DC Lawyers for Youth Budget Brief 1 of 5 DCLY Budget Brief Overview of the DC Juvenile Justice System April 2013 In order to help policymakers, advocates, and residents of the District of Columbia better understand and evaluate the financial implications of the District s juvenile justice system, DC Lawyers for Youth has prepared a five-part fact sheet series explaining the costs associated with arresting, detaining, adjudicating, and rehabilitating youth in DC. The following fact sheet the first in the series will provide an overview of the District s bi-furcated juvenile justice system, including explaining how control, financial responsibility, accountability, and data-collection for the system is split between federal and local agencies. MAPPING THE DC JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM The responsibility for processing youth through the juvenile justice system in the District of Columbia is split between local DC agencies, which report to the Mayor and the DC Council, and the DC Superior Court, which reports to the federal government. The local agencies with direct contact, control, or responsibility for court-involved youth include the Metropolitan Police Department, the Office of the Attorney General, and the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services. The federal entities with direct contact, control, or responsibility for court-involved youth include the DC Superior Court Family Division and Court Social Services, both of which are sub-divisions of the DC Superior Court. Figure 1 (next page) maps the manner in which a young person is processed through the juvenile justice system in the District. The stages are color-coded to indicate whether a local or federal agency has decision-making power or control during that stage of the process. Red signifies that the responsibility and cost for that particular stage falls with a local agency; blue signifies that the responsibility and cost falls with the federal government; and green signifies either an exit from the formal system or release from under the supervision of an agency that results in no cost to either the federal or local government. As evident below, the juvenile justice system in the District of Columbia involves a complicated mix of local and federal agencies that often pass the power, responsibility, and cost of processing a youth through the system back and forth until the youth exits the system.
Figure 1. DC Juvenile Justice System Process Map 1 OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM PHASES In order to understand how a youth is processed through the DC juvenile justice system, one must understand the different phases of the system, the different decision points in the process, who controls the different decisions points, and who pays for the different phases of the system. The various phases and decision points are: Arrest & Processing: The choice whether to arrest a young person in the District of Columbia typically falls with the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), though a federal or regional law enforcement agency (like the U.S. Park Police or the Metro Transit Police) can make the initial arrest. Additionally, the decision of whether to file a complaint against the young person, thereby referring the young person for prosecution, also typically falls with MPD. Therefore, the decisions to arrest and refer to juvenile court typically both fall within local control and are paid through District dollars. Overnight detention: Once MPD refers a youth for prosecution, Court Social Services (CSS) will conduct an intake with the youth and make a recommendation to the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) as to whether the young person should be prosecuted. CSS will also determine whether the youth should be detained at the Youth Services Center (YSC) pending his initial hearing or released to his parents with a summons to return to court. CSS s intake process is controlled by and paid for by federal dollars. However, the cost of the detaining the youth overnight at YSC, which is operated by the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS), is paid by District dollars. Petitioning Decision: While CSS conducts the intake of the youth and makes a recommendation to the OAG, the OAG makes the final decision regarding whether to file a petition against the youth. As a result, control over whether to charge a young person in the juvenile justice system falls within local control and is paid for by District dollars. 2
Initial Hearing: If a petition is filed against a youth, the youth must appear before the DC Superior Court Family Division for an initial hearing. During the initial hearing, a Family Division judge determines what level of detention community release, shelter care, or detention is appropriate for the youth pending trial. Thus, the decision whether to detain or release a young person pending trial falls within federal control. However, because DYRS operates YSC and contracts with shelter care providers, the cost to detain a youth pre-trial is paid by local dollars. Pre-trial supervision and/or detention: If a young person is released to the community pending trial, CSS supervises the youth to ensure the youth s is compliant with the conditions of pre-trial release set by the Family Court judge. If a young person is detained pre-trial, the youth is still supervised by CSS, but the youth is also housed by DYRS either in YSC or in a DYRScontracted shelter house. Thus, the pre-trial supervision of court-involved youth, and all the costs associated with that supervision, falls either solely on federal entities for released youth or on a mix of federal and District controlled entities for detained youth. Adjudication & Disposition: The DC Superior Court Family Division presides over the adjudication and disposition of the young person. At the adjudication phase, the judge conducts fact-finding to determine whether the young person was involved in the offense with which he is charged. The adjudication phase typically takes the form of a plea or a trial. At the disposition phase, the role of the judge is to determine whether: 1) a case should be closed for social reasons, 2 2) the young person should be placed on probation, or 3) the young person should be committed to DYRS. Thus, the federal government controls whether a youth is placed on probation or committed to DYRS. 3 The federal government also bears the cost of administering both the adjudication and disposition phases of the process. Probation: If the judge orders that the youth be placed on probation, the judge also sets the conditions of the probation for the adjudicated youth. Once the conditions of probation are set, CSS is responsible for monitoring and supervising the youth and for coordinating the services necessary for the youth s rehabilitation. As a result, the supervision and coordination of services for court-involved youth placed on probation falls under federal control. Additionally, the costs of supervising and coordinating services for youth on probation are borne by the federal government. Commitment: If the judge orders that the youth be committed to DYRS instead of being placed on probation, DYRS determines the placement of the adjudicated youth and any conditions of community placement upon the youth s eventual return to the community. 4 As a result, once a youth is committed, control over his or her care and rehabilitation reverts back to local control. Additionally, all costs associated with the commitment are born by the District. Probation revocation: If a youth is not compliant with his or her conditions of probation, CSS can recommend that the OAG file to revoke probation. The Court then will determine whether to revoke probation, and if so, whether to resentence the youth to a longer term of probation or to commit the youth to DYRS. As such, both the federal and District governments bear the costs of revoking a youth s probation. 3
Figure 2. Summary of Cost Responsibilities Local Federal Arrest Intake Overnight Detention Petitioning Initial Hearing Pretrial Supervision Pretrial Detention Adjudication & Disposition Probation Commitment Probation Revocation KEY CHALLENGES Local policymakers, advocates, and District residents seeking ways to further improve the DC juvenile justice system must keep in mind and find ways to address the following four key process challenges created by the bi-furcated nature of the system itself. Split Control: First, the bi-furcated nature of the system results in local agencies having limited or no control over a number of important decision points during the process. For instance, while DC decides whether to arrest and prosecute a youth, DC has little or no control over whether the youth should be detained pre-trial, what services the youth receives while under pre-trial supervision or probation, or whether the youth should be committed to DYRS at disposition. Thus, this split control between federal and local entities over court-involved youth makes it difficult to create one shared vision of what DC s juvenile justice system should be. Split Accountability: Second, the bi-furcated nature of the system means that the system is not fully accountable to District residents. As the DC Superior Court is part of the federal judiciary, the Family Division and Court Social Services two key components of the District s juvenile justice system report to Congress. While the Family Division and Court Social Services either host or participate in a number of interagency working groups that include both federal and local agencies, neither the DC Council nor the Mayor have any oversight power over either agency. Similarly, Congress has little to no direct oversight authority over the District agencies. As such, the agencies that comprise the juvenile justice system in DC report to two different masters over one of which DC residents and taxpayers have no control. Split Budgets: Third, the bi-furcated nature of the juvenile justice system means that decisions made by federal agencies like the Family Division and CSS impact local coffers and that decisions by local agencies like MPD and the OAG s office impact federal coffers. Because the Courts and CSS often pay for the decisions of local agencies and because local agencies often pay for the decision made by the Courts or CSS, neither the federal actors nor the District actors truly see or understand the fiscal implications of their decisions. By the same token, due to the manner in which the costs of the process are split between federal and District budgets, there is little ability to incentivize change or innovation along various phases of the process because the cost center that must execute and pay for the reform is often not the cost center that will receive the benefit of the reform. In other words, the split nature of the system often means that the federal government would pay for reforms that save the District government money and vice versa. Thus, as a result of this structure, there are often few opportunities to financially incentivize change within the District juvenile justice system. Split Data Systems: Fourth, DC s bi-furcated system has resulted in the lack of a cohesive data system that can track a youth from start to finish in the system and provide an accurate 4
high-level view of how the system is operating. Two reports released in August 2012 analyzing critical questions central to determining the success and efficiency of the District s juvenile justice system best highlight the issues that split data systems create. First, a study by the National Center for Juvenile Justice on juvenile recidivism between 2007 and 2008 in the District of Columbia indicated that one of the limitations to its analysis was the lack of robust data from DYRS regarding the time committed youth spend in residential facilities. The study recommended that DYRS and the Court enter into a mutually beneficial data-sharing agreement whereby both agencies would provide the other with more robust data. 5 Second, a study by the District of Columbia Crime Policy Institute on the commitment of youth to DYRS between 2004-2011 was limited by the lack of access to data in the possession of the Court. 6 In both cases, substantial time and resources were invested into conducting the studies, yet neither study was as robust as it could have been if the entire system had an integrated data system or had better processes in place for the regular sharing of information. Such data limitations will continue to pose challenges for both the Courts and the District as they seek to evaluate the success of its respective rehabilitative programming efforts. CONCLUSION To best understand and evaluate DC s juvenile justice system, policymakers, advocates, and residents must understand the costs associated with the decisions made at the various stages of the system and the key challenges faced by a system that often passes the responsibility and cost of processing a youth through the system back and forth between federal and local entities. This first brief has highlighted some of the key challenges in the system. The next four briefs will explain the specific costs associated with various phases of the District s juvenile justice system. ABOUT DC LAWYERS FOR YOUTH DC Lawyers for Youth (DCLY) seeks to improve the DC juvenile justice system by advocating for reforms that promote positive youth development, effective legal representation, and supportive relationships between the community and DC s youth. For more information, please visit www.dcly.org. ENDNOTES 1 For additional resources explaining the District s juvenile justice process, please refer to the Center for Court Excellence s Guide to the DC Juvenile Justice System (available at http://www.courtexcellence.org/uploads/pub lications/dcjuvenilejusticeguideenglish_fin al.pdf) and the DCLY Parent Handbook (available at http://www.dcly.org/sites/ default/files/dcly_handbook.pdf). 2 At disposition, the judge can dismiss the case if the youth demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the young person is not in need of care and rehabilitation. See DC Code 16-2317(d). 3 Commitment is the transfer of legal custody for a youth from the parent or guardian to the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services. See DC Code 16-2320(c). 4 See In re P.S., 821 A.2d 905 (D.C. 2003). 5 Melissa Sickmund, The District of Columbia Reoffending Study: 2007-2008 (National Center for Juvenile Justice, August 2012), at 9-10, available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/ files/juvenile-reoffending-study.pdf. 6 Akiva Liberman, Jennifer Yahner, & John Roman, Delinquent Youth Committed to the Department of Rehabilitative Services 2004-2011 (DC Crime Policy Institute, August 2012), at 2, available at http://www.urban.org/ publications /412657.html. 5