~~, ARSES& /--- NUCLEAR FSSON - CM' PROVDE ZlASK!!~ WTH BOG-.-- +&ye energy to serve a large number and varety of goa O^ :,+ dc.saltton of oceans and waterng3j'deserts to the meltng,,! polar ce and travelng n outer space. g$e-a+ed> t s the most tc.t..zt3&g explosve, one that could destroy chlzaton. n ths sense, tjtt. problem of war today s an ultmate expresson of a much mare,-+m!ml socal problem: the dsntegratng effect that new means, h t 18 J~CX technologcal nventons and related hsttutonal nnovatons, (,; produce n a socety. Tme and agan the ntroducton of more!-t<.ttve means to sene men's goals has urrdcnnned these very goals, [!,vr relatons \v& other men. and ther commtment to whatever god :tc&>' worshp. Unwllng to return to the stone age-n fact, rmable to rc,t:rn snce the kno\vledge to produce new means would reman even t!hose newly ntroduced were elmnated--man must Snd better ways. of controllng hs technology and hs fate. Otherwse, he \d be the scnnnt, f not the vctm, of the means he created to mprove hs 1% The danger of the "rratonalty of ratonalty," as Max \Yeber remrd to ths dlemma, yas frst encountered n depth when the ntroducton of modem means of producton (or ndustralzaton) threatened to subjrct the relatons between man and man to the blndorces of the market and deprve the worker of control over the hts of hs work. The same danger was encountered n the study of burcwcraces, where rules and regulatons, ntended to ncrease the (.!hacy and justce of governnvnt mnstratons to the c:zen-clentele,,~ame a new source of estrangement, of Kafka-lke labjrnths n -.vllch the needs of ctzens were dstorted and dsregarded rather than served. -~ Tls cbspter s an outgrowth of research at the nsttute o Var and Peace u d c's of Columba Unversty. 723 -_. L b ka P B- o F f t, F t k F k Pt
! The advent of nuclear technology has brought the threat of meq. the loss of control, to ts apex: rather than endangerng man s prvaq freedom, or happness. nuclear arms endanger the bass on whch such values are predcated-hs very survval. The means of wad& from bo\v to bomber, have been vehcles of power to serve go& rangng from relgous to sacrlegous, from glory to bandtr)..l What. e\er (her ends, whether legtmate or llegtmate, moral or b ora] these me:ms of volence potentally served those who welded them; a, a means to an end, weapons worked. But a contnual ncrease n tjjt effect1,eness of veapons has undermned ths means-ends relatonshp The mass possesson of nuclear bombs and mssles has created a stu. ton \vhere the possble gans of war hardly justfy the losses the use of modern \Yeapons would ental. The number of.%mercans who ded n n orld War was 126,000, n \ orld TVar 1 t was 397,000. n a statement before the How Armed Sences Commttee n 1965, Secretary of Defense 3lchTaman stated that f the Unted States spent an addtonal 25 bllon doh n the next fve years for fallout shelters and antmssle defenses, and f the attacker wated an hour after launchng hs ntal nuclear attack on our mltay targets before strkng our ctes (n McNamara s u.ords. an unlkely contngency ), only 41 mllon Amercans would be klled. f the attack on ctes came at the same tme as the attack on mltary targets. s mllon, or ever)- thrd Amercan, would de. wthout the addtonal expendture of 25 bllon dollars, 71 out of evq 100 Amercans would de.: There are already weapons n stock, a sngle one of whch has a greater yeld than the total amount of a- plosves dropped on Germany and Japan n World War n. The specter of a doomsday machne that would leave no survvors at all has been rased. Ths would be the ultmate subverson of human goah by human means, the complete loss of man s control over hs destny. Nuclear Wor: A Real Threat? s nuclear war a real threat? Does not the very exstence of nuclear weapons dctcr such a war? \$ ll not the very enormty of nuclear devastaton keep the leaders of the Unted States and the Sovet Unon from trggerng such a war? s t not a certanty that the deterrence 1 On thr vanng goals of warfare, see Alfred A. Vagts, A HFtory of Mltnrtrm (Sw York: Sorton. 1937j. 2 Tlrc A ew York Tmes, February 19, 1965, p. 10. Mechancal Falure Accordng to a study of &, nonmltary group, nuce; dozen major ncdents or Unted States and oversea had to jettson a 24-mega fell n a feld uthout emplc complex devces and strc frng of nuclear weapons. equpped wth sx nterlocl be trggered n sequence tc rushed to the North Card accdent they found that f the fall! Only a sngle sw detonatng and spreadng f a nuclear bomb should %es nto a radoactve des -emy attack and lead to -re talaton by the other sde, Y Unauthorzed Use The danger of unauthorzed the socal scences have nc: OW screenng of persons \V :y have access to, n vola -c, Jay Orear and Lncoln Wolfens &mc Sctcntts (.4pd, 1965 ;man Trumpet (New York: Ha Ralph E. Lapp, Kll urd Oomk 724 AhZrrA ErtOhl
~ tne threat of means:,rng man s prvacy, bass on whch $ means of warfare, rver to serve goals to bandm. What. moral or mmoral, lo \\yelded them; as nual ncrease n the 1s-ends relatonshp. has created a stua- 5 the losses the use \Tar was 128,000; : before the House Defense!fcX:amara 25 bllon dollars ssle defenses, and 3t3.l nuclear attack :s (n McSamara s n Amercans would as the attack nercan, would de; lars, 71 out of every ceapons n stuck, a total amount of ex- Vorld War 11. The 1 no survvors at all son of human goals rol over hs destny. po~cy \wuld contnue to work so that t never would be really nee rssav to carry out the threat of nuclear retalaton? Socal scentsts have contrbuted sgnfcantly to answerng tbese qupstons. Dralvng on ther )nowledge of man and socety, they have ponted out that even f no man would delberately unleash a GX- ~r.r&rnrnerung, there are many ways n whch control over nuclear,\t.apons mght be lost and a war mght be ntated unntentonally. Jjan has yet to desgn a foolproof control system, whether of producton, admnstraton, or war. t s generally recognzed that there are four ways n whch a war mght be started unntentondy: mechancal falure, unauthorzed use, mscalculaton, and brnkmanshp. Mechancal Falure Accordng to a study of the accdent problem made by an ndependent, nonmltary group, nuclear weapons have been nvolved n about a dozen major ncdents or accdents, mostly plane crashes, both n tho Unted States and overseas. n one of these ncdents, a B-52 bomber had to jettson a 24-megaton bomb over North Carolna. The bomb fell n a feld wthout explodng. The Defense Department has adopted complex devces and strct rules to prevent the accdental armng or frng of nuclear weapons. n ths case. the 24-megaton warhead was equpped wth sx nterlockng safetv mechansms, all of whch had to be tnggered n sequence to explode the bomb. \! hen Ar Force experts rushed to the North Carolna farm to examne the weapon after tho accdent they found that fve of the sx nterlocks had been set off by the fall! Only a sngle swtch prevented the %-megaton bomb from detonatng and spreadng fre and destructon over a wde ana4,. f a nuclear bomb should suddenly turn an area of the Unted! States nto a radoactve desert, ths mght well be tewed as an enemy attack and lead to retalaton. Ths, n turn, would lead to retalaton by the other sde, whch mght result n fdl-scale war. t P exstence of nuclear.mty o nuclear devd the Sovet Unon 9 that the deterrence Unauthorzed Use The danger of unauthorzed use of weapons wll be wth us as long as the socal scences have not developed selecton nstruments that allow screenng of persons who, under pressure, mght use the arms they have access to, n voaton of ther orders. Durng one year - Jay Orear and Lncoln Wolfensten, European Scentsts Speak, Bulktn of r h &mc ~ Sccntbts (Aprl, 1965). p. 45. See also Xaxwell D. Taylor, Tb uwe)tan Trumpd (New- York: Harper, 1960). p. 184. Ralph E. Lapp, Kll nnd OoerkU (New York: Basc Books. 1962), p. 127. 1 1 t 4 t t 1 t WAR fq DSAR~UMENT 725.., 1,
A alone, 1959, the Unted States Ar Force, for example, dschargd t- men on grounds of dsablty; one-fourth of ths number were rele,, because of psychotc dsorders, psychoneurotc dsorders, or -7 reactons.' Snce t s not possble to detect all the potental psych,c or ps\chcneurotcs n the armed servces, t s concevable that tua!l!. one such person mght break through and reach a mechancm. etler b1.7 commandng the openng of the szfety &,,: or by feedng the system false nformaton that would brng abu! ~ trggerm; b!. authorzed personnel. Lnzu:!or7ed acton mght be undertaken also by people \\.bo z, not "dsturbed." Accordng to an Assocated Press message from h, dated September 7. 1965, a 3larne unt used tear gas n a cl& the \'et Cong at the Batangan Pennsula. 1 a. *< +# The spokesman sad the commander of the Marne battalon n\-&..! \vas sa:d to have called for the use of tear gas on hs own au&. 13 4. '.6 <' ' The spokesman sad the commander may not have been a-m d as. # *e. poq [then n effect] aganst the use of tear gas or any other gut -'cu, 'et Sam. 3f scaculatwn The danger of war by mscalculaton by an authorzed penm probably even greater than that of war by accdent or unauthors achon. One major mstake by an!' one of the sdes, Presdent Kew warned. and there wll be "150 mllon fataltes n the frs: eghfn hours." c, The student of hstory can hardly expect each govemmm 2 command of nuclear arms to avod, over a long perod of tme, malone major mstake. Such a mstake mght well be the actng on 3 bass of nsuecent or wrong nformaton. as, t s argued, \vas the ar the frst tme an atomc bomb was dropped on human bengs. The ssue s a complcated one. At least a score of books have k- wrtten on the decson to drop the bomb. There are also smr. accounts by varous persons who partcpated n the decson, ncls ng Presdent Truman. By and large, the partcpants tend to jus:. the decson. ndependent experts, whle not al! crtcal of the decson, tend suggest that the decson was based on a mstaken assumpton c a more use of mltary mght \vould be necessary to compel laps. surrender. rctually, at least accordng to several authortatve cour,ts, t seems that the man bamer to Japan's surrender befort tr t. :- 5 Sf-Lrrow \leman, Peace Race (New Park: Brazller, 1961), p. 15. "Tfe-odore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper, 19&5), p- 51% '*' Kemedy's concern that hs mscalculaton mght occur, see p. 513. 726 MXTA ETpON
. fscharged 4213.r were released lers, or m~eh ntal psychotc.,ble that even. lch a releasn; safety devce brng about k?eople who at re from Sagq n a clash w& attalon nvolv&.s o\vr~ authore been aware of L any other gas m dropped was symbolc and socologcal. The Japanese,.<., to majlltan the status of the emperor, followng surrender...l,tc,cj States nssted on uncondtonal surrender. As the Em-.. $,,.] tlr key symbol of the socety, one of an mportance that, :.. T, of a modern Sl estern democratc socet)r fnd hard to con-,..,. j:,ln was wllng to contnue to fght, rather than gve up,.,,,lll,~~l. n retrospect t seems, accordng to some authortatve.!,!< 1))..4mercan experts, that the 1915 bombng of Hroshma : y.y5& made no essental contrbuton o Japan s surrender, % a last battle. \.!,.r,. rpcentl~, the Unted States government decded to bomb a,,-!t \*c.tnam. Not all the consderatons that went nto ths decson.,.,n,~tter of publc record at ths pont. But an authentc glmpse. t,(. ganed from the publshed statement of General Thomas S..(,. tle Commander n Chef of the Strategc Ar Command from :.-,: :11 1964,.e., tll just a few months before the bombng actually tlcgan: f rzed person b )r unauthorzed 1 dent Kennedj.e frst eghteen go\ enunent U f tme, makng 2 actng on the d, was the case engs. ~oks have bee^ re also several ecson, ncludtend to justf) :cson, tend to ssumpton that -.ompel Japan s thortatve acder before the p. 15. 55), p. 512. on 513. h t us assume that, n the fall of 1964, we would have warned the Communsts that unless they cease supportng the guerrllas n South \ t.tnam, we would destroy a major mltay,. supply depot n Nortb \ wtnam. Through rado and leaflets, we would have advsed the cvlan populaton lvng near the depot of our ultmatum and of dp exact tme of our attack so that cvlans could be evacuated. f &e Communsts faled to heed our namng and contnued to support the rctwls, we would have gone through Lvth the threatened attack and destroyed the depot. And f ths act of persuasve deterrence had not suffced. we would have threatened the destructon of anothercrtcal target and. f necessary, would have destroyed t also. We nmld have contnued ths strate= untl the Communsts had found ther support of the rebels n South Vetnam too expensve and agreed to stop t. Thus, wthn a few days and wth mnmum force, the conflct n South Vetnam uoum hace been endrd n OUT favor. Beyond ths. \ve would have ganed mmeasurably n prestge and. n. the credblty of our determnaton to prevent further Communst aggresson aganst our alles. P.1:11 Kecskemet, Strategc Surrender (Stanford, Calf.: Stanford Unversty :.. 1958). p. 209. Ths study was conducted under the auspces of the RAND.;-..ton. See also, Herbert Fes, lopan Subdued: Thc? Atomc Bud and thc f. m.! llrc U ur n fle Pacfc (Prnceton, N. J.: Prnceton Unverst). Press, 1961);,..... : ). Lcahy. 1 \\ os There (New TorL: \lcgra\v-hll, 1950); Robert J. c..tt lopon s Dccson to Surrender (Stanford, Calf.: Stxford Cnversty Press,... 1.c.n Co\.anntt and Fred Freed, The Decson to Drop the Bomb (New : * G)ward-hlcCam, 1965). (G.1l~ral Thomas S. Power, Desgn for Sutocal (New York: Coward-hfcCann,,;!. pp. 24-25. (t&- pro\&&) _.~ -..- J! [ b r t 4 c L J 1 a V f
< Ths was ob\ously a mscalculaton of mhat ar power could do. much larger strke could also be smlarly msdrected. Ths we wad, know, as n the case of Hroshma and North Vetnam, only n reh spert-that s. f \ve reman able to engage n retrospecton. Xlscalculaton seemed less lkely when the nuclear powers ssted of only the Unted States, the Sovet Unon, and Brtan. "l& recent addton of members and asprants to the nuclear club md. a nuclear war seem more lkely. The stakes of a nuclear gamble ;ut dfferent for countres that have ntense emotonal commtments 1: dsputed terrtores, such as V'est Germany, Unted Arab Repubhc nda, or Pakstan, and for countres that are overpopulated and povershed, than for the establshed, wealthy, and reasonably tented nuclear superpowers. The larger the number of countres wk access to nuclear arms, the less lkely that the cooler heads wll prb val. Ths leads us to the fourth danger of unntentonal war, brd manshp. Brnkmanshp The essence of brnkmanshp strategy s an attempt to gan COC cessons from the other sde by threatenng nuclear war wthm, actually expectng to have to engage n t. The strategy has often beer compared to the "chcken" game played by hot-rodders, n whd txvo cars race doun the center of a road toward each other; the h drver to turn hs car a\vay from the collson course loses the contes and s labeled a "chcken." Obvously, the more commtted a drve: s to \?ctoa: the more reckless he wll be; the more often the conth of wlls s engaged n, the more lkely that both drvers, ther c a ~ and all ther occupants end n runs. A typcal example of superpowen engaged n brnkmanshp s the 1962 Cuban crss. The Sovet Unm postoned mssles n Cuba, probably mscalculatng the Amerm response. The Unted States mposed a naval blockade on Cuba, dt ployng Amercan shps to ntercept So\<et shps.that were sf; to\vard Cuba. The fact that both sdes prevented, at the last momm: a confrontaton on the hgh seas and that the Unted States gand the removal of the mssles should not obscure the fact that tbc Solet's ntal act and the Amercan response nvolved leanng fr over the nuclear brnk.' The rccurrent pont ntroduced by ths examnaton of the four \vays n 1.hc.h the nuclear balance of power mght be unbalanced that mltary machnery s a set of means desgned and staffed b\ 9 Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 700 ff., em.,!s, t s. hence, bascally SUS~( 1" nut, bcfore we can asst.,y,l)front the qucstjon: Noc.,7r lt trggered uttcttngly?,,:>, h.vc clamed that nucle; t!.t and author C. P. Snow 3..:,all..t the most, ten yeaq s(. * r.l\mg. ths as responsbly as..rlty of dsaster." On the 0th : wrtnt preparatons are saf,, \(rrns to see as acceptable 8,.chlcves ths nvulnerablj~ hundred of startng a war am,, to last for decades, ths pr -. t.n:ot be partcularly comfol,. ~rncrcans under 35 who H'OU. For the over 40 mllon Amerc.!( look even dmmer. ra ntermedary poston holds t \. trrtanty. Stll, there s no re; 'L! ): nar cannot erupt; howeve1 x uar. one must note that S. whbltes of events that nev. ' 1 l)lty do take place; and wht :..: all manknd, are at stake, 1:. one must concern oneself evn P*mr: Cause or Symptom? observers see the man sou. themselves, especally the m ->:, nan can regan control of T the development of weapo x. n.' The ncrease of armamex.:oduce conscousness of streng hce these effects. On the cont r strength of other natons and,- For a more detaled treatment, see 1 - Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1965). hc Xrw York Tmes, December 28 (.rnan Kahn, On Thezrnonuckar '. > Press, 1960), pp. 2o3-09.
d do..h -e would n retr? en COG. ah. Thc db makc nble art nents tc epubhq and m. bly con. res wth \dl prrr, brnk. an conwthout ten beel n whch the frs! : contes? a drver c contect ter cars, erpowen et Unon hercan.uba, de e salng moment. s ganed that the nng far the four snced s ffed b>..,,::c, t s, hence, bascally susceptble to the folles and weaknesses,:, * :... 3ut, before we can assess the danger of nuclear war, we,,,r!,frollthe qucston: How lkely s the war system to trgger. a.,r trggered untcttngzy2.,!,. ]ll\~c clamed that nuclear war s a certanty. The Brtsh,:,t,c,t ;nd author C. P. Snow stated on December 27, 1960, that -...:.. ll, ;t the most, ten years, some of these bombs are gong off..!...,) <:1\.1~2 ths as responsbly as can. That s the certanty... a.... of dsaster. * On the other hand, there are some who beleve,! rrrnt preparatons are safe. The nuclear strategst Herman..,;.r, S C T ~ S to see as acceptable a force tvhch s nlulnerable but # :t! xheves ths nxulnerablty by havng (every year) one chance.., }undred of startng a war ac~dentally. ~~ f, however, the cold. r s to last for decades, ths probablty of one n a hundred peg...,: rannot be partcularly comfor tng to the approxmately 100 ml- ~nercans under 35 who would lke to lve at least to retrement,:. For the over 40 mllon Amercan chldren under ten, ths prow,,l:ld look even dmmer..n ntermedjaq poston holds that nuclear war s not lkely, much :, \ 3 certanty. Stll, there s no reason \vhy, f the cold war contnues, hot war cannot erupt; however low the estmated probablty of : :!ccar w-ar. one must note that such estmates are unrelable, as are ;mhbltes of events that never occurred, and that events of low -,~!~:blty do take place; and when the lves of hundreds of mllons, ::at all manknd, are at stake, the potental dsaster s so omnous!...t one must concern oneself even wth events that are unlkely. hrms: Cause or Symptom? %,:ne observers see the man source of danger n the exstence of.?:s themselves, especally the new thermonuclear weapons. n ths.. \\, man can regan control of hs fate by reassertng hs control.rr the development of weapons. Arms races follow ther own.. qc. The ncrease of armaments that s ntended n each naton * produce conscousness of strength and a sense of securty, does not,tluce these effects. On the contrary, t produces a conscousness of.: strength of other natons and a sense of fear, wrote the Brtsh * For a more detaled treatment, see the author s Wnnng V thout Wur (New Doublcday-hchor Books, 1965). pp. 159-89. 711~ A eu York Tmes, Decembm 28, 1960, p. 28. lcman Kahn, On Thermonuckur U US (Prnceton, N. J.: Prnceton Ud- 11) Pres, 1960). pp. 208-09. F.. t.
a Forem Secretary, Sr Edward Gray, at the outbreak of World War ~r But even- naton that arms for ts own securty s smultaneously "other naton." Armng for securty often leads to armng for defq by the "other naton." The defensve ntent of arms bult up by % other naton s rarely so regarded by the frst naton. t rather n the other's new arms evdence of ts hostle ntent; the frst nats often sees no alternatve but a new rush of armaments-for E- Hence. one major approach to the preventon of nar s to reduce a& ments. f the nuclear gene could somehow be returned to the the man new danger of war would be elmnated. f mltary Q could be entrely elmnated, t s argued, there would be no WZS. An opposng xen suggests that arms are chefly the symptoms d deep-seated conflcts. f there were no hostle motvatons, peoph would not produce arms: even f there were trggers, they would pa pull them. The people of Canada do not fear Amercan nuclear xm bardment. "\\'ar starts n the mnds of men," says the charter a' CNESCO. Curbng arms, t s sad. s lke treatng only the symptm of dsease. w-thout dentfyng and treatng the llness. The treatmat s unlkely to be successful, and f successful, other s!mptoms wll sa break out elselvhere. Dsarmament, f ever acheved, d.l be followd not by peace, but by rearmament. What s needed s a treatmen, d the underl!-ng conflcts of deology and nterest, the clash of powenb.\ thrd poston seems mare tenable. Ths one conceves of amr as both a s!mptom and a contrbutory cause that must be treated The malase that results n the arms race and wars s a deep mt bascally. t expresses man's wllngness to treat hs fellow man a~ P object rather than as an objectve. to the pont of turnng hm nto1 pershable utensl. The complete cure of ths malase requres p ~ p vdmg the socal foundatons for a world communty, snce onh members of a communty treat each other also as goals and not mere! as means f such a global communty can be bult at all, t wll SU& be a long process, meanu*hle, manknd nght destroy tself.?bc \vorld socety n the nuclear age s lke a patent who s runnng hsh fcver, untl we determne and treat the sources of ths fever, somt measures must be taken to reduce the fever tself f the patent s t~.. - - 3Le~vs F. Rchardson. Arms and nsecurty (Pttsburgh: Boxwood Pres 1960). p. 15. 24 For mth sdvs of ths debate see: John Burton, Peace Theory (New yd Knnpf. %!); Hcrhert C. Kelman, ed., nternatonu Behacor (New York: Hok 19G); Evan Luard, Pcucc und Opnon (London: Osford Unversty Press, 1962). and j'dter hllls, An End to A m (New York: Atheneum, 1965).
.orld Car 1.u taneo& an z for defens, t up by the t rather sees e frst naton -for securty reduce ana. to the bottle, mltary arms no WZU. s>mptoms of ' tom, people cy would no! nuclear bornle charter of he symptoms -he treatment oms wll soon 1 be followed treatment o! 1 of powers." JsTes of ms jt be treated a deep one, nv man as an g hm nto a requres pro-!., snce only,d not merely t surely 2:; tself. The s runnng 8 s fever, same,:!n.,.p, nut, obvously, ths treatment of the symptoms must be accom- $4 followed by treatment of the dsease tself." ' rrlrtl,c.,-more, whle the man causes of war seem to le outsde the..,,,,c.lljrlg force and spell of armaments, the pressures of the mltary, '...!,l,llmcnts are more than a qmptom; they are a contrbutory,, :,, T]lc mltav servces, as a rule, demand larger defense budgets,... thc.r curtalment; l5 the mltary's power, prestge, and-to a de-,-.!,.-jtl(.ome _. are affected by the sze of these budgets. Most ndus-,.:,, <(.t up or extended to serve the mltary can turn elsewhere for.!,, r ~>usncss, but the shft nvolves, at the least, the costs and pans fr,nston. Congressmen are nown to lobby aganst the closng.. r;l]tnv bases n ther dstrcts, and snce each dstrct has a con-.!,.q\man-and many at least one mltary nstallaton-t s hard to \.,..:.k~~ a broad reducton of arms wthout evokng some poltcal :F.:rt.n~e. Ths holds not smply for mssle stes or naval yards. The ;,: ;Jllc+on of nuclear warheads n the Unted States was contnued ;*.+,.and the pont of need, as estmated by most mltary experts, n..c because congressmen whose states had employment problems!,.,tt.d deeper unemployment." On top of these ex-trnsc nterests n ; :,ducton of arms come the ntrnsc pressures to contnually expad ~nltar;: system, for the buldng of one component generates call!(;: otlcrs. Bombers are of lttle use wthout runways. Runways are t,!!::te value f they are not protected from bombardment. The con- :jc!crs of the bomber fleets have to be sheltered. Thus, armed sys-!,::)< tvnd to produce some extrnsc and ntrnsc pressure for thek... - c-rjl.,nson. Hence, whgn a pont s reached where the orgnal reason : tle buldng up of armaments mght have declned or dsappeared, --:*.cl esorts are stll requred f arms are to be reduced. Smply'!:+.tng the orgnal causes wll not sufece. F.lly, armaments contrbute to the potentalty of war through 1.. < hologcal consequences. Arms buldups express and magnfy hos-!.;.?j{.s; arms reductons tend to ndcate efforts to move toward an 2. : fjmmodaton. For nstance, the abrupt resumpton of the testng thcmonuclear bombs by Russa n 1961, after a three-year mora-? patent s to * - ",Ftw a pood revew artcle of varous approaches to the "symptoms and ds- Boxu'ood press, "b' (xew 'Or': ;ew York: Hok,ty Press, 1962);. ***- rc\ton, see Phlp Green, "Alternatves to Overkll: Dream and Realty," -'. 'j~. oj tlc Atomc Scentsts (November, 1963), pp. 23-27... 1 'Jlf Jolds for the Sovet Unon as well. See, for nstance, Col. S. KodOV; #2 Forcrs Communst (January, 1961), n Surccal (July-August, 1961). ; ~(d), :' J J ~ C S Reston, The h'ew York Tmes, December 18, 1963, p. 40. p-'
torum on such testng, was taken by the Unted States as a hode and aggressve act. The 1963 Sovet-Amercan agreement on part;al cessaton of thcmnonrcear tests, though of lmted dsarmament value, \vas ha!ed as heraldng a new perod n East-l'est relatons. n O&Q Lvords. arms reductons can be used to create the atmosphere n whd the "treatment" of the deeper causes of war can be better acheved, n much the \Yay that reducng the fever of the patent enables h~ to sunve long enough for antbotcs to tzke effect.''. Preventon of War: Three Approaches There are many proposals for preventng war, but behnd all d them le three basc approaches, each contanng a treatment ph for armament and a concepton of the knd of poltcal world n e san to provde the condtons under whch the peace can be pnsen-ed. The approaches dffer n ther estmates of the dangers an, frontng the ~vorld today and the need as well as the ablty to s& to a deerent world order. Arms control s, comparatvely, the ma optmstc approach n e\,aluatng the present lvorld and most pess, mstc n estmatng the changes that can be realstcally expected t the ntrrnatonal system. (t s the approach revewed frst below, b ts concepton of the future s most lke the conceptons gudng th polcy-makers of today. ) General a d compkte dsarmament (CCD s most pessmstc about our ablty to sunve n an armed world BK most optmstc about our ablty to drastcally change nternatm poltcal nsttutons to ft our needs and desres.ld A m seductons an ntermeda? poston that seeks, through reversng the upwk spral of armament, a gradual transton from the world of arms ra~a (m-th or wthout arms control) to a world wthout arms. n shw. arms control seeks to make arms safe; GCD seeks safety from am arms reducton-a safe transton from one to the other. Advocates of arms control, we shall see, expect nternatonal reh tons to contnue to be guded by some concepton of balance4 potver; GCD requres a world authorty and a world communty; Amta Etzon, The Hard W'ay to Peace (New York: Coller Books, 18BT Chapter 4. 1:. luch confuson s cawed n dwusson of ths vtal subject by not km:; csrc.fuy wprtrate thc cnl sfate of a process and the process tself or ts VW <t:~zv\: ~trtl arc often referred to as "d\armament." Ths allows opponents of fl c-ductnn of arms to oppose ths by pontfz to some danger nvolved n a *' of c.mplc.te dsarmclmc~t. To avod ths problem, we shall refer to the end #J' as "gvneral and complvte dsarmament" (CCD), as offcal Unted Stater d~ ments do. and to the process leadng to GCD as "dsarmament"
~."- -_-- s as a hostle.:nt on partd nament value, :ons. n other.here n whch,t:er acheved, t enables hm behnd all of treatment plat 31 world neces- :e can be pnle dangers m. ablty to shd! vely, the mos: 3nd most pess~. d y expected 1~ j frst below, a! cjls gudbg th: :7arnent (GCD,med world anc 1ge nternatona rm reducton u,n the upward rld of arms ram. arms. n shot Jfep from ann: er. :terratond n of balance4 communty; tb! ;ouer Books, 198:' -)jrct by not kc@:'* tself or ts v ~ O '. ws opponents of s' r nvolved n a st,'' rfer to the end w Unted States lent",.; d reducton provdes the tme n whch a world au-,.!,, ;,,)d communty mght gradually be developed.. f~,,,~c-of-pottcr and Arms Control the phrase "balance-of-power" seldom appears n a for- <,:::< (. Jspatch or memorandum, t has for centures guded polcy-, T, L,ld strategsts n the world's captals. As a hstorcal concept,.,.-of-po\ver refers to an nternatonal system wheren states : to lnatan ther ndependence through the establshment of a..:. t.,lu]brum of power. Mantanng peace was thought to re-.. central regulatory authorty; rather, the balancng of power :,: st:tes occurred as a result of shftng allances n tme of peace..' (c,,;!tons aganst the aggressor n tme of war. A would-be ag-...t. \~JS ether deterred from ntatng hostltes by percevng odds aganst success were unfavorable, or, seekng to expand.. :-%,< ('r to a pont at whch t could unbalance the system and gan...:.:n1;ncy, found that other states unwllng to tolerate such a \t,ould then wage war to mantan or restore the balance. War st'cn as a temporary and lmted phenomenon, somethng necesto nsure condtons where no one state or group of states could ::::! to domnate the others wth mpunty. 4 ;...mce-of-power system n nternatonal relatons s thus corn-..:.,t, to a system of full competton and lassez fare n economcs. 1.\ctmpton that no unversal poltcal authorty s necessary s.,* vluvalent of the assumpton that economc unts, each seekng n:.;xmze ts profts, can be reled upon to generate a desrable :--*- o! affars, wthout extrnsc mechansms of control. 1-:.r.u_=hout hstory, from the tme of the Greek cty-states to Renas: :A'. c taly, numerous nterstate systems have been studed as ap :::.ttng a balance-of-power system.*o An examnaton of how a A:;cwf-power system functons s valuable both for an understand-. [.! ts lmtatons n the contemporary context and for the explora-. 1. socologcal factors n nternatonal relatons. :;e condtons for the mantenance of a balance-of-power were par- *.. :-!:$. fs\.orable durng the nneteenth century, as attested to by,' rwmc of a general war from 1815 to 1914. Sltary power was.. r1. mong several states. Dplomacy was conducted by sklled - - 'e--.*.lmds, and there were few deologcal mpedments to nter- -- '.( k ~he logc of these systems, see horton Kapan, System and Process n :' Poltcs (New York: f'ley & Sons, 1937), pp. 100 ff.; and Rchard ' '"~*~M" Acton and Reacton n World Polfcs (Boston: Lttle, Brown, x,; ; l
' fere wth the freedom of statesmen to take ther country from op, coalton nto another on the bass of shftng power relatons. 11 relatve strengths of competng states could be calculated wth rp, sonable accuracy. f'ar was seen as a method of mplementng pok but there \vas a consensus that ts objectves should be lmted & should not nclude the destructon of an enemy state, as yesterd, enemy mght be tomorrow's ally. mportant makeweghts n the b;: ance must not be destroyed f condtons of equlbrum were to preserved, and for ths a peace of reconclaton-not alenaton-% essental. Gres Brtan as an sland power played the role of balancf addng ts weght to the weaker sde when the threat of prep& ance arose. Sost mportant, perhaps, the European states that dm nated \\-orld poltcs shared a common nterest n presenng the 9, tem tself. snce they saw- ths as the best method of presenng ndependence of each of ts members and ther domestc regme1-4 classcal example of a balance-of-power system at work s p, vded by the Congress of Venna, where the statesmen of Europe Q n S15 to acheve a settlement to the chaos brought by the Nap& onc sars. The French domnaton of the Contnent had fnally b c~ ended through the mltaq success of a great coalton led by En& and ncludng Austra. Russa. and Prussa. Ths coalton was fom to reestablsh the state system and restore the European balance. Tb work of :he statesmen meetng n Yenna \vas facltated not onlyb such objectve poltcal factors as the relatve equalty n power tern of ther respectve states and the ease wth whch recprocal cob pensaton n terrtoral rewards could be arranged, but also by tba relatve socologcal homogenet)-. They shared a comparable d& logcal outlook based upon the acceptance of monarchy and dynm legtmacy, an averson to popular democracy, and a generally cap servatve poltcal orentaton. They were of the same socal ch seke a common language ( French j, and had long experence n dn nc f-th ther dplomatc counterparts. They had more n COwth each other than wth the masses of the people n ther res@ states. These socal and cultural condtons, together wth the shm ntereqt n the restoraton of the state system, contrbuted to the & t\ el!. moderate peace terms mposed upon the defeated power, Frm? An ndemnty was ex-tracted and there was a perod of mltary -P ton, but lvth a Bourbon kng restored to the French throne (and S^ "1 n\ L. Claude, Jr., Power ond lntemufwnnl Relatons (New York: Rd' Housr, LY62), pp. 90-91. 734 AMRN Emom
c mtry from One,r relatons. The ',.:ated wth rea, rnentng polcy,! be lmted and e, as yesterday's ghts n the balsum were to be t alenaton-was role of balancer. at of prepder. states that dom- ' -rser\ng the sys- f presenng the,m&c repmes.': at work s pre..a of Europe me! t by the Napolehad fnally been T led by England.ton was formed ran balance.?hr :ated not only b> ty n power terms 1 recprocal COP but also by the. comparable d* ;c-+ and dynastc a generally con- 5ame socal class. qerence n deal. more n C O ~ O D n ther respectve r wth the shard huted to the rela..ed power, Frmw f mltary ~ ~apa- throne (and wh (New York: ~andon t,t.ncfts of Talleyrand's skllful dplomacy) France was almost,n..n,..tl,ntcs]?s... readmtted to the councls of the Great Powers. 2 s,lc Vorld FVar, however, the socologcal condtons requred by lnc.e-of-power system have undergone eroson, and n an accelerat-!, tlvcrcc. Power relatons among states are no longer characterzed. - ;,,. a rough equalty. Dplomacy has often passed nto the hands,.j.,rnntc~~rs chosen for ther poltcal relablty. An age of radcally,.. s!b,c.d ddoges has supplanted the earler perods of consensus...,,.;tc..mc~l. under pressures of publc opnon, are no longer free to!:,,+kt. polcy apart from the demands of ther peoples. N7ar s no c y seen as an alternatve polcy means but as an unprecedented qtcr to be avoded. The statesmen no longer share a common outj s,.~, jrss often speak a common language, and do not agree on ether 11;ture of the status quo to be establshed or how long or n what %,.,: t should be preserved. n contrast to the perod of 1815-1914,!.,,. pcrod snce 1914 s characterzed by great poltcal and soco- ;..:,.~l heterogenety and has been marred by two world wars. Tj,e ye3r 1916 ushered n a perod of bpolarty: the European Great j;,m crs of the past were wholly overshadowed by two contnent-szed ttjp.rpou.ers, the Unted States and the Sovet Unon. A true balance- ++.pon.er s!.stem was precluded by the bpolar dvson of power.?lcw uwe no thrd, fourth, and ffth powers who could be counted!:;wn to prevent ether superpower from ganng absolute domnance. j(.pte ths new development, the old dea of balance-of-power conwd td gude statesmen and strategsts who molded the relatont!al>s between the two superpowers and ther camps: the two super- ;- fwrs were to "balance" each other. ;y the early 1950's there was added to the already bpolar pattern :!N rlemcnt of nuclear bpolarty. Armed wth massve nuclear weap r.6 tlnt were ncreasngly rendered nvulnerable to attack by sheld-.*.:' and concealng devces, nether sde could ratonally launch a war.:.rst the heartland of the other snce massve nuclear retalaton was.*r.l!. to follow. The ntaton of nuclear war, t was argued, meant :.dt(ml sucde. n ths sense, the two nuclear gants "balanced" each :,''wr. But, snce the balance was acheved not by the actual use of t!:.:txc weapons but through threats of ther use, the system has * 'W to be descrbed as one of deterrence, or, more colloqually, as a *.~:.rc'e-of-temr. \\'hlt the Communst camp mght stll have desred to extend ts ' 1. a d the Western allance to "roll" t back, nether sde dared to r~~~v~l&x n anythng but margnal skrmshes-and even these were. / E ' - -_._ f
undertaken wth great cauton-snce an unexpected developm,, could trgger an all-olt nuclear war. hany Amercan strategsts n tt, 1930's and early 1960's beleved that the balance-of-terror system be prolonged ndefntely, although they favored elmnatng especjc hazardous condtons through lmted arms-control measures (a*, shall see ). ncreasng conventonal forces that would alow a xnj&kalternatve to usng nuclear weapols, and foregong polces of c.., clear brnkmanshp.2z t should be emphaszed that even before the advent of nule+ weapons and even \vhen the poltcal and socologcal requstes sted. the balance-of-power system could not be reled upon to prt serve peace. f-hat thls system dd was not to prevent war but & major v-ars less devastatng and mnor wars less frequent. hostltes occurred, procedures excsted for restorng the balance a thus, a state of peace. The object of war, as we have seen, was not & destructon of the opponent but a form of sancton that was nten& to keep the system-and all ts major members-operatng. Un& balance-of-terror condtons, howfv, r, where the total destructon of opponent s techncally possble.fear of retalaton s reled upon r: deter a nuclear attack. But whereas a ratonal statesman would D ntate a nuclear war, t s questonable whether even nuclear weq ons xvould deter a Htler of tomorrow any more than the fear d conventonal response deterred the Htler of yesterday. n addha because of the unprecedented and,ontnung peacetme preparatm for \var and the nstantaneous mpact of modem arms, tbere t E longer any tme cushon between 3 major mstake and a major x1: The enormous destructve capaqt) t of thermonuclear weapons m w that even a sngle breakdown of t:,e balance-of-terror system WO& be one too many. Noreover, n a tme of con&ctng deologes, wbc, competng socoeconomc regmes seek not lmted trumphs but eot other's elmnaton, an ntematona! system wth no margn for em and,-relyng on the ratonal behat or of all of ts partcpants s L b<jtca hazardous one. 'ncreased recognton of these factors, coupled wth the appm nablty of states to agree upon dkarmament, has generated nted n proposah for arms control-that s, efforts to reduce the pmbak ty of war and to lmt ts scope should t occur. t s a much rj encompssqng and fundamental approach to the problem of war tb general and complete dsarmament, but also a much less demadz.d t- 22 hlorton H. Halpern. Lmted War n the Nuclear Age (New York: W'h ' Sons, 1963).
3 developmm rategsts n t& 3r system mu :?,tng especall-, casures (as \re,]low a mltan polces of nb.,vent of nuclez 1 requstes et..d upon to prt. : war but makt * rrequent. W h ~ he balance ad..en, \s--a~ not th at was ntendd -matng. Undr jestructon of Q : reled upon tc man would na n nuclear weap n the fear of t,ay. n addtm mr preparatm ms, there s n~ nd a major war weapons meam Dr system W O ~ C 1 deooges, whet umphs but margn for em: artcpants s a: th the a?paren enerated nter& ce the probabdt s a much la.)lern of war tha 3 less demandng New York: WdeY b 7 - nlr. ams-control polcy nether ams nor eqects to elmnate b ;,.!,,,!. n,,-ncplc, t precludes the abolton of large natonal ml-.,,,,!l!sllnl~nts. t s largely a trmmng operaton-one that seeks......,t.r r,lt)lcr than to change the exstng nternatonal system, to ~,!!,,. 1,nlnnce-of-terror system less dangerous nstead of attempt-.._, xl,\[jtute another system. --,, many arms-control proposals.2s Some are measures each.,,-, ntroduce unlaterally. For nstance, the Unted States n- >,, : c.lt,c.tronc locks on ts strategc mssles, whch do not allow,. t 3*,r.\ of the hlnuteman mssle slos to be opened unless a corn-...,...j ~<ton emts a coded sgnal ntercepted by the lock. Ths,.,,.!Tt- rrduces the possblty of local unauthorzed acton or the of nuclear arms by local cvlan groups. The Unted States ncnt hopes that the Sovet Unon has taken smlar precautons mssles but has seen lttle sense n postponng the ntroduo 0:. ths and other unlateral arms-control measures untl the t, ~- t non frst agreed to recprocate. o!jt~r arms-control measures are blateral. One such measure we,..*..~.tc~d n 1963, when a teleprnter lne, popularly ho\m as the %.,+ ;lr~., * \Gas nstalled to provde a drect communcaton lnk be-... :) Jloscow and Tyashngton. Should, for nstance, an Amercan. 8 t.t(hc hs bomber on an unauthorzed attack toward the Sovet. :, the Unted States s expected to alert that country and help -.! dorm the plane. 4 wll-hewn multlateral arms-control measure s the 1963 treaty ;,.:::tg the testng of nuclear weapons n the atmosphere, n space, - - z, urcler the seas. The treaty has less value than often clamed: r.j mltar) experts beleve that the Unted States and the Sovet. :11 had tested as many delces as were necessary to test before - C tvst ban was sgned; the Bg Two have contnued to conduct-., have probably even ncreased-ther underground testng; qd *+., : ~ 2c.5 are free under the treaty to wthdrag upon three manu...: *,: f new testng n now forbdden areas s n ther supreme & :. \t Chna was not prevented from testng atomc weapons n the., A :;r$rphc.re by the treaty. lm have been more encompassng arms-control proposals, n-....... 4rthur T. Hadley, The A aton s Safety and Arms Control (New York:.a- : :,411); Lous Henkn, d., Arms Control (Englewood Clffs, N. J.: Prent~e-. -.... -. t* :. 1991). *. {..lrngs before the Commttee on Foregn Relatons, U.S. Senate. 88th ::e,,, Frst Sesson. Nucleur Test Ban Treaty, page 3, letter to the Senate tlw State Depamat!.? 1.. $ WAR AXD DSARhWfENT. --... 7 w n P (*
P cludng one that suggests a freeze of strategc weapons, that s, agreement behveen the major powers not to produce addtonal looe ranse mssles. strateqc bombers, and nuclear warheads. A n o ~ ~ arms-control plan calls for some reducton of armament. For a tv.- some experts favored the bomber bonfre plan, accordng to whch number of bombers of both sdes would be brought together n neutral spot and burned under jont supervson. These varous arms-control plans, however, are not meant to, cannot, lead to the elmnaton of the nstruments of warfare, e p f these proposals were mplemented, \vhch most are not. Actu& the underlyng assumpton of these measures s that natonal govet ments \v11 contnue to rely on large natonal mltary establshmec, to protect ther securty. One mght ask. Vhy large mltary forcer-. Could securty not be mantaned f all states would cut ther arms half, or el-en by nne-tenths, as long as the cuts are proportjonal, snp the key s the comparatlve, not the actual, amount of armament? B:. the strategsts of arms control emphasze that t cannot lead to lap arms reductons because of the prncple of hgh numbers.* The dscusson about nuclear dsarmament has revealed the parador. cal fact that there s a certan safety n numbers. And ths s even f both rdes scrupulously observe an agreement to lmt nuder \r-eapons or the means of delver?. nstablty s greater f each s:. possesses 10 mssles than f the equlbrum s stablzed at, say, jc< For an attack whch s 50 percent successful when the defender hz: 10 mssles leaves hm one-or a number hardly Uely to dct una. ceptahle damage. An attack of smlar effectveness wben the dr fender possesses 500 mssles leaves 50-perhaps suffcent to pose c - unacceptable rsk n retalaton. And of course t s techncdly mm complcated to destroy such a large number. Reducton of numb s thus not an nfallble remedy. A very small and vulnerable retalr ton force ma): ncrease the danger of war by encouragng the oy ponent to rsk surprse attack. :-.- t follows that stablty s greatest when numbek are sdcently arp to complcate the calculatons of the aggressor and to provde a mh.,.- mum ncentve for evason but not so substantal that they defea.... ~0ntrol.~5 Thus, the polcy of arms control may be capable of lmtng thc ams race. but abolshng armaments s not ts purpose. t seeks tc. ensure the balance-of-terror, not to shft to a dfferent system of st curty. Arms control, at best, reduces the probablty of nuclear WE? :t -?*Henry A. Kssnger, The Necessty for Choce (New York: Harper, 1s 196l), p. 217. under certan crcumstances, mgl, t does not, however, remo?,:,lc~ of the balance-of-terror systen,,,&mced are stll open. The less.l~d mechancal accdent mght t,,a of arms control were effected, escalaton, or a technologcal bl,{jth us at least as much as n an 1 4,) demonstrate ths pont, let us exa c.control system that strves to st mpro\ng the balance) and one (on\ entonal armaments. A nu& one most frequently dscussed) ltjon of nuclear war even less rea d arms race condtons, snce t.,,a1 superorty one sde mght ttd States had at least four tmes So\et t non, but ths rato was nc :aa advantage. They were produc, expected the Russans to produ 1 lot to be the case, resstance to 7 curtalment. Psychologcally, how bcr of arms-let us say, n the nun *,Mzng value: t makes the tempt -_ me attack less lkely. :,~t the gan s accompaned by a d 11 to recognze that they have st.:. the larger the premum on C more effectvely nuclear war s T mal wars mght seem. And, once *:be arms-control system to preven,ton of such a war to theuse of There s no assurance that afte! arms the losng sde would refr : u eapons, whch would unleash, : t s true that East-West clashe5 ~nton:l le~el, n Korea and n V.<]ear blows. But n each case the : to the nuclear level. Ths does n 1 \v11 tend to fall over the edge, b : and the brnk s 100 megatons :t? derved from nuclear arms CO
- weapons, that s, &ce addtonal loag. r warheads. Ana&.. gnarnent. For a ~ccordng to whch :rought together n n. re not meant to, r&,nts of warfare, ost are not. Actual]!, that natonal govern. tay establshmenb argc mltary forces? 3uld cut ther arms c re proportonal, sne nt of armament? BUT cannot lead to laqt ;h numbers. revealed the paradon. lbers. And ths s true.-enent to lmt nuclear 1s greater d each ad. stab!zed at. say, 500 hen the defender ha! v hlely to n5ct una@ :veness wben the de 7s s&cen! to pose an t s techncally more Redu&o of numbers ~nd wlnexable retaha- : encouragng the op TS are s¢ly large and to provde a mn- ;ntal that they defeat 2able of lmtng the purpose. t seeks to ftrent system of STblty of nuclear war PW York: Harper, 1!W,,lncjrr certan crcumstances, mght lmt devastaton n the event,, ~t does not, however, remove any one of the major short- 1,ll:-,.< of the balance-of-terror system. All the ways the system mght!,.~:,jl,,]~~~ctd are stll open. The lesser dangers of unauthorzed ac-.:,llc ncchancal accdent mght be somavhat reduced f a wde. f!ct, of ams control were effected, but the danger of mscalcula-,., (. cll]aton, or a technologcal breakthrough (dscussed below),.,. US at least as much as n an uncontrolled arms race. dt.monstrate ths pont, let us examne the dfference between an j.,,:\-co:ltrol system that strves to stablze only nuclear armaments,.. nprovng the balance) and one that attempts to control nuclear.,.! onvcntonal armaments. A nuclear arms-control system (whch,!,(. one most frequently dscussed) ntends to make the delberate....:.rtbn of nuclear war even less reasonable than t s under uncon-..,::..a arms race condtons, snce t would dmnsh whatever nu-...rrlcn] superorty one sde mght have. n the early 19Ws, the. :.,!,d States had at least four tmes as many long-range mssles as p.,r So\rt Unon, but ths rato was not consdered to be a sgnfcant... advantage. They were produced largely because the Unted \!.,tt*5 cxptcted the Russans to produce more, and when ths turned %:: not to be the case, resstance to unlateral arms cuts prevented - : curtnlment. Psychologcally, however, reducng advantages n..:ntk.r of arms-let us say, n the number of long-range mssles-has c:.tl)zng value: t makes the temptaton to try to get away wth a.qrsr attack less lkely. lut the gan s accompaned by a danger. The more the two sdes : w t ~ to recognze that they have stalemated each other s nuclear :-,,:t, the larger the premum on conventonal means of umfare. l(. more effectvely nuclear war s ruled out, the more feasble ccm-..t ::o:al wars mght seem. And, once ntated, there would be lttle.* the arms-control system to prevent strong pressures toward the c.,~.!:ton of such a war to theuse of tactcal, then strategc, nuclear 4:::~ Tnere s no assurance that after a major battle wth conven- * ~ ~ arms the losng sde would refran from resortng to some nut c ~ r wapons, whch would unleash, n all lkelhood, a response m a,:.(!. t s true that East-\Vest clashes have thus far stopped on the c!!:l\.c.ntonal level, n Korea and n Vetnam, and have not escalate+,. ldcar blows. But n each case the sdes have come close to esca- :*!S)< to the nuclear level. Ths does not mply that each drve to he Tllk ull tend to fall over the edge, but only tbat sooner or later one- *~~~< lt, and the brnk s 100 megatons hgh. By ts vey nature, ae (*T lrl derved from nuclear arms control mght well turn out to be. t -!....,. P s
b- lluso~ wthout conventonal anns control, just as llusory as the fab securt!. of auto seat belts to the drver speedng along narrow rmh.srms-co::rol systems that encompass both nuclear and convento,.,. arms (rcludn_r subconventonal armaments such as those used E guerrlla a d counterguerrlla warfare) are extremely dbcult to feet for techncal reasons that need not be dscussed here? But f such cor!tro!s uwe ever successfully ntroduced, the opposng ~6, \voud bnd :!lcmseves n mlta? stratjackets rcthout havng treatr: the drelogcal and poltcal sources of the conflct. For the West,: \oud mezn ha\ng to tolerate revolutons n a large numb,j countr;f-s. ewn f they are Communst-nspred, fnanced, and en& neered. as on3 as no outsde armed ntenyenton occurred. For &. munst countres. t \vould spell the end of armed support for what r least some stll consder just wars- n.ars of natonal lberaton. k hostlty s Dot reduced, both sdes would probably channel large par*, of ther mltan- budgets to secret research efforts, to try to achevel technologd brcakthrough or to fnd a weapon that would gve a strategc zd\.antage..among the weapons already under consden ton and tolvard n.hch the superpowers are nvestng heady are ant mssle xzssles; to halt a retalator). strke followng an attack (th;? breakng cut of the mutual deterrence system); a nerve gas to SJ. denly nczpctate mentally the other sde; and varous forms ofr ruses and Lactera to spread epdemcs n an enemy s country. Snce an encompassng arms-control system would not allow pea meal ad7:ances. only a \veapon that would provde a swft and allor. advantage lvould be useful. (Most experts doubt that a stratep advantage could be ganed n ths way, but both sdes are @% for one arj>7:ay.) Tyng the hands of the opposed sdes wthout fra! nf: the soarces of ther conflct, wthout prol3dng supenson t keep them from preparng a blo\v behnd each other s back, and ~t out Zsamng them, \vould put a premum on all-out war. n shw. most arms-control systems only skrt the problem of war and do Do &en attcnpt to come to grps wth t. Those that do confront the qm ton.- of preventon of Lvar do t n a way that, f successful, WOU: complctc-ly s:aemate the sdes wthout provdng an nternatob force tu sdt-guzrd freedom and justce, and f they fal-they m& p&uce the most devastatng war, an all-out strke. n short, control st-t.;ns hardly enough to mantan securty, whatever ts O& &ues may be. 28 Br rrrrd T. Fcld, nspecton Technques of h j Control, n Donald c Brerulan, ed., Ams Control, Dsarmament, and h atonal Securty (New Brau ller, 1961 ), pp. 317-32. A-TA1