanitarian needs un-responded or insufficiently responded to. A significant gap is the phase-out of humanitarian assistance and hand-over to development partners and national governments in the Sahel region when recovery should be transformed into development. 3

1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) The three year SRP for the Sahel focuses on three overarching strategic goals: 1) Track and analyse risk and vulnerability, integrating findings into humanitarian and development programming 2) Support vulnerable populations to better cope with shocks by responding early to warning signals, by reducing post-crisis recovery times and by building capacity of national actors; 3) Deliver coordinated and integrated life-saving assistance to people affected by emergencies The five joint humanitarian priorities identified in the SRP are: 1) Food insecurity 2) Malnutrition 3) Conflict-related needs 4) Epidemic-related needs 5) Disaster-related needs The following 6 sectors are prioritised in the response plan for 2015: 1) Education in Emergencies 2) Food Security 3) Health 4) Nutrition 5) Protection 6) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 2. IN REGION HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES 2.1 National and local capacities and constraints Government Governments response to both humanitarian and development needs has so far been weak. The countries in the Sahel rank among the lowest in Human Development Index (HDI) in the world. Through strong engagement and advocacy with regional governments and their development partners, humanitarian teams are promoting policies and investments that help the Sahel s most vulnerable households better cope with shocks, and protecting their assets. Ensuring early warning systematically leads to early action and building the emergency preparedness capacity of individuals, communities and governments remain central to the response. Only an integrated humanitarian response, with coordinated and sustained action from governments, humanitarians and development actors, can curb the worrying trend of spiraling needs in the Sahel. The integrated strategy for the Sahel is addressing some of these issues around Governance, Security and Resilience. Infrastructure is not well developed and access due to lack of commercial flights and safe roads is a constraint in the whole region that renders humanitarian assistance difficult and costly. Civil Society National civil society in the Sahel countries has remained weak and often only acting as service delivery partners for the UN and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) humanitarian programmes. As civil society may be seen as a threat to governments lacking in democracy and respect of human rights, it is often difficult for civil society organisations to become strong advocates for change of politics and resource mobilisation and resource management. Even in Burkina Faso where there are many NGOs, when it comes to humanitarian response capacity they are lacking in systems and institutional resources. 2.2 International operational capacities and constraints Regional representations both for the Sahel and for West Africa are in place both among UN and INGOs. Many donors also have regional advisers and representations, mostly in Dakar. Humanitarian coordination structures are well developed and include INGOs. The latter have shown a high degree of cost efficient service delivery, but have been somewhat lacking in capacity development strategies for local NGOs to render hand-over and phasing out possible. Among the donor agencies some new methods for supporting NGOs are seen as with UK Department for International Development (DfID) s new approach in the Sahel, where a large part of the funds are now channelled through the European Commission Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). 4

2.3 International and Regional assistance Donors In the Sahel, the largest donors in 2014 are USA, ECHO and the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF). Other important donors are Japan, UK, Sweden and Canada. Regional Organisations The engagement of locally driven regional structures such as Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) has been active, but has not shown strength in addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity, household vulnerability and security issues. The AGIR initiative (the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative) has given guidance to national governments in developing national and local capacities for resilience and CILSS to address desertification and reduce vulnerability due to drought. 3. Sida s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 3.1. Sida s role Earlier assistance, results and lessons learned With Sida s Sahel-allocation for 2014, increased focus was put on organisations that can provide an integrated multisectoral response package supporting various humanitarian needs at the same time ranging from nutrition to health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and education to name a few key sectors. There was also an increased flexibility in allowing part of the integrated programming to address underlying causes even though not qualifying as core life-saving interventions. The approach is directly linked to the chronic nature of the Sahel crisis, with the purpose of preventing large number of people from quickly tipping over the emergency threshold which is a documented risk. In the long run however, governments and development actors need to be involved on a more comprehensive level in addressing the root causes to the huge humanitarian caseloads in the Sahel and thereby in the long run helping to phase out the need for humanitarian funding for recurrent or chronic crises in the region. For 2015 the flexibility remains, but in the case of Mali e.g. the limited funding in combination with unmet humanitarian needs has forced a stricter focus on the more core life-saving activities. See the Burkina Faso and Mali sections for further elaboration on how synergies are found between Swedish humanitarian funding and the implementation of bilateral development cooperation strategies, with the latter increasingly being able to include funding to resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) activities. 3.2. Response Priorities 2015 Humanitarian Focus The focus in the region for 2015 should be on conflict related crises including refugee and IDP situations as well as other population movements due to conflict. Food insecurity and malnutrition also remain as prioritized areas for humanitarian interventions. Contributing to efficient coordination and increased humanitarian access should continue to be a priority. Pilot projects for showing good practice within resilience and DRR but with priority to projects with a possibility to hand over to local partners supported by development funding should also be included in the response and recovery plan. Projects and programmes funded by Sida must include gender equality and should take in account environmental consequences of the change brought by the project. Synergies with Development It is paramount that Sida applies a holistic approach to in the elaboration of the new country strategy for Burkina Faso, making sure to find the synergies between the humanitarian side and the development side, as was done for Mali during 2014. In that process, the regional strategies of ECHO/DEVCO and DfID should be further consulted and analysed, to render complementarity with and catalytic dimensions to the Swedish contribution in the region. A higher degree of Sida presence in the field should be prioritized and existing capacities at the embassies (Mali and Burkina Faso) should be further involved. 3.3. Partners Framework agreements Most of the strategic partners of Sida/Hum are active in the region. The UN organisations are most of them represented both on regional level and national level, in some countries also on local level. Other partners 5

The European Union through ECHO has a regional strategy/hip (Humanitarian Implementation Plan) for the Sahel in which the Niger is included (together with Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauretania, Mali, Cameroun, Senegal and the Gambia).There are also separate ECHO HIPs for Mali, Chad and Nigeria which focus on providing assistance to the victims of the political crisis. Sida should engage with the integrated Sahel strategy for the Sahel and ECHO/DfID regional food/safety net and resilience programme as well as other donors with a humanitarian and development focus. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) should be a priority on a central level to take lead in the transition from humanitarian to development partnerships with governments in the region. Sida s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE SAHEL 2015 Recommended country for Sida support Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated or multi sectorial programming ) Proposed allocation Burkina Faso Refugees/DRR/Resilience 14,000,000 Chad Nutrition/Resilience/Refugees/Access 64,000,000 Niger Nutrition/Resilience/Refugees/Access 53,000,000 Nigeria Nutrition/Livelihoods/IDPs 28,000,000 Mali Nutrition/DRR/Resilience/Access 63,000,000 TOT: 222,000,000 Sahel regional Coordination (OCHA Dakar) 5,000,000 SOURCES Key documents Sahel Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2014-2016 Revised country SRPs from August 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO) 2015 (where available) SRP Strategic Response Plan 2015 ECHO original and revised Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) 2014 ECHO HIP 2015 Web sources Reliefweb Alertnet Irin FEWS NET ACAPS IDMC 6

BURKINA FASO - HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2015 1. CRISIS OVERVIEW Conflict Background/underlying causes The ongoing conflict in the neighbouring country Mali, due to insurgents that started in 2012, has led to a significant number of Malian refugees seeking refuge in northern Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, the Former President Blaise Compaoré s and the ruling party s attempts to change the constitution in order to enable the President to prolong his mandate (after 27 years in power) caused a socio-political crisis and civil unrest at the end of October 2014. Under the pressure of hundreds of thousands of protesters, President Compaoré finally resigned and left the country. An interim government was appointed on 23 November, according to a charter developed by civil society, the former opposition, the former majority, and the military. Looting occurred during the crisis with consequences to service delivery including vaccines programmes and school feeding programmes. Some deaths also occurred during the crisis as well as resulting in significant numbers of persons injured. Main stakeholders in the conflict Regarding the conflict in the neighbouring country Mali, the Malian army is combatting separatism in the northern parts of the country. Burkina Faso is part of African Union/ECOWAS African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), a military coalition under United Nations Security Council mandate to support the Malian army. As for the recent political crisis in Burkina, the main stakeholders are the former ruling elite (members of the CDP party close to former president Blaise Compaore, and the party ADF/RDA), the former political opposition, civil society traditional and religious leaders and the army. The army sided with civil society and the opposition during the crisis and hence a possibly more violent scenario was avoided. During the transition the army has played an important role in stabilising and securing the situation, while at the same time ensuring its influence through its members in the interim government. Cross border implication As a consequence of the conflict in Mali there are at present a total of 32 350 Malian refugees residing in northern Burkina Faso. This part of the country is also the region most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition and thereby adding to the vulnerability of both refugee and host populations. With regard to the recent political transition in Burkina Faso the situation was fairly quickly stabilised. However a large number of members of the former majority party (CDP) the collaboration party ADF/RDA and the association FEDAP-BC have been forced to leave their residences due to attacks by mobs and their situation is yet somewhat unclear. The presence of Ebola in Mali poses a new threat that must not be underestimated. Up to date there have been 8 cases of Ebola in Mali, whereof 7 cases of death from Ebola. Even though Mali now is declared Ebola-free, there is a significant risk that Ebola will spread to Burkina Faso. Trends Burkina Faso, with almost half of the population living in severe poverty and with the placement 181 out of 187 countries on the human development index, is very sensitive to crises with humanitarian consequences. The current situation with refugees in the northern part of the country and the humanitarian impacts of the current socio-political crisis risk to further increase this vulnerability. Already prior to the crisis, it was estimated that 939 148 persons were food insecure. Of these, 264 379 individuals were of acute need of assistance. In addition to this, 499 000 children under the age of five suffer from malnutrition. With regard to Ebola, Burkina Faso has developed a national response plan. Training has been conducted with staff that dealing with isolation of eventual detected Ebola cases. Preventive measures in terms of Ebola information campaigns are also ongoing. With already very weak capacities and poor organisation within the national health system, a possible spread of Ebola in Burkina Faso could have a disastrous effect. Natural disasters As for the agricultural production, the current rainy season seems to have been satisfactory and good yields are expected in 2014/2015. Final figures from the Government are still awaited. Some local flooding has been reported but the situation seems to be under control. Moreover, invasions of grain-eating birds have been reported in the northern part of the country seriously affecting the harvest. Since the start of the rain period in April 2014, eight regions have been touched by storms and flooding, affecting about 8,963 individuals in terms of losses of dwellings and other material. Recurrent floods and drought spells are regularly reported during the rainy season (from May to October). The majority of regions that were the most affected by storms and flooding during 2014 are the regions neighbouring Mali (Sahel, Nord, Hauts-Bassin, Boucle du Mouhoun). 7

Resilience and coping mechanisms As regards natural disasters such as rainfall varies, desertification, climate change, locust/grain eating-birds invasions, the degree of resilience in Burkina Faso is on the average low. This is due to a combination of factors, including undiversified livelihoods, high poverty rate (about half of the population living poverty) and high fertility rates (with an average of six children per woman). Parts of the country are subject to reoccurring annual food and nutrition insecurity. After poor rainy seasons, the whole country can even be subject to famine and drinking water shortage. About 80% of the population depend directly or indirectly on small-scale farming. This makes the population highly vulnerable to reoccurring droughts, especially in the Sahel region. 1.1 Geographical areas and affected population The most disaster prone areas in Burkina Faso are the northern and Sahel provinces of the country which receive limited and irregular rainfall. The Northern and Eastern regions are characterised by poverty rates of 64.6 respectively 62%, hence above the national average of about 46.7%. Children, women and elderly lacking social safety nets are the most vulnerable groups of the population. About 514 000 children under the age of five suffered from malnutrition in Burkina Faso during 2014. As for coping mechanisms, there is a dependency on humanitarian aid provided though the Government with substantial donor support traditional solidarity mechanisms in the Burkinabé communities and money transfer from diaspora migrants. Regarding the recent humanitarian crisis caused by the social unrest, both the Government and humanitarian aid providers are struggling to restore the food supply stocks. The new Government promised to compensate losses for the victims. Since 2012 the Government implements a national policy for social protection which aims to reduce the population s vulnerability. This policy includes for example efforts to improve vulnerable groups access to basic social services. The national development strategy also foresees increased financing of the agricultural sector to improve the national food production. 1.2 Risks and threats The main risks and threats to communities in Burkina Faso consist in food insecurity and malnutrition. Risks are also posed by reoccurring epidemics such as rubella, measles and others, especially in a context where vaccine stocks were destroyed during the recent socio-political crisis. Ebola outbreak is still a risk in Burkina Faso and in the whole region. Although preparations are ongoing for isolation and treatment of eventual Ebola cases in Burkina Faso the country is far from sufficiently prepared. As for financial risks, Burkina Faso receives the score 38, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, from Transparency International. Hence the public sector in Burkina Faso, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a medium-high level of corruption. Further risks for an effective humanitarian assistance are weak coordination mechanisms and limited data availability. 1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) The main objective of humanitarian intervention during the 2014-2016 period is to support vulnerable populations to better cope with stress and shocks by answering to early-warning signals, reducing the duration of the post-crisis recovery and strengthening the capacity of national actors, while providing people in emergencies coordinated and integrated assistance for their survival. To achieve this, in 2015, actions by international and national actors that have been going on over the past three years will continue. Humanitarian and development actors identify that the four priorities for Burkina Faso are food insecurity, malnutrition, support for Malian refugees and epidemics. It is national in scope, but interventions will be more concentrated in areas identified at high risk and where people suffer severe food insecurity. Also special attention will be given to people hard hit by the previous food and nutrition crises and having a lost or hampered their livelihoods. Hence activities for these groups will include recovery or livelihoods support in order to strengthen their resilience. These interventions of humanitarian actors will complement the Government's efforts on behalf of populations in need in the 13 regions of Burkina Faso. The approach through cluster coordinated response will be favored. Each sector will implement its activities in partnership / collaboration with relevant stakeholders and appropriate state structures. 2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES 2.1 National and local capacities and constraints Government Civil Protection is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and organises rescue services. CONAREF (Commission Nationale Pour les Réfugiés) is the national agency dealing with refugee issues, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and counterpart to UNHCR. This agency was unsuccessful in consolidating reliable figures on refugee influx in 2012; it identified refugee camp sites in disaster-prone areas or too close from the border. CONASUR (Conseil National de Secours d'urgence et de Réhabilitation, Ministère de l'action Sociale et de la Solidarité National) is the national agency dealing with emergency disaster response and rehabilitation, under the Ministry of Social Affairs. This agency is characterised by very limited capacities. A National Council for Food Security is led by the 8

Ministry of agriculture and ensures strategic coherence and coordination among partners. It has proved to have an effective preparedness and response mechanism. Civil society Burkina Faso has a large number of civil society organisations (CSOs), more than 4,500 are registered. The potential for social mobilisation is significant. However, the lack of long-term resources, coordination mechanisms and a strategic focus make them quite ineffective in assisting the population. They provide however essential support and assistance at the community level, compensating for gaps left by public services. The national Red Cross society is a more and more recognized national partner, collaborating closely with the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef) and World Food Program (WFP) for assisting refugees, people touched by food insecurity and in fighting epidemics. 2.2 International operational capacities and constraints Leadership and Coordination Mr. Pascal Karorero has now been Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) s resident representative and UN s resident coordinator (RC) for three years. A regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sahel region, based in Dakar, was appointed by the UN Under Secretary General/Emergency Response Coordinator (USG/ERC) in 2012, Mr. David Gressly. However, according to the Strategic Response Plan (SRP), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) is the lead agency of the coordination component of Burkina Faso SRP. UNDP is currently carrying out a study on Burkina Faso capacity of managing humanitarian crisis. The provisional report is expected first half of 2015. Humanitarian Agencies The international community is mainly engaged into development cooperation with an increased attention over building resilience capacities (significant inputs from the World Bank, including Sida-supported GFDRR). Humanitarian experience exists (built on precedent crises: droughts, floods, returnees from Côte d Ivoire) but is not comparable in capacities to neighbouring Niger and larger humanitarian settings. It affects the quality and responsiveness of humanitarian action in Burkina Faso, but it involves a greater synergy with development work. OCHA has deployed in 2012 a Humanitarian Advisory Team (HAT) from its regional office in Dakar for Central and West Africa in order to support the HC. The cluster coordination set up was not rolled out at the onset of the crisis in the beginning of 2012. The RC/HC preferred to withhold a sector/thematic coordination set up that was pre-existing, due to lack of human resources and capacities and in view of reinforcing development and humanitarian action linkages. It had its pros and cons: stronger linkages between relief and development, capacity gaps as cluster rolling out is accompanied by increased HQ support. UNDP has developed a regional resilience strategy for the Sahel following USG/ERC s and UNDP Administrator s joint visit in the region in 2012. EU is joining its own development and humanitarian resources for resilience building in the Sahel (AGIR, Alliance globale pour l Initiative Résilience au Sahel et en Afrique de l Ouest). UNHCR is running a multisector coordination platform with its implementing partners to assist and protect refugees, and holding bimonthly meetings. It remains a Geneva-supported operation, as UNHCR does not have an established office in Burkina Faso. It scaled up staffing from 2 to 80 persons. UNHCR has developed a Malian crisis regional contingency plan (involving mainly Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso). Following challenges and constraints are foreseen: - low involvement of humanitarian agencies and state services in the coordination mechanisms; - data collection difficulties for information disaggregated by sex and age; - poor mobilization of financial resources; - poor ownership of the SRP by all actors; - difficult for access in several regions in the rainy season; - changing socio-political instability; - legal vacuum regarding protection, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), child protection; - lack of capacity (human resources) in some institutions. In addition, insecurity is a constraint to access the northern parts of the country (the Sahel region, the north of Ouahigouya, Djibo and Dori) which are off-limit to expatriate staff /aid workers of western origins unless with armedescort; kidnapping by militant groups/criminal gangs is identified as a threat according to UN agencies and diplomatic missions. So far there have been no kidnappings of this character in Burkina Faso. As for military forces, 500 Special Forces are deployed in the region; while a 600 person contingent arrived in Mali within the ECOWAS operation 9

(AFISMA). Humanitarian actors are mainly present in the northern and western regions. The East is neglected, due to lower population rates, except by few actors like Actions Contre la Faim (ACF). Implementing partners Sida s humanitarian framework partner organizations present in the country are Plan, Red Cross, Save the Children, Oxfam-Spain (Intermón), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (France and Luxemburg), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Diakonia (through Church of Sweden /ACT). The national Red Cross society is supported by partner Red Cross societies from Belgium, France, Spain, Monaco and Luxemburg. IFRC has two delegates in place (food crisis response, regional malaria programme) reporting to Dakar office. The ICRC is currently training local committees and headquarters of the Burkinabe Red Cross to roll out emergency response interventions in case of new refugee influx. 2.3 International and regional assistance Donors In the 2014 SRP the European Commission gave 26,577,293 USD (47.1 % of the contributions) United States 7,764,810 USD (13.8 % of the contributions) Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) 3,930,332 USD (7.0 % of the contributions) Sweden 3,410,028 USD (6.0 % of the contributions) allocation of unearmarked funds by UN agencies 3,021,000 USD (5.4 % of the contributions). According to recent publication from OCHA, a total of 157 NGOs are present in the country. The 157 NGOs include 60 national NGOs 50 international NGOs; ten governmental agencies; eight UN agencies; seven affiliated to the Red Cross; and four financial partners. For regional organisations please see the Sahel regional analysis at the beginning of this document. 3. Sida s HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 3.1. Sidas role Earlier assistance and results Previous humanitarian support to Burkina Faso has predominantly been directed to the Mali refugee crisis and acute hunger crises. Lessons learnt As the Mali crisis is being prolonged it stands clear that more durable solutions need to be pursued for the Malian refugees still residing in camps. Humanitarian focus The focus for 2015 should be the immediate refugee crisis with Mali refugees. Food security should focus on infant malnutrition and resilience DRR initiatives with a high degree of learning and innovative pilot approaches. All Sida funded work in Burkina Faso should have gender integration leading to gender equality and environmental consequence descriptions leading to conservation of nature and efficient use of resources included in the proposals. Synergies with development Since Sweden has a bilateral cooperation strategy with Burkina Faso and the strategy is going to be revised and renewed after the elections in 2015, this is an excellent opportunity for cooperation between development cooperation and humanitarian assistance through a resilience approach. 3.2. Partners Framework agreements Partners in Burkina Faso are NRC, ACF, Church of Sweden/Diakonia and Unicef. One new partner is proposed for 2015 allocation being Diakonia through the Church of Sweden to be included in HCA for 2015. Sida s HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO BURKINA FASO 2015 Recommended partner Sector/focus of work (incl. integrated Proposed allocation for Sida support or multi sectorial programming ) ACF Nutrition/Health 4 000 000 NRC Shelter/Refugees 4 000 000 Unicef Health/Nutrition 4 000 000 CoS Resilience 2 000 000 TOT: 14 000 000 10

CHAD - HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANALYSIS 2015 1. CRISIS OVERVIEW Conflict Background/underlying cause Chad is politically a stable country, but with a low degree of decentralisation and democratic governance. The situations of rebel groups mobilising in neighbouring countries to mobilise for attacks on the capital N Djamena seem to have ceased. Still ranking among the lowest in human development index, economic growth due to oil revenues have contributed to a significant degree of development and investments in infrastructure and services the latter years. State investment in security (defence) is also significant. Chad is a secular state including large populations of both Christian and Muslim populations. Internal tensions due to religion seem to be unusual and communities co-exist from macro to local level with low or no tension between the groups. Ethnically Chad is diverse and counts over 160 local languages and dialects. Most of the population live in rural areas. There is a mix of pastoral and agriculturalist farmers, and many groups of both pastoralists and agriculturalists are nomadic or semi-nomadic. Urbanisation is rapid and city growth is both according to development plans, and in form of unofficial settlements. Since colonial borders doesn t reflect ethnicity and language nor mobility-patterns such as seasonal transhumance movement in the region, cross-border issues are further complicated. The two official languages in Chad are French and Arabic. Society is in its social organisation to a large extent traditional with a clear division between male and female duties and expectations. Chad has a dual governance system with the traditional sultanate with a hereditary order of succession and a post-colonial administration that is heavily centralised from the capital. Nativity rates remain very high and combined with a reduced infant and maternal mortality, as well as general improvement in health, population growth is very rapid. Chad is affected by conflicts in neighbour countries and the current crisis that results in an influx of refugees are the CAR conflict and the Sudan/Darfur crisis. Chad is today host for approximately 453 000 refugees. Main stakeholders in the conflict The conflicts in neighbouring countries each have their own dynamics and reasons but affecting Chad not only through refugees, but also politically. The president of Chad, Idriss Déby, has been active in peace negotiations in crisis in neighbouring countries, as well as keeping close relations to France and USA. The lack of democracy and decentralisation is a threat to inner stability and the current calm may, as in the case of Burkina Faso, very rapidly change. Chad has had a central role in negotiation truce between Nigeria and Boko Haram and has also assisted with military interventions to release captive hostages. Cross border implications Chad has had an open-door policy to refugees since many years. Borders are in general open and the possibility to seek refuge in Chad is generally welcoming to those who are in need of protection. Recently the border between CAR and Chad has been closed for regular passage. It has not affected asylum seekers, but does have implications to the transhumance migration, and it is reported that cattle herds are starting to become denser in the border regions between Chad and CAR. This may trigger conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists if cattle start to damage fields before the harvest. Other conflicts in neighbouring countries aren t at the moment creating any significant crossborder implications other than refugees arriving in Chad. The proximity between N Djamena and Nigeria is a concern, but Chad is thought to have reached a non-aggression agreement with Boko Haram. Trends The general trend in Chad is despite internal challenges and conflicts in neighbouring countries that the economic growth will continue and that it will remain calm. Elections are not due in a few years. The situation calls for a gradual handover from humanitarian to development actors including national NGOs and the state, centrally and down to county and district level are now starting to get to the point where they may pursue their own development goals. Natural disasters The Sahel region and Chad in particular has a climate and topography that is sensitive to seasonal drought and floods resulting in food insecurity. The natural variation from year to year is exuberated by climate change and desertification. Population increase also drives the need for increase of food production. Indications for 2015 are that it will be a normal year when it comes to agricultural production. Despite this there are many households that are struggling. The period just before the rainy season (usually March to July) called the lean season, when many households run out of reserves and the number of malnourished children rise. Approximately 246,440 Chadians are food insecure. Over 85% of rural populations live below poverty the line. Chad ranks 184 out of 187 countries in the human development index. 11

Resilience and coping mechanisms Traditionally there are resilience and risk management systems and coping mechanisms among the Sahel peoples. Seasonal variations and yearly variations have been dealt with through transhumance migrations and multiple sites for agricultural crops in different areas. The role of the extended family and clans is also a way to cope, where resources are distributed amongst members of the extended family that live in another area of the country. Population increase and degradation of the environment (desertification), low usage of irrigation and closure of borders, the traditional coping mechanisms are not enough to deal with the protracted crisis. Since the financial resources on household level is week, there may be severely malnourished children and adults, despite that food is readily available on the market. 1.1 Geographical areas and affected population Food insecurity affects the whole country, but is most pronounced in the dryer parts of the country (northern and eastern part of the country). The refugee crisis is mostly affecting border areas in the south and east. A few Niger refugees have settled on islands in Lake Chad. The most vulnerable groups including women and men, girls and boys who lack social safety nets such as family/extended family and/or transferrable skills are the most sensitive both in regards to the refugee crisis and the food insecurity crisis. Communities and individuals are trying to, and have ambitions on how to cope better in the situation they live. Diversification of transferrable skills, diversification of crops, improved seed, etc. but for most households these coping strategies need investments and often resources are not enough to realize the ambitions. 1.2 Risks and threats Chad is a fragile state and there is always a risk of spill-over from conflicts in neighbouring countries. The food insecurity is revised on a yearly basis as each year s crop affects the next years lean period. As most farmers are subsistence farmers, a drought for a year may lead to low or no crop at all for consumption the next year. Chad is also one of the least democratic states in the world, so despite the last few years stability, civil unrest is possible. As for financial risks, Chad receives the score 22, on a scale where 100 equals freedom from corruption, from Transparency International. Hence the public sector in Chad, compared to other countries, can be said to be characterised by a high level of corruption. Humanitarian access has improved due to the security situation that is better in the entire country. Also better and developed infrastructure makes transport and access easier. Humanitarian flights are still the only effective way to reach refugee populations. 1.3 Strategic objectives identified in the Strategic Response Plan The strategic objectives will be presented once the SRP is launched. 2. IN COUNTRY HUMANITARIAN CAPACITIES 2.1 National and local capacities and constraints Government Despite the willingness to accept refugees, the desire to let refugees settle and integrate has previously been low. A change has however occurred and the new politics of Chad is social and economic integration of refugees, but without the possibility of naturalisation. Capacity from government to respond to both refugee crisis and food security crisis is low, but there seem to be few constraints in regards to willingness to grant humanitarian access and space to work for international organisations. Civil Society Chadian civil society is not particularly well developed or organised. The traditional sultanate and traditional structures to regulate issues around ownership of land and resolution of interpersonal conflicts is in place, but NGOs in the sense of democratically organised member organisations or foundations with a board of directors, there are very few established in the country. The ones that exist are very much acting like implementing partners and are of the local affiliates of international organisations. 12