enpres: Effective number of presidential candidates. Source: Golder (2005), variable enpres.

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Replication Data Codebook for Allen Hicken and Heather Stoll, 2008, Electoral Rules and the Size of the Prize: How Political Institutions Shape Presidential Party Systems, Journal of Politics 70 (4). NOTE: Missing data is coded NA throughout. country: Country. Cyprus combines the unified (post-independence) Cyprus with Greek Cyprus after the 1974 division of Cyprus into Turkish and Greek areas (note that Greek Cyprus does not enter Golder s 2005 data set until the 1985 election). Congo is the Republic of Congo or Congo-Brazzaville. year: Year of election. Source: Golder (2005). fused: Dummy variable coded 1 for country-elections held under a fused legislative and presidential electoral system and 0 otherwise. Source: Golder (2005), variable fusedvote. enpres: Effective number of presidential candidates. Source: Golder (2005), variable enpres. preselecsystemtype: Type of electoral system used in presidential elections: 1 for plurality; 2 for absolute majority; 3 for qualified majority; 4 for electoral college; and 5 for STV. Source: Golder (2005), variable preselecsystem_type. prescollege: Dummy variable coded 1 if the president is elected using an electoral college and 0 otherwise. Source: Golder (2005), variable pres_college. presmajority: Dummy variable coded 1 if the president is elected using an absolute majority runoff and 0 otherwise. Source: Golder (2005), variable pres_majority. presplurality: Dummy variable coded 1 if the president is elected using plurality rule and 0 otherwise. This variable codes all countries employing an electoral college such as the United States as not employing plurality rule (i.e., as employing a permissive electoral system). Source: Golder (2005), variable pres_plurality. prespluralityus: Variable presplurality with the United States additionally coded as employing a plurality rule electoral system. Source: modification of Golder (2005), variable pres_plurality. prespluralityusar: Variable presplurality with both Argentina (for the years when it employed an electoral college, given its provisions governing circumstances when an electoral college majority was not obtained) and the United States additionally coded as employing a plurality rule electoral system. Source: modification of Golder (2005), variable pres_plurality.

presqualmajority: Dummy variable coded 1 if the president is elected using a qualified majority requirement and 0 otherwise. Source: Golder (2005), variable pres_qualmajority. presrunoff: Dummy variable coded 1 if there is a presidential runoff and 0 otherwise. A presidential runoff requires a successful candidate to win an absolute or qualified majority of the vote. Regarding the former, if no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote in the first round, a runoff election is held between the top two candidates. Regarding the latter, systems vary in terms of the procedure that applies with a candidate does not cross the specific threshold employed in the first round; some hold a runoff between the top two candidates, while others use an electoral college or the legislature to elect the president. Source: Golder (2005), variable pres_runoff. presstv: Dummy variable coded 1 if the president is elected using the single transferable vote and 0 otherwise. Source: Golder (2005), variable pres_stv. prespowers: Index of presidential powers at the time of the country-election. Source as given in variable coding. coding: Source of presidential powers data of variable prespowers. 0 denotes extrapolation of existing coding by other scholars, in absence of our knowledge of any constitutional changes in that year; 1 denotes Shugart and Carey (1992); 2 denotes Frye, Hellman and Tucker (2000); and 3 denotes our own coding of the case where we were aware of recent (post-1992 in the case of Shugart and Carey and post-1995 in the case of Frye, Hellman and Tucker) constitutional changes, or when the case was not included in either of the original (Shugart and Carey or Frye, Hellman and Tucker) data sets. prespowers2: Index of presidential powers at the time of the country-election. Differs from variable prespowers in that all codings are our own unless flagged with a 1 by the variable coding2. For such cases, we were not able to obtain constitutions and code them. Instead, we used extant codings if the extant codings clearly were of the constitution applicable at the given election year; if there either were no extant codings or the extant codings were not clearly appropriate, we extrapolated our own earliest coding backwards in time. coding2: Dummy variable for not our own coding of presidential powers in variable prespowers2. 1 denotes either extrapolation of our coding or our use of extant codings and 0 denotes our own coding of the case. coding3: Dummy variable for an extrapolation of presidential powers in prespowers2. 1 denotes an extrapolation of either our own or an extant coding and 0 denotes either our own coding of the case or our use of a clearly appropriate extant coding. prespleg: Legislative presidential powers, which is added to prespnonleg to create the index of presidential powers, prespowers2. Source is as given in coding2 and coding3.

prespnonleg: Non-legislative presidential powers, which is added to prespleg to create the index of presidential powers, prespowers2. Source is as given in coding2 and coding3. regime1: Political regime, coded 3 for direct presidential; 2 for strong president elected by assembly; and 1 for parliamentary. Source: re-coding of Database of Political Institutions (2004), variable system, for consistency with variable regime2. regime2: Political regime, coded 3 for presidential; 2 for mixed (semi-presidential, presidentparliamentary, or premier-presidential); and 1 for parliamentary. Source: Golder (2005), variable institution, which is in turn based on ACLP (1999). govrev_gdp1: National government revenue as % GDP for the election year, expressed as a decimal, from Polity II. Missing data would have been imputed with data from year t-1 etc. if this data had been available (see govrev_gdp2 ), but it never was available. Source: calculated from Polity II (Gurr 1990) by dividing variable Government Revenues (NGREV, 8.3) by variable National Accounts (NACTS, 8.5). govrev_gdp2: National government revenue as % GDP for the election year, expressed as a decimal, from the World Bank Development Indicators (2002). Includes data from year t-1, t-2, t+1, or t+2 (in that order) if available if the election year data is missing. Year of nonelection year data is as noted in comment. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2002), series GB.RVC.TOTL.GD.ZS; effectively identical data obtained from 2004 edition of series. govrev_gdp3: National government revenue as % GDP for the election year, expressed as a decimal, from the World Bank Development Indicators (2007). Data only available for elections from 1990 onwards. Includes data from year t-1, t-2, t+1, or t+2 (in that order) if available if the election year data is missing. Year of non-election year data is as noted in comment. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2007), series GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS, which uses new methodology as opposed to the 2002 and 2004 series. govrev_gdp4: Combines govrev_gdp1, govrev_gdp2, and govrev_gdp3, using govrev_gdp2 (i.e., World Bank 2002/2004 data) when either of the others is available, unless govrev_gdp2 is an extrapolation and one of the others is not. govrev_gdp5: Combines govrev_gdp2 and govrev_gdp3, using govrev_gdp2 (i.e., World Bank 2002/2004 data) where the other is available, unless govrev_gdp2 is an extrapolation and the other is not. govrev_gdp6: Election year only version of govrev_gdp2.

govexp_gdp1: National government expenditures as % GDP for the election year, expressed as a decimal. Missing data would have been imputed with data from year t-1 etc. if this data had been available (see govrev_gdp2 ), but it was never available. Source: calculated from Polity II (Gurr 1990) by dividing variable Government Expenditures (NGEX, 8.1) by variable National Accounts (NACTS, 8.5). govexp_gdp2: National government expenditures as % GDP for the election year, expressed as a decimal. Includes data from year t-1, t-2, t+1, or t+2 (in that order) if available if the election year data is missing. Year of non-election year data is as noted in comment. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2002), series GB.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS; effectively identical results obtained from 2004 edition of series. govexp_gdp3: National government revenue as % GDP for the election year, expressed as a decimal. Data only available for elections from 1990 onwards. Includes data from year t-1, t-2, t+1, or t+2 (in that order) if available if the election year data is missing. Year of nonelection year data is as noted in comment. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2007), series GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS, which uses new methodology as opposed to 2002 and 2004 series. govexp_gdp4: Combines govexp_gdp1, govexp_gdp2, and govexp_gdp3, using govexp_gdp2 (i.e., World Bank 2002/2004 data) when either of the others is available, unless govrev_gdp2 is an extrapolation and one of the others is not. govrev_tot1: National government revenue as percent of total revenue, expressed as a percentage. Source: calculated from World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, Subnational revenues (% total revenues) ; this variable subtracted from 100. govrev_tot2: Same as previous variable, but includes data from year t-1, t-2, t+1, or t+2 (in that order) if available if the election year data is missing. Year of non-election year data is as noted in comment. govext_tot1: National government expenditures as percent of total expenditures, expressed as a percentage. Source: calculated from World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, Subnational expenditures (% total expenditures) ; this variable subtracted from 100. govexp_tot2: Same as previous variable, but includes data from year t-1, t-2, t+1, or t+2 (in that order) if available if the election year data is missing. Year of non-election year data is as noted in comment. elf: The classic ethno-linguistic fractionalization index ranging from 0 (minimal fractionalization) to 1 (maximal fractionalization) based on data compiled by Soviet geographers. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003). fearon: Ethnic fractionalization index based on Fearon s (2003) data. Source: Fearon (2003). region: Region of the world as found in the ACLP dataset: 1, Sub-Saharan Africa; 2, S. Asia; 3, E. Asia; 4, South East Asia; 5, Pacific Islands/Oceania; 6, Latin America; 7, Caribbean and

non-iberic America; 8, Eastern Europe/Soviet Union; 9, Industrial countries. Source: Golder (2005), variable region. region1: Same as previous variable, but collapses the three Asian categories into one Asia category and the two Pacific Islands and Caribbean categories into one other category: 1, Sub-Saharan Africa; 2, Asia; 3, Latin America; 4, Eastern Europe/Soviet Union; 5, Industrial countries; 6, Other. oecd: Dummy variable coded 1 for pre-1990 OECD member countries and 0 otherwise, with two exceptions: Israel is coded 1, and Turkey is coded 0. Source: OECD website, www.oecd.org. newdem: Dummy variable coded 1 for presidential elections that are the first since either independence or a transition to democracy, 0 otherwise. Source: based on Golder (2005), variable newdem, and ACLP (1999), variable reg. oneelect: Dummy variable coded 1 for countries with only one election in the pre-list-wise deleted (LWD) data set. oneelectlwd: Dummy variable coded 1 for countries with only one election in the post-listwise deleted (LWD) data set for Models 1 and 2. population: Population of country in July 2007. Source: CIA World Factbook.