OFFICE OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DIRECTORATE FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS Current Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic Region with a Special Focus on Hybrid Aspects 21 st International Parliamentary NATO Conference Parliament of Hungary Budapest, 23 November 2017 Delegation Hall Speaking points by Rasa Juknevičienė (Lithuania) Vice-President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Mr Deputy Speaker, Excellences, Colleagues, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a privilege to represent the NATO Parliamentary Assembly at this important annual event dedicated to discussing critical security issues facing our Euro-Atlantic community. Allow me, on behalf of the Assembly, to express our utmost appreciation of Hungary s outstanding contribution to our Alliance and international peace missions. In particular, I would like to stress Hungary s active participation in NATO-led missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan as well as your support for the security of the Baltic States though your contributions to NATO Air Policing Mission and rotational deployment of the Visegrád Group units as part of the Alliance s commitment to strengthen its eastern flank. As a Lithuanian politician, I would like to express my country s profound gratitude to Hungary for this support. Nagyon köszönöm! [nadjon kesenom] I would also like to express our thanks to my friend Mihaly Balla, Head of the Hungarian delegation to the NATO PA, for his work and support for our Assembly. We have always cherished the outstanding cooperation with your parliament, a co-operation which dates back even to pre-membership days, when in 1
1995, Hungary was the first non-nato country to host an Assembly session. Hungary hosted other excellent sessions in 2000 and 2015. Ladies and gentlemen, I congratulate the decision of the organisers of this year s conference to focus on hybrid warfare. This is a subject that our NATO Parliamentary Assembly has been working on consistently in recent years, trying to raise awareness of these issues among national legislators across the Alliance. This is also a problem that we in the Baltic States have been raising for a number of years, but which has only entered the mainstream of the Euro-Atlantic strategic thinking since the occupation of Crimea and the reports of Moscow s election meddling in Western countries. However, Crimea and election interference are but the latest manifestations of Russia s targeted and comprehensive policy of strategic confrontation with the West, which can be traced back at least to Mr Putin s Munich speech in 2007, and possibly to even earlier times. In my view, the origins of this antagonism towards the West are twofold: one is objective and has to do with Russia s post-imperial complexes and difficulties of adapting to its reduced global role. Another is more personal: as a former KGB officer, Mr Putin worships control and does not seem to believe in genuine democracy. He knows that, within Russia, democratic institutions are just a façade, but he also seems to think that Western democracy and the rule of law are just as artificial. References to human rights and democracy are regarded by Putin as a mere camouflage for excluding Russia from the European decisionmaking process, sponsoring Western interests in Russia s neighborhood and seeking regime change in Russia itself. In fact, one of the key tenets of the Russian propaganda strategy is to expose the alleged Western hypocrisy and to undermine the basis of values that underpin our great Alliance. Russian national security strategy of 2015 has clearly identified NATO as an adversary. Taken at face value, the Alliance should be infinitely stronger: our collective defence spending is about 12 times higher than that of Russia, the size of Russia s GDP is comparable to that of Italy and the combined population of the alliance dwarfs that of Russia. Major global media channels as well as social media platforms are also of Western origin. In this context, Russia is exploring ways of remaining under the threshold of Article 5 by focusing on hybrid techniques. This approach is reflected in the so-called Gerasimov doctrine. Essentially, Russia s hybrid warfare is a way of seeking strategic weaknesses in our Alliance and exploiting them. Hybrid warfare poses a particular challenge for the way NATO is structured as it is developed to probe for political, economic, and societal vulnerabilities with the backing of conventional military means. Countries in Russia s immediate neighbourhood particularly Ukraine have been the primary target and were subjected to the entire spectrum on hybrid attacks, ranging from the use of special forces without military insignia to economic and energy blackmail, unabashed propaganda and fake news, hacking, and even targeted killings, all aimed at destabilising Ukraine from within and undermining its will and ability to resist. Russia often seems to have the edge in this confrontation because it has a unified decision-making process and a clear anti-western agenda. It is also ruthless and not bound by any moral or ethical constraints. It exploits the open nature of media landscape in the free world, while eradicating the last remnants of free speech domestically and turning media channels into weapons of mass deception. It sponsors the most 2
extreme political movements in the West while persecuting any meaningful opposition at home. It expanded significantly its intelligence operations in NATO countries, while harassing our diplomats based in Moscow. It orchestrates widespread hacking and trolling campaigns against Western targets, while gradually strangling the Internet freedom in Russia. It endorses separatism beyond its borders while denying same rights to nations that live in the Russian Federation. And, of course, it sounds the alarm about 4 NATO battalions in the Baltic States and Poland while boosting significantly its military capabilities on its Western borders and nearly doubling its defence budget over the last decade. And the list goes on Dear colleagues, At its milestone summit in Wales and Warsaw, the Alliance elevated hybrid threats to the top of its agenda. A lot has been accomplished since, including the launching of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the deployments in the Baltics and Poland, reinforcement of NATO Public Diplomacy Division, increased assistance to Ukraine and Georgia, the establishment of the EU East Stratcom Task Force and Hybrid Warfare Centres in Helsinki and Prague as well as numerous fact-checking and anti-trolling initiatives launched by traditional and social media as well as by academics and civil society. We are slowly learning from past mistakes and our resilience is growing, as demonstrated by the preventive actions taken by the team of the French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron, including when he removed representatives of RT and Sputnik from his media pool and called them for what they are agents of influence, and not journalists. However, so far, our response to Russian hybrid warfare has been piecemeal. A number of steps have yet to be taken. First, we need to increase strategic awareness. Member states must be able to come to a quick, unanimous assessment of events on the ground in order to be able to respond effectively to threats such as illegal militant groups (I don t like the term little green men and I think they should be called what they are Russian special forces). This requires greater intelligence sharing, reinforcing links between domestic agencies, including law enforcement, and should include consideration of a larger role for Special Forces to co-ordinate military assistance to both member states and NATO partners. Second, NATO member states, that have not yet done so, should designate specific government units to conduct round-the-clock monitoring and exposing fake news and hostile propaganda, and countering them with facts. Existing NATO and EU capabilities such as NATO s Public Diplomacy Division and the EU s East Stratcom Task Force should be provided with additional financial and technological capabilities as well as human resources to continue providing credible responses as often as possible. Policy towards classified intelligence information should be revisited to allow public diplomacy officers to use less sensitive information, including satellite imagery, in order to refute disinformation. We must learn from positive examples such as the reaction to the information attack against German troops that arrived in Lithuania as part of NATO enhanced forward presence earlier this year: a fake news report that German soldiers have allegedly raped a handicapped Lithuanian girl has been promptly identified and discarded before it was able to do considerable harm. 3
Obviously, Russian disinformation and propaganda has to be countered with truth and good journalism. But, as RAND experts put it, one cannot counter the firehose of falsehood with the squirt gun of truth. We will need to continue applying restrictive measures, such as removal of fake news as well as blacklisting and freezing the assets of the most active Russian disinformation warriors. Third, while cyber defence is growing in priority, more creative thinking and multilateral cooperation across the alliance of 29 will enhance the security of our networks and systems. Russia s cyber activities are not just some digital hooliganism it s a sophisticated, well-funded and well-staffed campaign, designed to hurt us. I would argue that our response should not be limited to cyber-defence and include cyber-retaliation capabilities. Fourth, we should revise our education policies to ensure that schools promote the value of genuine, factbased debate and critical thinking, encouraging the young generation who are avid social media users to come out of their virtual bubbles and to recognise the use of trolls and bots. In the era of hybrid warfare, conventional armed forces are playing but a supporting role, and the existence of educated, patriotic and resilient society is our first line of defence. Fifth, we should continue supporting initiatives designed to diversify energy imports and promote energy efficiency, including by implementing the vision of the EU Energy Union. I know that the level of dependency on Russian energy resources is an acute topic here in Hungary, but from my own country s experience I can testify that the development of alternative gas and electricity infrastructure has been a major game-changer in the Baltic region in recent years and it considerably strengthened our economic and political independence. Six, we should remember that hybrid warfare is about exploiting our weaknesses. So we should get our house in order. We should address injustice and corruption in our own countries, because there is mounting evidence of Russia s use of corrupt officials and criminal groups as its foreign policy weapon. We should also address the problems of various minorities, and we should look for ways of adapting our institutions including the EU institutions to today s realities. I know that Budapest and Brussels have their share of differences. The EU may not perfect and it is legitimate to expect it to evolve, but ultimately it has to be preserved as the bedrock of stability and security on our continent. Last but not least, ladies and gentlemen, if we want to limit the space for Russian hybrid warfare, we have to address the problem of grey zones in Eastern Europe. I am absolutely convinced that leaving Eastern European countries in limbo is an invitation for further Russian aggression and further tensions with the West. Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova as well as Western Balkan countries should be given a clear membership perspective both in NATO and the EU. Their accession should be based solely on their implementation of membership criteria, and not on political calculations. NATO enlargement has so far been a resounding success, and I am absolutely positive that the inclusion of new eastern European and Balkan member states would only further strengthen the Alliance and ultimately enhance security and stability in Europe. 4
Let me say a few words specifically on Ukraine. I would argue that it is a pivotal country for the future of Europe. As I noted earlier, Ukraine has been a test ground for the entire spectrum of Russian hybrid warfare techniques. If Ukraine survives and succeeds in this situation, it will have a major impact on regional, and indeed global security. At the moment, the Russian propaganda channels focus excessively on Ukraine s real and alleged problems and failures. If Ukraine actually succeeds in creating a European future for itself, the regime in Moscow would lose an important source of legitimacy and would face the domestic pressure to revisit its anti-western policies. So if we really want to see the Russian attitudes change, let s help Ukraine become a success story. It will not be easy, because the Soviet legacy and oligarchic influences still have deep roots in Ukraine. But it can be done the EU and NATO countries have vast resources, and only a fraction of them would make a decisive difference. My country Lithuania has prepared and submitted to the European institutions a New European Plan Ukraine which lists a number of specific measures of support, including what we call the Marshal Plan for Ukraine. According to our estimates, the annual investment package of up to 5 billion Euro would increase the growth of the Ukrainian economy to 6-8% per year, instead of the current rate of 2%. We also suggest that the EU allocates 3% of its Multinational Financial Framework for 2020-2027 to support Ukrainian reforms. I am glad to report that the New Plan for Ukraine is receiving significant backing among various Western stakeholders. Colleagues, there is a vibrant, active, Western-minded part of Ukrainian population that chooses the future, and not the past, and it needs our support. The pace of reforms is truly remarkable in the last three years, Ukraine has done more than in the previous two decades of independence. And all of it in the context of continuing Russian aggression in Ukraine s east. Some of these reforms are more successful than others, and I know that Hungary has concerns regarding the recent education reform bill. According to my sources, this reform is not as controversial as sometimes presented, and the idea behind this bill is to improve the proficiency in Ukrainian language among ethnic minorities, and not to ban education in minority languages altogether. In any case, I call on my Hungarian friends to engage with Ukraine on this issue in a constructive manner, and decouple this question from Ukraine s European and Euro-Atlantic membership perspectives. I am positive that this disagreement between friends can be resolved in good faith. In conclusions, dear colleagues, Let s make no mistake our Euro-Atlantic community finds itself in the state of hybrid conflict with Putin s Russia. Mr Putin appears determined to disrupt collective European decision-making and reduce the influence of the U.S. on this continent. In his attempts to weaken the Euro-Atlantic security community, Russia is challenging our collective vision of a Europe whole and at peace. It is a daunting challenge, but we have the capacity to counter it, if we continue to act in the spirit of solidarity. The need for a close transatlantic Alliance based on common values is as great as ever. We are faced with both external and internal challenges in an environment marked by growing protectionism and crowded with misinformation and disinformation. We must stand by our commitments and harmonise our divergent positions. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly will play its part. Thank you. 5