II. Bentham, Mill, and Utilitarianism Do the ends justify the means? Getting What We Are Due We ended last time (more or less) with the well-known Latin formulation of the idea of justice: suum cuique tribuere to allocate to each his own. Another way of putting that: Justice involves giving each person what he or she is due. It involves how things get distributed But what is to be distributed (what are the relevant distributanda)? 1
Distributive Justice Income and wealth; rights and duties; benefits and burdens; powers and opportunities; positions and honours Retributive/Corrective Justice Punishment; restitution; contrition; rehabilitation Three Main Approaches Historically, there have been three main approaches to justice i.e., approaches to distributing the good (and bad) things to which persons are due: 1. Maximizing Welfare 2. Respecting Rights and Freedoms 3. Promoting Virtue 2
Justice Ancient and Modern Historically (and in terms of cross-cultural popularity) virtue comes first. For Aristotle, e.g., determining who deserves what depends on first determining the nature of the good life. Determing what virtues (characteristics and dispositions that make life go well for individuals and communities) ought to valued what vices ought to be disvalued. Put in modern terms, justice-as-virtue involves judging people s choices and preferences Modern conceptions of justice (e.g., Kant, Mill, Rawls) by contrast, are founded on respecting rights/freedoms and/or promoting welfare. And note: At least in principle, those goals can be achieved without having to judge people s choices or preferences. Instead, according to modern conceptions, a just society can remain neutral /w/r/t the good life; neutral /w/r/t what constitutes virtue and vice. 3
Since its something of pedagogical tradition (and because it has been so tremendously influential in law, public policy, economics, etc.), let s start with the first approach on the list the idea that justice consists in maximizing overall welfare. A Revolution In Morality For our purposes, utilitarianism can be said to have been founded by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832); developed and refined by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) Philosophical Radicals : Both Bentham and Mill were active social and political reformers; both wrote and campaigned in aid of legislation (Bentham, penal reform; Mill, women s suffrage, contraception, Irish land reform) 4
this practical focus is not accidental. Bentham s major work: Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). As its title implies, for Bentham, moral philosophy is and ought to be put to use in setting a practical political agenda. Harriet Taylor Mill Mill, for his part, wrote numerous pamphlets on social and political questions and served as an MP. Of particular note, his The Subjection of Women (with Harriet Taylor Mill, 1869) one of the major documents of modern liberal feminism. Classical Utilitarianism (U) in a Nutshell a) Actions are to be judged right or wrong solely by virtue of their consequences; nothing else matters (consequentialism) b) Consequences are to be assessed as good or bad solely in terms of the utility or disutility (pleasure or pain; happiness or unhappiness) created. c) Each person s utility counts and counts equally (egalitarianism) The fundamental normative principle: Maximize utility! (for everyone affected). 5
Why Revolutionary? The core idea: An action is morally right (i.e., is at least morally permissible) if it brings about more utility (more happiness, more pleasure) for everyone affected than any other (feasible) alternative action. Its familiar (though potentially self-contradictory) slogan: The greatest happiness of the greatest number Implication: Our happiness matters; everyone s happiness matters. Morality is not given by God or inscribed in eternal abstract rules. It something we can do something about Item: Bentham on Pauper Management Seeing beggars on the street decreases utility tenderhearted people feel the pain of sympathy; hard-hearted people feel the pain of disgust. As for beggars themselves, a few may might actually prefer the mendicant life, but virtually all beggars would be better off if they received adequate food, safe accommodation, medical care, etc. Bentham: So, round em up for the workhouse!... 6
Any citizen who notices a beggar is legally empowered to detain him and take him to the nearest workhouse. A 20 shilling reward will help to motivate this prosocial behaviour. Beggars will be well cared for and put to work for wages. They may leave when they have accumulated sufficient funds in their self-liberation account (accrued room and board, life insurance premiums [in case they die before they are paid up] and the 20 shilling reward paid for their capture) Objectivity The bold U claim: We can, in principle, get morals objectively right. How? In order to function as a practical guide to moral questions, the utilitarian reckons, a moral theory must be as objective as possible. Utility is understood to be the sort of thing that we ought to be able ascertain, at least in principle, by observation, measurements, scientific reasoning 7
Sidebar: Liberty / Paternalism Mill: Each sane adult is the best judge of what is in her best interests (i.e., what will maximize her utility). Even if that may sometimes seem to be false, how can we be sure that we know any better? Plus, deciding on other people s behalf has disutility of its own, e.g., creating dependency and impeding moral development both of individuals and the community. Implication: U (at least for Mill) is compatible with, indeed, entails, respect for liberty Sidebar: Liberty/Paternalism II But is it true that individuals are objectively the best judges of what is in their interests? Consider: Drug addiction, vaccination, personal finances, monetary policy Accordingly, for some contemporary utilitarians, the theory turns out to be compatible with a fairly high degree of paternalism. 8
Utility In general, the term utility stands for whatever is understood to be intrinsically valuable Intrinsically valuable: Valuable as an end, for its own sake Instrumentally valuable: Valuable as a means to obtain something else (e.g., money, possessions) Candidate intrinsically valuable things: Pleasure (Bentham); Happiness/Eudaemonia (Mill); Welfare; Preference satisfaction (some contemporary utilitarians). Equality & Impartiality On any version of utilitarian theory, we are to maximize utility (minimize disutility) for everyone affected in aggregate. Bentham: Each is to count for one, none to count for more than one. Mill: I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested benevolent spectator. ( Utilitarianism, 76) 9
The Case for Utilitarianism The U idea has been enormously influential over the last 200+ years, in philosophy, politics, economics and elsewhere. The attractiveness of the U idea, I d suggest, has a lot to do with precisely those features of the theory that we ve already noted: Objectivity/Non-mysteriousness Equality/Impartiality At least some scope for human freedom Criticisms of U 1. Is Utility All That Matters? Hedonic U (à la Bentham) seems to many to be too narrow, excluding other things we value besides pleasure/the absence of pain. (the pianist s damaged hands; gossip of which the gossipee is unaware) Well, to some degree, Mill tries to address this issue 10
Mill: We must broaden our conception of utility from simple pleasure to happiness (eudaemonia, thrivingness ) everything we desire becomes part of happiness. Happiness is a complex phenomenon. it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied ( Utilitarianism, 1863, 74) 2. Is U justice what we mean by justice? Retributive Justice: McCloskey s southern sheriff example Distributive Justice: Candy bowl example 11
3. Rights Considerations Privacy Rights: Why should the pleasure of a peeping tom count at all? Security Rights: Why should the pleasure of the rapist count at all? In fact, classical Us are typically skeptical about the very idea of rights (Bentham: Nonsense on stilts ). We ve already seen this /w/r/t judicial rights 4. Backward-Looking Reasons Personal Relationships: The benevolent, disinterested spectator would count strangers on an equal basis with friends and family. This seems bizarre or too demanding (But is it really? Consider Peter Singer on people in less developed societies.) Desert Island Promises: If lying/breaking a promise will yield more utility than the truth, and will not create any disutility of its own (but is that ever the case?), then, by AU, these things seem to be morally permissible. 12