ALLIANCES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENNETH WALTZ S AND STEPHEN WALT S THEORIES OF ALLIANCES

KAAV INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARTS, HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES A REFEREED BLIND PEER REVIEW QUARTERLY JOURNAL KIJAHS/JUL-SEP2017/VOL-4/ISS-3/A9 PAGE NO-44-51 ISSN: 2348-4349 IMPACT FACTOR (2017) 7.9183 www.kaavpublications.org ALLIANCES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENNETH WALTZ S AND STEPHEN WALT S THEORIES OF ALLIANCES 1 ARSHID IQBAL DAR 1 Research Scholars Deptt. Of Political Science, University of Kashmir, India 2 IRFAN UL HAQ 2 Research Scholars Deptt. Of Political Science, University of Kashmir, India 3 TANVEER AHMAD KHAN 3 Research Scholars Deptt. Of Political Science, University of Kashmir, India Abstract Alliances occupy a very important place in the study of international politics. Alliance formation is a vital tool of statecraft. They help states in a self help world to enhance their capabilities and thereby to maintain their security and survival in the anarchic international system. They can also be dangerous as they would provoke counter alliance measures. To examine the formation of alliances Balance of Power (BOP) is the dominant traditional theory within the lexicon of International politics. The BOP was given a systemic interpretation by Kenneth Waltz which triggered the debate further and resulted in the refined account of Balance of Threat (BOT) by Stephen Walt. The paper is aimed at explaining the discourse of alliance formation by offering a comparative study of both theories. The Paper will also discuss the meaning and utility of alliances. Keywords : Alliances, Statecraft, Self help, BOP, BOT INTRODUCTION In International Relations, alliance formation is an envitable result of interaction among sovereign political units driven by the interests of either dominating or balancing the power. Alliances are formed, as for Stephen Walt, by states to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat (Walt 1987). The weaker states generally forge alliance to balance power and for John Mearshiemer the stronger states sometimes form alliances to increase their share of world power (Mearshiemer 2001). The primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the member's capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests. Each state, thus, has an alliance policy formally negotiated with the other states of the world. Thus alliances are agreements concluded 44

by states, having other orientation that is they are aimed at outside their own membership. Alliances have helped states go to war, provide for their own security, and even open the doors to peace. Within the international system, alliance theory shows that alliances play important roles in international relations and vice-versa. Alliances can help manage and foster transparent relations among members and non-members, while making the international system more predictable and stable. On the other hand, alliances can also be dangerous to members and non-members. With World War I as a classic example, alliances can foster unpredictability, paranoia, and ultimately war. The traditional Balance of Power (BOP) theory predicts that states solely form alliances to balance the power of other states which is being considered as dangerous to their own security. Kenneth Waltz subscribing to this view offers a different reasoning than classical realists. Stephen Walt a student of Waltz offers a refined account of BOP which is famously known as Balance of Threat (BOT) where he maintains that states form alliances to balance threat and not simply power. Alliance: Defining the Concept In International Relations, alliance formation is an envitable result of interaction among sovereign political units driven by the interests of either dominating or balancing the power. Alliances are formed, as for Stephen Walt, by states to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat (Walt 1987). The weaker states generally forge alliance to balance power and for John Mearshiemer the stronger states sometimes form alliances to increase their share of world power (Mearshiemer 2001). Galaxy of international relations scholars have defined the term 'alliance' differently. It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances (Liska 1962: 3). Alliance is described as a process or a technique of statecraft or a type of international organization (Fedder 1968: 68). Arnold Wolfers (1968: 268) defines an alliance as 'a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states'. An alliance is a 'promise', which sets it apart from intentions or expectations. An alliance involves 'military collaboration' as distinct from all non-military associations. Alliances are only the formal subset of a broader and more basic phenomenon, than that of 'alignment' (Snyder 1990). For Morgenthau (1960) alliance is a process for manipulating equilibrium as well as a means to the end of maintaining equilibrium. Alliances differ in the, functions that they perform. Threats and counters-threats need not be explicit, but merely understood in the minds of decision makers and need not be explicitly embodied in formally signed agreements. They expect their partners to assist them in times of conflict. Alliances are also formal associations of states for the use or non-use of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified (Snyder 1990). The primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the member's capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests. Each state, thus, has an alliance policy formally negotiated with the other states of the world. Thus alliances are agreements concluded by states, having other orientation that is they are aimed at outside their own membership. Why Alliances Matter Alliances are universal components of relations between political units, irrespective of time and place. Every state must have an alliance policy, even if its purpose is only to avoid alliances argued by Robert. E Osgood is illustrative of the importance of an alliance (Osgood 1968). In the realist view, "the historically most important manifestation of the balance of power... is to be found... in the relations between one nation or alliance and another alliance" (Morgenthau, 1959) because "alliances and regional coalitions among the weak to defend themselves from the strong have been the typical method for preserving... balance" (Wright, 1965). Similarly George Liska, one of the important international relations alliance theorist maintains that alliances are an integral part of international relations, and in fact, It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name (Liska 1968). Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John Sullivan correspond with this idea by stating, alliances are apparently a universal component of relations between political units (Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan 1973). Since alliances are woven into the fabric of world politics, it is important to understand how they work and what holds them together or pulls them apart. Alliances have helped states go to war, provide for their own security, and even open the doors to peace. Therefore, to have a clear understanding of international politics and the international 45

system, it is vital to know how alliances work. Although each one is unique, there are distinguishable patterns that emerge. It is from this basis that alliance theory has developed into a growing and advanced sub-field of international relations. Within the international system, alliance theory shows that alliances play important roles in international relations and vice-versa. Alliances can help manage and foster transparent relations among members and non-members, while making the international system more predictable and stable. On the other hand, alliances can also be dangerous to members and non-members. With World War I as a classic example, alliances can foster unpredictability, paranoia, and ultimately war. Alliances are instruments to manage the security dilemma (Waltz 1979). Alliances increase the perceived likelihood of expected behavior to come true. Thereby, they help to decrease the uncertainty among states. Alliances enhance perceptions positively in the sense that it reduces the uncertainty as to what other state will do. Uncertainty, alternatively labeled as shadow of the future, is an age-old factor that causes the security dilemma. Similar to fog of war, uncertainty about burdensharing and reliability of partners (fog of alignments) causes impasse and reluctance to commit resources. Formal alliances, such as the NATO, are aimed at addressing this uncertainty. Alliances decrease the likelihood of defection from cooperation by their treaty-based road-map. Road-map includes guidelines or modalities serving materialization of reciprocal benefits and assessment of state commitments to common cause. These factors clear away the fog of alignments and alliances to certain extent. The benefits provided by an alliance road-map and strategy are relatively higher in comparison to coalitions. Coalitions are coalition of the willing kind of grouping of states. Coalitions are unstructured cooperation attempts. As structured cooperation, alliances are more predictable, binding and enforceable than rest of the cooperative relations. This is so due to alliances formal status and pre-arranged modalities. Although even treaties may not always guarantee accordant state behavior, alliances (as treaty-based organizations by definition) decreases the uncertainty that causes the security dilemma. Future concerns may well constrain state behavior. Uncertainty about the intentions of other states is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities. That uncertainty is a result of mutually constituting sovereignty and anarchy (Mearshiemer 2001). The security dilemma (the dilemma that the more states seek security, the more insecure they become) force states to form new alliances or to strengthen existing alliances (Jervis 1978). In fact, alliances may not prevent or promote war or peace at all; instead, they merely serve as tools for states to manage relations (Vasquez 1987). Kenneth Waltz s Balance of Power Theory If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance of power theory is it argues Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 classic book Theory of International Politics. In the book, he builds off Hans Morgenthau s theory of realism to explain that alliances are formed by states to balance against power. Waltz s overall approach to international relations holds that the international system consists of two structural parts. First, there is an overarching structure, and second, there are interacting units within the structure. This systemic approach reduces international politics down to the sum of its parts. Within a systemic approach to understanding international relations, neorealism argues that states are the principle units within the system and tend to act rationally. The theory also assumes the international system is anarchic and decentralized (Waltz 1979). Because the system lacks a hierarchical order, neorealists seek to understand the relationship between state actors and the abstract international system. Waltz considers the system to always maintain a blank frame that units in the world operate within. He also considers the domestic unit to be defined based on the principle of which it is ordered, by the specifications of intrastate functions, and by the distribution of capabilities within the operating units of a state (Ibid). This means that among and within every state there is a power structure arrangement where power is distributed among institutions and organizations in which capabilities are located. As a result of the arrangement, Waltz states that between units and the system, states resort to self-help behavior due to anarchic constraints. Moreover, states will always remain as similar and related units unless the entire system becomes anarchic and unordered. However, Waltz does not claim that states are the only units within the system. Instead, he says they are simply the most major, principal, and important. While there are other important units in 46

the world, such as alliances, none of these or any other will replace states in the foreseeable future. Importantly, Waltz claims that the nature of the anarchic international system is always a state of war. While he also believes the hierarchic state system is also a state of war, what separate the two realms are the respective systemic structures. In the typical national system, the state exercises legitimacy on the public use of force over private use of force. As a result, few nationals feel the need to rely on individual protection. This type of system is not a self-help system because the state always offers a public-help system: police and military forces. However, the international system is a self-help system because there are no legitimate world police or military forces that ensure national security. Concerning the behavior of states in the self-help international system, Waltz believes that a security dilemma exists, in that states view gains relative to that of others. Thus, Waltz views the international system as a zero-sum game. Consequently, this is how Waltz sees international cooperation impeded (Ibid). Specifically regarding alliances, Waltz says states will ally with the devil to avoid hell of military defeat. For him in the anarchic structure were security is the highest end states form alliances to balance the power (capabilities for Waltz) of preponderant states. As he himself says the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system (Ibid). Therefore it follows that power is only a means to achieve the highest end of security which distinguishes Waltz s balance of power perspective from classical realists like Morgenthau. Further for classical realists balance of power is a conscious move by states whereas for Waltz balance of power emerges automatically out of state s disposition to achieve security and survival. Within the Waltzian international system states prefer to join the weaker of the two coalitions, if states wished to maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would not see balances forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not band wagoning, is the behavior induced by the system (Ibid). Structural realists view balancing as law-like phenomenon in international politics. According to Waltz: From the theory, one predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. From the theory, one predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not that a balance once achieved will be maintained, but that a balance once disrupted will be restored in one way or another. Balances of power recurrently form (Paul 2004). For Waltz while balancing the capabilities of preponderant states alliance formation serves the purpose. Alliances are formed in the quest for security. Once formed, alliances have to be managed. Alliance formation is driven further by commonalty of some if not all interests among sovereign states. The common interest is ordinarily negative one----fear of other states. Thus for Waltz alliance strategies are always the product of compromise since the interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them are never identical. If a member of one alliance tries to settle differences, or to cooperate in some ways with a member of another alliance, its own allies become uneasy (Waltz 1979). His theory of neorealism assumes that alliances are not autonomous political actors because it is states that created them, it is states that largely provide the staff that run them, and it is states national interests that dictate the direction of the alliance (Ibid). In fact, the realist Glenn Snyder writes that alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response (Synder 1997: 192). Kenneth Waltz adds that while an alliance s own bureaucracy can strengthen its longevity, it is state members of the alliance that ultimately determines its fate (Waltz 2000). Furthermore, alliances are sometimes created and maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests (Ibid).Waltz s understanding of alliances indicates that they are primarily a network of interests, in which states, and sometimes primarily the most powerful state, have primary control over the alliance s formation, longevity, and disintegration. This is not to say that institutional features of alliances cannot exist, instead, even when they do exist their independent effect is minimal. Thus for Waltz states form alliances to balance the capabilities (power) of preponderant states which however is based on different reasoning as compared to classical realist account of balance of power most notably Morgenthau s account. Stephen Walt s Balance of Threat Theory Stephen Walt refined the Balance of Power Theory in his famous book The Origins of Alliances (1987) and offered what is famously known as Balance of Threat Theory. Walt begins by seeking to answer questions such as: What causes states to support one another s foreign policy or territorial 47

integrity? How do statesmen choose among potential threats when seeking external support? How do the great powers choose which states to protect, and how do weaker states decide whose protection to accept? In short, how do states choose their friends? (Walt 1987: 1, 2 ). Walt, throughout the book uses the terms alliance and alignment interchangeably. He defined an alliance as "a formal or informal arrangement of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states". It includes both formal treaties and informal commitments because states may be willing to cooperate but unwilling to sign a formal treaty. The presence or absence of a formal treaty often says relatively little about the actual level of commitment between the parties (Ibid: 12, 13). According to Stephen Walt, when confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat. To balance, states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat. Walt identifies two reasons why states choose to balance. First, states join together with other less or nonthreatening allies to curb the potential of a greater enemy. The second reason states balance is because it provides a better place for the state to control the alliance or coalition, whereas bandwagoning to a greater power does not give the state as much say in the direction of the alliance.(ibid: 17, 18). Bandwagoning on the other hand is defined as alignment with the source of danger. Walt mentions two reasons why states choose to engage bandwagoning. First, it is a form of appeasement. By aligning with an ascendant state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere. The second reason is because, during war time, states can foresee which side will be victorious. Therefore, states will bandwagon to the threatening power because it will be the winning power. As such, the state will then be able to share the spoils of victory. (Ibid: 21) Walt s emphasis regarding the balance-bandwagon debate is that states do not solely view alliance policy in terms of power. Instead, by focusing on power, states actually focus on threats. He also mentions that Because balancing and bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats, it is important to consider all the factors that will affect the level of threat that states may pose. He lists four factors that come into play when a state determines the level of threat emanating from another state: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions. (Ibid: 22, 26) Based on Walt s analysis of balancing and bandwagoning, he states that balancing occurs far more frequently than bandwagoning. Therefore the main cause of alliance formation is states aspiration to counter the threat of a powerful state(s) by banding together with others that share the same intention. This is not to say that alliances never form out of bandwagoning behaviors, they just do so less frequently. (Walt 1985: 4) Contrasted to the balance-of-power alliance behavior, Walt mentions that some believe a cause behind alignment is shared ideologies. This concept is based on the idea that political or cultural traits can bring states together. He cites remarks by foreign leaders that mention destiny, nature, democracy, and even Christian brotherhood as bases for alignment. However, some occurrences of this idea may be attributable to secondary factors. Another dimension to this is the importance of cross-national ideological solidarity in alliance formation. There have been many international movements, such as communism, pan-arabism, and Rastafarianism. These ideological networks can provide incentives and motivation to ally with states in an ideological group. Walt considers the significance of this concept and draws important conclusions. To begin, states are more likely to follow their ideological preferences when they are already fairly secure. This means that when a secure state is in a position to support a similar state, it will more likely do so if that state is already secure. In other words, states are pickier when they are secure than when they are not. Therefore, security considerations take precedent over ideological preferences, and ideologically based alliances are unlikely to survive when more pragmatic interests intrude. Walt also identifies political tools states use to gain allies. It is important to understand this because tools can play a role in initiating and crafting alliance agreements. The tools he focuses on are bribery and penetration. For bribery, he refers to foreign economic and military assistance. He cites examples of states providing arms or economic aid to others in hope of establishing significant leverage over the recipient. Therefore, there are historic examples of formal and informal alliances forming in the context of foreign aid exchange. Walt, however, calls the idea that aid creates allies as erroneous and simplistic. Instead, he mentions that a large aid relationship is more often the result of alignment than a cause of it and therefore it is more appropriate to consider the conditions under 48

which the use of military or economic assistance will have powerful independent effects on the recipients conduct. The second tool Walt mentions is penetration. For this, he refers to political penetration, which means the covert or indirect manipulation of one state s political system by another. This takes many forms, including diplomats attempting to bring their own country close with another, cross-national lobbying organizations seeking to alter national policies, or even foreign propaganda used to sway another state s public opinion. Political penetration may be able to influence or sway a state into forming an alliance. Just as with bribery, Walt cites historic examples of how states have pressured other states into forming alliances. However, he claims that penetration has a very limited effect of alliance formation. When it does have a significant effect, societies are often open, and foundations for prospective relationship are often already conducive. (Ibid) Therefore, penetration does not really provide a cause for alliance formation; instead, it mostly serves as an outlet for states in forming alliances.( Ibid) Waltz and Walt: Points of Agreement Both Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Want belong to the neorealist tradition of international relations as the latter was the student of former. Therefore having the common theoretical footing, their theories of alliances share some common assumptions: 1) States are rational unitary actors 2) They operate in an anarchic system 3) Where self-help is the primary mode of behavior. (Waltz 1979) Apart from their theoretical convergence both Waltzian and Waltian explanations of alliances are systemic in that the self-help approach of alliance literature is primarily based upon neo-realism. Since neo-realism or structural realism does not take small states into account, traditional alliance literature centers only on great power politics and alignments to increase security and stability. Needless to say non-state entities are outside of the confines of neorealism. Although Waltz himself maintains that neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy and does not purport to explain or predict what individual states will do, he nevertheless asserts that states do not pursue power per se, but security is what they primarily seek (Waltz 1988).This is a systemic given or axiom of neo-realism different from the tenets of classical realism (Synder 2002).Both Waltz and Walt assume that while aligning states have two choices either to bandwagon or to balance. Although they consider that States while facing preponderant power (Waltz) or threat (Walt) states will be attracted to bandwagoning. Nevertheless, they arrive at same conclusion regarding the most preferred choice which is the manifestation of anarchic system where states balance more than they bandwagon. That is, they often balance against greater capability or against threatening state rather than bandwagon, namely the behavior of aligning against the source of power (power being defined as capability) or against the source of threat. Waltz and Walt: Points of Disagreement Waltz balance of threat theory theoretically follows in the foot-steps of the balance of power theory. It shows concern with both great powers and lesser states different from Kenneth Waltzian balance of power theory. It does not assume away the roles of lesser states. To the contrary, Walt includes the analysis of the Middle Eastern states alignment strategies in his seminal work the Origins of Alliances (Walt 1987). Waltz defines bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing alignment with periodic balancing of would-be leaders among states. For Kenneth Waltz, states decision to whether balance against or bandwagon with another state is mainly based on the strongest state. In Waltz s argumentation, determining which state or group of states appears strongest is vital (Waltz 1979). However, for S. Walt, this consideration of the balance of power is not enough to understand alliances. Stephen Walt varies from K. Waltz on the merits of states calculations. He argues that balance of threat is more important: States measure or calculate the merits of bandwagoning with or balancing against other states by determining not only which state or group of states appear strongest, but also they consider which state or states appear most threatening. Therefore, if serious threats appear, Stephen Walt asserts that state leadership need to consider risks and to calculate towards the threatening state Stephen Walt s framework is very parsimonious in that there are only two options for states, either balancing or bandwagoning. Different from Kenneth Waltz s argument, Walt argues that states do not balance against power or strongest state, but rather their alignment strategies are 49

based on the perception and calculation of the external threat. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat of hegemony while bandwagoning refers to aligning oneself with the source of threat. According to Walt, balancing has been the dominant tendency in international politics, while bandwagoning has been the opportunistic exception. Finland's relations with the Soviet Union are given as a rare example of bandwagoning in the Origins of Alliances. Walt improved neorealism by aligning it with cognitive processes of perception. Balance of threat also paved the way for a discussion of the role of ideology in realism. That is a step towards both classical realism and constructivism in the sense that although Walt argues that ideology does not play important role in alliance formation, the formation and role of ideas is brought forward to the extent state decisionmaking and perceptions are concerned. Aggressive intentions and perception are the doors to further realist refinement of the concept of threat (Walt 1987). CONCLUSION To discuss alliances, their meaning and the basis of their formation is very vital for the students of international politics. The rationale is being provided by the famous alliance theorist George Liska that It is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name. These are the important tools of statecraft and are envitable results of states interaction. They can help in enhancing states capability in international system thereby making them secure. But at the same time they can be counterproductive as well by provoking Counter alliances. Traditional Balance of Power theory proposes alliance formation as a conscious move of states to balance the preponderant power of other states which is considered dangerous for state security and sovereignty. Kenneth Waltz while subscribing to the same view says states form alliances to balance the capabilities (power) of other states but offers a different reasoning from classical realists. For Waltz it is not the conscious or deliberate move of states rather it emerges automatically out of states disposition to achieve security and survival. However, Stephen Walt in his The Origins of Alliances offers a refined theory known as Balance of Threat theory. For Walt states form alliances to balance threat not simply aggregate capabilities or power, were power is one condition coupled with other conditions like intentions, proximity and offensive capabilities. Thus balance of threat theory is superior to balance of power theory in many ways. Probing the impact of several related but distinct sources of threat can provide a more persuasive account of alliance formation than can focusing solely on distribution of aggregate capabilities. Furthermore, Kenneth Waltz s account of balance of power theory is only applicable to great powers while as Walt s balance of threat theory includes lesser powers as well. Last but not least Walt s theory makes more sense because of its regional specificity as it is clear now that the study of international politics is tilting more towards regions since the end of cold war. REFERENCES 1. Stephen, Walt. "The origins of alliances." Ithaca New York 1 (1987) 2. Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of international politics. Waveland Press, 2010. 3. Senese, Paul D., and John A. Vasquez. The steps to war: An empirical study. Princeton University Press, 2008. 4. Snyder, Glenn H. Alliance politics. Cornell University Press, 2007. 5. Liska, George. Nations in alliance: The limits of interdependence. Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 6. Walt, Stephen M. "Alliance formation and the balance of world power." International security 9.4 (1985): 3-43. 7. Waltz, Kenneth N. "The origins of war in neorealist theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18.4 (1988): 615-628. 8. Snyder, Glenn H. "Mearsheimer's World Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay." International Security 27.1 (2002): 149-173. 9. Osgood, Robert Endicott. "Alliances and American foreign policy." (1968). 10. Mearsheimer, John J. The tragedy of great power politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001. 11. Fedder, Edwin H. "The concept of alliance." International Studies Quarterly12.1 (1968): 65-86. 50

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