Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto Asia Policy, Number 21, January 2016, pp. 21-28 (Article) Published by National Bureau of Asian Research DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2016.0008 For additional information about this article https://muse.jhu.edu/article/609171 Access provided by Kathmandu Model College (5 Feb 2018 15:11 GMT)
roundtable non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea Out of Its Comfort Zone: Indonesia and the South China Sea Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto During a visit to Tokyo in 2015, Indonesia s president Joko Widodo publicly rejected China s so-called nine-dash or U-shaped line claim in the South China Sea. Yet shortly thereafter in Beijing, he also agreed with Chinese president Xi Jinping that Indonesia s global maritime fulcrum (poros maritim dunia) concept is complementary to China s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. 1 Widodo s statements give the impression that Indonesia is conveying a conflicting message to China, expressing concern about the U-shaped line while simultaneously trying to cultivate a closer economic relationship through maritime cooperation. This approach appears to reflect a hedging strategy that Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations take in both accommodating and confronting China s rise at the same time. 2 In the long run, however, Indonesia could face a fork in the road where it will be unable to have closer cooperation with China while concurrently resisting intimidation and coercion whenever and wherever China attempts to impose the U-shaped line. This essay examines Indonesia s perspective as a non-claimant state on the South China Sea disputes. The first section discusses Indonesia s interests in the South China Sea. The essay then considers the relevance of Indonesia s status as a non-claimant state for its role in the disputes and assesses the implications of the South China Sea disputes for Indonesia s relationships with China and the United States. Finally, the conclusion discusses the future that Indonesia envisages for the South China Sea. ristian atriandi supriyanto is an Indonesian Presidential PhD Scholar with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He can be reached at <ristian.supriyanto@anu.edu.au>. 1 Kanupriya Kapoor and Linda Sieg, Indonesian President Says China s Main Claim in South China Sea Has No Legal Basis, Reuters, March 23, 2015 u http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesiachina-southchinasea-iduskbn0mj04320150323; and Joint Statement on Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the People s Republic of China and the Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People s Republic of China, March 26, 2015 u http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1249201.shtml. 2 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Malaysia s Balancing Act, New York Times, December 6, 2015 u http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/opinion/malaysias-balancing-act.html. [ 21 ]
asia policy What Is at Stake? The territorial disputes in the South China Sea place Indonesia s interests at stake, namely the security of the resource-rich Natuna Islands, the sanctity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the security of sea lines of communication, and nonalignment vis-à-vis the major powers. The security of the Natuna Islands is Indonesia s immediate concern in the South China Sea. China has never claimed the islands, yet neither has it clarified to Indonesian policymakers the meaning of the U-shaped line. Indonesia rejects the U-shaped line and claims to have neither territorial nor boundary disputes with China. 3 However, Indonesia is increasingly concerned with the potential spillover effects of conflict between China and other claimants as a result of Beijing s assertive enforcement of the U-shaped line. The Natuna Islands are scattered across over 100,000 square miles of ocean more than ten times the size of their total land area and only 27 out of the 154 islands are inhabited, with a total population of around 76,000 people. 4 Despite the lack of infrastructure, the Natuna Islands are one of Indonesia s richest regencies in offshore natural resources. Fisheries are estimated to yield a potential of 500,000 tons annually, but in reality the locals manage to haul in only a third of it through traditional methods. Chinese fishermen continually venture south into the fishing grounds around the islands, escorted by Chinese government fishery patrol vessels. A number of incidents have occurred between these vessels and Indonesian maritime authorities while the latter were trying to apprehend illegal Chinese fishermen, including one threatening encounter in which a Chinese government vessel trained its guns on an Indonesian patrol boat. 5 Beneath the seabed also lie vast energy resources. Located within the purported overlap of the U-shaped line, the East Natuna block (block D-Alpha) is estimated to contain one of the world s largest gas reserves at around 46 trillion cubic feet. Indonesia s oil and gas company, Pertamina, in partnerships with U.S.-based ExxonMobil, France s Total SA, 3 Randy Faby and Ben Blanchard, Indonesia Asks China to Clarify South China Sea Claims, Reuters, November 12, 2015 u http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-indonesia-iduskc N0T10KK20151112#FpxvFikQ4V2vr8eB.97. 4 Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, Indonesia s Natuna Islands: Next Flashpoint in the South China Sea? S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), RSIS Commentary, no. 033, February 16, 2015 u https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/co15033.pdf. 5 Scott Bentley, Shaping the Narrative: New Chinese Documentary Revisits Indonesia and the South China Sea, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategist, February 26, 2014 u http://www.aspistrategist. org.au/shaping-the-narrative-new-chinese-documentary-revisits-indonesia-and-the-south-china-sea. [ 22 ]
roundtable non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea and Thailand s PTT Public Company Limited, plans to begin production in 2024. 6 Additionally, Pertamina holds some shares in the offshore blocks near Vietnam in the Nam Con Son Basin with PetroVietnam and Petronas that might overlap with the U-shaped line. Chinese insistence on the U-shaped line also devalues Indonesia s belief in the sanctity of UNCLOS. Jakarta has been consistently advocating for the convention, which recognizes Indonesia as an archipelagic state, so that it may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost islands and dying reefs of the archipelago. 7 Indonesia s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary north of the Natuna Islands was drawn in this manner. After China published its U-shaped line map again in 2009, Indonesia responded that China s claim clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset[ting] the UNCLOS 1982. 8 This statement reflects the sentiments of Indonesian diplomats, who consider the U-shaped line only as an illustrative map and not a real map and as incomplete, inaccurate, inconsistent and legally problematic. 9 Apart from undermining UNCLOS, the South China Sea disputes could impede on the security of sea lines of communication. While merchant shipping navigation has not been violated, the growing risk of conflict could increase insurance rates and deter merchant ships from passing through the South China Sea. China might urge ships to provide notification through electronic or other means to its monitoring stations located in Chinesecontrolled artificial features in the area, thus providing indirect recognition of China s sovereignty over the U-shaped line. Moreover, China could insist that commercial flights in and from the region, including Indonesia, comply with an air defense identification zone (ADIZ). These outcomes, albeit unlikely, are not impossible. Indonesia has clearly stated that it would reject a Chinese ADIZ, 10 and it would likewise reject Chinese-imposed reporting for foreign ships passing through the U-shaped line. 6 Amahl Azwar, Govt Looks to Approve East Natuna Bid, Jakarta Post, August 14, 2013 u http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/14/govt-looks-approve-east-natuna-bid.html. 7 According to Article 7 of UNCLOS, straight baselines can be drawn only under exceptional circumstances. 8 United Nations, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia, no. 480/POL-703/VII/10, July 8, 2010 u http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/ idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf. The Indonesian version of this note uses stronger words against China s U-shaped line. 9 Arif Havas Oegroseno, Indonesia, South China Sea and the 11/10/9-dashed lines, Jakarta Post, April 9, 2014 u http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/04/09/indonesia-south-china-sea-and- 11109-dashed-lines.html. 10 Esther Teo, South China Sea Air Zone? Complicated, Says Beijing, Straits Times, February 20, 2014 u http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south-asia/south-china-sea-air-zone-complicated-says-beijing. [ 23 ]
asia policy Finally, as tensions in the South China Sea increase, Indonesia s nonalignment vis-à-vis the major powers could be compromised. Indonesia maintains an independent and active (bebas aktif) foreign policy that emphasizes nonalignment. Although this policy eschews formal military alliances with foreign countries, Indonesia cannot remain neutral when international law is violated, especially when the violation occurs right within its front yard. By the same token, while formal military alliances are out of the question, anything short of that is possible. Jakarta wishes to cultivate close ties with both Beijing and Washington, as well as with other major powers, but its order of preference ultimately depends on who is aligned more closely with Indonesia s national interests. Jakarta currently considers Beijing and Washington as both responsible for intensifying tensions in the South China Sea. However, Indonesia can also see that Beijing is a source of anxiety in the views of Southeast Asian claimants and thinks that Washington s policy is largely a reaction to Beijing s provocative behavior. Although it is not in Indonesia s interest to lean on one major power against another, if push comes to shove, external assistance would be necessary, including closer military cooperation with the United States. A Cautious Non-claimant In May 2010, through its UN representative in New York, Indonesia declared that it is not a claimant State to the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, and as such Indonesia has played an impartial yet active role in establishing confidence-building measures among the claimant States and creating an atmosphere of peace through a series of workshops on the South China Sea since 1990. 11 However, being a non-claimant state connotes a double meaning. On the one hand, Indonesia does not lay claim to the disputed features in the South China Sea (such as the Spratly Islands), nor does it take sides with any claimant states with regard to the territorial disputes therein. On the other hand, Indonesia can attempt to be an honest broker by facilitating confidence-building measures among claimant states to peacefully manage their disputes. Understood in this context, Indonesia s non-claimant status is not equivalent to that of a disinterested party. On the contrary, its non-claimant status creates a comfort zone where Indonesia can avoid being drawn into the fray alongside the claimant states, elevate its diplomatic prestige by offering to be an honest broker to the claimants, 11 United Nations, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia. [ 24 ]
roundtable non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea and reap prospective benefits of closer cooperation with China and the United States. 12 By consistently rejecting the U-shaped line, Indonesia can avoid creating the perception that it has become a claimant state. If it were to acknowledge that overlaps do exist between the U-shaped line and its EEZ, Indonesia would indirectly lend credence to Beijing s claim and undermine its credibility as a non-claimant state. This non-claimant status also allows Indonesia to elevate its diplomatic prestige by offering to facilitate dialogues through a multilateral, consensus-building approach. Indonesia did this in the 1990s by facilitating an informal workshop series to reduce tensions and build confidence among the claimants and other interested parties. More recently, Indonesia has tried to help preserve ASEAN s unity in the face of disagreements over the South China Sea disputes, such as following the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh. This preference for a multilateral, consensus-building approach is also reflected in Indonesia s continuing emphasis on the implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and attempts to formulate a code of conduct, rather than on the Philippines unilateral decision to seek international arbitration in The Hague, as the best way to manage the South China Sea disputes. Through such an approach, Indonesia can better showcase its role as an honest broker, while at the same time elevating its diplomatic prestige as ASEAN s primus inter pares now buttressed with President Widodo s maritime diplomacy agenda. In contrast, unilateral approaches, such as the Philippines arbitration decision, are seen as divisive and leave less maneuvering room for Indonesia to play a greater facilitating role. Relationships with China and the United States Indonesia s non-claimants status allows it to avoid the political baggage of territorial disputes when cultivating closer cooperation with China and the United States. Despite its repeated verbal backlash against the U-shaped line claim, Indonesia welcomes growing economic and security cooperation with China. As of September 2015, China is Indonesia s largest trading partner with a total value of around $27.2 billion. 13 Jakarta is interested in 12 Douglas Johnson, Drawn into the Fray: Indonesia s Natuna Islands Meet China s Long Gaze South, Asian Affairs 42, no. 3 (1997): 154. 13 World Trade Organization, Indonesia, September 2015 u http://stat.wto.org/countryprofile/ WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=S&Country=ID. [ 25 ]
asia policy Beijing s investment pledges, especially through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to finance large-scale infrastructure projects, such as seaports, that can help achieve President Widodo s maritime agenda. 14 The fanfare surrounding Sino-Indonesian maritime cooperation at times gives the impression that Indonesia is strategically tilting toward China. However, these closer economic ties with China are just another expression of Indonesia s pragmatic policy to finance its cash-strapped infrastructure development. 15 The government reports that in 2005 14 only 7% of Beijing s investments in Indonesia were actually implemented. 16 A similar trend is also found in bilateral security cooperation. Although both countries have announced joint military activities and projects, including special forces and naval exercises, missile development, and surveillance systems, these activities are mainly symbolic and add little substantial value to Indonesia s cooperation with its traditional Western partners, such as the United States and European Union. Instead, Sino-Indonesian security cooperation can be seen as a diplomatic way to showcase Jakarta s nonalignment policy, if not also as a diversionary maneuver to gain more military assistance from the West amid the intensifying Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition. On the other hand, Indonesia remains wary of closer alignment with the United States and other Western countries, lest it be accused of violating its independent and active foreign policy. The United States remains one of Indonesia s top trade and investment partners, and Jakarta has shown interest in joining the U.S.-led Trans Pacific Partnership. Indonesia is also trying to deepen the country s military partnership with the United States and its allies, including in the maritime domain. Growing concern over Chinese maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea has led Jakarta and Washington to conduct military surveillance flights over the Natuna Islands and the surrounding waters and to plan regular submarine engagements 14 Ben Otto, China-Led Bank to Focus on Big-Ticket Projects, Indonesia Says, Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2015 u http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-led-aiib-to-focus-on-big-ticket-projectsindonesia-says-1428647276. 15 Rizal Sukma, Insight: Is Indonesia Tilting toward China? Jakarta Post, December 11, 2015 u http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/12/11/insight-is-indonesia-tilting-toward-china.html. 16 BKPM Seeks to Boost Investment from China, Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board, March 23, 2015 u http://www7.bkpm.go.id/contents/news_detail/230101/bkpm+seeks+to+boost +Investment+from+China#.Vnj4UpN973A. [ 26 ]
roundtable non-claimant perspectives on the south china sea and operations. 17 In addition, Indonesia is a target recipient country of the U.S.-funded Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative that was announced in 2015. Such U.S. assistance could help Indonesia develop its nascent coast guard agency to better patrol the country s vast maritime swathes, including waters around the Natuna Islands. However, this development should not be interpreted as a sign of Indonesia s alignment with the United States. If all things stay the same, Indonesia still wishes to see all major powers, especially the United States and China, keep each other in check. Thus, its interests continue to lie in preserving ASEAN unity and centrality against the domination of a single major power. Conclusion: Future Instability Without doubt, the most interesting question is what happens if all things fail to stay the same. In other words, what if the claimant states and interested parties engage in behaviors that make the South China Sea less stable and more prone to conflict? From the moment China revealed its U-shaped line at an Indonesia-facilitated workshop in 1993 until 2010, Indonesia could simultaneously both cultivate closer cooperation with China and reject the U-shaped line. This is the status quo Indonesia wishes to uphold. The strategic ambiguity that China carefully and masterfully maintained in the last two decades helped sustain this status quo. By keeping the U-shaped line from claiming the insular features of the Natuna Islands, China removed the most sensitive of Indonesia s sovereignty concerns. It is becoming clearer, however, that China s ambiguity is more declaratory than actual. Despite this vague stance on the potential overlap between the U-shaped line and Indonesia s EEZ boundary, China s behavior suggests that the line can stretch as far south as Beijing wants. Even if China were to decide to compromise and adjust the southern extremity of the U-shaped line to align with Indonesia s EEZ boundary, Jakarta would still not accept such a move because of the intimidating and coercive nature via which Beijing enforces its claim vis-à-vis the ASEAN claimants, even apart from the illegality of the U-shaped line itself under UNCLOS. 17 Kanupriya Kapoor and Randy Fabi, Indonesia Eyes Regular Navy Exercises with U.S. in South China Sea, Reuters, April 13, 2015 u http://in.reuters.com/article/indonesia-ussouthchinasea-idinkbn0n40nt20150413; and Brian Reynolds, Submarine Group 7 Strengthens Ties with the Indonesian Submarine Force, Submarine Force Pacific, April 20, 2015 u http://www.csp.navy.mil/media/news-articles/display-news/article/633587/ submarine-group-7-strengthens-ties-with-the-indonesian-submarine-force. [ 27 ]
asia policy As China increasingly finds the status quo untenable, Indonesia grows more convinced that the South China Sea is becoming unstable. The former chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Moeldoko, felt dismayed with the U-shaped line and pledged that the Indonesian National Defence Forces would strengthen their presence in Natuna. 18 This would include a greater deployment of naval and air assets for combat and surveillance purposes. Indonesia s top security minister and former senior adviser to President Widodo, Luhut Pandjaitan, has even threatened to take China to an international court if it continues to assert its U-shaped line, which has the potential to affect the security of the Natuna Islands. 19 Unlike in the past, when it had to rely more on diplomatic overtures, China can now utilize its naval and law-enforcement capabilities to impose its territorial claims. The recent fortification and militarization of features claimed by China has created anxiety in Indonesia, not just because of their proximity to the Natuna Islands, but also because Chinese activities could destabilize the situation further and increase the risk of conflict, with real consequences for Indonesia s interests. It appears that the sooner Indonesia begins contemplating a life out of its comfort zone, the better it can brace for this future instability. 18 Moeldoko, China s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea, Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2014 u http://online.wsj.com/articles/sb10001424052702304279904579515692835172248. 19 Sara Schonhardt and Ben Otto, Indonesia Invokes International Tribunal in South China Sea Dispute, Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2015 u http://www.wsj.com/articles/ indonesia-invokes-international-tribunal-in-south-china-sea-dispute-1447260065. [ 28 ]