DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) MAHKAMAH RAYUAN JENAYAH NO. B-05-381-12/2014 (RAYUAN JENAYAH SELANGOR NO. 45A-241-10 TAHUN 2012) ANTARA BARRY ABDOUL (W/N: GUINEA)... PERAYU (NO. P/P: R 0300005) DENGAN PENDAKWA RAYA... RESPONDEN (Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Perbicaraan Jenayah No. 45A-241-10/2012 Antara Pendakwa Raya Dengan Barry Abdoul) KUORUM MOKTARUDIN BIN BAKI HMR ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SEBLI HMR ABDUL KARIM ABDUL JALIL HMT 1
PENGHAKIMAN Barry Abdoul, perayu, seorang warganegara Guinea, telah didakwa di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dengan pertuduhan seperti yang berikut: Bahawa kamu pada 12.3.2012 lebih kurang jam 3:30 petang sehingga 14.3.2012 jam lebih kurang 12:15 malam di kawasan kaunter Pemeriksaan Kastam, Balai Ketibaan MTB KLIA, Sepang dan di Bilik 27 Wad 6C, Hospital Serdang, di dalam daerah Sepang di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine dengan berat 678.3 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39 B(1) Akta Dadah Merbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39 B(2) Akta yang sama. 2. Setelah perbicaraan penuh, YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi (hakim bicara) telah mendapati perayu bersalah dan menjatuhi hukuman mati mandatori ke atasnya. Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, perayu telah merayu ke mahkamah ini. 3. Pada 18.1.2016, setelah mendengar penghujahan kedua-dua pihak, kami memutuskan rayuan perayu tidak bermerit. Lantaran itu, rayuannya ditolak. Berikut ialah alasan kami memutuskan sedemikian. 2
Latar Pentas Kes 4. Fakta kes telah dihuraikan dengan begitu teliti dan komprehensif oleh YA Hakim bicara. Kami tidak berniat untuk mengulanginya di sini kecuali ringkasan yang berikut. Pada 12.3.2012, pukul lebih kurang 3.30 petang, Inspektor Zahril Asri Bin Mohd Zain (SP1) bersama-sama pasukannya semasa dalam tugasan pemantauan kegiatan berkaitan jenayah narkotik di Aras 3, Balai Ketibaan Antarabangsa, KLIA, Sepang, telah melihat perayu, seorang warga asing (dicam oleh SP1), dalam keadaan mencurigakan di kawasan tuntutan bagasi. Perayu dilihat mundar mandir di kawasan tersebut, bersikap berhati-hati dan berkelakuan tidak seperti penumpang-penumpang yang lain. Perayu dilihat juga membawa sebuah beg berwarna hitam. SP1 seterusnya menahan perayu dan membawanya ke pejabat pemeriksaan Narkotik. 5. Setibanya di pejabat Narkotik, SP1 memeriksa beg pakaian hitam tersebut dan juga tubuh badan perayu. Namun begitu, tiada apa-apa barang salah dijumpai. Bagaimanapun, semasa pemeriksaan itu dijalankan, perayu dilihat berkeadaan kurang selesa dan gelisah. Mencurigakan, dan setelah membuat laporan polis P5, SP1 membawa perayu ke Hospital Serdang untuk pemeriksaan doktor dan X-ray. 6. Sebaik tiba di Hospital Serdang, Dr. Michelle Ng Wei Chung (SP3) telah memeriksa perayu untuk mengesahkan sama ada perayu ialah a body packer iaitu seseorang yang menelan paket-paket dadah dan diangkut (transport) ke tempat lain. Hasil pemeriksaan itu, SP3 mendapati abdomen perayu mengembung secara luar biasa (to be more distended than normal). SP3 lantas mengarahkan perayu 3
menjalani pemeriksaan X-ray. Hasil daripada imbasan X-ray, P34 dan P35, oleh Mohd Yazid Bin Hashim (SP2), juru X-ray, SP3 menemukan pelbagai (multiple) benda asing di dalam abdomen perayu. SP3 kemudiannya memasukkan perayu ke wad pembedahan di Wad 6C, Bilik 27, Hospital Serdang untuk pemeriksaan lanjut. Perayu ditahan di situ. 7. Semasa ditahan di dalam Wad 6C tersebut, SP1 dan anggotanya iaitu Lans Koperal Hayat, Koperal Salleh, Konstable Mohd Sabri Bin Yaacob (SP5), Abdul Rashid Bin Basir (SP6) dan Lans Koperal Muhamad Hisyam bin Hassan (SP7), telah menjaga, memantau dan menyaksikan perayu membuang air besar dan mengeluarkan, melalui duburnya, sebanyak enam (6) kali benda asing yang berikut: pada 12.3.2012, pukul 9:20 malam : 30 biji kapsul dikeluarkan; pada 13.3.2012, pukul 10.10 pagi : 14 biji kapsul dikeluarkan; pada13.3.2012, pukul 2:15 petang : 13 biji kapsul dikeluarkan; pada 13.3.2012, pukul 5:10 malam : 7 biji kapsul dikeluarkan; pada 13.3.2012, pukul 9.50 malam : 6 biji kapsul dikeluarkan; pada 14.3.2012, pukul 12:01 pagi : 1 biji kapsul dikeluarkan. 8. Pada 20.3.2012 kesemua kapsul tersebut telah dihantar oleh Inspektor Amrin Bin Mohamad Arif, pegawai penyiasat (SP9), kepada En Zulkfeli bin Mohd Edin, (Ahli Kimia)(SP4), di Jabatan Kimia Malaysia. Setelah dianalisis, SP4 mendapati dan mengesahkan kesemua 71 kapsul tersebut mengandungi dadah jenis methamphetamine seberat 678.3 gram, dadah berbahaya yang disenaraikan dalam Jadual Pertama, ADB 1952. 4
Keputusan Di Akhir Kes Pendakwaan 9. Di akhir kes pendakwaan, YA Hakim bicara telah mendapati bahawa perayu mempunyai milikan sebenar dan mengetahui akan bentuk dan jenis dadah berbahaya, seperti mana yang disahkan oleh SP4 sebagai Methamphetamine seberat 678.3 grams, dalam milikannya itu. Memandangkan berat dadah tersebut ialah 678.3 grams, YA Hakim telah mengguna pakai anggapan pengedaran di bawah seksyen 37 (da)(xvi), ADB 1952. Setepatnya, YA Hakim membuat dapatan seperti yang berikut: THE ACCUSED WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS Reverting to the factual matrix of the instant case, the totality of the surrounding circumstances show that the accused had entered our shores through the KLIA Sepang with dangerous drugs contained in capsules lodged inside his body. The X-ray carried out on the accused at the Serdang hospital and the subsequent passing out through the motion by the accused of the capsules containing the dangerous drugs clearly show that the drugs were inside the abdomen of the accused. Common sense will dictate that the manner in which those dangerous drugs found its way into the accused body was either through swallowing them or by insertion through the anus. The manner in which the drugs were ingested also would raise the irresistible inference that they were meant to be cleverly concealed in the abdomen of the accused. Similarly, being guided by the principles as enunciated in the above cases and given the circumtances in which the drugs were concealed here as alluded to above, the finding of this court is that quite apart and independently of the statutory presumption in section 37(d) of the Act, the accused had the knowledge that what was in his abdomen were dangerous drugs and was therefore in actual possession of the dangerous drugs. The prosecution has thus made out the second element of the charge against the accused. 5
THE ACCUSED WAS TRAFFICKING IN THE DANGEROUS DRUGS As this court has already made an affirmative finding (as opposed to legal presumption) that the accused was in possession of the impugned drugs and given that the combined nett weight of the drugs is 678.3 grams, far exceeding the statutory minimum of 50 grams, it is the finding of this court that the presumption of trafficking under section 37(da)(xvi) of the DDA has also been raised against the accused. 10. Dengan dapatan tersebut, YA Hakim memutuskan bahawa pendakwaan, responden, telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap perayu. Perayu dengan itu diarahkan untuk membela dirinya. Kes Pembelaan 11. Perayu memberikan keterangannya secara bersumpah. Dalam keterangannya perayu mendakwa dia telah disuruh oleh seorang yang bernama Eboke untuk menelan 71 ketulan berbentuk kapsul tersebut yang dikatakan mengandungi emas dalam bentuk serbuk untuk diserahkan kepada adik Eboke bernama Iffeny yang berada di Malaysia. Sebagai balasan, perayu mengatakan dia telah diberikan upah sebanyak USD 2000, isterinya USD 500 dan sejumlah USD 500 lagi akan diberikan selepas barangan tersebut diserahkan kepada Iffeny. 12. Walaupun tidak menafikan mengeluarkan 71 kapsul secara buangan air besar semasa ditahan di Wad 6C, Bilik 27, Hospital Serdang, perayu mendakwa dia tidak tahu bahawa 71 kapsul tersebut mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis methamphetamine seberat 678.3 gram. 6
Keputusan Di Akhir Pembelaan 13. Di akhir perbicaraan, YA Hakim bicara mendapati pembelaan perayu merupakan satu penafian semata-mata (mere denial) dan telah gagal, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, untuk mematahkan anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 (d)(xvi) ADB 1952. Perayu juga didapati telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas pemilikan dan pengetahuan ke atas dadah berbahaya berkenaan. Dalam kata-katanya sendiri, YA Hakim memutuskan: This court finds that there is merit in the prosecution s contention that the defence is based on a mere denial of the contents of the capsules. The defence version further does not accord with the reasonable propabilities of the case when viewed as a whole... DECISION OF THE COURT AT THE END OF DEFENCE CASE As a result of the above, it is the finding of this court that the accused has failed to rebut the statutory presumption of trafficking on a balance of probabilities under section 37(da)(xvi) of the DDA. The court also finds that the accused has failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge and possession of the drugs in question. The decision of this court therefore is that it finds the accused guilty of the charge of trafficking under section 39(B) 1(a) Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 punishable under Section 39B (2) of the same Act. The accused is accordingly sentenced to suffer death by hanging. Dengan itu, perayu telah didapati bersalah, disabitkan dan dijatuhi hukuman mati mandatori. Lantas, rayuan ini. Rayuan Ini 14. Di hadapan kami peguam perayu yang terpelajar hanya membangkitkan satu isu sahaja. Isu tersebut adalah seperti mana yang dinyatakan dalam petisyen rayuan perayu terpinda iaitu: 7
4. YA Hakim Bicara telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal mempertimbangkan bahawa penyata saksi SP4 (P37) has no declaration to the effect that it is true to the best of my knowledge, yang mana ianya adalah satu perlangaran jelas kepada peruntukan seksyen 402B (2) (b) dan 402B (6) Kanun Acara Jenayah. 15. Seksyen 402B, Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, setakat yang berkaitan memperuntukkan: 402B. (1) In any criminal proceedings, a written statement by any person shall, with the consent of the parties to the proceedings and subject to the conditions contained in subsection (2), be admissible as evidence to the like extent as oral evidence to the like effect by that person. (2) A statement may be tendered in evidence under subsection (1) if (a) (b) (c) the statement purports to be signed by the person who made it; the statement contains a declaration by that person to the effect that it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief; a copy of the statement is served, by or on behalf of the party proposing to tender it, on each of the other parties to the proceedings not later than fourteen days before the commencement of the trial unless the parties otherwise agree. (6) So much of any statement as is admitted in evidence by virtue of this section shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be read aloud at the trial and where the Court so directs an account shall be given orally of so much of any statement as is not read aloud. 16. Susulan daripada peruntukan di atas, peguam terpelajar telah mengemukakan dua cabaran ke atas keputusan YA Hakim bicara iaitu: 8
(a) (b) Pertama, peguam terpelajar menegaskan YA Hakim bicara telah khilaf apabila gagal menghayati bahawa seksyen 402B (2) dan khususnya subseksyen (2)(b), merupakan syarat duluan (condition precedent) untuk menerima masuk sesuatu pernyataan bertulis mana-mana orang dalam mana-mana prosiding jenayah di bawah seksyen 402B (1). Dalam kes ini pernyata saksi SP4 (P37) dengan jelas tidak mengandungi pengisytiharan yang dimaksudkan dalam seksyen 402B (2)(b) tersebut. Natijahnya, menurut peguam terpelajar, telah adanya pelanggaran ke atas kehendak tersebut. Oleh itu, pernyata saksi SP4 (P37) tidak boleh diterima masuk sebagai keterangan. Dalam keadaan itu, responden dihujahkan telah gagal untuk membuktikan hal perkara utama pertuduhan iaitu dadah berbahaya methamphetamine. Keduanya, peguam terpelajar menghujahkan bahawa YA Hakim bicara telah khilaf lagi kerana tidak menentukan kehendak seksyen 402B (6) dipatuhi. Tanpa apa-apa arahan sebaliknya oleh YA Hakim bicara, peguam terpelajar menghujahkan pernyata saksi SP4 tidak langsung dibacakan (be read aloud) dalam perbicaraan kes ini seperti mana dikehendaki oleh seksyen 402B (B) tersebut. Dalam hal keadaan di atas, dihujahkan YA Hakim bicara telah gagal dalam mempertimbangkan kedua-dua syarat mandatori di atas. Oleh itu, pernyata saksi SP4 tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan dan YA Hakim bicara sepatutnya memutuskan responden telah gagal untuk 9
membangkitkan satu kes prima facie terhadap perayu. Peguam terpelajar menegaskan kekhilafan YA Hakim bicara itu mewajarkan campur tangan mahkamah ini. Peguam terpelajar telah bergantung pada kes Mahdi Keramatviyarsagh Khodavirdi v PP (2015) 3 CLJ 336 untuk menyokong saranan di atas. 17. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR) bersetuju terdapatnya kecacatan dalam pernyata saksi SP4 (P37) iaitu ketiadaan pengisytiharan seksyen 402B (2)(b) tersebut namun dihujahkan kecacatan itu tidak memudaratkan (prejudicial) perayu dan tidak menjadi isu kerana: (a) SP4 telah secara lisan semasa perbicaraan (di muka surat 110: Rekod Rayuan, Jilid 2) menyatakan: Ini witness statement yang saya buat berkait kes ini. Saya sahkan segala yang saya nyatakan dalam witness statement ini adalah benar dan dalam pengetahuan saya. (SP4 tandatangan witness statement) (Tekanan diberikan) Ini dihujahkan sudah mencukupi dan tidak memudaratkan perayu dalam apa bentuk jua. (b) Keperluan pengisytiharan tersebut dapat dipenuhi juga dengan seseorang saksi itu memberikan keterangan secara bersumpah di bawah seksyen 13, Oath and Affirmation Act 1949 (Akta 194). Selaras dengan peruntukan seksyen 6, 7 dan 13 Akta 194, semua saksi yang memberikan keterangan dalam mahkamah atau tribunal dikehendaki menyatakan yang benar. Mana-mana saksi yang dengan 10
sengaja memberikan keterangan palsu boleh didakwa di bawah seksyen 193 Kanun Keseksaan; dan (c) Berdasarkan tujuan dan objektif seksyen 402B digubalkan, prosedur yang digariskan di situ lebih merupakan satu peruntukan berbentuk direktori dan bukan mandatori. Dihujahkan kegagalan untuk mematuhi kehendak seksyen tersebut tidak memudaratkan perayu. Keputusan Kami 18. Kami telah mempertimbangkan penghujahan kedua-dua pihak dengan penuh ketelitian. Kami berkecenderungan untuk bersetuju dengan penghujahan yang dikemukakan oleh TPR dan mendapati bahawa jika adapun ketidakpatuhan yang dihujahkan, kecacatan itu telah dipulihkan dengan kehadiran SP4 sebagai saksi yang telah memberikan keterangan secara bersumpah. SP4 juga telah membuat pengisytiharan yang berkenaan sebelum menandatangani pernyata saksi P37nya. Kami juga dapati perayu tidak pada bila-bila masa telah dimudaratkan dengan ketiadaan pengisytiharan berkenaan dalam pernyata saksi P37nya. 19. Kami catatkan di sini bahawa isu tentang skop pemakaian dan kesan seksyen ini telah berulang kali ditimbulkan dalam beberapa kes yang telah dirayu ke mahkamah ini. Dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Shanmuganathan Panchavarnam v Public Prosecutor & satu kes lain, rayuan jenayah No. B-05-227-08/2014 (IND), yang melibatkan isu yang sama, perkara ini telah dihuraikan dengan jelas oleh YA Abdul Rahman Sebli HMR, seperti yang berikut: 11
[3] The sole question for our determination was whether it was mandatory for the prosecution to comply with section 402B(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code ( the CPC ) where the makers of the written statements were called to give evidence at the trial. Section 402B(2) is to be read together with subsection (1) and they provide as follows: (peruntukan seksyen 402B (1) dan (2) dinyatakan). [4] The intention behind the provision obviously is to save time and expense and to obviate the need for the trial judge go through the tedious process of taking down in writing the evidence-in-chief of the witnesses, as under section 272 of the CPC, evidence is required to be taken down in writing. The need for the declaration in terms of paragraph (b) of section 402B(2) is to ensure that the out of court statements contain the truth. [5] By the terms of section 402B, it is clear that the provision avails both the prosecution and the defence, meaning to say either side can, with the consent of the other, use the written statements as evidence to support their cases. [6] The grounds proffered by the appellants in their respective petitions of appeal in relation to the issue were as follows: By the first appellant: The prosecution cannot be said to have proven its case beyond reasonable doubt when its key witnesses, including the chemist and the investigating officer, gave evidence by way of written statements in breach of s. 402B of the Criminal Procedure Code in that conditions to the admissibility of the said written statements were not complied. By the second appellant: The prosecution cannot be said to have proven its case as the written statement of the chemist (SP5) is clearly inadmissible in evidence. [7] It was not disputed that none of the six written statements contained the declaration in terms of paragraph (b) of section 402B(2). But what was also undisputed was the fact that the makers of the statements were called to give evidence and their written statements were tendered and admitted as part of the prosecution s evidence without any objection by the defence. There could only be one reason why the appellants did not object to the admission of the statements, 12
and that was because they had given their consent pursuant to section 402B(1). [8] The contention by learned counsel for the appellants was that the written statements should not have been admitted in evidence as they were not admissible in evidence for non-compliance with section 402B(2)(b) of the CPC. The law is trite that inadmissible evidence remains inadmissible irrespective of whether it was objected to or otherwise when it was produced as evidence. [9] It was argued that since the prosecution chose to prove their case by way of written statements pursuant to section 402B, it was mandatory for the written statements to be endorsed with the declaration in terms of paragraph (b) of section 402B(2), failing which the statements could not be used as evidence. [10] The learned DPP contended otherwise, submitting that compliance with the requirement of paragraph (b) of subsection 402B(2) is only mandatory where no witnesses are called to give evidence in court. It was argued that the failure by the six witnesses to make the declaration in their written statements was a mere irregularity and had been cured by their attendance at the trial and testifying under oath. [11] If we were to accede to the appellants contention, the statements would have to be disregarded. That would leave the prosecution s case without any leg to stand on because without the written statements no prima facie case would have been established against both appellants and they would have to be acquitted and discharged. The oral testimonies of these witnesses were clearly insufficient to establish the case against both of them. [12] Having regard to the wordings of section 402B(2)(b), we would have agreed entirely with learned counsel for the appellants if he had qualified his proposition by saying that the mandatory requirement for declaration is only meant for cases where the makers of the statements are not called to give evidence at the trial. [13] We appreciate that section 402B(2)(b) is clear and unambiguous and should therefore be given a literal interpretation. Interpreted literally, it means that a written statement can only be admitted in evidence if it contains the declaration in terms of paragraph (b). But that does not answer the question whether the declaration is 13
mandatory where the maker of the statement is called to give evidence at the trial. [14] The view that we take is that it is not, because by being called as a witness at the trial, the maker will invariably affirm to the truth of his written statement. We take this view after taking into account the object behind the requirement for declaration under section 402B(2)(b). Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 is relevant and provides as follows: In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. [15] This section is in fact a codification of the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that a statutory provision must be interpreted with a view to give effect to its object rather than to defeat its object. By adopting this approach, we take the view that the construction that will promote the object of section 402B(2)(b) is to give it a meaning that the requirement for declaration is only mandatory where the written statement is used at the trial without calling the maker to give evidence. [16] The rationale behind the requirement is simple. If evidence in the form of a written statement is to be used against the accused without the maker being called to give evidence to face crossexamination, there has to be some form of assurance that the statement is true. It is for this reason that section 402B(2)(b) makes it compulsory for the maker of the written statement to declare that the statement is true to the best of his knowledge and belief. It is in this sense that learned counsel would be right in his submission. [17] Such need for a declaration in terms of section 402B(2)(b) is consonant with justice and fair play. It is no different from the requirement to affirm an affidavit for the purpose of a judicial proceedings, except that it is not made before a Commissioner for Oaths. [18] If the written statement is later found to be false, the maker is liable to be prosecuted for the offence of giving false evidence in a judicial proceedings under section 193 of the Penal Code. So the declaration under section 402B(2)(b) acts as a safeguard against giving false evidence by a person who is not called to give evidence at the 14
trial. That in our view is the true purport of section 402B(2)(b) of the CPC, which is to prevent the admission of false evidence in criminal proceedings. [19] It is important to appreciate that section 402B is an exception to the hearsay rule. If not for this section, the written statement would be hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence. But because of this section, it is admissible without the maker being called to give evidence. [20] Thus, where the written statement is used at the trial without calling the maker to give evidence, the statement is admissible provided it contains the declaration in terms of paragraph (b) of section 402B(2). But where, as in the present case, the makers of the statements were called to give evidence, the failure to make the declaration would not render the statements inadmissible. By the makers themselves giving evidence, the statements were no longer hearsay, which required the application of the exception to the hearsay rule in order for them to be admissible in evidence. [21] With due respect to learned counsel, it was incorrect for him to say that the prosecution had chosen to prove its case by way of written statements pursuant to section 402B of the CPC. That would only be true if the prosecution had relied entirely on the written statements to prove its case without calling the makers of the statements to give evidence at the trial. [22] While it is true that the written statements were subject to the requirement of section 402B(2)(b) of the CPC, the prosecution by calling the makers to give evidence at the trial had adhered in pith and substance to the spirit of section 402B(2)(b), which is to ensure that the statements contained the truth. [23] It needs to be emphasised that the makers of the written statements had taken oath to speak the truth before tendering the statements as their evidence in court. By taking oath under section 6 of the Oath and Affirmations Act, 1949, they had sworn to tell the truth and to stand by their written statements, which became part of their evidence in court. As we said earlier, they face prosecution for the offence under section 193 of the Penal Code if they were to give false evidence. [24] Given the serious penal consequences of giving false evidence in a judicial proceedings, we are of the view that the taking of oath 15
before a trial judge fulfills the object and requirement of section 402B(2)(b) of the CPC, that the statement is true to the best of the maker s knowledge and belief. We venture to say that taking oath before a judge has greater force than making a declaration under section 402B(2)(b), which is not even made before a person authorized by law to take oath. [25] For this reason, the fact that the written statements in the present case did not contain the requisite declaration was an omission of no consequence. The oaths that the makers of the statements made before the trial judge had served the purpose for which section 402B(2)(b) was designed to achieve. The omission would of course be fatal if they had not taken oath before giving evidence, for then the statements would be in breach of section 402B(2)(b) and therefore inadmissible in evidence. [26] It is also important to bear in mind that the makers of the statements were not called solely for the purpose of tendering their written statements. The record shows that after their statements were tendered and marked as evidence, each of them went through the normal process of examination, i.e. examination-in-chief, crossexamination and re-examination. This was certainly not a case where, after tendering their written statements, they left the witness box, waved goodbye to everyone and returned home. [27] Further, in the course of their examination by both the prosecution and the defence, references were made to their written statements, except where learned counsel for the appellants chose not to ask any question in cross-examination. What this means is that the defence was given every opportunity and every latitude to challenge the makers of the statements on the contents of their written statements. [28] There is therefore no question that the appellants had been prejudiced or disadvantaged by the failure of the witnesses to state in their written statements their belief that the statements were true to the best of their knowledge and belief. Nor can it be argued that the failure had occasioned a miscarriage of justice. [29] It is not any and every non-compliance with a statutory requirement that will lead to failure of prosecution. In Wood v Director of Public Prosecutions [2010] EWHC 1769 (Admin), the English High Court was dealing with section 9(1) and (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 ( the CJA ) which are couched in the following terms: 16
(1) In criminal proceedings, other than committal proceedings a written statement by a person shall, if such of the conditions mentioned in the next following subsection as are applicable are satisfied, be admissible as evidence to the like extent as oral evidence to the like effect by that person. (2) The said conditions are (a) the statement purports to be signed by the person who made it; (b) the statement contains a declaration by that person to the effect that it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief and that he made the statement knowing that, if it were tendered in evidence, he would be liable to prosecution if he willingly stated in it anything which he knew to be false or did not believe to be true; (c) before the hearing at which the statement is tendered in evidence, a copy of the statement is served, by or on behalf of the party proposing to tender it, on each of the other parties to the proceedings; and (d) none of the other parties or their solicitors, within seven days from the service of the copy of the statement, serves a notice on the party so proposing objecting to the statement being tendered in evidence under this section [30] If section 402B(2)(a) and (b) of the CPC were to be juxtaposed with section 9(1) and (2) of the CJA, it will be apparent that the provision is a modified version of its equivalent in the CJA. As can be seen, section 9(2)(a) of the CJA requires the statement to be signed, and section 9(2)(b) requires it to contain a declaration that the statement is true to the best of the maker s knowledge and belief, much like the requirements of section 402B(2)(a) and (b) of the CPC. [31] Rule 27.1 of the English Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 ( the CPR ) further requires the written statement to be in a form which includes the signature of the maker. In that case, the copy of the statement that was served on the appellant did not bear the signature of the maker of the statement, in breach of section 9(2)(a) of the CJA and rule 27.1 of the CPR. 17
[32] The admissibility of that statement was at the heart of the submissions made to the District Judge and to the High Court Judge. The District Judge ruled that although there might have been a technical breach of the requirements of section 9 and rule 27, it in no way prejudiced the appellant and he was entitled to ignore it. [33] On appeal, this was how Mitting J at paragraphs [13] and [14] dealt with the point: [13] I deal now with Mr Ley s second point. In Paterson v Director of Public Prosecutions [1990] RTR 329, [1990] Crim LR 651, evidence was given by means of a s 9 statement which contained a number of defects. Importantly, the statutory declaration did not comply with the statutory conditions, the Divisional Court held that it was inadmissible. [14] In determining whether or not the erroneous reference to two rather than three pages undermined the validity of the declaration made on the first page, it is necessary to have in mind exactly what Parliament provided that the declaration must contain. The provision is that the statement contains a declaration by that person to the effect that it is true to the best of his knowledge and belief etc. This statement contained exactly that provision. The fact that it misidentifies the number of pages in the statement is neither here nor there. There is no doubt whatever what statement the declaration referred to. It referred to a statement contained in a document of three pages, each of which was signed by Mr Downing. No one would have any difficulty in ascertaining what statement Mr Downing was making, the truth to which he was certifying. For that simple reason there is no force in Mr Ley s second point. There would be no good purpose in my remitting the case to the District Judge for him to state a question on that point. It is a bad one. (emphasis ours) [34] The facts are not on all four with the facts of the case before us but the relevance of the case lies in the fact that it dealt with a provision that is almost identical to section 402B of the CPC and in the fact that failure to comply with a statutory requirement was not ruled to be fatal to the prosecution s case. [35] By parity of reasoning, the absence in the case before us of the declaration in terms of paragraph (b) of section 402B(2) in the written statements is neither here nor there as the makers of the statements 18
were called to give evidence and they had taken oath to tell the truth. The truth that they swore to tell necessarily included the truth of the contents of their written statements, which they were prepared to defend by facing cross-examination and scrutiny by the court. [36] Learned counsel for the appellants relied on Mahdi Keramatviyarsagh Khodavirdi v PP [2015] 3 CLJ 336, a decision of another panel of this court which decided along the line of counsel s submissions before us. With due respect, the case is readily distinguishable as the court in that case did not deal with the effect in law of the oaths that the makers of the statements had taken before they tendered their written statements as evidence at the trial. The case is therefore of no assistance to the appellants." (Rujuk kes yang sama fakta dan isu seperti dalam kes sekarang ini dalam Chikwenze Chidiebele v Pendakwa Raya, Rayuan Jenayah No: B-05-247-08/2014. Juga kes: Kingsley Obi Dike v PP (2015) 7 CLJ 1037; PP v Mohammadreza Aslanzad & Anor And Another Appeal (2016) 2 CLJ; Mohd Kusaini Mahmud v PP (2016) 4 CLJ 216) 20. Kami bersetuju dan mengikut sepenuhnya alasan keputusan kes Shanmuganathan, supra, yang sekaligus menjawab isu yang dibangkitkan oleh peguam terpelajar. Dalam kes ini SP4 telah hadir sebagai saksi, telah mengangkat sumpah, memberikan keterangan tambahan dan telah disoal balas dengan teliti oleh peguam perayu. Dalam keterangannya SP4 telah menyatakan (muka surat 110 et seq: Rekod Rayuan, Jilid2) SP4 Nama Umur Pekerjaan : Zulkfeli bin Mohd Edin : 40 tahun : Ahli Kimia JKM PJ 19
Angkat sumpah dan beri keterangan di dalam Bahasa Malaysia. Pemeriksaan Utama Saya ada sediakan kenyataan saksi. Ya, ini dia. Saya sahkah. TPR : Pohon rekod penggunaan witness statement dipersetujui oleh Peguambela dan OKT. Peguambela : Sahkan. Ini witness statement yang saya buat berkaitan kes ini. Saya sahkan segala yang saya nyatakan dalam witness statement ini adalah benar dan dalam pengetahuan saya. [SP4 tandatangan witness statement] Soalan tambahan S: Berkenaan analisa yang dijalankan, berat bersih dan kandungan setiap ketulan kapsul 1-6 masing-masing, jika dicampurkan keseluruhan berapa jumlahnya? J: Jumlah keseluruhan berat bersih untuk bahan kristal jernih adalah 1054.8 gram. S : Bahan Methamphetamine? J: Dalam pengiraan saya menggunakan excel 2 decimal place tapi dalam proses saya menggunakan 1 decimal place. Izinkan saya untuk dapatkan kalkulator untuk buat calculation semula untuk 1 decimal place. Melalui 20
pengiraan saya berat keseluruhan Methamphetamine adalah 678.3 gram. S : J : S : J : Rujuk tandaan yang dibuat pada setiap ketulan kapsul ini A1, A30, A31 dan seterusnya, adakah terdapat sebarang penandaan lain pada setiap ketulan ini? Ada penandaan lain di mana setiap ketulan kapsul ini mempunyai 2 tanda, 1 tarikh dan 1 tandatangan. Rujuk ms 3. Berkenaan homogen adalah ia sebahagian proses analisa? Ya, proses homogen merupakan sebahagian proses analisa. S : Adakah alat timbangan yang digunakan untuk melakukan timbangan berfungsi dengan baik dan dikaliberasi? J : Ya dan ada sijil kaliberasi dikeluarkan. S : Rujuk ms 4 keputusan analisa seperti di ms 2 dan 3 yang mana? J : S : J : Ms 2 dan 3 kenyataan saksi saya. Adakah sample perwakilan yang kamu ambil mencukupi dan memadai untuk mencapai 1 keputusan yang konklusif? Ya, sampel perwakilan yang saya ambil adalah mencukupi dan mewakili keseluruhan sampel yang saya terima. 21
S : J : S : J : S : J : Ada terima borang permohonan polis Pol. 31 semasa Inspektor Amrin hantar barang kes kepada kamu? Ya, ada. Kalau dirujuk boleh cam? Ya. Rujuk Borang Pol. 31. Adakah ini borang yang dimaksudkan? Ya, sama camkan. TPR: Sebelum itu pohon witness statement dikemukakan dan ditender. Cuma pada borang yang saya terima saya telah minta IO membuat pembetulan pada mukasurat depan. Pembetulan berkenaan bungkusan bertanda. Saya minta IO buat kotak bertanda AA. Asalnya bungkusan bertanda AA, AB, AC, AD, AE, AF. Saya pasti itu merujuk kepada bungkusan plastik yang berada dalam kotak. Dalam borang permohonan tak ada description pasal kotak sebab itu saya minta betulkan. Selain daripada itu kandungan sama. IO betulkan di hadapan saya. Kenyataan Saksi SP4 P37 Pol. 31 ID38 Laporan Kimia- P40 (SP4 telah mengecam ekshibit P39, P41, P33A, P33B, ID 42, ID 42A, P42B, ID43, P43B, ID44, P45, ID46, ID45A, P45B, ID46, ID46A(1), P46B)) 22
Pemeriksaan Balas S: P37 ms 2 dan 3 Pemeriksaan dan analisis. Boleh ulang berat bersih dadah yang dianalisa? J: Berat bersih bahan kristal jernih bukan dadah untuk keseluruhan adalah 1054.8 gram. Manakala berat Methamphetamine keseluruhan adalah 678.3 gram. (SP4 juga telah ditanya berkenaan dengan ujian-ujian yang dijalankan oleh SP4) Kami berpendapat jika pernyata saksi SP4 (P37) diketepikan, terdapat cukup keterangan lisan ini, termasuk pengesahan dadah berbahaya jenis methamphetamine oleh peguam terpelajar semasa pemeriksaan balas SP4, untuk mengetepikan penghujahan peguam terpelajar bahawa tiadanya keterangan berkenaan dengan dadah berbahaya methamphetamine. (Rujuk kes antaranya: Kingsley Obi Dike v PP, supra, (ahli kimia telah hadir memberikan keterangan yang mencukupi walaupun ada kecacatan dalam prosedur); PP v Mohammadreza Aslanzad & Anor And Another Appeal, supra (keterangan lisan ahli kimia mencukupi walaupun pernyata saksi tidak mematuhi seksyen 402B); Mohd Kusaini Mahmud v PP, supra; dan, Chikwenze Chidiebele v Pendakwa Raya, supra (melibatkan isu yang sama) yang menyokong saranan di atas. 21. Dalam keadaan yang dibentangkan di atas, kami dapati isu yang ditimbulkan adalah suatu non starter. Kami ingin catatkan bahawa isu ini tidak dibangkitkan di hadapan YA Hakim bicara. Itulah sebabnya 23
isu ini tidak disentuh langsung oleh YA Hakim bicara. Kami percaya perkara ini tidak ditimbulkan kerana semua pihak terutamanya pihak perayu telah bersetuju dengan pengemukaan dan kemasukan pernyata saksi SP4 (P37) oleh SP4 sendiri. Sejajar dengan keputusan kes Shanmuganathan Panchavarnam, supra, dan dalam keadaan fakta kes ini, prosedur di bawah seksyen 402B lebih bersifat direktori dan ketidakpatuhan yang diadukan itu tidak menjejaskan kes responden. Secara substantifnya, prosedur perbicaraan yang digariskan dalam Kanun Prosedur Jenayah telah dipatuhi. Dengan segala peluang yang telah diberikan kepada perayu, ketinggalan yang diadukan itu tidak memudaratkan perayu, dan kami juga dapati tiadanya salah laksana keadilan berlaku. Kesimpulan 22. Setelah mempertimbangkan kesemua alasan di atas, kami sebulat suara mendapati isu yang ditimbulkan tidak bermerit. Kami dapati sabitan ke atas perayu adalah selamat. Dengan itu, kami menolak rayuan perayu dan mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman yang dijatuhi oleh YA Hakim bicara. t.t... ABDUL KARIM ABDUL JALIL Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Tarikh: 3 Mac 2017 24
Peguam Bela & Peguam Cara Muhammad Rafique bin Rashid Ali Tetuan Law Practice of Rafique No. 25-3A, SunwayMas Commercial Centre Jalan PJU 1/3B, 47301 Petaling Jaya Selangor DE Bagi pihak Peguam Negara Tetralina Ahmad Fauzi Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Bahagian Perbicaraan dan Rayuan Jabatan Peguam Negara Malaysia 25