IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA NO. 16-2087 ELECTRONICALLY FILED JUN 08, 2017 CLERK OF SUPREME COURT STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, BRIAN PATRICK CLEMENS. Defendant-Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR MAHASKA COUNTY HONORABLE RANDY DEGEEST, JUDGE APPELLEE S FINAL BRIEF AND CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT vs. THOMAS J. MILLER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IOWA Emily Willits David M. Ranscht Assistant Attorneys General Licensing & Administrative Law Division Hoover State Office Building, 2 nd Floor Des Moines, Iowa 50319 Ph: (515) 281-6403 Fax: (515) 281-4209 E-mail: Emily.Willits@iowa.gov David.Ranscht2@iowa.gov 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...3 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW...6 ROUTING STATEMENT...9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE...9 STATEMENT OF FACTS...10 ARGUMENT...13 I. EXPUNGEMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE TO CLEMENS BECAUSE A CRIMINAL CASE UNDER CHAPTER 901C INVOLVES ALL CHARGES ARISING FROM THE SAME TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE....13 A. Preservation and Standard of Review...13 B. Argument...13 CONCLUSION...21 REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT...22 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...22 PROOF OF SERVICE...23 CERTIFICATE OF FILING...23 2
Cases TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page No. Hadjis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 275 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 1979)...17 Jacobs v. Iowa Dep t of Transp., 887 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2016)...9 Judicial Branch v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 800 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 2011)... 15-16 Marzen v. Klousia, 316 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1982)...17 McFadden v. Dep t of Transp., 877 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 2016)...16 Stoddard v. State, 911 A.2d 1245 (Md. 2006)...18 State v. Alvarado, 875 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 2016)...18 State v. Basinger, 721 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa 2006)...20 State v. Bobola, 138 A.3d 519 (N.H. 2016)...18 State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 2007)...15 State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 889 N.W.2d 467 (Iowa 2017)...13 State v. J.R.A., 714 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)...19 State v. L.W., 350 S.W.3d 911 (Tenn. 2011)...19 State v. McFarland, 721 N.W. 2d 783 (Iowa 2006)... 20-21 State v. Nicoletto, 862 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 2015)...20 State v. Paye, 865 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2015)...20 State v. Senn, 822 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2016)...21 3
Woodbury Cty. Att y v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 448 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1989)... 17-18 Statutes Iowa Code 155A.21...10 Iowa Code 155A.23...10 Iowa Code 708.7...10 Iowa Code 708.2A(2)(a)...10 Iowa Code 724.1...10 Iowa Code 724.4...10 Iowa Code 901C.2 (1)... 12-13 Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a)(1) (2016 Supp.)... 9, 12-15, 18-20 Iowa Code 907.9(4)(b)...15 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1073, 184, 188...13 Other Authorities Iowa Const. art. I, 11...17 Iowa R. App. P. 6.1101(2)(c)...9 Iowa R. App. P. 6.1101(2)(f)...9 Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.64...18 Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.1 2.37...17 Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.51 2.76...17 4
Black s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)...15 Webster s Third New Int l Dictionary (1993)...15 5
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW I. DOES A CRIMINAL CASE WITHIN THE MEANING OF IOWA CODE SECTION 901C.2(1)(a) REFER ONLY TO A PARTICULAR DOCKET NUMBER, OR TO A SET OF FACTUALLY RELATED CRIMINAL CHARGES REGARDLESS OF DOCKET? Iowa R. App. P. 6.1101(2)(c) Authorities Jacobs v. Iowa Dep t of Transp., 887 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2016) Iowa R. App.P. 6.1101(2)(f) Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a)(1) (2016 Supp.) Iowa Code 724.4(1) Iowa Code 708.7 Iowa Code 155A.21 Iowa Code 155A.23 Iowa Code 708.2A(2)(a) Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a) State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 889 N.W.2d 467 (Iowa 2017) Iowa Code 901C.1 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1073, 184, 188 Iowa Code 901C.2(1) 6
Case, Black s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) Case, Webster s Third New Int l Dictionary (1993) State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 502 (Iowa 2007) Iowa Code 907.9(4)(b) Judicial Branch v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 800 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 2011) McFadden v. Dep t of Transp., 877 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 2016) Judicial Branch, 800 N.W.2d at 575 Iowa Const. art. I, 11 Marzen v. Klousia, 316 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1982) Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.1 2.37 Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.51 2.76 Hadjis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 275 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa 1979) Woodbury Cty. Att y v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 448 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1989) Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.64 State v. Alvarado, 875 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 2016) Stoddard v. State, 911 A.2d 1245 (Md. 2006) State v. Bobola, 138 A.3d 519 (N.H. 2016) State v. J.R.A., 714 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) State v. L.W., 350 S.W.3d 911 (Tenn. 2011) 7
Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(b) State v. Basinger, 721 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa 2006) State v. McFarland, 721 N.W. 2d 783 (Iowa 2006) State v. Paye, 865 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015) State v. Nicoletto, 862 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa 2015) State v. Senn, 882 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2016) 8
ROUTING STATEMENT The State agrees retention is appropriate. Because chapter 901C in its current form is relatively new, its provisions (especially those relevant to this case) present an issue of first impression. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1101(2)(c); see also Jacobs v. Iowa Dep t of Transp., 887 N.W.2d 590, 592 93 (Iowa 2016) (retaining an appeal that involved newly enacted procedural rules governing electronic filing). Relatedly, to the extent chapter 901C changed the law of expungement, interpretation of the new language presents a question of changing legal principles. See id. r. 6.1101(2)(f). Finally, this case presents an opportunity for the Court in its supervisory capacity to guide the lower courts efficient administration of judicial business. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Brian Clemens appeals from the district court s denial of his motion to expunge the dismissed charge in Mahaska County docket SMSM168241. The district court concluded Mr. Clemens has not met the requirements for expungement under Iowa Code section 901C.2 because his is not a case in which an acquittal was entered for all criminal charges, or in which all criminal charges were otherwise dismissed. Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a)(1) (2016 Supp.). (Dist. Ct. Ruling p. 2, App. 41.) 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS On May 31, 2011, the State charged Mr. Clemens by trial information in Mahaska County with five crimes: Count 1 carrying weapons in violation of Iowa Code section 724.4(1) (aggravated misdemeanor); Count 2 harassment in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code section 708.7 (aggravated misdemeanor); Counts 3 and 4 unlawful possession of a prescription drug in violation of Iowa Code sections 155A.21 and 155A.23 (serious misdemeanor); and Count 5 carrying weapons in violation of Iowa Code section 724.4 (aggravated misdemeanor). (AGIN107785 Trial Information 5/31/2011, App. 13.) Mr. Clemens was also charged by complaint and affidavit with domestic abuse assault in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(a), which is a simple misdemeanor. (SMSM168241 Criminal Complaint 5/23/2011, Supp. App. 4.) Counts 1 5 were assigned docket no. AGIN107785, and the simple misdemeanor was assigned docket no. SMSM168241. Mr. Clemens moved to sever Count 2 (first-degree harassment) and the domestic abuse assault misdemeanor charge from the other counts. 1 (AGIN107785 Mot. to Sever 11/8/2011, App. 16-22.) According to the motion 1 The motion references Count I as the harassment charge in some places, but that appears to be a typo. As the charging document reflects, the harassment charge was Count 2. 10
to sever, the harassment and domestic abuse assault charges arose from allegations relating to an incident that occurred at a storage facility, while the remaining charges arose out of a subsequent incident when state troopers stopped Mr. Clemens as he drove away from the storage facility. Mr. Clemens asserted the harassment charge and the simple misdemeanor domestic abuse charge should be severed from the other charges because the harassment and domestic abuse charges arose from the same facts and circumstances, whereas the remaining charge arose from a subsequent set of events. (AGIN107785 Mot. to Sever 11/8/2011, App. 17-18.) The district court granted the motion. (AGIN107785 Docket Entry 12/19/2011, App. 3.) Mr. Clemens subsequently pled guilty to harassment in the third degree, a lesser included offense of Count 2, in docket AGIN107785. (AGIN107785 Judgment Entry March 6, 2012, App. 23.) The Judgment Entry reflects that the simple misdemeanor was dismissed as part of the plea agreement in which Mr. Clemens pled guilty to the harassment charge: All violations of the Code of Iowa which arose from the same transaction or occurrence pending in magistrate division (SMSM168241) and Counts 3, 4 and 5 of the Trial Information are dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement. (AGIN107785 Judgment Entry March 6, 2012, App. 23.) The district court entered a dismissal in docket 11
SMSM168241 on the same date the judgment was entered in docket AGIN107785. (SMSM168241 docket entry 3/6/2012, App. 9.) On August 22, 2016, Mr. Clemens moved to expunge the charge docketed as SMSM168241 under the newly enacted expungement statute, Iowa Code section 901C.1 (now codified at Iowa Code section 901C.2). (Motion to Expunge, App. 25.) The State resisted the motion on the basis that Mr. Clemens had pled guilty to harassment in the third degree, and therefore not all charges in the case had been dismissed, as section 901C.2 requires. See Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a). (Resistance to Motion to Expunge, App. 28-29.) The magistrate handling SMSM168241 denied the motion. Mr. Clemens appealed to the district court, which affirmed. Mr. Clemens then sought discretionary review, and this Court granted his application. 12
ARGUMENT I. EXPUNGEMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE TO CLEMENS BECAUSE A CRIMINAL CASE UNDER CHAPTER 901C INVOLVES ALL CHARGES ARISING FROM THE SAME TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE. A. Preservation and Standard of Review. On appeal, issues of statutory construction are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 889 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 2017). The State agrees Clemens s assorted motions and briefs below preserved error. B. Argument. In 2015, the Iowa Legislature passed Senate File 385, which was codified as Iowa Code section 901C.1 and went into effect January 1, 2016. 2 The law allows for the expungement of criminal records in cases resulting in dismissal or acquittal, if certain conditions are met: 1. a. Except as provided in paragraph b, upon application of a defendant or a prosecutor in a criminal case, or upon the court s own motion in a criminal case, the court shall enter an order expunging the record of such criminal case if the court finds that the defendant has established that all of the following have occurred, as applicable: 2 In 2016, the legislature enacted minor amendments, re-codifying the statute at section 901C.2 and placing definitions in section 901C.1. 2016 Iowa Acts ch. 1073, 184, 188. These changes went into effect July 1, 2016, roughly a month before Mr. Clemens filed his initial motion to expunge. This brief therefore references the current version of the statute. 13
(1) The criminal case contains one or more criminal charges in which an acquittal was entered for all criminal charges, or in which all criminal charges were otherwise dismissed. (2) All court costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk of the district court have been paid. (3) A minimum of one hundred eighty days have passed since entry of the judgment of acquittal or of the order dismissing the case relating to all criminal charges, unless the court finds good cause to waive this requirement for reasons including but not limited to the fact that the defendant was the victim of identity theft or mistaken identity. (4) The case was not dismissed due to the defendant being found not guilty by reason of insanity. (5) The defendant was not found incompetent to stand trial in the case. b. The court shall not enter an order expunging the record of a criminal case under paragraph a unless all the parties in the case have had time to object on the grounds that one or more of the relevant conditions in paragraph a have not been established. Iowa Code 901C.2(1). This appeal turns solely on the meaning of a criminal case in section 901C.2(1)(a)(1). The statute does not define case. Nor are dictionary definitions particularly helpful under the circumstances presented here. Black s Law Dictionary defines case as [a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or 14
controversy at law or in equity. Case, Black s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Other definitions include a special set of circumstances or conditions, a set of circumstances constituting a problem, and the matters of fact or conditions involved in a suit. Case, Webster s Third New Int l Dictionary (1993). The various descriptors proceeding, controversy, suit lend little clarity to the issue at hand because a docket number may or may not represent the entire proceeding or controversy. Without a statutory definition or a clear dictionary definition, the Court must search for a reasonable interpretation that best achieves the purpose of the statute. State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 502 (Iowa 2007). Prior to the enactment of chapter 901C, Iowa law permitted expungement of criminal records for charges that resulted in a deferred judgment (and charges related to the deferred judgment), but did not provide for expungement of charges that were dismissed without a deferred judgment or for which an acquittal was obtained. See Iowa Code 907.9(4)(b); see also Judicial Branch v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 800 N.W.2d 569, 578 (Iowa 2011). Documents in cases where the charges were dismissed or for which an acquittal was entered were public records, with no option for expungement. The legislature sought to remedy this discrepancy and broaden the 15
availability of expungement by enacting chapter 901C. In doing so, the legislature struck a balance between two important policy concerns: innocent individuals right to have their records cleared, and the public s right to access court dockets and records. Cf. McFadden v. Dep t of Transp., 877 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Iowa 2016) (balancing two competing principles in resolving a legal dispute). The Iowa Supreme Court recognized the importance of court dockets and the public s access to them in Judicial Branch, holding that dockets are public records under both statutory and common law. Judicial Branch, 800 N.W.2d at 575. Section 901C.2(1)(a)(1) s requirement that all charges in a case must have resulted in acquittal or dismissal in order to obtain an expungement reflects the legislature s policy determination that the public should be able to view the universe of charges in a criminal proceeding if a guilty plea or verdict was entered for any charge. It is apparent from the record that dismissal of the simple misdemeanor charge was part of a plea bargain in which Mr. Clemens agreed to plead guilty to third-degree harassment. The guilty plea and dismissal were documented in a single plea agreement and a single judgment entered in AGIN107785. AGIN107785 Judgment Entry March 6, 2012, App. 23.) The plea agreement underscores the intertwined nature of the two charges; the prosecutor was 16
willing to drop one in exchange for a guilty plea in the other. The fact that one charge against Clemens was an indictable offense and the other was a simple misdemeanor should not alone dictate whether the charges are part of the same case. The distinction between indictable offenses and simple misdemeanors is grounded in the Iowa Constitution, which allows (but does not mandate) non-jury trials for offenses that are not felonies and for which the punishment does not exceed a fine of $100 or imprisonment of 100 days. Iowa Const. art. I, 11; Marzen v. Klousia, 316 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Iowa 1982). To effectuate the goals of the Iowa Constitution, the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure contain one set of rules for indictable offenses and a second set of rules for simple misdemeanors. See Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.1 2.37 (indictable offenses); Iowa Rs. Crim. P. 2.51 2.76 (simple misdemeanors). The purpose of the simple misdemeanor procedural rules is to facilitate disposition of criminal charges with as much speed and as little cost as can be accomplished consistent with a fair trial. Hadjis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 275 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Iowa 1979). Because they are governed by different procedural rules, simple misdemeanors and indictable offenses are assigned different case numbers at the outset. See generally Woodbury Cty. Att y v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 448 N.W.2d 20, 22 17
(Iowa 1989) (discussing case docketing procedures). A simple misdemeanor may be tried to a magistrate, district associate judge, or, by request of the defendant, to a six-person jury. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.64. But the differing procedural track cannot alter the fact that charges may arise from the same incident. Cf. State v. Alvarado, 875 N.W.2d 713, 717 18 (Iowa 2016) (discussing two charges, one a felony and one an aggravated misdemeanor, that could both arise from one episode). Indeed, while the harassment and domestic abuse charges against Clemens were placed on differing procedural tracks, they arose from the same incident (as Clemens s motion to sever expressly asserted) and were ultimately re-joined in the plea agreement. Other states examining similar statutes have concluded that expungement is not available when the record for which expungement is sought arose from the same set of circumstances as another charge for which a guilty plea or verdict was entered. See Stoddard v. State, 911 A.2d 1245, 1247 49 (Md. 2006) (noting charges arising out of the same incident as a charge to which the defendant pled guilty constitute a unit, preventing their expungement ); State v. Bobola, 138 A.3d 519, 525 (N.H. 2016) (concluding annulment was not available where the assault charge to be annulled was an alternative theory to the assault charge that resulted in a conviction, and observing that [t]he fact that, 18
administratively, the charges were assigned separate docket numbers does not, standing alone, mean that these charges were separate cases ); cf. State v. J.R.A., 714 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding a condition of expungement that all pending actions or proceedings be resolved in the defendant s favor referred to multiple charges based on the same incident, and granting expungement because all charges based on the same incident were in fact dismissed as part of a plea deal for an unrelated charge); State v. L.W., 350 S.W.3d 911, 916 18 (Tenn. 2011) (permitting expungement of one charge after a guilty plea to a related charge because the statute referred to the charge that was dismissed not all charges). Mr. Clemens argues that the district court erroneously added a factual inquiry to the statute. (Clemens Br. at 8.) But Iowa Code section 901C.2(1)(a) necessitates a factual analysis by placing the burden on the defendant and requiring the court to make findings that each of the five enumerated requirements have been satisfied. Iowa Code 901C.2(1)(a) ( [T]he court shall enter an order expunging the record of such criminal case if the court finds that the defendant has established that all of the following have occurred, as applicable.... (emphasis added)). The decision whether to enter an expungement is not merely ministerial, but rather requires the court to conduct a 19
factual analysis to ensure the requirements are met. The district court s duty to inquire whether the requirements have been satisfied is further underscored by the requirement in section 901C.2(1)(b) that [t]he court shall not enter an order expunging the record of a criminal case under paragraph a unless all the parties in the case have had time to object on the grounds that one or more of the relevant conditions in paragraph a have not been established. Mr. Clemens relies on the Iowa Supreme Court s decisions in State v. Basinger, 721 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa 2006) and State v. McFarland, 721 N.W. 2d 783 (Iowa 2006), to support the notion that SMSM168241 and AGIN107785 were two separate cases for purposes of the expungement statute. However, those cases deal with specific statutes regarding the assessment of court fees and court reporter fees, which are inapposite here because they arise in a much different context. Although a word used multiple times in the same statute should have the same meaning each time, State v. Paye, 865 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015), the same word used in different code chapters fulfilling different statutory purposes may properly carry a different interpretation in each distinct context, see State v. Nicoletto, 862 N.W.2d 621, 626 n.3 (Iowa 2015). Accordingly, it is both possible and consistent with precedent to conclude that case means something different in chapter 901C than it did in Basinger and 20
McFarland. Likewise, the question of when a case starts under the Iowa Constitution, which the Court explored in State v. Senn, 882 N.W.2d 1, 8 9 (Iowa 2016), has little bearing on the word s meaning for other purposes like expungement. In addition, Basinger and McFarland are not controlling here because those cases turned on a long-standing rule that court costs are not apportioned in criminal cases. McFarland, 721 N.W.2d at 794; Basinger, 721 N.W.2d at 786. There is no similar long-standing rule in the expungement context that requires the Court to reach a similar conclusion. CONCLUSION Factual relatedness is not an impossible or cumbersome standard, especially under the circumstances presented here; the judgment entry on its face refers to the related charges and the negotiated plea agreement. Not all charges in the harassment/abuse case were dismissed, so Clemens is ineligible for expungement, and this Court should affirm. 21
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT The interpretive issue is relatively narrow and is crystallized in the parties briefs. Therefore, oral argument would likely not be a significant aid to the Court. However, if the Court grants oral argument, the State asks to be heard. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(d) and 6.903(1)(g)(1) or (2) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Times New Roman in 14-point font size and contains 2,768 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(1)(g)(1). /s/ Emily Willits EMILY WILLITS Assistant Attorney General 22
PROOF OF SERVICE I, Emily Willits hereby certify that on the 8th day of June, 2017, I or a person acting on my behalf did serve Appellee Final Brief on all other parties to this appeal by EDMS to the respective counsel for said parties: Brandon Brown Gina Messamer Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Boles Gribble Gentry Brown & Bergmann L.L.P. 2910 Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa 50312 /s/ Emily Willits EMILY WILLITS Assistant Attorney General CERTIFICATE OF FILING I, Emily Willits, hereby certify that on the 8th day of June, 2017, I or a person acting on my behalf filed Appellee Final Brief with the Clerk of the Iowa Supreme Court by EDMS. /s/ Emily Willits EMILY WILLETS Assistant Attorney General 23