COURSE SYLLABUS PSC 761: AMERICAN POLITICAL FRONTIERS Spring 2006 Prof. Charles J. Finocchiaro Tuesdays 4:00-6:50 Office: 422 Park Hall 502 Park Hall Phone: 645-2251 ext. 422 University at Buffalo E-mail: finocchi@buffalo.edu COURSE OVERVIEW: This course provides an introduction to social choice theory as applied to American politics. As a branch of positive political theory, social (or public choice) theory seeks to explain a variety of political and economic phenomena by making an assumption (or a set of assumptions) and then analyzing how actors behave. Some of the more prominent questions and issues in this area deal with collective action (e.g., interest group formation), the spatial theory of voting (and voting rules more generally), and institutional rules and development. Despite the course number, this is an introductory-level course that is appropriate for anyone with an interest in either positive theory (and as such, it is a nice complement to game theory) or political institutions, voting, and elections. The seminar will also provide a foundation for further coursework in subfields like legislative politics which draw heavily on the social choice tradition. The reading list is a mix of the classics and their critics, alongside more recent applied work in American politics. COURSE MATERIALS: The readings for the course will be drawn from the list of books below, as well as a number of journal articles and chapters from edited volumes. Required books are available for purchase from the usual sources and are also on 2-hour/overnight reserve in the library. Unless indicated otherwise, the remaining assigned readings can be downloaded from JSTOR. The readings not available from JSTOR may be accessed through the UB Libraries course reserve system at: ublib.buffalo.edu or via UBlearns. All of these sites require you to logon from a UB IP address or to verify your identity. Please bear in mind that readings may be added or dropped and the syllabus and schedule may be altered at my discretion. Any changes will be announced in class and by e-mail. Required Books: Aldrich, Why Parties? (Chicago 1998) ISBN: 0226012727 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Harper Collins 1957) ISBN: 0060417501 Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (Yale 1994) ISBN: 0300066368 Hinich and Munger, Analytical Politics (Cambridge 1997) ISBN: 0521565677 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard [1965] 1971) ISBN: 0674537513 Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (Waveland Press 1982) ISBN: 0881333670
One of the following two: Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics (Chicago 1998) ISBN: 0226452727 Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda (Cambridge 2005) ISBN: 0521619963 Recommended Books: Shepsle and Bonchek, Analyzing Politics (W.W. Norton 1997) ISBN: 0393971074 * Good introduction to social choice theory and its application in political science. COURSE EXPECTATIONS AND EVALUATION: Course grades will be based on three components, each comprising one-third of the total. [1] Since this is a graduate-level reading course, students are expected to come to class each week prepared to discuss all of the assigned readings. The extent and quality of participation in class discussion, including leading the discussion on the days corresponding to submission of a critical review, will make up the first component. [2] Students will on at least two occasions (possibly more, depending on final enrollment) write a critical review of the literature assigned for the week. These reviews need not be excessively long (6-7 pages is probably adequate), but they should analytically synthesize and critique the literature in the particular area of focus. More effort and attention should be focused on analysis and criticism and very little on summarization. [3] Students will also complete a more lengthy writing assignment. This project involves selecting a particular area of research (or topic) in which a public choice perspective has been applied and tracing the evolution of the literature both within and outside this paradigm. The paper should have two major themes: a cogent, critical review of the body of literature and a discussion of unresolved issues that are open for further research. This last component, while not necessarily involving a research design, could certainly lay the groundwork for a future research project. This paper is due Wednesday, May 3 (approximately one week after the last class session). ACADEMIC INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBILITY, ETC.: Academic dishonesty of any kind will not be tolerated and will be sanctioned to the fullest extent possible under UB policy. Additionally, students are expected to conduct themselves in a professional and civil manner. These and other expectations are discussed in more detail in the Graduate School Policies and Procedures (www.grad.buffalo.edu/grad-docs/policies/) as well as in the Student Rules and Regulations (www.ub-judiciary.buffalo.edu/art1.shtml). Students with special needs that require accommodation should meet personally with the professor as soon as possible at the beginning of the semester. OFFICE HOURS: Tuesdays from 8:45 to 11:15 and 2:00 to 3:00; Thursdays from 11:00 to 11:30 2
COURSE SCHEDULE: * Indicates the material is available through the UB Libraries course reserve system or posted on UBlearns. January 17: Introduction * Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. Analyzing Politics. New York: W.W. Norton. Ch. 1-2 January 24: Overview * Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and S. M. Amadae. 1999. The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 269-295. * Riker, William H. 1990. Political Science and Rational Choice, in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 163-181. * Aldrich, John H. 1994. Rational Choice Theory and the Study of American Politics, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., The Dynamics of American Politics. Boulder: Westview Press, pg. 208-233. January 31: Spatial Models I SPATIAL MODELS Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins. Ch. 1-6 Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. 1997. Analytical Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1-2 February 7: Spatial Models II & Extensions to the Downsian Model Downs, Ch. 7-16 Hinich and Munger, Ch. 3-4, 6, 8 February 14: Applications * Ferejohn, John. 1993. The Spatial Model and Elections, in Bernard Grofman, ed., Information, Participation, and Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pg. 107-124. * Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Downs and Two-Party Convergence. Annual Review of Political Science 7: 25-46. Lacy, Dean, and Philip Paolino. 1998. Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers. American Journal of Political Science 42: 1180-1199. 3
Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Brian R. Sala. 1998. The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824. American Journal of Political Science 42: 1157-1179. Ansolabehere, Stephen D., James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart, III. 2001. Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections. American Journal of Political Science 45: 136-159. GROUP CHOICE February 21: Voting Rules, Agenda Setting, and Sophisticated Voting I Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Ch. 1-5 February 28: Voting Rules, Agenda Setting, and Sophisticated Voting II Hinich and Munger, Ch. 5 Riker, Ch. 6-10 March 7: Applications Jones, Bradford, Benjamin Radcliff, Charles Taber and Richard Timpone. 1995. Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders. American Political Science Review 89:137-144. Wilkerson, John D. 1999. Killer Amendments in Congress. American Political Science Review 93: 535-552. * Clinton, Joshua D., and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790. American Journal of Political Science 48: 675-689. Hammond, Thomas H., and Gary J. Miller. 1987. The Core of the Constitution. American Political Science Review 81: 1155-1174. Carter, John R., and David Schap. 1990. Line-Item Veto: Where is Thy Sting? Journal of Economic Perspectives 4: 103-118. Cox, Gary W. 2000. On the Effects of Legislative Rules. Legislative Studies Quarterly 25: 169-192. March 21: Institutional Analysis # Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. # Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. # Although each student will read portions of both books, you will be responsible for reading only one of the two in its entirety. 4
COLLECTIVE ACTION March 28: Collective Action I Olson, Mancur. [1965] 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ch. 1-3 April 4: Collective Action II Olson, Ch. 4-6 Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ch. 1-5 April 11: Applications Aldrich, Ch. 6-9 Lubell, Mark, Mark Schneider, John T. Scholz, and Mihriye Mete. 2002. Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective Action Institutions. American Journal of Political Science 46: 148-163. * Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. Coping with Tragedies of the Commons. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 493-535. April 18: Critics ASSESSMENTS Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice. New Haven: Yale University Press. April 25: Responses to the Critics and Other Perspectives * Miller, D. W. 2001. Storming the Palace in Political Science. Chronicle of Higher Education. September 21: A16. Selections from volume 9 of Critical Review (1995): * Chong, Dennis. Rational Choice Theory s Mysterious Rivals, pg. 37-58. * Diermeier, Daniel. Rational Choice and the Role of Theory in Political Science, pg. 59-70. * Fiorina, Morris. Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise, pg. 85-94. * Shepsle, Kenneth. Statistical Political Philosophy and Positive Political Theory, pg. 213-222. * Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. Pathologies Revisited: Reflections on Our Critics, pg. 235-276. 5
* McCubbins, Mathew D., and Michael Thies. 1996. Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory. Leviathan. Simon, Herbert. 1985. Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science. American Political Science Review 79: 293-304. Quattrone, G., and Amos Tversky. 1988. Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice. American Political Science Review 82: 719-736. * Becker, Gary. 1986. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, in John C. Elster, ed., Rational Choice. New York: New York University Press, pg. 108-122. Final Paper Due: Wednesday, May 3, no later than 5pm 6