Remarks on the Political Economy of Inequality

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Transcription:

Remarks on the Political Economy of Inequality Bank of England Tim Besley LSE December 19th 2014 TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 1 / 35

Background Research in political economy by economists has become a huge mainstream topic in the past 20 years Nobody would any longer seriously debate policy reform without studying the institutional framework that is needed to support that reform "Well-executed policies that are 30 degrees off are much more effective than poorly-executed policies that are spot on. (Larry Summers (2004)) We need to study "closed behavioural systems" political and economic incentives studied side-by-side TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 2 / 35

Capital in the 21st Century Thomas Pikettty s book gives plenty of material to engage with for students of political economy There are two broad and inconsistent reactions to the book which I have heard TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 3 / 35

Capital in the 21st Century Thomas Pikettty s book gives plenty of material to engage with for students of political economy There are two broad and inconsistent reactions to the book which I have heard 1 There is no serious political economy in Capital in the 21st Century TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 3 / 35

Capital in the 21st Century Thomas Pikettty s book gives plenty of material to engage with for students of political economy There are two broad and inconsistent reactions to the book which I have heard 1 There is no serious political economy in Capital in the 21st Century 2 Capital in the 21st Century is essentially a work of political economy. TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 3 / 35

Capital in the 21st Century Thomas Pikettty s book gives plenty of material to engage with for students of political economy There are two broad and inconsistent reactions to the book which I have heard 1 There is no serious political economy in Capital in the 21st Century 2 Capital in the 21st Century is essentially a work of political economy. My remarks today will try to unpack this and to use the insights in the book to reflect on how the political economy literature has engaged with the study of inequality. TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 3 / 35

This Presentation Look at a wide range of issues relating to part IV (Regulating Capital in the 21st Century) 1 Background discussion TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 4 / 35

This Presentation Look at a wide range of issues relating to part IV (Regulating Capital in the 21st Century) 1 Background discussion 2 A standard approach TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 4 / 35

This Presentation Look at a wide range of issues relating to part IV (Regulating Capital in the 21st Century) 1 Background discussion 2 A standard approach 3 The evolution of state capacities TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 4 / 35

This Presentation Look at a wide range of issues relating to part IV (Regulating Capital in the 21st Century) 1 Background discussion 2 A standard approach 3 The evolution of state capacities 4 Forms of redistribution TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 4 / 35

This Presentation Look at a wide range of issues relating to part IV (Regulating Capital in the 21st Century) 1 Background discussion 2 A standard approach 3 The evolution of state capacities 4 Forms of redistribution 5 Well being and shifting values TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 4 / 35

This Presentation Look at a wide range of issues relating to part IV (Regulating Capital in the 21st Century) 1 Background discussion 2 A standard approach 3 The evolution of state capacities 4 Forms of redistribution 5 Well being and shifting values 6 Global action TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 4 / 35

This Presentation Look at a wide range of issues relating to part IV (Regulating Capital in the 21st Century) 1 Background discussion 2 A standard approach 3 The evolution of state capacities 4 Forms of redistribution 5 Well being and shifting values 6 Global action 7 The art of political economy TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 4 / 35

Background Issue Is effective governance undermined by inequality? Basic compact of liberal democracies? rich accept redistribution in exchange for security of property rights But depends on where inquality comes from and how economic and political power are used by those who have it. To understand this will require us to travel well beyond some of the concerns in the standard political economy approach. The UK has become increasingly dependent on income taxes levied on the rich: top 1%: 1980: 11%, 1990: 15%, 2000: 20%, 2010, 25% top 10%: 1980: 35%, 1990: 42%, 2000: 50%, 2010: 54% this is largely a reflection of rising inequality rather than increasing progressivity. What is the prognosis for taxing the rich? TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 5 / 35

The Recent Literature Heavy focus on understanding the consequences of political institutions for policy Inequality affects policy within an institutional setting e.g. redistribution by a median voter Inequality also shapes the set of institutions which emerge and what can be sustained e.g. institutional structures in high inequality polities such as the Gulf States Forces such as revolutions and coups shape the dynamics of institutional change. This has led to huge progress in our understanding. TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 6 / 35

Redistribution through an income tax with heterogeneous earning ability w 1,..., w N Variable labor supply: l i with quasi-linear preferences: z i ψ (l i ). Government budget constraint: ty = T where T is demogrant and Y = 1 N w i l i is mean aggregate labor earnings. Suppose that the median vote with wages w m is decisive, then the politically optimal income tax solves t = Y y m Y / t = mean median income extent to which taxes discourage income generation. So skewness in the earnings distribution and incentives need to be balanced. TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 7 / 35

The US over time (from Angus Deaton) TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 8 / 35

Is there a positive correlation between taxation and inequality? TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 9 / 35

Model Predicts that Incentives Matter Standard labor supply incentives small effects for prime earners but participation for some groups important BUT labor supply angle would tend to suggest that there is a lot more scope for raising revenue from the rich. Factors which affect avoidance and evasion total income elasticities bigger than justified by labor supply responses converting income across tax bases Greater international mobility within and between countries TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 10 / 35

Issues A good way into the discussion is to think about what is wrong with the above model. I will discuss the following issues: 1 Median voter is decisive TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 11 / 35

Issues A good way into the discussion is to think about what is wrong with the above model. I will discuss the following issues: 1 Median voter is decisive 2 State capacity is taken as given TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 11 / 35

Issues A good way into the discussion is to think about what is wrong with the above model. I will discuss the following issues: 1 Median voter is decisive 2 State capacity is taken as given 3 All inequality due to exogenously given earnings, i.e. no capital or other factors affecting income distribution TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 11 / 35

Issues A good way into the discussion is to think about what is wrong with the above model. I will discuss the following issues: 1 Median voter is decisive 2 State capacity is taken as given 3 All inequality due to exogenously given earnings, i.e. no capital or other factors affecting income distribution 4 Preferences/values/norms are given TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 11 / 35

Beyond the Median Voter Median voter predictions are not taken particularly seriously for a variety of reasons. traditionally thought of as an issue in non-democratic society How does economic power translate into political power in liberal democracies? Classic Marxist critique of democracy, cf Lenin in The State and Revolution: TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 12 / 35

Beyond the Median Voter Median voter predictions are not taken particularly seriously for a variety of reasons. traditionally thought of as an issue in non-democratic society How does economic power translate into political power in liberal democracies? Classic Marxist critique of democracy, cf Lenin in The State and Revolution: "Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich that is the democracy of capitalist society." TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 12 / 35

Beyond the Median Voter Median voter predictions are not taken particularly seriously for a variety of reasons. traditionally thought of as an issue in non-democratic society How does economic power translate into political power in liberal democracies? Classic Marxist critique of democracy, cf Lenin in The State and Revolution: "Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich that is the democracy of capitalist society." "The most important political fact about advanced capitalist societies...is the continued existence in them of private and ever more concentrated economic power. As a result of that power, the men owners and controllers in whose hands it lies enjoy a massive preponderance in society, in the political system, and in the determination of the state s policy and actions." Milliband TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 12 / 35

Beyond the Median Voter Median voter predictions are not taken particularly seriously for a variety of reasons. traditionally thought of as an issue in non-democratic society How does economic power translate into political power in liberal democracies? Classic Marxist critique of democracy, cf Lenin in The State and Revolution: "Democracy for an insignificant minority, democracy for the rich that is the democracy of capitalist society." "The most important political fact about advanced capitalist societies...is the continued existence in them of private and ever more concentrated economic power. As a result of that power, the men owners and controllers in whose hands it lies enjoy a massive preponderance in society, in the political system, and in the determination of the state s policy and actions." Milliband Ralph Milliband in The State in Capitalist Society (1973, page 237) TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 12 / 35

Key Issues How do de jure and de facto power structures interact? example of post-bellum south in the U.S. State capture can be modeled as a lobbying game policies are determined by those with deep pockets emasculates the electoral process Trivial summary: where y d > y m. control of the media and electoral campaigning t = Y y d Y / t TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 13 / 35

Endogenous State Capacity How does inequality affect operation of and development of institutions? Engerman and Sokoloff History of the state can be viewed through the growth of state capacities. Such capacities are a fundamental constraint on state action Built by conscious decisions monitoring and tax compliance redistributive programs (the social state) Incentives to create capacities depend on interests, power structures and institutions: Institutions for acquiring and exercising power Importance of cohesive institutions TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 14 / 35

Three dimensions of State Capacity Legal capacity contract enforcement (from Doing Business) Fiscal capacity income tax share in total taxes Collective capacity life expectancy and human capital TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 15 / 35

Complementaries and common determinants TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 16 / 35

Types of State Cohesive states defy the Marxist critique? Western European welfare capitalism Special interest states come in many flavors (Anna Karenina) Weak states China Russia Gulf states The norm in history But mainly in Africa today But also characterizes supra-national institutions TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 17 / 35

Exhibit I: State Capacity in LAC State Capacity and Income State Capacity 0.2.4.6.8 1 6 7 8 9 10 11 GDP per capita (2000) LAC Fitted values None LAC TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 18 / 35

Exhibit IIa: State Capacity and the Gini Coeffi cient Unconditional TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 19 / 35

Exhibit IIb: State Capacity and the Gini Coeffi cient Conditional on income and executive constraints TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 20 / 35

Why Does Inequality Matter? Affects the extent of common interests, making it harder to achieve common interests. interacts with institutions This can skew the priorities of the state: Rich want strong legal capacity (in some dimensions?) Weaker fiscal capacity Less obvious what elites want with regard to collective capacity do unversalistic norms emerge? TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 21 / 35

Political Economy Dynamics Can one-off interventions have long-lived effects? land redistribution in Taiwan and South Korea Thatcher/Reagan deregulations "General equilibrium" political economy effects are poorly understood. "Trojan horse" policies Knowledge of how to study the dynamics of institutions is also imperfect. TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 22 / 35

Forms of Redistribution Core framework is based on earnings inequality depends on distribution of human capital access to physical assets (land, structures and financial capital) competitiveness/flexibility of labour and product markets discrimination public sector employment policies What about policies which act directly on these? in standard framework, it is conceptually no different to tax-based redistribution TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 23 / 35

Political Economy of Wealth Taxation Even the Swedes abolished their wealth tax it was never more that 0.4% of GDP and 0.16% by the end (2006 was last year) a problem in fiscal capacity issues of monitoring and compliance Indirect forms of wealth taxation housing as in UK soft target with government-induced scarcity of housing inheritance riddled with exemptions Is limited wealth taxation a puzzle given skewness of the distribution of wealth? TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 24 / 35

Shifting values Not always part of what economists study But collective obligation and entitlement is central to endogenous common interests Historically war played a defining role TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 25 / 35

Shifting values and recognizing shared obligations Creating universalistic norms of citizenship How do the rich in society perceive their obligations to others? Participatory transfer programs with reciprocal obligations beyond "them and us" Key debate about funding social insurance also focus on lifetime consequences of redistribution Catalyst to cohesive institutions? TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 26 / 35

Does Well-Being Respond to Inequality? Key dimension in debates about how inequality drives public action. More generally, reactions to inequality are interesting to study How much do people actually care about inequality and what determines this? There is very little evidence And also debates about how to look at well-being ladder of life positive and negative affect (Kahneman) The following three Figures come from recent preliminary work by Angus Deaton they use cross state variation from the US TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 27 / 35

Ladder of Life and Inequality (U.S. States) TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 28 / 35

Positive Affect and Inequality (U.S. States) (average of smiling, enjoyment, and happiness each day) TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 29 / 35

Negative Affect and Inequality (U.S. States) (sadness and worry each day) TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 30 / 35

The Well-being and Inequality Agenda There is much to be done in understanding how inequality affects people s lives There is then a question of how this links to public action and changing values Economists tend to focus on the impact on material well-being But the political economy consequences depends on how it shifts attitudes and policy preferences TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 31 / 35

Global Issues Figure from Branko Milanavic (2012) TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 32 / 35

Global Issues Taxation above the nation state looks like a remote possibility EU has not even managed to enforce a common tax base let alone common tax policies But the EU lacks legitimate democratic institutions which would support common policies in many areas Questions around the sequencing of reforms to create supra-national fiscal capacity are interesting first step is to shift norms? Action beyond the EU seems even more remote Lacks both values the cosmopolitan citizenship agenda (Pogge) And lacks legitimacy for action without cooperation from nation states TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 33 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics What is TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics What is Normative economics TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics What is Normative economics What should be TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics What is Normative economics What should be The art of political economy TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics What is Normative economics What should be The art of political economy when we pass... to problems of taxation, or problems that concern the relations of the State with trade and industry, or to the general discussion of communistic and socialistic schemes it is far from being the case that economic considerations hold the field exclusively. Account must be taken of the ethical, social, and political considerations, that lie outside the sphere of political economy regarded as a science." (Keynes [1891, page 55]) TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics What is Normative economics What should be The art of political economy when we pass... to problems of taxation, or problems that concern the relations of the State with trade and industry, or to the general discussion of communistic and socialistic schemes it is far from being the case that economic considerations hold the field exclusively. Account must be taken of the ethical, social, and political considerations, that lie outside the sphere of political economy regarded as a science." (Keynes [1891, page 55]) John Neville Keynes The Scope and Method of Political Economy TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

What is political economy and why should we study it? Branches of economics: Positive economics What is Normative economics What should be The art of political economy when we pass... to problems of taxation, or problems that concern the relations of the State with trade and industry, or to the general discussion of communistic and socialistic schemes it is far from being the case that economic considerations hold the field exclusively. Account must be taken of the ethical, social, and political considerations, that lie outside the sphere of political economy regarded as a science." (Keynes [1891, page 55]) John Neville Keynes The Scope and Method of Political Economy I think that this is what Thomas is referring to when he mentions "a multi-polar political economy" in the preface of his book. TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 34 / 35

The Art of Political Economy Action to address growing inequality is more likely than not to come from the actions of nation states currently global structures are like a "weak state" Political economy needs to study Political incentives within an institutional setting How institutions change and evolve The interplay between norms/values/preferences and economics/politics Will require mixing insights from theory, data and history. Part IV of capital is the least developed and most speculative part of the book so plenty to be done to follow up on the issues discussed there. TB (LSE) Political Economy of Inequality December 19th 2014 35 / 35