INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY AND RUSSIA ENVIRONMENTAL OR FOREIGN POLICY? Anna Korppoo, Postdoctoral Fellow, Pan-European Institute, University of Turku Studia Generalia, 31 October 2013
ENVIRONMENTAL ENCOUNTERS? RF motives on international environmental policy / agreements questioned: other benefits drive diplomatic, economic etc.? With SU environmental field was a neutral area for cooperation not politicized BUT less focus on actual environmental results? Book project: three areas of environmental policy (Baltic Sea Protection, climate, fisheries) how Russian actors conceptualize RF s role in environmental agreements discourse analysis Hønneland, Korppoo & Tynkkynen Edward Elgar TODAY climate and Baltic Sea protection cases
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY - BACKGROUND - UN Framework Convention 1992, the Kyoto Protocol (KP) 1997 - KP: binding commitments for Annex I industrialized countries, compliance system, sinks, the Kyoto mechanisms - RF transition economy KP negotiated mid-1990s allocated headroom for increasing GHG emissions due to economic recovery following post- Soviet collapse Closures of obsolete industrial capacity led to permanent decline in emissions surplus allowances - The Kyoto mechanisms (KM): opportunity to trade emission allowances within Annex I cap: - Direct emissions trading vs. Joint Implementation (JI) links to concrete emission reduction projects that reduce the permanence risk of trading - RF (and EITs) potential sellers US potential buyer but withdrew JI gained importance
RUSSIAN CLIMATE POLICY CASES Four cases of RF climate policy debates chosen: Participation in the Kyoto Protocol Ratification in 2003-2004 Participating in 2nd commitment period of KP in 2011-2012 Joint Implementation Preparatory phase 2004-2005 Implementation phase 2009-2012 Object of research: To identify discourses common to Russian climate policy that can explain what is driving it To observe changes in discourses and actors over time Discourse: Commonly accepted starting point / theme for a discussion on a policy issue, which is not questioned even though conclusions on what to do typically differ between actors. Approach / method: Analysis of storylines which evolved around policy processes for / against Materials: newspaper articles, governmental preparatory and legal documents, Duma debate, radio debates
RATIFICATION OF KP - 2003-2004 SL1: Kyoto is a political pact, only benefits, no threats Not much required from RF overshooting commitment impossible Modernization investments available support to GDP doubling goal Foreign policy benefits from bringing KP into force env. leader Actors: Roshydromet, Duma Ecological Committee, RAO UES Rossii, experts SL2: Threats to and conspiracy against RF GHG emissions likely to overshoot target before 2012 limits economic growth No guaranteed demand for RF surplus KP conspiracy against RF: Domestic uncontrolled sales of allowances by oligarchs International: oversight of emissions, access to RF natural resources, dependency on foreign technologies EU Actors: presidential advisor Illarionov, PM Fradkov, Duma deputies SL3: KP is ineffective pact without scientific basis KP lacks scientific basis, and is ineffective RF commitments discriminatory as not all countries involved RF ecological donor (forests) compensation fair Actors: Academians Izrael and Kondratiev, Duma deputies Russia ratified KP in 2004, Putin s decision, political decision
PARTICIPATING IN KP2 2011-2012 SL1: KP2 provides economic benefits with little burdens No reason to drop out Tangible benefits can continue JI projects which only really got started modernization investments KP2 target of 15-25% limitation of emissions of 1990 level involves no economic risk RF 31% below 1990 level in 2011 Actors: MED, Sberbank, companies involved in JI projects, NGOs SL2: KP2 is ineffective and income through JI is limited KP2 ineffective as brings together only 15% of global emissions even less than KP KP2 is a false goal which detracts attention away from real solutions Lack of demand and low prices for JI projects insignificant benefits available RF can withdraw KP2 with clear conscience + domestic target to replace KP2 participation Actors: President s climate advisor Bedritsky, Vice PM Dvorkovich RF rejected KP2, JI mechanism expired in the end of 2012
JI PREPARATORY PHASE 2004-2005 SL1: JI opportunity for companies to modernize Launch JI early (before 2008) to maximize benefits Economic losses as no KP ratification nor domestic approval system Access to EU ETS important start domestic ETS Actors: RAO UES Rossii, its Energy Carbon Fund, MED SL2: JI to be kept under state control JI can support industry s modernization Rejected urgency of establishing JI, balanced approach JI more realistic option than IET control Actors: Ministries and agencies involved in preparing JI SL3: JI sounds too good to be true Demand questioned, guarantees for JI purchased called for Some kind of a trick, RAO UES will grab state property JI money small, comes with major modernization requirements Actors: Duma deputies, also Illarionov and Izrael JI launch was severely delayed, state-led system
JI IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2009-2012 SL1: Improve bureaucratic practices to make JI work JI implementation failing due to domestic bureaucratic shortcomings Need to get some investment from JI as established approval system Fair that limited benefits as domestic process been low quality JI only one element of RFs climate policy rather than a priority Actors: President, Presidential administration, some experts SL2: JI can provide more benefits beyond 2012 RF s JI project legitimate, environmental benefits approved by foreign buyers Project participants to be controlled, also buyers - discrimination Continuation of JI beyond 2012 without joining KP2 Actors: JI leading agencies MED and Sberbank SL3: Join KP2 to continue retrieving benefits Bureaucracy and control of JI make it fail lost profits Problems with project allocation and tenders, criticism of Sberbank Join KP2 to continue JI, significant benefits available Actors: Companies, especially RSPP JI approval system started working effectively only in 2011, JI expired in 2012
EMERGING DISCOURSES: BENEFITS Justification of participating in KP / JI through benefits instead of solving an environmental problem. Reoccurring and almost unquestioned theme also other countries expected to understand this economic rather than environmental pact. Typical benefit categories: KM investments for modernization, image / foreign policy, forest allocations, unrelated to climate (WTO). Compensation ecological donor + bringing KP into force zero sum game instead of global responsibility. JI: economic losses, early / post-2012 JI, significance of JI investments. Demands of guaranteed benefits lack of them argument against KP and JI but tuned down over time. Now realization that receiving benefits also depends on RF s own actions.
EMERGING DISCOURSES: THREATS Commitments to GHG emission caps considered as a potential threat to economic growth overshooting emission limit before 2012, uncontrolled sales of RF s allowances by private sector Threats to Putin s goal to double the GDP, loss of competitiveness of industry Conspiracy theories: privatization of the atmosphere by oligarchs and sales of allowances back to RF government, KP a plot against RF: forcing technology imports, gaining access to natural resources JI: state control a threat to retrieving maximum benefits vs. Private sector dominance threat to RF s headroom for future growth Threats posed by the impacts of climate change were NOT brought up Threats-discourse had less legitimacy on the side of KP / JI supporters than the benefits discourse Illarionov s rhetoric during KP ratification seen as illegitimate Over time threats-discourse has tuned down. Emission trend showed that fears were false, JI remained state controlled, no IET. But remained in KP2 debate.
EMERGING DISCOURSES: RATIONALITY / FAIRNESS Often argued: RF climate sceptical views detrimental to adopting climate policies / commitments Lack of scientific basis of KP to reduce emissions sufficiently ineffectiveness i.e. inability to bring together significant share of global emissions ecological argument Some arguments questioning climate science not dominant negative nature of impacts of climate change in RF territory questioned - all changes are not automatically considered as negative only IPCC consensus vs. Keeping all options open / discussing natural climate variation and human-induced climate change together Western consensus whilst uncertainties remain seems scientifically misguided and somewhat hysterical or false (conspiracies)? Forest sinks calculations vs. Political negotiation on quotas the latter considered to devalue KP scientifically KP fairness: not all countries take burdens RF commitments unfair discriminatory also seen to have done its fair share surplus unused Change fair that less benefits from JI as poor preparation new!
CONCLUSION RF discourses clearly differ from Western argumentations / consensus important to understand the RF starting point in order not to talk past each other Can also at least partly explain the Russian scepticism on the motives of international climate diplomacy / other governments Environmental concern has very little to do with RF s climate policy decisions ecological means something else than environment has more to do with science and measurement / evidence What is driving RF climate policy? NOT environmental concern as we know it BUT genuine concern on the environmental rationality of KP, KP2 will it really solve the problem? If not, why bother? Zero-sum game: I scratch your back if you scratch mine thinking seen as legitimate rather than shared global responsibility Foreign policy / diplomacy: Swap of KP to WTO, fairness views on burdens Image benefits: RF is a civilized country Economic considerations / benefits: economic impacts, investments to modernization, private interests in JI (but limited)