Europe s Neighbours
Europe s Neighbours European neighbourhood policy and public opinion on the European Union European Outlook 6 Paul Dekker Albert van der Horst Suzanne Kok Lonneke van Noije Charlotte Wennekers The Netherlands Institute for Social Research SCP CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis The Hague, July 2008
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research scp, The Hague, Netherlands 2008 Typesetting and layout: Textcetera, The Hague, Netherlands Figures: Mantext, Moerkapelle, Netherlands Cover design: Bureau Stijlzorg, Utrecht, Netherlands We would like to thank the following persons for their collaboration on the cover: Arabic: Charlotte Huygens; Hebrew: Dr Yaniv Hagbi and Dr W. van Bekkum; Ukrainian: Dr Janette Verrijzer. The Arabic text is an excerpt from the Qur an; sura 49, verse 13: We [ ] rendered you distinct peoples and tribes, that you may recognize one another. [Authorised Translation by Dr Rashad Khalifa] The Hebrew text is an excerpt from the Hebrew Bible; Genesis 28, verse 3: [ ] thou mayest be a multitude of people The Ukrainian text is an excerpt from the Ukrainian Bible, Genesis 28, verse 3: And God Almighty bless thee, and make thee fruitful, and multiply thee, that thou mayest be a multitude of people. [King James Bible] isbn 978-90-377-0386-3 nur 740 This report is printed on chlorine-free paper. Insofar as reprographic reproduction of parts of this publication is permitted under Article 16h of the Copyright Act 1912, the fees payable by law therefore should be remitted to the Stichting Reprorecht (P.O. Box 3060, 2130 kb Hoofddorp, Netherlands, www.repro-recht.nl). Permission for reproducing (a) selection(s) of this publication for anthologies, readers and other compilations (Article 16 of the Copyright Act 1912) may be sought from Stichting pro (Stichting Publicatie- en Reproductierechten Organisatie), P.O. Box 3060, 2130 kb Hoofddorp, Netherlands, www.cedar.nl/pro. The Netherlands Bureau for Netherlands Bureau for Economic Social Research scp Policy Analysis Parnassusplein 5 Van Stolkweg 14 2511 vx The Hague 2585 jr The Hague netherlands netherlands Telephone: +31 (0)70 340 70 00 Telephone: +31 (0)70 338 33 80 Telefax +31 (0)70 340 70 44 Telefax: +31 (0)70 338 33 50 Website: www.scp.nl Website: www.cpb.nl E-mail: info@scp.nl E-mail: info@cpb.nl
5 Content Foreword 7 Part A Public opinion on the European Union 9 Outline and findings 9 A1 Public opinion in Europe 12 1.1 National differences 12 1.2 Attitudes towards the eu 15 1.3 Policy preferences 18 1.4 Differences within countries 21 1.5 In conclusion: The Netherlands in Europe 24 Appendix to chapter A1: Tables 25 A2 Europe in the press, an international comparison 32 2.1 Introduction 32 2.2 National attitudes towards the eu 33 2.3 Attention for Europe in the national press 40 2.4 Recent developments in the attention to Europe in the Dutch press 46 2.5 Conclusion 51 A3 Public opinion in the Netherlands 52 3.1 Developments in support for the eu 52 3.2 Backgrounds to involvement with the eu 54 3.3 Backgrounds to rejection of the eu 56 A4 The changeability of views 61 4.1 Views in surveys 61 4.2 Insights from the literature 61 4.3 The follow-up questions survey 63 4.4 Conclusions 70 References for part A 72 Part B European neighbourhood policy 75 Findings 75 B1 Introduction 78 B2 The neighbours of the European Union 80 2.1 Geography, politics and institutions 80 2.2 Economic situation in the neighbouring countries 81 2.3 Relations with the neighbours 84 2.4 Conclusion: economic neighbours? 89 B3 Economic growth among the neighbours 90 3.1 Economic development since 1990 90 3.2 Direct causes of economic growth 92 3.3 Underlying causes of economic growth 95 3.4 Better institutions for higher growth rates 99
6 Europe s Neighbours B4 Trade with the neighbouring countries 103 4.1 Economic benefits of trade 103 4.2 What determines trade with the neighbouring countries? 105 4.3 Scope for more trade with neighbouring countries 109 4.4 What products do the neighbouring countries export? 112 Appendix to chapter B4: Gravity model 115 B5 Policy for the new neighbours 117 5.1 Existing policy 117 5.2 Strengthening relations with the neighbours 120 5.3 Institutions for better market operation 127 5.4 The limits of the eu 130 References for part B 132 Publications of the cpb and scp 135
7 Foreword The 16 neighbours of the European Union are a very mixed bunch. They range from the oil states of Algeria and Libya to wealthy Israel and impoverished Moldova. Moreover, it is a group of countries which, owing to deep mutual tensions (especially in the Middle East) and large geographical distances (from Belarus to Morocco), do not or barely talk to each other. The eu has launched a common policy for these countries, the European Neighbourhood Policy (enp), which aims to promote prosperity in and relations with the neighbouring countries of the eu. The challenge taken on in part B of this European Outlook is to conduct an analysis into the economic situations of this very mixed group of neighbouring countries and into the scope for improving their prosperity levels. The emphasis is on the importance of good trade relations and the supportive role of the European neighbourhood policy. The thematic part B is preceded by part A, on public opinion on Europe. This section examines differences among the 27 member states on a broad spectrum of attitudes and preferences. For the Netherlands we also consider the latest developments in and individual backgrounds to support for eu membership (high) and involvement with the eu (limited). In a country comparison we also pay attention to news reporting on the eu in several policy areas in the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. This year we also include a chapter on the changeability of opinions on Europe in the Netherlands. Experimental survey data analysed for this Outlook reveal that basic attitudes towards Europe are probably relatively stable, but many people are inclined to change their opinions on specific issues when they are presented with counterarguments. This sixth European Outlook, prepared jointly by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (cpb) and the Netherlands Institute for Social Research scp, is published, like the fifth Outlook, on Europe Day, 9 May. The scp is primarily responsible for part A (Paul Dekker, Lonneke van Noije and Charlotte Wennekers), while the cpb is primarily responsible for part B (Albert van der Horst and Suzanne Kok). The scp authors would like to thank Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Wouter van Atteveldt and Jouke Jacobi (vu University Amsterdam) for their assistance with chapter A2. The cpb would like to thank Henri de Groot and Jan Möhlmann for their contribution to chapter B4, and Arjan Lejour, Bas Straathof and Bas ter Weel for their constructive comments. On behalf of ourselves and the authors, we would also like to thank the members of the interdepartmental sounding board group for their useful suggestions, and the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Forward Strategy Unit (dg European Cooperation) for the support they have provided towards completing this publication. These words of thanks in no way detract from the fact that the responsibility for the content of the Outlook is borne by the cpb and the scp. This views expressed here therefore do not necessarily represent the views of the Dutch government. Prof. Dr. Paul Schnabel Director of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research scp Prof. Dr. Coen Teulings Director of the cpb, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
9 Part A Public opinion on the European Union Outline and findings In this part we set out in a country comparison and in greater detail for the Netherlands a picture of public opinion on the European Union (eu). Last year, due to the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, long-term developments took centre stage. In addition to presenting statistics on public opinion, we tracked the reporting of European issues in Dutch newspapers since the start of the 1950s. Following on from that, this year we consider the attention paid to the eu in the press in France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands since 1990 (chapter A2). The second special topic of this Outlook is the changeability of views on Europe, as measured in population surveys: how stable are opinions over time, and how susceptible are they to counterarguments (chapter A4)? In addition, we have the regular chapters with a broad comparison of public opinion in the 27 member states (chapter A1) and a short description of developments of and differences in views in the Netherlands (chapter A3). The comparison of the 27 member states in chapter A1 reveals major differences with regard to people s satisfaction with their own lives and with developments in their own country. Denmark is again the most satisfied, and the Netherlands also scores high. Depending on the measurement, at the other end of the spectrum are several new member states and sometimes also southern old member states. In comparison with other countries, many Dutch people think that they are well informed about the eu, even though their actual knowledge gives little cause for such a view. Support for eu membership is strong in our country, but the enthusiasm for further enlargements is limited. In the United Kingdom and Austria the mood on Europe is negative across the board. As in previous European Outlooks, the citizens of most eu member states are massive proponents of joint European policies in the fight against terrorism, technological research and environmental protection, but they prefer to leave health, education, social security, taxation and pensions to national governments. As far the European neighbourhood policy is concerned, the subject of part B, eu citizens prove themselves ambivalent in the surveys: they acknowledge the importance of good relations, but they are wary of the costs of assisting the neighbouring countries. In a recent letter to the Lower House of Parliament, the state secretary for European Affairs, Frans Timmermans, expressed the ambition that greater justice is done to Europe in public debate. This debate should focus less on the rules of European integration, such as the European constitution, and more on the impact of the eu on citizens in their daily lives. The media have an active role to play here. In chapter A2 we examine to what extent the Dutch press paid and pays attention to the eu. Compared to two fellow member states, the United Kingdom and France, Europe received strikingly little coverage in the Dutch daily newspapers during the 1990s and around the turn of the century. Dutch news about Europe concentrated much more on the activities of Dutch politicians at European level. Between 1990 and 2003 this position of Europe in Dutch news
10 Europe s Neighbours coverage did not improve (nor did it in France and the United Kingdom), so that the interest in Europe seems to be independent of the power of Europe, which certainly did increase during these year. In 2004 and 2005, when the future of Europe rose well up the political agenda after some years of relative neglect (enlargement with new member states, referendum on the constitution), the Dutch press took an interest in Europe. European news became far less hooked on Dutch politicians: the previously strongly national perspective in the Dutch coverage of Europe became more European. In 2006, a year without remarkable European events, there was a slight decline in attention for Europe, but it remained above the level of the previous decade. The state secretary s wish seems to have been fulfilled to some extent at least. Recently Europe has acquired a more prominent position in the Dutch news - papers. However, the press has still not fulfilled his wish to give greater recognition of the impact of Europe on people s daily lives and to focus less on the rules of integration. Apart from the larger organised events such as a treaty or summit, it seems to be above all crises and rows which give Europe a place on the media agenda. In short, it is not the eu s actual power and its actual work, but the rules and violations of those rules which lead the media agenda. In late 2007, support for eu membership was not only high in the Netherlands in comparison with other countries, but it also appears to have increased. According to the Eurobarometer, in late 2007 three-quarters of the Dutch population took the view that membership is a good thing and that our country benefits from it. In other surveys the same questions generate less support, however, which may be explained by differences in surveying methods and the nature of the preceding questions. Nevertheless there seems little reason to doubt the trend, which has been mapped with a virtually unchanged survey instrument. Other research, presented in chapter A3, shows that support for eu membership is also relatively stable at individual level. The acknowledgement of the importance of the eu for the Netherlands does not preclude a limited involvement with what happens in Europe and a low satisfaction with the functioning of the eu. We will trace the backgrounds to both attitudes. Limited involvement is more common among women, young adults, the less well- educated, people who see themselves as neither left nor right politically, and people who do not read a newspaper. While the percentage of all people with limited involvement averages 25%, this figure reaches 39% among less well-educated women and drops to 7% among highly educated men. On the basis of the 21minuten.nl survey, a group of around 8% of the population can be identified as being strongly opposed to the eu. This group is noticeably larger among men (12%) than among women (5%), larger among the less well-educated (11%) than among the more highly educated (6%), and larger among those who voted for the pvv (24%) and Eénnl (28%) at the Lower House elections of 2006 than among those who voted for D66 (3%) and GroenLinks (1%). Rejection of the eu is also embedded in a negative attitude towards Dutch politics and society. Those who are dissatisfied with the country, who do not trust fellow citizens and who do not feel represented in politics are more likely to be opposed to the eu. In previous Outlooks we observed a disjunction between the positive mood towards the eu according to Eurobarometers and other population surveys on the one hand, and the more negative and sometimes even cynical tone in focus groups and in statements by the public in the media on the other. How
Outline and findings 11 stable are the surveyed opinions, how susceptible are they to counterarguments? To throw more light on this, we report in chapter A4 on a follow-up survey conducted in early 2008, in which respondents gave their opinions on certain European issues and were then presented with hypothetical advantages and disadvantages. It emerges that in response to this many people change their minds. How easy or difficult it is to persuade people to change their views differs from person to person and from argument to argument. Generally speaking, the more highly educated, people who say they are involved with the eu, men, middle-aged people and people with a negative basic attitude towards Europe tend to remain firmer. Arguments about the possible threat to cultural identity are usually more persuasive than arguments about economic benefits. However, which arguments appeal differs from group to group: thus the more highly educated tend to be more easily swayed by arguments relating to peace and security in Europe, while the less-well educated are more susceptible to arguments about threats to their personal lives. When people were surveyed again one month later, it emerged that most adhered to their original standpoint again. This applied more to people who remained firm under the influence of a counterargument than those who changed their minds. The fact that opinions about European issues are susceptible to change does not mean, however, that they are meaningless and that survey research into them is pointless. There is nothing wrong with people changing their mind on the basis of new information, nor with people subsequently reverting to their old standpoint because they reject the hypothesis of the new information ( suppose that ). Nor is there much wrong with people making their judgements on European issues not on the basis of specific knowledge of matters, but more intuitively from a diffuse attitude towards Europe, the similarity of the issue in question with a domestic issue, sympathy for assumed political supporters and opponents on a contentious issue, and so on. That is also how people come to their views on Dutch issues, and how they come to a choice in the voting booth. Opinions on specific issues often hide relatively stable basic attitudes (eu membership is a good thing and benefits the country; see chapter A3). On the basis of focus groups, survey experiments and deliberative polls (chapter A1), we can also say more about what affects people and how they will change their minds when they receive more information and participate in more discussion. However, it makes little sense to present average citizens with detailed questions about matters of which most of them will have barely any knowledge. That might well be the case with regard to the European neighbourhood policy, for which a selection of questions in the Eurobarometer is included in appendix table A1.B7. There is no point in dismissing survey data on Europe as meaningless, but there is a point in trying to look at the issues through the eyes of probably only moderately interested and informed citizens, and not to be swayed by what fellow professionals know and what Brussels policy interests might dictate.
12 A1 Public opinion in Europe 1.1 National differences How satisfied are Europeans with their own lives and with their own countries? What do they regard as serious social problems? Before we consider their views on the European Union and European politics, we will first at look these more fundamental and immediate issues. We will do so, as in previous European Outlooks, with data from several eu-wide population surveys conducted by the Eurobarometer in 2007. 1 The data for all 27 eu member states are shown in the appendix tables to this chapter; these tables also quote the actual questions asked. In the main text we present the key findings in figures with national patterns and by comparisons between the old and new member states. Furthermore, at several points we compare in tables the Netherlands, the 15 old and the 12 new member states. After these presentations, we consider at the end of the chapter the differences and similarities in the backgrounds to several basic attitudes and views. But first people s satisfaction with their own lives and their own countries. The question as to the how satisfied people are with their own lives elicits very different answers in comparison with everything else that follows in this chapter. Two-thirds of Danes say there are very satisfied, and more than 30% say they are fairly satisfied; only 2% are not very satisfied or not at all satisfied. How different from Bulgaria, where around 60% of the population gives one of the latter answers, one-third is fairly satisfied and only 3% very satisfied. The answers for all 27 member states can be found in appendix table A1.B1. This table also shows what people think of the development of their own country and how optimistic they are about the situation in a number of areas: the economy, employment, the environment and social security. There is a positive correlation between these evaluations and the people s evaluations of their own lives and the development of their country. 2 Countries are satisfied to a greater or lesser extent across the board. In figure A1.1 we restrict ourselves to the national combinations of the percentage of people who are very satisfied with their own lives and the percentage who are satisfied with their own country (or rather, the direction in which the country is developing), or who think that the country is going in the right direction. 3 At opposite ends of the spectrum on both dimensions are the satisfied Danes and the dissatisfied Hungarians. 1 With thanks to the European Commission, which gave us early access to the data of Eurobarometer 68.1 of autumn 2007 for this Outlook. As always, we have to assume that the questions and answers in the surveys are strictly comparable between countries. This will never be entirely the case, however, if only because the translations of the questions and answers may not always be equally fortuitous, but also because the associations and emotional connotations of words may still differ even if they are translated accurately. Another factor may be that countries respond more or less moderately across the board. 2 Between the four areas ranging from r = 0.71 (social security employment) to 0.89 (economy -employment), and for the average evaluation r = 0.84 with the percentage of people who are very satisfied with their own lives and 0.67 with the percentage of people who consider that the country is heading in the right direction (n = 27). The significant positive correlations also dominate within countries at the individual level. In several countries people s satisfaction with one s own lives is sometimes not related to the other evaluations; only in the Netherlands is there no correlation between satisfaction with the environment and satisfaction with the economy and employment. 3 The figures are for people who are very satisfied with their own lives. Adding satisfied to this yields percentages of 90 upwards in many countries. The number of people who say that they are not very satisfied or not at all satisfied is very small. This may be because people are indeed contented, or it may be that an expression of dissatisfaction is widely regarded as an inability to make something of their own lives. We cannot uncover differences of this kind.
A1 Public opinion in Europe 13 Figure A1.1 People s satisfaction with their own lives and with the development of their own countries, autumn 2007 (in percent) thinks that the country is going in the right direction 60 EE DK FI 50 RO FR MT AT IE SE LU 40 LT EL SK DE ES SI NL 30 PL CZ BE UK BG LV CY 20 PT IT HU 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 is very satisfied with one s own life Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B1 (rows 1 and 3). The line in the figure shows the connection between the national percentages of people who are satisfied with their own lives and with their own countries (r = 0.50). Above the line are the countries where people are relatively satisfied with their country; below the line are the countries where people are relatively satisfied with their life. In Estonia, people s satisfaction with the development of the country is almost as high as in Denmark, but their satisfaction with their own lives is very low; the Netherlands comes in second in terms of personal satisfaction, but satisfaction with the development of the country is no more than average. From the satisfaction level we move to the problems. Appendix table A1.B2 show what Europeans regard as the most important issues in their countries. The top four in the average of national priorities are rising prices (18%), unemployment (12%), crime (12%) and healthcare (12%). There are appreciable differences within these four issues, however. Thus rising prices is rarely mentioned in Northwestern Europe (Sweden 2%, Netherlands 7%), while they are a major source of concern in the Baltic States (Estonia 30%, Latvia 41% and Lithuania 32%). In the Netherlands it is crime (18%) and healthcare (17%) which are most often identified as the most serious problems. Among issues which tend to be down the list of concerns in Europe as a whole, some countries sometimes leap out, in particular the United Kingdom with immigration (20% of the British regard this as the most serious problem, compared to a country average of 6%), Spain with terrorism (20% versus 3%), Luxembourg with housing (17% versus 4%), and Sweden with the environment (14% versus 4%). Appendix table A1.B3 contains several views on one s own country and the eu. These views are about the attachment to one s town or village, one s own country and the eu, trust in the national parliament and the eu, and satisfaction with national and European democracy. Generally speaking, people are
14 Europe s Neighbours most attached to their country, closely followed by their town or village. The eu comes a very distant third. This is no different in the Netherlands, except that all scores are lower. It seems that it is undutch to express a strong attachment to places and countries. This also tallies with the low score for Dutch people on national pride (cpb/scp 2007: 44). Attachment to country and town or village is very strong in Greece and Bulgaria. Attachment to the eu is strongest in Belgium and Luxembourg. Trust in the national parliament is generally higher in the old eu member states than in the new member states. Against this, people in the new member states tend to have more trust in the eu. A similar pattern emerges with regard to satisfaction with how democracy works in one s own country and in the eu. These two views are set against each other in figure A1.2. The diagonal line does not present an empirical connection between the two values (there is no linear correlation for the 27 countries), but it identifies countries with the highest appreciation of national democracy (below the diagonal) from countries with the highest appreciation of European democracy. The line marks a nearly perfect separation between the old and new member states. Above the line we find the eu s new member states, where satisfaction with European democracy exceeds satisfaction with national democracy. Below the line we find the old member states, where satisfaction with national democracy is greater. The three exceptions to this rule are Italy and Portugal, which can be found among the new member states and are thus less satisfied with national democracy than with European democracy, and Cyprus, where people are more satisfied with national democracy. is satisfied with democracy in the EU 100 Figure A1.2 People s satisfaction with democracy in their own country and in the EU, autumn 2007 (in percent) 80 60 40 HU LT BG RO SK PT IT LV PL SI CZ EE MT BE EL DE CY FR IE LU ES FI AT SE NL DK UK 20 20 40 60 80 100 is satisfied with democracy in one s own country Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B3 (rows 6 and 7). The Poles, Belgians, Spanish and Danes are most satisfied with European democracy. In Denmark this is accompanied by an exceptionally high satisfac-
A1 Public opinion in Europe 15 tion with national democracy. Earlier in this chapter the Danes also caught the eye with their satisfaction with their own lives and their own country. The Dutch are also very satisfied with national democracy, but they are among the most dissatisfied with European democracy (together with the British, Finns and Bulgarians). 1.2 Attitudes towards the eu Appendix table A1.B4 compares the member states in terms of involvement with the eu and actual and perceived knowledge of the eu. Between 7% (Cyprus) and 44% (Bulgaria) of the population says it is very involved with European affairs (average 19%, Netherlands 26%). Between 20% (Bulgaria) and 59% (Poland and Slovenia) claims an understanding of how the eu works (average 42%, Netherlands 55%). The level of actual knowledge is measured with three knowledge questions (see appendix table A1.B4). The Greeks, Luxembourgers and Austrians achieve the highest scores on these. The Poles and Slovenians think that they have the greatest knowledge. With some justification in Slovenia, but not in Poland. Like last year, the Dutch somewhat overestimate their actual knowledge, while the Portuguese and Slovakians are too modest. The two winners, Greece and Luxembourg, were at the top of the actual knowledge league last year as well, while the two losers, Italy and the United Kingdom, came bottom then as well (cpb/scp 2007: 43-44). Figure A1.3 sets perceived and actual knowledge against each other. The line in the figure shows the connection between the two (r = 0.48). Figure A1.3 Actual and perceived knowledge of the EU, autumn 2007 (in percent) claims to be well-informed about the EU 60 PL SI NL CY LU 50 LV EE DK DE BE EL SE FI 40 LT FR AT UK MT HU RO ES IE CZ PT 30 IT SK BG 20 20 30 40 50 60 70 has actual knowledge of the EU Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B4 (rows 2 and 3). That an average of 42% of the people say that they understand how the eu works perhaps reveals a certain lack of self-knowledge. People seem more conscious of their limited actual knowledge of the eu when they are asked about how much others know: according to the final row of figures in appendix
16 Europe s Neighbours table A1.B4, on average only 23% of the people in the member states (13% in the Netherlands) think that their compatriots are well-informed about what is happening in European politics. In a country comparison that percentage is not correlated with actual knowledge (r = 0.17) and only weakly correlated with perceived knowledge (r = 0.37; n = 27). 1 The two most common measurements of support for the eu are the answers to the questions whether people consider their country s membership of the eu a good thing and whether they think that their country has benefited from eu membership. Figure A1.4 sets these measurements of support against each other and reflects the correlation between these two views. thinks that one s own country has benefited from EU membership 90 EE EL 80 LT DK PL IE Figure A1.4 Two positive evaluations of one s own country s membership of the EU, autumn 2007 (in percent) 70 MT SI PT SK ES RO BE NL LU 60 LV CZ FR DE FI BG 50 IT SE 40 UK AT CY HU 30 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 considers one s own country s EU membership a good thing Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B5 (rows 1 and 2). The line in the figure shows the link (r = 0.78): people who are positive about eu membership are also likely to think that their own country benefits from eu membership, and vice versa. The spread on both views is very wide: in the Netherlands and Luxembourg around 80% of the population considers eu membership a good thing, whereas in the United Kingdom, Latvia and Austria only one-third or slightly more take this view. The figures for seeing eu membership as beneficial range from 37% (Cyprus, United Kingdom) to 87% (Ireland). People in the old member states tend to regard eu membership slightly more often as a good thing but are less convinced of the benefits for their own country, while the reverse applies in the new member states. The dif- 1 In terms of correlations at individual level within countries, people s perceived knowledge among others is usually not correlated with their own actual knowledge (no link for 18 countries, a negative link for three countries, and a positive link for six countries), but there is a correlation with self-claimed knowledge (positive for 23 countries, no link for four countries). This will often be a case of projection ( I don t know much about the eu, and the same is true for other normal people ). The Netherlands is one of the countries with no correlation between people s own perceived knowledge and that of others. In appendix table A1.B4 it is also the country with the largest percentage point difference between the number of people who believe that they are well-informed (no less than 55%) and those who believe that other people are well-informed (only 13%).
A1 Public opinion in Europe 17 ferences with last year are small: country averages on these general views are fairly stable. In chapter A3 we will examine whether this also applies at individual level. Views on further enlargements and on the eu s image are divided across the member states. People in the new member states are significantly more in favour of further enlargements than people in the old member states. As to the backgrounds to this, we speculated as follows last year: Possibly this could in part be due to feelings of solidarity owing to cultural proximity and an expectation, nonetheless, of economic (enlargement of internal market in one s own region) or political (more stability in one s own region) benefits from enlargement (cpb/scp 2007: 48). The eu s image cannot be explained along the lines of old and new member states. The eu has a positive image in Ireland and Spain, but also in Romania and Poland. The eu has a negative image in the United Kingdom, Finland and Austria, but also in Latvia. Usually support for eu membership goes together with a positive image (and lack of support with a negative image), but not in the Netherlands: here support for eu membership is especially high, but the eu does not have a very rosy image. How firm are these kinds of views on Europe? The eu and European issues are not matters which average citizens engage with strongly. Prompted opinions in surveys will rarely be based on extensive information and deep convictions and will rarely be tested in debate or discussion. Do survey views change when people start discussing the issues and receive more information? This question was investigated by the think tank Notre Europe (www.notre-europe.eu). In the project Tomorrow s Europe this think tank brought together a representative sample of 362 citizens from all eu member states for a three-day meeting in Brussels in October 2007. Prior to the deliberations, the researchers measured what the participants thought of the eu. In small groups the participants discussed the organisation s political and institutional future. Among the topics discussed were social and economic reforms, enlargements of the eu, the role of the eu in the world, and the desirability of a European approach to various problems. Experts took part in the discussions and provided the participants with information. Then another measurement was taken of what the participants thought of various eu issues. The aim of this deliberative poll was to tell us what conclusions the public could reach, if people had the opportunity to get together, to gain balanced information, and to become more engaged by the issues (www.tomorrowseurope.eu). Table A1.1 shows for a number of issues what the participants thought of them before and after the deliberation. The issues presented here are concerned with eu membership and further enlargements. The discussion and information boosted support for eu membership of their own countries, but the participants also became more wary of enlargements. A striking feature was that participants from the new member states changed their opinions more than participants from the old member states. After the deliberation the differences in views between new and old member states were smaller than before. The greater opposition to enlargements after the deliberation may be explained by the fear of political unmanageability: after the deliberation more participants thought that the eu would find it more difficult to make decisions if additional countries were admitted. Participants also completed
18 Europe s Neighbours a knowledge test before and after the deliberation. This showed that people knew far more about the eu afterwards. How long the effects on views and knowledge were sustained was not investigated. In chapter A4 we will report on a Dutch study into changes of views, and this will include an analysis of what was left of these several weeks later. Table A1.1 Results of the deliberation for views on EU membership and further enlargements, divided by people from the old member states and from the new member states (in percent) 15 old member states 12 new member states before deliberation after deliberation before deliberation after deliberation scores high (6-10) on the scale: EU membership [of one s own country] is an extremely bad thing (= 0) is an extremely good thing (= 10) 82 91 72 89 strongly agrees or tends to agree with the following statements: additional countries that meet all the political and economic conditions for membership should be admitted to the EU 61 58 78 63 if it meets all the political and economic conditions for membership, Turkey should be admitted to the EU 54 47 57 42 if it meets all the political and economic conditions for membership, Ukraine should be admitted to the EU 66 58 78 50 adding more countries to the EU would help our security 35 36 45 34 adding more countries to the EU would make it more difficult for the EU to make decisions 54 64 47 62 Source: Tomorrow s Europe, www.tomorrowseurope.eu 1.3 Policy preferences First we will look at the preferences for joint European policies in a number of policy areas and for a number of objectives. The preferences are listed in the extensive appendix table A1.B6. The results are very similar to those of previous years: there is stable support for joint approaches to cross-border problems (such as terrorism and environmental protection) and for leaving the traditional tasks of the welfare state (pensions, taxation, social security) to the national governments (see also cpb/scp 2005-2007). 2 The average preference for joint European policy has only a weak correlation with the share of the population which has a positive image of the eu. 3 Substantial support for joint policy can be found in both a number of old member states (Portugal, Belgium) and new member states (Cyprus, Lithuania), although generally speaking inhabitants of the new member states take a more positive view on this. Opposition to joint policy is strong above all in the old member states, in particular in the United Kingdom, Finland and Austria. People in those countries do not have a very rosy image of the eu either. Incidentally, the most recent accession countries, Romania and Bulgaria, are not (or not yet?) very keen on joint policy, even though Romanians in particular have a very positive image of the eu. The latter is also the case in Ireland and Poland. In the Netherlands relatively few people have a positive image of the eu. It seems that the strong support for Dutch eu membership is more an expression of what is deemed necessary in the national interest rather than of the eu s appeal. 2 This picture coincides with findings on the basis of slightly different questions in the 21 minuten.nl survey of 2007 (see chapter A3). This yielded high scores for a European or joint (i.e. Dutch and European) approach to international affairs (81%), the environment (80%), development cooperation (75%) and technological development (72%), and low scores for healthcare (23%), social security (26%) and labour market issues (40%). 3 National differences in support for joint European policy can be explained for only 23% by differences in the share of the population with a positive image of the eu (the regression line in figure A1.5). The other support indicators in table A1.B5 have even less explanatory power.
A1 Public opinion in Europe 19 Figure A1.5 Support for the EU and for joint European policies, autumn 2007 (in percent) supports joint European policy 70 CY PT 60 LV HU DE LT BE EL IT SI 50 SE NL CZ DK SK EE MT FR LU BG ES PL RO IE AT 40 FI UK 30 20 30 40 50 60 70 has a positive image of the EU Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007). weighted results; see appendix tables A1.B5 (row 4) and A1.B6 (row 21). What can we say about public opinion on the European Neighbourhood Policy (enp), the theme of this European Outlook? The views and feelings of eu citizens were polled on this in Eurobarometer surveys in 2006 and 2007. The Eurobarometers regularly include opinion polls on eu policy issues on which many citizens are unlikely to have strong views and specific feelings. This does not make the answers to such questions meaningless (see the final section of chapter A4), but it does make sense to take a close look at the questions. We will do this below with Eurobarometer 67.3 of May-June 2007. After questions about potential eu member states and which countries the respondent considers to be neighbours of the eu, the Eurobarometer asks whether the respondent has ever heard of the neighbourhood policy. This question is answered in the affirmative by a country average of 23% (14% in the Netherlands). After the question whether the respondent has ever heard of the enp, the questionnaire gives some background information: A few years ago a separate policy called the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched for countries which do not have an accession prospect. This policy aims at creating an area of shared values, stability and prosperity, enhanced cooperation and deeper economic integration with 16 different countries located to the South and to the East of the European Union. The respondents are also shown a map with only the 16 countries in question highlighted in colour (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestinian Territories, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco; see part B). If the questionnaire is conducted properly, the interviewers should keep showing the map while asking further questions about views on the neighbouring countries and policy preferences. A selection of these questions is included in table A1.B7.
20 Europe s Neighbours More Luxembourgers, Finns, Latvians and Maltese claim to have heard of the enp than the citizens of other countries. The enp is least known in the United Kingdom and Ireland (or, following on from the minimal involvement with the eu identified earlier, respondents are less embarrassed about admitting their ignorance). Support for financial assistance for enp countries suffering from internal conflicts with potential international consequences is highest in Cyprus (71%), followed by Malta (60%), Greece (55%) and, remarkably given the longer distance to conflict areas, Denmark (55%). Support is lowest in Austria (17%), Italy (21%) and Ireland (24%). There is more support for the idea to help the enp countries by giving them easier access to the eu s internal market: on average 64% of the people are in favour, ranging from 48% in the United Kingdom to 77% in Greece (72% in the Netherlands). More people in the new member states (41% on average) than in the old (26% on average) think that the enp countries share most of our values. This will be due in part to the closer geographical and cultural proximity, which may also be the reason for the stronger support in the new member states for further enlargements of the eu (cpb/scp 2007: 46). Despite the limited awareness of the enp, the overwhelming majority of eu citizens thinks that it is very important or fairly important that the eu cooperates with its neighbouring countries in such areas as (in order of importance) fighting terrorism, energy and environment, economic development, promotion of democracy, education and immigration. In figure A1.6 we have set average support for cooperation (the final row in appendix table A1.B7) against the degree to which the population of the member states claims to have heard of the enp. average support for special relationships in six policy areas PL 90 EL SE CZ HU ES 85 BE NL IE CY DK IT LT SK SI AT MT LV DE FI Figure A1.6 Awareness of and support for the EU s neighbourhood policy, spring 2007 (in percent) 80 FR RO PT BG LU 75 UK EE 70 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 has heard of the European neighbourhood policy Source: Eurobarometer 67.3 (May-June 2007), weighted results; see appendix table A1.B7 (rows 1 and 11).
A1 Public opinion in Europe 21 There is no evidence of a link between awareness of the policy and support for it. Support for special relationships is massive, but this probably has little to do with views on the 16 enp countries and the conflicts which rage there. Earlier in this chapter we already saw that eu citizens have a stable preference for joint European policy for undeniably cross-border problems. It seems that people realise that these problems do not end at the eu s borders. Given the results, it is probably not very sensible to talk of a public opinion on the European neighbourhood policy. What was probably measured was a combination of very general preferences (such as being in favour of international cooperation in principle) and of occasionally present views on specific enp countries in the respondent s own regions. The result probably has little predictive value for the public s stance if the enp were to become a real political issue. In chapter A4 we will consider a new Dutch study which includes a question on cooperation with the eu s neighbouring countries. 1.4 Differences within countries In the previous sections we looked only at national data and did not pay any attention to differences within countries. We will do that now. For perceived and actual knowledge of the eu, the view that eu membership is a good thing and the preference for joint European policy, we examine the differences by gender, age, education, satisfaction with one s own life and political preference. To keep things manageable, we will do so for a small selection of countries: the Netherlands, the old member states France and the United Kingdom (the next chapter looks at these three countries), and the new member states Poland and Bulgaria. To what extent do the backgrounds to differences of opinion coincide in this selection of very disparate countries? First perceived and actual knowledge of the eu. Tables A1.2 and A1.3 show that with regard to both self-assessment of knowledge and actual knowledge, women (taking account of the other characteristics) score less than men. Only in Bulgaria is there no difference between the genders in terms of perceived knowledge. In the other countries men not only believe that they know more, they actually do know more. The same harmony can be found for the effect of higher educational attainment: the more highly educated believe that they know more, and they actually do know more. On age, something else is happening: older people sometimes have more knowledge, but they do not claim any more than younger people. There are fewer correspondences with regard to support for eu membership (table A1.4) and the preference for joint European policy (table A1.5). Insofar as women diverge from men and older people from the under-55s, they do so in terms of lower support for eu membership and joint policy. But often there are no discernible differences. With the exception of Bulgaria, more highly educated people are consistently more positive about eu membership. In comparison with the less well-educated they are also always more in favour of joint policy. With the exception of the Netherlands, dissatisfaction with one s own life is coupled with lower support for eu membership, and in three of the five countries also with lower support for joint policy. Europe seems to be a political left/right issue only in the United Kingdom and Bulgaria: in the former country the left is more in favour of eu membership and joint policy, while in the latter it is actually the right.
22 Europe s Neighbours Table A1.2 Backgrounds to perceived knowledge (appendix table A1.B4, row 2), autumn 2007 (odds ratios a ) The Netherlands United Kingdom France Poland Bulgaria gender: women 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.5*** 0.8* 0.9 age: 15-34 years compared to 35-54 0.7* 0,8 1.1 0.9 0.8 55 years compared to 35-54 1.0 0.7** 0.9 0.6** 0.7 education: lowest third per country compared to middle third 0.7* 0.9 0.8 0.6* 0.3** highest third per country compared to middle third 1.6** 2.2*** 1.7*** 1.8*** 2.8*** satisfaction with one s own life: not very or not at all compared to fairly 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.7 very compared to fairly 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.7* 1.7 self-description in political terms: left compared to centre 1.1 1.3 0.7* 1.2 0.8 right compared to centre 1.3 1.9*** 0.9 1.5* 1.0 Nagelkerke pseudo-r 2 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.15 a When the coefficient is 1, the characteristic has no effect on knowledge; the lower the coefficient, the more negative the effect, the higher the coefficient, the more positive the effect; significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 and *** p < 0.001 (bivariate). Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results Table A1.3 Backgrounds to actual knowledge (appendix table A1.B4, row 3), autumn 2007 (odds ratios a ) The Netherlands United Kingdom France Poland Bulgaria gender: women 0.5*** 0.4*** 0.4*** 0.5*** 0.6*** age: 15-34 years compared to 35-54 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.6* 55 year compared to 35-54 1.2 1.6** 1.5* 1.3 1.0 education: lowest third per country compared to middle third 0.8 0.8 0.6** 0.6* 0.4*** highest third per country compared to middle third 1.3 1.8*** 1.6** 2.1*** 1.9*** satisfaction with one s own life: not very or not at all compared to fairly 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.7* 0.8 very compared to fairly 1.3* 1.0 1.2 1.3 2.1 self-description in political terms: left compared to centre 1.8*** 1.4* 1.2 1.1 1.0 right compared to centre 1.5** 1.5* 1.2 1.5* 1.7** Nagelkerke pseudo-r 2 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.14 a See note to table A1.2. Source: Eurobarometer 68.1 (September-November 2007), weighted results Only the left/right results in the United Kingdom and Bulgaria point to a significant difference in the domestic backgrounds to European attitudes. For the other countries there are similarities, above all in the lack of clear differences. All in all the background characteristics presented here do not provide much explanatory power for differences in attitudes towards the eu in any of