Laboratory for Comparative Social Studies Research Project: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité! The Impact of Inequality on Support for Democracy and Redistribution Yegor Lazarev Department of Political Science St. Petersburg State University yegor.lazarev@gmail.com
Research Question How does income inequality affect perceptions of unfairness of wealth distribution and attitudes toward democracy? Debate Famous words from the motto of the Great French Revolution liberty, equality and fraternity are among the most fundamental values of modern societies. Generally they exist in mass perceptions as an inseparable whole. However, there is a lack of understanding of causal links between social phenomena that mirrors such a great concepts. This study aims to investigate the impact of income inequality (egalite) on support for democracy (liberte). The puzzle also includes a point how does inequality expressed in support for redistribution (fraternite). The key question about the relationship between equality and freedom was raised in the Ancient times by Aristotle. Many centuries later, Alexis de Tocqueville (1831) in his classical work Democracy in America has clearly shown the positive impact of social equality on economic development and political freedom. Developing his argument, Putnam (1993) has pointed out that equality enhance democracy, while promoting social capital in general and trust in particular. This idea is supported by results of Uslaner (2002) study that based on the evidence from the US and shows that the more inequality, the less trust. Trust in its turn is widely accepted as building block for economic and political development (Fukyama 1996; Gambetta, 2000). However, the relationship between trust and democracy is not so evident. For instance, Inglehart (1999) has shown that transitions to democracy are more likely to be accompanied with low levels of trust. The hottest debate in social sciences in this sphere is about the link between inequality and democracy. According to most influential political scientists (Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1991), democracy is almost impossible in highly unequal societies. Hence, there is controversial empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality and political regime performance. For instance, Bollen and Jackman (1985) found no statistically significant relationship. Muller (1988) concluded that higher inequality made dictatorships more stable. Przeworski et al. (2000) has shown that in most cases the durability of dictatorships is unaffected by income distribution. Noteworthy, the most detailed investigations on the political effects of inequality have been done on American material. For instance, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) explained the factors of polarization of American elites and electorate. And Bartels (2008) based on exploration of causes and consequences of income inequality in America, has proven that inequality affects the quality of democracy, while wealth-holders highly unequal society may be more able to convert their assets into political power and to limit the effective voice of majorities.
Two most influential contributions to debate on the impact of inequality on democratization also produce controversies. According to Boix (2003) inequality harms democratization, while raising costs for the power-holders. And according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) there is a non-linear relationship between inequality and democratization and it is middle-level equality that is favorable to transition to democracy. Both theories are based on models of redistributive conflict. Despite high analytical power of these political economy models, one have to agree that there is a fundamental problem of all them they rely only on assumed preferences and do not study real attitudes and values of the people. In economic-based approach political values are determined by mathematical utility functions. It is useful starting point for building the argument, but to understand real causal links we need to consider also social, political and cultural factors. On the other side of debate, socio-cultural theory goes from Inglehart and Welzel (2005) study, based on detailed investigation of actual preferences, shows a dominant role of ordinary people attitudes toward democracy for regime performance. This theory stresses that mass beliefs have critical importance for a country s chances to become and remain democratic. However, strong in this point, theory suffers from economic determinism. Emphasizing the role of socioeconomic conditions (primarily welfare) it neglects political factors. I argue that inequality and redistributive politics caused by it may be one of the most important missing variables. The general logic of this research finds support from the recent studies of Alesina and Guliano (2009) and Kaufman (2009), who have explored the determinants of support for redistribution and found that simple utility functions are a big simplification and individual characteristics, expected future, social mobility and cultural factors do matter for people s preferences. Challenge This study pretends to make an endowment for the debate on both theoretical and empirical level. Theoretically it bridges political economy models of democratization and democracy (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) with socio-cultural theory (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Studying real preferences of the people will help to develop theories of political economics and test basic assumptions of them. This idea is in line with Kaufmann (2009), who stressed that to understand the political and economic effects of inequality we need closer examination of the social-psychological foundations of beliefs on it. On empirical level the research allows to look beyond the US and regions and establish broad comparative perspective. For instance, it is very important to know, how unique is India?
Core Variables Inequality (Gini Index; capital share) Support for democracy (Democracy Battery in WVS) Perceptions of unfairness of wealth distribution (WVS) Regime type (Freedom House, Polity IV) Longevity of democratic rule (Polity IV) Access for information (WVS) and media freedom (Freedom House) Party system (Effective number of electoral/parliamentarian parties) Welfare (GDP per capita) Resource abundance (oil) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization/ Segregation Religiosity (WVS) Hypotheses H(0) The higher is income inequality, the less is support for democracy and the higher is support for redistribution. H(1) If the level of economic welfare is high, income inequality increase support for democracy and redistribution. H(2) In democracies income inequality reduces support of democracy. H(3) In authoritarian regimes the higher is inequality, the stronger is support for democracy and redistribution. H(4) The longer is period of democratic rule, the less is the effect of inequality on support of democracy and redistribution. H(5) If the media freedom is high, income inequality enhance support for democracy and redistribution. H (6) In countries with multiparty system, the effect of inequality on support for democracy and redistribution is higher than in two-party systems. H(7) The higher is ethnolinguistic fractionalization and segregation, the higher is the effect of income inequality on support of democracy and redistribution. H(8) The higher is religiosity, the less is the effect of inequality on support for democracy and redistribution.
Main Argument Common sense and dominant theoretical tradition lead to an idea that inequality will reduce support for democracy, while increasing discontent and frustration in society. But it is also theoretically possible that inequality may generate support for democracy and there are several reasons for this alternative story. First of all, this assumption fits authoritarian politics and first stages of democratization process, while they are characterized by increasing demand for redistribution through political means. Considering regime type, it is also possible to assume that in long-standing democracies the impact of inequality on support for democracy is low, due to democratic tradition or democratic political culture. Second, the relationship between inequality and support for democracy may also be affected by means of articulation of political interests. Media freedom could be intervening variable in this sense, due to if the rich or power elite control the media they can influence preferences of the poor or masses. Another potentially important factor is party system, while in conditions of multiparty system it is higher probability that one of the parties will emphasize the demand for redistribution in its program. Third, the magnitude of the negative effects of inequality on support for democracy is probably depends on the level of welfare. High level of welfare or economic growth in conditions of inequality may on the one hand increases support for democracy, due to extension of size of the prize from democratic redistribution, and on the other hand it may lead to reduction of support for democracy, because of satiety of people. This argument is especially sound for natural resource abundant countries. Forth, it is plausible that the impact of inequality on attitudes toward democracy is affected by overlapping of inequalities. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization or segregation may increase the negative effects of inequality, but in some cases (for instance in the presence of significant ethnic minority) enhance support of democracy. Finally, one can predict the salience of religiosity factor for the relationship, while in many religions social order is accepted as given and therefore there is no intention for changes and no demand for equality on this world. In sum, I predict that (1) there is non-linear relationship between inequality and attitudes toward democracy; and that (2) the impact of inequality on support for democracy is conditional to the several external determinants, that express demand for redistribution and articulation of political interests. Methods Statistical analysis of the data: Multiple Regressions; Marginal Effect Analysis; Probit/Logit modeling Case-studies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, Iran, Haiti, Venezuela)
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Uslaner Mark (2002), The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scheve, Kenneth, and David Stasavage. (2008). Religion and Social Insurance: Evidence from the United States, 1970 2002. In Divide and Deal: The Politics of Distribution in Democracies, ed. Ian Shapiro, Peter A. Swenson, and Daniela Donno. New York: New York University Press Walzer, Michael. (2002) Equality and Civil Society. in Chambers, Simone and Will Kylicka. Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society. 2002. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tilly, Charles. (1998). Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wallerstein, Michael, and Karl Ove Moene. (2003). Earnings Inequality and Welfare Spending: A Disaggregated Analysis. World Politics 55 (July) Welzel Christian and Inglehart Ronald (2008), The Role of Ordinary People for Democratization. Journal of Democracy. N 19. Roadmap of the Research Project 1. January February: studying literature, clarifying hypotheses and the argument 2. March April: gathering data and analyze it; developing skills in quantitative methods and statistical computation (STATA, R) 3. End of April preliminary results 4. May September case-studies and paper writing